The Guide for the Perplexed（迷途指津）
THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
BY
MOSES MAIMONIDES
TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL ARABIC TEXT
BY
M. FRIEDLÄNDER, Ph.D
SECOND EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT
LONDON
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LTD
New York: E. P. DUTTON & CO
1910
PREFACE
The first Edition of the English Translation of Maimonides’ Dalalāt
al-Hairin being exhausted without having fully supplied the demand, I
prepared a second, revised edition of the Translation. In the new
edition the three volumes of the first edition have been reduced to one
volume by the elimination of the notes; besides Hebrew words and
phrases have been eliminated or transliterated. By these changes the
translator sought to produce a cheap edition in order to bring the work
of Maimonides within the reach of all students of Theology and Jewish
Literature.
M. FRIEDLÄNDER.
Jews’ College, July 1904.
PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE OF THE FIRST EDITION
In compliance with a desire repeatedly expressed by the Committee of
the Hebrew Literature Society, I have undertaken to translate
Maimonides’ Dalalāt al-Ḥairin, better known by the Hebrew title Moreh
Nebuchim, and I offer the first instalment of my labours in the present
volume. This contains—(1) A short Life of Maimonides, in which special
attention is given to his alleged apostasy. (2) An analysis of the
whole of the Moreh Nebuchim. (3) A translation of the First Part of
this work from the Arabic, with explanatory and critical notes.
Parts of the Translation have been contributed by Mr. Joseph Abrahams,
B.A., Ph.D., and Rev. H. Gollancz—the Introduction by the former, and
the first twenty-five chapters by the latter.
In conclusion I beg to tender my thanks to Rev. A. Loewy, Editor of the
Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, for his careful revision
of my manuscript and proofs, and to Mr. A. Neubauer, M.A., for his
kindness in supplying me with such information as I required.
M. FRIEDLÄNDER.
Jews’ College, June 1881.
CONTENTS
PAGE
Life of Maimonides xv
Moreh Nebuchim Literature. Analysis of the Guide for the
Perplexed xxvii
Part I.
Introduction—
Dedicatory Letter 1
The Object of the Guide 2
On Similes 4
Directions for the Study of this Work 8
Introductory Remarks 9
CHAPTER.
I The homonymity of Ẓelem 13
II On Genesis iii. 5 14
III On tabnit and temunah 16
IV On raah, hibbit and ḥazah 17
V On Exod. xxiv. 10 18
VI On ish and ishshah, aḥ and aḥot 19
VII On yalad 19
VIII On maḳom 20
IX On kisse 21
X On ʻalah, yarad 22
XI On yashab 23
XII On kam 24
XIII On ʻamad 25
XIV On adam 25
XV On naẓab, yaẓab 25
XVI On Ẓur 26
XVII On Mishnah Ḥagigah ii. 1 27
XVIII On ḳarab, nagaʻ, niggash 27
XIX On male 28
XX On ram, nissa 29
XXI On ʻabar 30
XXII On ba 32
XXIII On Yaẓa, shub 32
XXIV On halak 33
XXV On shaken 34
XXVI On “The Torah speaketh the language of man” 34
XXVII On Targum of Gen. xlvi. 4 35
XXVIII On regel 37
XXIX On ʻaẓeb 39
XXX On akal 39
XXXI, XXXII On the Limit of Man’s Intellect 40, 42
XXXIII to XXXVI On the Study and the Teaching of
Metaphysics 43–52
XXXVII On panim 52
XXXVIII On aḥor 53
XXXIX On leb 54
XL On ruaḥ 55
XLI On nefesh 56
XLII On ḥayyim-mavet 56
XLIII On kanaf 57
XLIV On ʻayin 58
XLV On shamaʻ 58
XLVI, XLVII On the Attribution of Senses and Sensations
to God 59, 63
XLVIII The Targum of shamaʻ and raah 64
XLIX Figurative Expressions applied to Angels 65
L On Faith 67
LI–LX On Attributes 68–89
LI On the Necessity of Proving the Inadmissibility of
Attributes in reference to God 68
LII Classification of Attributes 69
LIII The Arguments of the Attributists 72
LIV On Exod. xxxiii. 13; xxxiv. 7 75
LV On Attributes implying Corporeality, Emotion,
Non-existence and Comparison 78
LVI On Attributes denoting Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom
and Will 79
LVII On the Identity of the Essence of God and His
Attributes 80
LVIII On the Negative Sense of the True Attributes of God 81
LIX On the Character of the Knowledge of God Consisting
of Negations 83
LX On the Difference between Positive and Negative
Attributes 87
LXI On the Names of God 89
LXII On the Divine Names composed of Four, Twelve and
Forty-two Letters 91
LXIII On Ehyeh, Yah and Shaddai 93
LXIV On “The Name of the Lord,” and “The Glory of God” 95
LXV On the phrase “God spake” 96
LXVI On Exod. xxxii. 16 98
LXVII On shabat and naḥ 99
LXVIII On the Terms: The Intellectus, the Intelligens and
the Intelligibile 100
LXIX On the Primal Cause 102
LXX On the attribute rokeb baʻarabot 105
LXXI The Origin of the Kalām 107
LXXII A Parallel between the Universe and Man 113
LXXIII Twelve Propositions of the Kalām 120
LXXIV Proofs of the Kalām for the creatio ex nihilo 133
LXXV Proofs of the Kalām for the Unity of God 138
LXXVI Proofs of the Kalām for the Incorporeality of God 141
Part II.
The Author’s Introduction. The Twenty-Six Propositions
employed by the Philosophers to prove the Existence of God 145
CHAPTER.
I Philosophical proofs for the Existence, Incorporeality,
and Unity of the First Cause 149
II On the Existence of Intelligences or purely Spiritual
Beings 154
III The Author adopts the Theory of Aristotle as least
open to Objections 156
IV The Spheres and the Causes of their Motion 156
V Agreement of the Aristotelian Theory with the Teaching
of Scripture 159
VI What is meant by the Scriptural Term “Angels” 160
VII The Homonymity of the term “Angel” 162
VIII On the Music of the Spheres 163
IX On the Number of the Heavenly Spheres 163
X The Influence of the Spheres upon the Earth manifests
itself in four different ways 164
XI The Theory of Eccentricity Preferable to that of
Epicycles 166
XII On the Nature of the Divine Influence and that of
the Spheres 168
XIII Three Different Theories about the Beginning of the
Universe 171
XIV Seven Methods by which the Philosophers sought to
prove the Eternity of the Universe 174
XV Aristotle does not scientifically demonstrate his
Theory 176
XVI The Author refutes all Objections to Creatio ex
nihilo 178
XVII The Laws of Nature apply to Things Created, but do
not regulate the Creative Act which produces them 178
XVIII Examinations of the Proofs of Philosophers for the
Eternity of the Universe 181
XIX Design in Nature 184
XX The Opinion of Aristotle as regards Design in Nature 189
XXI Explanation of the Aristotelian Theory that the
Universe is the necessary Result of the First Cause 190
XXII Objections to the Theory of the Eternity of the
Universe 192
XXIII The Theory of Creatio ex nihilo is preferable to
that of the Eternity of the Universe 195
XXIV Difficulty of Comprehending the Nature and the Motion
of the Spheres according to the Theory of Aristotle 196
XXV The Theory of Creation is adopted because of its own
Superiority, the Proofs based on Scripture being
Inconclusive 199
XXVI Examination of a passage from Pirḳe di-Rabbi Eliezer
in reference to Creation 200
XXVII The Theory of a Future Destruction of the Universe is
not part of the Religious Belief taught in the Bible 201
XXVIII Scriptural Teaching is in favour of the
Indestructibility of the Universe 202
XXIX Explanation of Scriptural Phrases implying the
Destruction of Heaven and Earth 204
XXX Philosophical Interpretation of Genesis i.-iv. 212
XXXI The Institution of the Sabbath serves (1) to Teach
the Theory of Creation, and (2) to promote Man’s
Welfare 218
XXXII Three Theories concerning Prophecy 219
XXXIII The Difference between Moses and the other Israelites
as regards the Revelation on Mount Sinai 221
XXXIV Explanation of Exodus xxiii. 20 223
XXXV The Difference between Moses and the other Prophets
as regards the Miracles wrought by them 223
XXXVI On the Mental, Physical and Moral Faculties of the
Prophets 225
XXXVII On the Divine Influence upon Man’s Imaginative and
Mental Faculties through the Active Intellect 227
XXXVIII Courage and Intuition reach the highest degree of
Perfection in Prophets 229
XXXIX Moses was the fittest Prophet to Receive and
Promulgate the Immutable Law, which succeeding
Prophets merely Taught and Expounded 231
XL The Test of True Prophecy 232
XLI What is Meant by “Vision” 234
XLII Prophets Received Direct Communication only in Dreams
or Visions 236
XLIII On the Allegories of the Prophets 238
XLIV On the Different Modes in which Prophets Receive
Divine Messages 240
XLV The Various Classes of Prophets 241
XLVI The Allegorical Acts of Prophets formed Parts of
Prophetic Visions 245
XLVII On the Figurative Style of the Prophetic Writings 247
XLVIII Scripture ascribes Phenomena directly produced by
Natural Causes to God as the First Cause of all
things 249
Part III.
The Author’s Introduction and Apology for Publishing, contrary
to the Teaching of the Mishnah, an Interpretation of Ezek. i. 251
CHAPTER.
I The “Four Faces” are Human Faces with four different
peculiarities 252
II The Ḥayyot and the Ofannim 252
III Further Explanation of the Ḥayyot and the Ofannim
derived from Ezek. x. 255
IV The rendering of Ofan by Gilgal in the Targum of
Jonathan 256
V The Vision of Ezekiel is divided into three stages:
(1) Ḥayyot (=the Spheres); (2) Ofannim (=Earthly
elements); and (3) the man above the Ḥayyot
(=Intelligences) 257
VI On the Difference between the Vision of Ezekiel and
that of Isaiah (vi.) 258
VII The Different Ways in which the Prophet perceived the
Three Parts of the Mercabah (Chariot) 259
VIII Man has the Power to Control his Bodily Wants and
Earthly Desires 261
IX The Material Element in Man Prevents him from
Attaining Perfection 264
X God is not the Creator of Evil 265
XI Man is the Cause of his own Misfortunes 267
XII Three Kinds of Evil: (1) That caused by the Nature
of Man; (2) Caused by Man to Man; (3) Caused by
Man to himself 267
XIII The Universe has No other Purpose than its own
Existence 272
XIV It is the Will of the Creator that the Spheres
regulate the Affairs of Mankind 277
XV Impossible Things are not ascribed to the Creator,
but it is difficult to Prove the Impossibility in
each Individual Case 279
XVI On God’s Omniscience 280
XVII Five Theories concerning Providence 282
XVIII Every Individual Member of Mankind enjoys the
Influence of Divine Providence in proportion to
his Intellectual Perfection 289
XIX It is an ancient Error to Assume that God takes no
Notice of Man 290
XX God’s Knowledge is Different from Man’s Knowledge 292
XXI The Creator’s knowledge of His Production is Perfect 295
XXII Object of the Book of Job, and Explanation of the
First Two Chapters 296
XXIII Job and his Friends Discuss the various Theories
concerning Providence 299
XXIV On Trials and Temptation 304
XXV The Actions of God are Not Purposeless 307
XXVI The Divine Precepts Serve a certain Purpose 310
XXVII The Object of the Divine Precepts is to Secure the
Well-being of Man’s Soul and Body 312
XXVIII This Object is easily seen in some Precepts, whilst
in others it is only known after due Reflection 313
XXIX On the Sabeans or Star-worshippers 315
XXX It is one of the Objects of the Law of Moses to
Oppose Idolatry 320
XXXI The Law Promotes the Well-being of Man by teaching
Truth, Morality and Social Conduct 321
XXXII Why did God give Laws to Oppose Idolatry instead of
Uprooting it directly? 322
XXXIII Another chief Object of the Law is to Train Man in
Mastering his Appetites and Desires 327
XXXIV The Law is based on the ordinary condition of man 328
XXXV Division of the Precepts into Fourteen Classes 329
XXXVI First Class of Precepts, to Know, Love and Fear God 331
XXXVII Second Class, Laws concerning Idolatry 332
XXXVIII Third Class, Moral Precepts 338
XXXIX Fourth Class, Laws relating to Charity 339
XL Fifth Class, Compensation for Injury and the Duty of
Preventing Sin 342
XLI Sixth Class, Punishment of the Sinner 344
XLII Seventh Class, Equity and Honesty 350
XLIII Eighth Class, Sabbath and Festival 352
XLIV Ninth Class, Prayer, Tefillin, Ẓiẓit and Mezuzah 354
XLV Tenth Class, The Temple, its Vessels and its Ministers 355
XLVI Eleventh Class, Sacrifices 359
XLVII Twelfth Class, Distinction between Clean and Unclean;
and on Purification 366
XLVIII Thirteenth Class, Dietary Laws 370
XLIX Fourteenth Class, Marriage Laws 372
L On Scriptural Passages with seemingly Purposeless
Contents 380
LI How God is worshipped by a Perfect Man 384
LII On the Fear of God 391
LIII Explanation of Ḥesed (Love), Mishpat (Judgment), and
Ẓedaḳah (Righteousness) 392
LIV On True Wisdom 393
Index of Scriptural Passages 399
Index of Quotations from the Targumim 409
Index of Quotations from the Midrashim 409
Index of Quotations from the Talmud 410
Index of References to Other Works of Maimonides 411
Index of References to Works of Science and Philosophy 412
Alphabetical Index 412
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES
“Before the sun of Eli had set the sun of Samuel had risen.” Before the
voice of the prophets had ceased to guide the people, the Interpreters
of the Law, the Doctors of the Talmud, had commenced their labours, and
before the Academies of Sura and of Pumbadita were closed, centres of
Jewish thought and learning were already flourishing in the far West.
The circumstances which led to the transference of the head-quarters of
Jewish learning from the East to the West in the tenth century are thus
narrated in the Sefer ha-kabbalah of Rabbi Abraham ben David:
“After the death of Hezekiah, the head of the Academy and Prince of the
Exile, the academies were closed and no new Geonim were appointed. But
long before that time Heaven had willed that there should be a
discontinuance of the pecuniary gifts which used to be sent from
Palestine, North Africa and Europe. Heaven had also decreed that a ship
sailing from Bari should be captured by Ibn Romahis, commander of the
naval forces of Abd-er-rahman al-nasr. Four distinguished Rabbis were
thus made prisoners—Rabbi Ḥushiel, father of Rabbi Ḥananel, Rabbi
Moses, father of Rabbi Ḥanok, Rabbi Shemarjahu, son of Rabbi Elḥanan,
and a fourth whose name has not been recorded. They were engaged in a
mission to collect subsidies in aid of the Academy in Sura. The captor
sold them as slaves; Rabbi Ḥushiel was carried to Kairuan, R.
Shemarjahu was left in Alexandria, and R. Moses was brought to Cordova.
These slaves were ransomed by their brethren and were soon placed in
important positions. When Rabbi Moses was brought to Cordova, it was
supposed that he was uneducated. In that city there was a synagogue
known at that time by the name of Keneset ha-midrash, and Rabbi Nathan,
renowned for his great piety, was the head of the congregation. The
members of the community used to hold meetings at which the Talmud was
read and discussed. One day when Rabbi Nathan was expounding the Talmud
and was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the passage under
discussion, Rabbi Moses promptly removed the difficulty and at the same
time answered several questions which were submitted to him. Thereupon
R. Nathan thus addressed the assembly:—‘I am no longer your leader;
that stranger in sackcloth shall henceforth be my teacher, and you
shall appoint him to be your chief.’ The admiral, on hearing of the
high attainments of his prisoner, desired to revoke the sale, but the
king would not permit this retraction, being pleased to learn that his
Jewish subjects were no longer dependent for their religious
instruction on the schools in the East.”
Henceforth the schools in the West asserted their independence, and
even surpassed the parent institutions. The Caliphs, mostly opulent,
gave every encouragement to philosophy and poetry; and, being generally
liberal in sentiment, they entertained kindly feelings towards their
Jewish subjects. These were allowed to compete for the acquisition of
wealth and honour on equal terms with their Mohammedan fellow-citizens.
Philosophy and poetry were consequently cultivated by the Jews with the
same zest as by the Arabs. Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Ḥasdai, Judah ha-levi,
Ḥananel, Alfasi, the Ibn Ezras, and others who flourished in that
period were the ornament of their age, and the pride of the Jews at all
times. The same favourable condition was maintained during the reign of
the Omeyades; but when the Moravides and the Almohades came into power,
the horizon darkened once more, and misfortunes threatened to destroy
the fruit of several centuries. Amidst this gloom there appeared a
brilliant luminary which sent forth rays of light and comfort: this was
Moses Maimonides.
Moses, the son of Maimon, was born at Cordova, on the 14th of Nisan,
4895 (March 30, 1135). Although the date of his birth has been recorded
with the utmost accuracy, no trustworthy notice has been preserved
concerning the early period of his life. But his entire career is a
proof that he did not pass his youth in idleness; his education must
have been in harmony with the hope of his parents, that one day he
would, like his father and forefathers, hold the honourable office of
Dayyan or Rabbi, and distinguish himself in theological learning. It is
probable that the Bible and the Talmud formed the chief subjects of his
study; but he unquestionably made the best use of the opportunities
which Mohammedan Spain, and especially Cordova, afforded him for the
acquisition of general knowledge. It is not mentioned in any of his
writings who were his teachers; his father, as it seems, was his
principal guide and instructor in many branches of knowledge. David
Conforte, in his historical work, Ḳore ha-dorot, states that Maimonides
was the pupil of two eminent men, namely, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Migash and
Ibn Roshd (Averroes); that by the former he was instructed in the
Talmud, and by the latter in philosophy. This statement seems to be
erroneous, as Maimonides was only a child at the time when Rabbi Joseph
died, and already far advanced in years when he became acquainted with
the writings of Ibn Roshd. The origin of this mistake, as regards Rabbi
Joseph, can easily be traced. Maimonides in his Mishneh Tora, employs,
in reference to R. Isaac Alfasi and R. Joseph, the expression “my
teachers” (rabbotai), and this expression, by which he merely describes
his indebtedness to their writings, has been taken in its literal
meaning.
Whoever his teachers may have been, it is evident that he was well
prepared by them for his future mission. At the age of twenty-three he
entered upon his literary career with a treatise on the Jewish
Calendar. It is unknown where this work was composed, whether in Spain
or in Africa. The author merely states that he wrote it at the request
of a friend, whom he, however, leaves unnamed. The subject was
generally considered to be very abstruse, and to involve a thorough
knowledge of mathematics. Maimonides must, therefore, even at this
early period, have been regarded as a profound scholar by those who
knew him. The treatise is of an elementary character.—It was probably
about the same time that he wrote, in Arabic, an explanation of Logical
terms, Millot higgayon, which Moses Ibn Tibbon translated into Hebrew.
The earlier period of his life does not seem to have been marked by any
incident worth noticing. It may, however, be easily conceived that the
later period of his life, which was replete with interesting incidents,
engaged the exclusive attention of his biographers. So much is certain,
that his youth was beset with trouble and anxiety; the peaceful
development of science and philosophy was disturbed by wars raging
between Mohammedans and Christians, and also between the several
Mohammedan sects. The Moravides, who had succeeded the Omeyades, were
opposed to liberality and toleration; but they were surpassed in
cruelty and fanaticism by their successors. Cordova was taken by the
Almohades in the year 1148, when Maimonides was about thirteen years
old. The victories of the Almohades, first under the leadership of the
Mahadi Ibn Tamurt, and then under Abd-al-mumen, were, according to all
testimonies, attended by acts of excessive intolerance. Abd-al-mumen
would not suffer in his dominions any other faith but the one which he
himself confessed. Jews and Christians had the choice between Islam and
emigration or a martyr’s death. The Sefer ha-ḳabbalah contains the
following description of one of the persecutions which then occurred:
“After the death of R. Joseph ha-levi the study of the Torah was
interrupted, although he left a son and a nephew, both of whom had
under his tuition become profound scholars. ‘The righteous man (R.
Joseph) was taken away on account of the approaching evils.’ After the
death of R. Joseph there came for the Jews a time of oppression and
distress. They quitted their homes, ‘Such as were for death, to death,
and such as were for the sword, to the sword; and such as were for the
famine, to the famine, and such as were for the captivity, to the
captivity’; and—it might be added to the words of Jeremiah (xv.
2)—‘such as were for apostasy, to apostasy.’ All this happened through
the sword of Ibn Tamurt, who, in 4902 (1142), determined to blot out
the name of Israel, and actually left no trace of the Jews in any part
of his empire.”
Ibn Verga in his work on Jewish martyrdom, in Shebeṭ Jehudah, gives the
following account of events then happening:—“In the year 4902 the
armies of Ibn Tamurt made their appearance. A proclamation was issued
that any one who refused to adopt Islam would be put to death, and his
property would be confiscated. Thereupon the Jews assembled at the gate
of the royal palace and implored the king for mercy. He answered—‘It is
because I have compassion on you, that I command you to become
Muslemim; for I desire to save you from eternal punishment.’ The Jews
replied—‘Our salvation depends on our observance of the Divine Law; you
are the master of our bodies and of our property, but our souls will be
judged by the King who gave them to us, and to whom they will return;
whatever be our future fate, you, O king, will not be held responsible
for it.’ ‘I do not desire to argue with you,’ said the king; ‘for I
know you will argue according to your own religion. It is my absolute
will that you either adopt my religion or be put to death.’ The Jews
then proposed to emigrate, but the king would not allow his subjects to
serve another king. In vain did the Jews implore the nobles to
intercede in their behalf; the king remained inexorable. Thus many
congregations forsook their religion; but within a month the king came
to a sudden death; the son, believing that his father had met with an
untimely end as a punishment for his cruelty to the Jews, assured the
involuntary converts that it would be indifferent to him what religion
they professed. Hence many Jews returned at once to the religion of
their fathers, while others hesitated for some time, from fear that the
king meant to entrap the apparent converts.”
From such records it appears that during these calamities some of the
Jews fled to foreign countries, some died as martyrs, and many others
submitted for a time to outward conversion. Which course was followed
by the family of Maimon? Did they sacrifice personal comfort and safety
to their religious conviction, or did they, on the contrary, for the
sake of mere worldly considerations dissemble their faith and pretend
that they completely submitted to the dictates of the tyrant? An answer
to this question presents itself in the following note which Maimonides
has appended to his commentary on the Mishnah: “I have now finished
this work in accordance with my promise, and I fervently beseech the
Almighty to save us from error. If there be one who shall discover an
inaccuracy in this Commentary or shall have a better explanation to
offer, let my attention be directed unto it; and let me be exonerated
by the fact that I have worked with far greater application than any
one who writes for the sake of pay and profit, and that I have worked
under the most trying circumstances. For Heaven had ordained that we be
exiled, and we were therefore driven about from place to place; I was
thus compelled to work at the Commentary while travelling by land, or
crossing the sea. It might have sufficed to mention that during that
time I, in addition, was engaged in other studies, but I preferred to
give the above explanation in order to encourage those who wish to
criticise or annotate the Commentary, and at the same time to account
for the slow progress of this work. I, Moses, the son of Maimon,
commenced it when I was twenty-three years old, and finished it in
Egypt, at the age of thirty[-three] years, in the year 1479 Sel.
(1168).”
The Sefer Ḥaredim of R. Eleazar Askari of Safed contains the following
statement of Maimonides:—“On Sabbath evening, the 4th of Iyyar, 4925
(1165), I went on board; on the following Sabbath the waves threatened
to destroy our lives.... On the 3rd of Sivan, I arrived safely at Acco,
and was thus rescued from apostasy.... On Tuesday, the 4th of
Marḥeshvan, 4926, I left Acco, arrived at Jerusalem after a journey
beset with difficulties and with dangers, and prayed on the spot of the
great and holy house on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of Marḥeshvan. On Sunday,
the 9th of that month, I left Jerusalem and visited the cave of
Machpelah, in Hebron.”
From these two statements it may be inferred that in times of
persecution Maimonides and his family did not seek to protect their
lives and property by dissimulation. They submitted to the troubles of
exile in order that they might remain faithful to their religion.
Carmoly, Geiger, Munk, and others are of opinion that the treatise of
Maimonides on involuntary apostasy, as well as the accounts of some
Mohammedan authors, contain strong evidence to show that there was a
time when the family of Maimon publicly professed their belief in
Mohammed. A critical examination of these documents compels us to
reject their evidence as inadmissible.—After a long period of trouble
and anxiety, the family of Maimon arrived at Fostat, in Egypt, and
settled there. David, the brother of Moses Maimonides, carried on a
trade in precious stones, while Moses occupied himself with his studies
and interested himself in the communal affairs of the Jews.
It appears that for some time Moses was supported by his brother, and
when this brother died, he earned a living by practising as a
physician; but he never sought or derived any benefit from his services
to his community, or from his correspondence or from the works he wrote
for the instruction of his brethren; the satisfaction of being of
service to his fellow-creatures was for him a sufficient reward.
The first public act in which Maimonides appears to have taken a
leading part was a decree promulgated by the Rabbinical authorities in
Cairo in the year 1167. The decree begins as follows:—“In times gone
by, when storms and tempests threatened us, we used to wander about
from place to place; but by the mercy of the Almighty we have now been
enabled to find here a resting-place. On our arrival, we noticed to our
great dismay that the learned were disunited; that none of them turned
his attention to the needs of the congregation. We therefore felt it
our duty to undertake the task of guiding the holy flock, of inquiring
into the condition of the community, of “reconciling the hearts of the
fathers to their children,” and of correcting their corrupt ways. The
injuries are great, but we may succeed in effecting a cure, and—in
accordance with the words of the prophet—‘I will seek the lost one, and
that which has been cast out I will bring back, and the broken one I
will cure’ (Micah iv. 6). When we therefore resolved to take the
management of the communal affairs into our hands, we discovered the
existence of a serious evil in the midst of the community,” etc.
It was probably about that time that Maimon died. Letters of condolence
were sent to his son Moses from all sides, both from Mohammedan and
from Christian countries; in some instances the letters were several
months on their way before they reached their destination.
The interest which Maimonides now took in communal affairs did not
prevent him from completing the great and arduous work, the Commentary
on the Mishnah, which he had begun in Spain and continued during his
wanderings in Africa. In this Commentary he proposed to give the
quintessence of the Gemara, to expound the meaning of each dictum in
the Mishnah, and to state which of the several opinions had received
the sanction of the Talmudical authorities. His object in writing this
work was to enable those who are not disposed to study the Gemara, to
understand the Mishnah, and to facilitate the study of the Gemara for
those who are willing to engage in it. The commentator generally
adheres to the explanations given in the Gemara, and it is only in
cases where the halakah, or practical law, is not affected, that he
ventures to dissent. He acknowledges the benefit he derived from such
works of his predecessors as the Halakot of Alfasi, and the writings of
the Geonim, but afterwards he asserted that errors which were
discovered in his works arose from his implicit reliance on those
authorities. His originality is conspicuous in the Introduction and in
the treatment of general principles, which in some instances precedes
the exposition of an entire section or chapter, in others that of a
single rule. The commentator is generally concise, except when occasion
is afforded to treat of ethical and theological principles, or of a
scientific subject, such as weights and measures, or mathematical and
astronomical problems. Although exhortations to virtue and warnings
against vice are found in all parts of his work, they are especially
abundant in the Commentary on Abot, which is prefaced by a separate
psychological treatise, called The Eight Chapters. The dictum “He who
speaketh much commits a sin,” elicited a lesson on the economy of
speech; the explanation of ʻolam ha-ba in the treatise Sanhedrin (xi.
- led him to discuss the principles of faith, and to lay down the
thirteen articles of the Jewish creed. The Commentary was written in
Arabic, and was subsequently translated into Hebrew and into other
languages. The estimation in which the Commentary was held may be
inferred from the following fact: When the Jews in Italy became
acquainted with its method and spirit, through a Hebrew translation of
one of its parts, they sent to Spain in search of a complete Hebrew
version of the Commentary. R. Simḥah, who had been entrusted with the
mission, found no copy extant, but he succeeded, through the influence
of Rabbi Shelomoh ben Aderet, in causing a Hebrew translation of this
important work to be prepared.—In the Introduction, the author states
that he has written a Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud treatise
Ḥullin and on nearly three entire sections, viz., Moëd, Nashim, and
Nezikin. Of all these Commentaries only the one on Rosh ha-shanah is
known.
In the year 1172 Maimonides wrote the Iggeret Teman, or Petaḥ-tiḳvah
(“Letter to the Jews in Yemen,” or “Opening of hope”) in response to a
letter addressed to him by Rabbi Jacob al-Fayumi on the critical
condition of the Jews in Yemen. Some of these Jews had been forced into
apostasy; others were made to believe that certain passages in the
Bible alluded to the mission of Mohammed; others again had been misled
by an impostor who pretended to be the Messiah. The character and style
of Maimonides’ reply appear to have been adapted to the intellectual
condition of the Jews in Yemen, for whom it was written. These probably
read the Bible with Midrashic commentaries, and preferred the easy and
attractive Agadah to the more earnest study of the Halakah. It is
therefore not surprising that the letter contains remarks and
interpretations which cannot be reconciled with the philosophical and
logical method by which all the other works of Maimonides are
distinguished. After a few complimentary words, in which the author
modestly disputes the justice of the praises lavished upon him, he
attempts to prove that the present sufferings of the Jews, together
with the numerous instances of apostasy, were foretold by the prophets,
especially by Daniel, and must not perplex the faithful. It must be
borne in mind, he continues, that the attempts made in past times to do
away with the Jewish religion, had invariably failed; the same would be
the fate of the present attempts; for “religious persecutions are of
but short duration.” The arguments which profess to demonstrate that in
certain Biblical passages allusion is made to Mohammed, are based on
interpretations which are totally opposed to common sense. He urges
that the Jews, faithfully adhering to their religion, should impress
their children with the greatness of the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and
of the miracles wrought through Moses; they also should remain firm in
the belief that God will send the Messiah to deliver their nation, but
they must abandon futile calculations of the Messianic period, and
beware of impostors. Although there be signs which indicate the
approach of the promised deliverance, and the times seem to be the
period of the last and most cruel persecution mentioned in the visions
of Daniel (xi. and xii.), the person in Yemen who pretends to be the
Messiah is an impostor, and if care be not taken, he is sure to do
mischief. Similar impostors in Cordova, France, and Africa, have
deceived the multitude and brought great troubles upon the Jews.—Yet,
inconsistently with this sound advice the author gives a positive date
of the Messianic time, on the basis of an old tradition; the
inconsistency is so obvious that it is impossible to attribute this
passage to Maimonides himself. It is probably spurious, and has,
perhaps, been added by the translator. With the exception of the rhymed
introduction, the letter was written in Arabic, “in order that all
should be able to read and understand it”; for that purpose the author
desires that copies should be made of it, and circulated among the
Jews. Rabbi Naḥum, of the Maghreb, translated the letter into Hebrew.
The success in the first great undertaking of explaining the Mishnah
encouraged Maimonides to propose to himself another task of a still
more ambitious character. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, it was his
object that those who were unable to read the Gemara should be made
acquainted with the results obtained by the Amoraim in the course of
their discussions on the Mishnah. But the Mishnah, with the Commentary,
was not such a code of laws as might easily be consulted in cases of
emergency; only the initiated would be able to find the section, the
chapter, and the paragraph in which the desired information could be
found. The halakah had, besides, been further developed since the time
when the Talmud was compiled. The changed state of things had suggested
new questions; these were discussed and settled by the Geonim, whose
decisions, being contained in special letters or treatises, were not
generally accessible. Maimonides therefore undertook to compile a
complete code, which would contain, in the language and style of the
Mishnah, and without discussion, the whole of the Written and the Oral
Law, all the precepts recorded in the Talmud, Sifra, Sifre and Tosefta,
and the decisions of the Geonim. According to the plan of the author,
this work was to present a solution of every question touching the
religious, moral, or social duties of the Jews. It was not in any way
his object to discourage the study of the Talmud and the Midrash; he
only sought to diffuse a knowledge of the Law amongst those who,
through incapacity or other circumstances, were precluded from that
study. In order to ensure the completeness of the code, the author drew
up a list of the six hundred and thirteen precepts of the Pentateuch,
divided them into fourteen groups, these again he subdivided, and thus
showed how many positive and negative precepts were contained in each
section of the Mishneh torah. The principles by which he was guided in
this arrangement were laid down in a separate treatise, called Sefer
ha-miẓvot. Works of a similar kind, written by his predecessors, as the
Halakot gedolot of R. Shimon Kahira, and the several Azharot were,
according to Maimonides, full of errors, because their authors had not
adopted any proper method. But an examination of the rules laid down by
Maimonides and of their application leads to the conclusion that his
results were not less arbitrary; as has, in fact, been shown by the
criticisms of Naḥmanides. The Sefer ha-miẓvot was written in Arabic,
and thrice translated into Hebrew, namely, by Rabbi Abraham ben Ḥisdai,
Rabbi Shelomoh ben Joseph ben Job, and Rabbi Moses Ibn Tibbon.
Maimonides himself desired to translate the book into Hebrew, but to
his disappointment he found no time.
This Sefer ha-miẓvot was executed as a preparation for his principal
work, the Mishneh Torah, or Yad ha-ḥazakah, which consists of an
Introduction and fourteen Books. In the Introduction the author first
describes the chain of tradition from Moses to the close of the Talmud,
and then he explains his method in compiling the work. He distinguishes
between the dicta found in the Talmud, Sifre, Sifra, or Tosefta, on the
one hand, and the dicta of the Geonim on the other; the former were
binding on all Jews, the latter only as far as their necessity and
their utility or the authority of their propounders was recognized.
Having once for all stated the sources from which he compiled his work,
he did not deem it necessary to name in each case the authority for his
opinion or the particular passage from which he derived his dictum. Any
addition of references to each paragraph he probably considered useless
to the uninformed and superfluous to the learned. At a later time he
discovered his error, he being himself unable to find again the sources
of some of his decisions. Rabbi Joseph Caro, in his commentary on the
Mishneh Torah, termed Keseph Mishneh, remedied this deficiency. The
Introduction is followed by the enumeration of the six hundred and
thirteen precepts and a description of the plan of the work, its
division into fourteen books, and the division of the latter into
sections, chapters, and paragraphs.
According to the author, the Mishneh Torah is a mere compendium of the
Talmud; but he found sufficient opportunities to display his real
genius, his philosophical mind, and his ethical doctrines. For in
stating what the traditional Law enjoined he had to exercise his own
judgment, and to decide whether a certain dictum was meant to be taken
literally or figuratively; whether it was the final decision of a
majority or the rejected opinion of a minority; whether it was part of
the Oral Law or a precept founded on the scientific views of a
particular author; and whether it was of universal application or was
only intended for a special period or a special locality. The first
Book, Sefer ha-maddaʻ, is the embodiment of his own ethical and
theological theories, although he frequently refers to the Sayings of
our Sages, and employs the phraseology of the Talmud. Similarly, the
section on the Jewish Calendar, Hilkot ha-ʻibur, may be considered as
his original work. In each group of the halakot, its source, a certain
passage of the Pentateuch, is first quoted, with its traditional
interpretation, and then the detailed rules follow in systematic order.
The Mishneh Torah was written by the author in pure Hebrew; when
subsequently a friend asked him to translate it into Arabic, he said he
would prefer to have his Arabic writings translated into Hebrew instead
of the reverse. The style is an imitation of the Mishnah; he did not
choose, the author says, the philosophical style, because that would be
unintelligible to the common reader; nor did he select the prophetic
style, because that would not harmonize with the subject.
Ten years of hard work by day and by night were spent in the
compilation of this code, which had originally been undertaken for “his
own benefit, to save him in his advanced age the trouble and the
necessity of consulting the Talmud on every occasion.” Maimonides knew
very well that his work would meet with the opposition of those whose
ignorance it would expose, also of those who were incapable of
comprehending it, and of those who were inclined to condemn every
deviation from their own preconceived notions. But he had the
satisfaction to learn that it was well received in most of the
congregations of Israel, and that there was a general desire to possess
and study it. This success confirmed him in his hope that at a later
time, when all cause for jealousy would have disappeared, the Mishneh
Torah would be received by all Jews as an authoritative code. This hope
has not been realized. The genius, earnestness, and zeal of Maimonides
are generally recognized; but there is no absolute acceptance of his
dicta. The more he insisted on his infallibility, the more did the
Rabbinical authorities examine his words and point out errors wherever
they believed that they could discover any. It was not always from base
motives, as contended by Maimonides and his followers, that his
opinions were criticised and rejected. The language used by Rabbi
Abraham ben David in his notes (hasagot) on the Mishneh Torah appears
harsh and disrespectful, if read together with the text of the
criticised passage, but it seems tame and mild if compared with
expressions used now and then by Maimonides about men who happened to
hold opinions differing from his own.
Maimonides received many complimentary letters, congratulating him upon
his success; but likewise letters with criticisms and questions
respecting individual halakot. In most cases he had no difficulty in
defending his position. From the replies it must, however, be inferred
that Maimonides made some corrections and additions, which were
subsequently embodied in his work. The letters addressed to him on the
Mishneh Torah and on other subjects were so numerous that he frequently
complained of the time he had to spend in their perusal, and of the
annoyance they caused him; but “he bore all this patiently, as he had
learned in his youth to bear the yoke.” He was not surprised that many
misunderstood his words, for even the simple words of the Pentateuch,
“the Lord is one,” had met with the same fate. Some inferred from the
fact that he treated fully of ʻOlam ha-ba, “the future state of the
soul,” and neglected to expatiate on the resurrection of the dead, that
he altogether rejected that principle of faith. They therefore asked
Rabbi Samuel ha-levi of Bagdad to state his opinion; the Rabbi
accordingly discussed the subject; but, according to Maimonides, he
attempted to solve the problem in a very unsatisfactory manner. The
latter thereupon likewise wrote a treatise “On the Resurrection of the
Dead,” in which he protested his adherence to this article of faith. He
repeated the opinion he had stated in the Commentary on the Mishnah and
in the Mishneh Torah, but “in more words; the same idea being
reiterated in various forms, as the treatise was only intended for
women and for the common multitude.”
These theological studies engrossed his attention to a great extent,
but it did not occupy him exclusively. In a letter addressed to R.
Jonathan, of Lunel, he says: “Although from my birth the Torah was
betrothed to me, and continues to be loved by me as the wife of my
youth, in whose love I find a constant delight, strange women whom I at
first took into my house as her handmaids have become her rivals and
absorb a portion of my time.” He devoted himself especially to the
study of medicine, in which he distinguished himself to such a degree,
according to Alkifti, that “the King of the Franks in Ascalon wanted to
appoint him as his physician.” Maimonides declined the honour.
Alfadhel, the Vizier of Saladin king of Egypt, admired the genius of
Maimonides, and bestowed upon him many distinctions. The name of
Maimonides was entered on the roll of physicians, he received a
pension, and was introduced to the court of Saladin. The method adopted
in his professional practice he describes in a letter to his pupil, Ibn
Aknin, as follows: “You know how difficult this profession is for a
conscientious and exact person who only states what he can support by
argument or authority.” This method is more fully described in a
treatise on hygiene, composed for Alfadhel, son of Saladin, who was
suffering from a severe illness and had applied to Maimonides for
advice. In a letter to Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon he alludes to the amount
of time spent in his medical practice, and says: “I reside in Egypt (or
Fostat); the king resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day
journeys from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very
heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and
when he or any of his children or the inmates of his harem are
indisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but must stay during the greater
part of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or
two of the royal officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As
a rule, I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing
unusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when I am almost
dying with hunger; but I find the antechambers filled with Jews and
Gentiles, with nobles and common people, awaiting my return,” etc.
Notwithstanding these heavy professional duties of court physician,
Maimonides continued his theological studies. After having compiled a
religious guide—Mishneh Torah—based on Revelation and Tradition, he
found it necessary to prove that the principles there set forth were
confirmed by philosophy. This task he accomplished in his Dalalāt
al-ḥaïrin, “The Guide for the Perplexed,” of which an analysis will be
given below. It was composed in Arabic, and written in Hebrew
characters. Subsequently it was translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Samuel
Ibn Tibbon, in the lifetime of Maimonides, who was consulted by the
translator on all difficult passages. The congregation in Lunel,
ignorant of Ibn Tibbon’s undertaking, or desirous to possess the most
correct translation of the Guide, addressed a very flattering letter to
Maimonides, requesting him to translate the work into Hebrew.
Maimonides replied that he could not do so, as he had not sufficient
leisure for even more pressing work, and that a translation was being
prepared by the ablest and fittest man, Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon. A
second translation was made later on by Jehudah Alḥarizi. The Guide
delighted many, but it also met with much adverse criticism on account
of the peculiar views held by Maimonides concerning angels, prophecy,
and miracles, especially on account of his assertion that if the
Aristotelian proof for the Eternity of the Universe had satisfied him,
he would have found no difficulty in reconciling the Biblical account
of the Creation with that doctrine. The controversy on the Guide
continued long after the death of Maimonides to divide the community,
and it is difficult to say how far the author’s hope to effect a
reconciliation between reason and revelation was realized. His
disciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin, to whom the work was dedicated, and who was
expected to derive from it the greatest benefit, appears to have been
disappointed. His inability to reconcile the two antagonistic elements
of faith and science, he describes allegorically in the form of a
letter addressed to Maimonides, in which the following passage occurs:
“Speak, for I desire that you be justified; if you can, answer me. Some
time ago your beloved daughter, the beautiful and charming Kimah,
obtained grace and favour in my sight, and I betrothed her unto me in
faithfulness, and married her in accordance with the Law, in the
presence of two trustworthy witnesses, viz., our master, Abd-allah and
Ibn Roshd. But she soon became faithless to me; she could not have
found fault with me, yet she left me and departed from my tent. She
does no longer let me behold her pleasant countenance or hear her
melodious voice. You have not rebuked or punished her, and perhaps you
are the cause of this misconduct. Now, ‘send the wife back to the man,
for he is’—or might become—‘a prophet; he will pray for you that you
may live,’ and also for her that she may be firm and steadfast. If,
however, you do not send her back, the Lord will punish you. Therefore
seek peace and pursue it; listen to what our Sages said: ‘Blessed be he
who restores to the owner his lost property’; for this blessing applies
in a higher degree to him who restores to a man his virtuous wife, the
crown of her husband.” Maimonides replied in the same strain, and
reproached his “son-in-law” that he falsely accused his wife of
faithlessness after he had neglected her; but he restored him his wife
with the advice to be more cautious in future. In another letter
Maimonides exhorts Ibn Aknin to study his works, adding, “apply
yourself to the study of the Law of Moses; do not neglect it, but, on
the contrary, devote to it the best and the most of your time, and if
you tell me that you do so, I am satisfied that you are on the right
way to eternal bliss.”
Of the letters written after the completion of the “Guide,” the one
addressed to the wise men of Marseilles (1194) is especially
noteworthy. Maimonides was asked to give his opinion on astrology. He
regretted in his reply that they were not yet in the possession of his
Mishneh Torah; they would have found in it the answer to their
question. According to his opinion, man should only believe what he can
grasp with his intellectual faculties, or perceive by his senses, or
what he can accept on trustworthy authority. Beyond this nothing should
be believed. Astrological statements, not being founded on any of these
three sources of knowledge, must be rejected. He had himself studied
astrology, and was convinced that it was no science at all. If some
dicta be found in the Talmud which appear to represent astrology as a
true source of knowledge, these may either be referred to the rejected
opinion of a small minority, or may have an allegorical meaning, but
they are by no means forcible enough to set aside principles based on
logical proof.
The debility of which Maimonides so frequently complained in his
correspondence, gradually increased, and he died, in his seventieth
year, on the 20th Tebeth, 4965 (1204). His death was the cause of great
mourning to all Jews. In Fostat a mourning of three days was kept; in
Jerusalem a fast was appointed; a portion of the tochaḥah (Lev. xxvi.
or Deut. xxix.) was read, and also the history of the capture of the
Ark by the Philistines (1 Sam. iv.). His remains were brought to
Tiberias. The general regard in which Maimonides was held, both by his
contemporaries and by succeeding generations, has been expressed in the
popular saying: “From Moses to Moses there was none like Moses.”
THE MOREH NEBUCHIM LITERATURE
I. The Arabic Text.—The editio princeps, the only edition of the
original text of the Guide (in Arabic, Dĕlil, or Dalalat al-ḥaïrin),
was undertaken and executed by the late S. Munk. Its title is: Le Guide
des Égarés, traité de Théologie et de Philosophie par Moïse ben Maimon,
publié pour la première fois dans l’original Arabe, et accompagné d’une
traduction Française et de notes critiques, littéraires et
explicatives, par S. Munk (Paris, 1850–1866). The plan was published,
1833, in Reflexions sur le culte des anciens Hébreux (La Bible, par S.
Cahen, vol. iv.), with a specimen of two chapters of the Third Part.
The text adopted has been selected from the several MSS. at his
disposal with great care and judgment. Two Leyden MSS. (cod. 18 and
221), various MSS. of the Bibliothèque Nationale (No. 760, very old;
761 and 758, written by R. Saadia Ibn Danan), and some MSS. of the
Bodleian Library were consulted. In the notes which accompany the
French translation, the various readings of the different MSS. are
fully discussed. At the end of the third volume a list is added of
“Variantes des Manuscrits Arabes et des deux Versions Hébraïques.”
The library of the British Museum possesses two copies of the Arabic
text; the one Or. 1423 is complete, beautifully written, with
explanatory notes in the margin and between the lines. The name of the
copyist is not mentioned, nor the date when it has been written. The
volume has in the beginning an incomplete index to the Scriptural
passages referred to in the Guide, and at the end fragments of Psalm
cxli. in Arabic and of astronomical tables.
The second copy of the Dalalat al-ḥaïrin is contained in the MS. Or.
2423, written in large Yemen Rabbinic characters. It is very
fragmentary. The first fragment begins with the last paragraph of the
introduction; there are a few marginal notes in Hebrew.
In the Bodleian Library there are the following copies of the Dalalat
al-ḥaïrin according to the Catal. of Hebr. MSS. by Dr. A. Neubauer:—
No. 1236. The text is preceded by Jehudah al-Charizi’s index of the
contents of the chapters, and by an index of Biblical quotations. In
the margin there are notes, containing omissions, by different hands,
two in Arabic characters. The volume was written 1473.
No. 1237. The Arabic text, with a few marginal notes containing various
readings; the text is preceded by three Hebrew poems, beginning, De’i
holek, Bi-sedeb tebunot; and Binu be-dat Mosheh. Fol. 212 contains a
fragment of the book (III., xxix.).
No. 1238. Text with a few marginal notes.
No. 1239. The end of the work is wanting in this copy. The second part
has forty-nine chapters, as the introduction to Part II. is counted as
chapter i.; Part III. has fifty-six chapters, the introduction being
counted as chapter i., and chapter xxiv. being divided into two
chapters. The index of passages from the Pentateuch follows the
ordinary mode of counting the chapters of the Guide.
No. 1240. Arabic text transcribed in Arabic characters by Saadiah b.
Levi Azankoṭ for Prof. Golius in 1645.
No. 1241. First part of the Dalalat al-ḥaïrin, written by Saadiah b.
Mordecai b. Mosheh in the year 1431.
No. 1242 contains the same Part, but incomplete.
Nos. 1243, 1244, 1245, and 1246 contain Part II. of the Arabic text,
incomplete in Nos. 1245 and 1246.
Nos. 1247, 1248, and 1249 have Part III.; it is incomplete in Nos. 1248
and 1249. No. 1249 was written 1291, and begins with III., viii.
A fragment of the Arabic text, the end of Part III., is contained in
No. 407, 2.
No. 2508 includes a fragment of the original (I. ii.–xxxii.), with a
Hebrew interlineary translation of some words and a few marginal notes.
It is written in Yemen square characters, and is marked as “holy
property of the Synagogue of Alsiani.”
A fragment (I. i.) of a different recension from the printed is
contained in 2422, 16. On the margin the Commentaries of Shem-ṭob and
Ephodi are added in Arabic.
A copy of the Dalalat is also contained in the Berlin Royal Library MS.
Or. Qu., 579 (105 Cat. Steinschneider); it is defective in the
beginning and at the end.
The Cairo Genizah at Cambridge contains two fragments: (a) I. lxiv. and
beginning of lxv.; (b) II. end of xxxii. and xxxiii. According to Dr.
H. Hirschfeld, Jewish Quarterly Review (vol. xv. p. 677), they are in
the handwriting of Maimonides.
The valuable collection of MSS. in the possession of Dr. M. Gaster
includes a fragment of the Dalalat-al-ḥaïrin (Codex 605). II.
xiii.–xv., beginning and end defective.
II. Translations. a. Hebrew.—As soon as European Jews heard of the
existence of this work, they procured its translation into Hebrew. Two
scholars, independently of each other, undertook the task: Samuel Ibn
Tibbon and Jehudah al-Ḥarizi. There is, besides, in the Moreh ha-moreh
of Shemṭob Palquera an original translation of some portions of the
Moreh. In the Sifte yeshenim (No. 112) a rhymed translation of the
Dalalat by Rabbi Mattityahu Kartin is mentioned. Ibn Tibbon’s version
is very accurate; he sacrificed elegance of style to the desire of
conscientiously reproducing the author’s work, and did not even neglect
a particle, however unimportant it may appear. Ibn Tibbon went in his
anxiety to retain peculiarities of the original so far as to imitate
its ambiguities, e.g., meẓiut (I. lviii.) is treated as a masculine
noun, only in order to leave it doubtful whether a pronoun which
follows agrees with meẓiut, “existence,” or with nimẓa, “existing
being,” both occurring in the same sentence (Br. Mus. MS. Harl. 7586,
marg. note by Ibn Tibbon). When he met with passages that offered any
difficulty he consulted Maimonides. Ḥarizi, on the other hand, was less
conscientious about words and particles, but wrote in a superior style.
Vox populi, however, decided in favour of the version of Ibn Tibbon,
the rival of which became almost forgotten. Also Abraham, the son of
Moses Maimonides, in Milḥamoth ha-shem, describes Ḥarizi’s version as
being inaccurate. Most of the modern translations were made from Ibn
Tibbon’s version. There are, therefore, MSS. of this version almost in
every library containing collections of Hebrew books and MSS. It has
the title Moreh-nebuchim. The British Museum has the following eight
copies of Ibn Tibbon’s version:—
Harl. 7586 A. This codex was written in the year 1284, for Rabbi
Shabbatai ben Rabbi Mattityahu. In the year 1340 it came into the
possession of Jacob b. Shelomoh; his son Menaḥem sold it in the year
1378 to R. Mattityahu, son of R. Shabbatai, for fifty gold florins. It
was again sold in the year 1461 by Yeḥiel ben Joab. There is this
peculiarity in the writing, that long words at the end of a line are
divided, and written half on the one line, half on the next; in words
which are vocalized, pataḥ is frequently found for ḳameẓ. There are
numerous various readings in the margin. The text is preceded by a
poem, written by Joseph Ibn Aknin, pupil of Maimonides, in praise of
his master, and beginning Adon yiẓro. This poem is attributed to R.
Yehudah ha-Levi (Luzzatto, in his Divan, Betulat-bat-Yehudah, p. 104).
At the end the copyist adds an epigram, the translation of which is as
follows:—
“The Moreh is finished—Praise to Him who formed and created
everything—written for the instruction and benefit of the few whom the
Lord calleth. Those who oppose the Moreh ought to be put to death; but
those who study and understand it deserve that Divine Glory rest upon
them, and inspire them with a spirit from above.”
Harl. 7586 B. This codex, much damaged in the beginning and at the end,
contains the version of Ibn Tibbon, with marginal notes, consisting of
words omitted in the text, and other corrections. The version is
followed by the poems Ḳarob meod, etc., and De’i holek, etc.
Harl. 5507 contains the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon, with the
translator’s preface and marginal notes, consisting of various readings
and omissions from the text. The work of Maimonides is followed by Ibn
Tibbon’s Vocabulary (millot-zarot), Mesharet-mosheh, ʻArugot
ha-mezimmah, Millot higgayon, Ruaḥ-ḥen, Alfarabi’s Hatḥalot, a
Hebrew-Italian vocabulary of logical terms, and an explanation of
koṭeb. The passage in Part I., chap. lxxi., which refers to
Christianity, has been erased.
Harl. 5525 was the property of Shimshon Kohen Modon. The MS. begins
with Ḥarizi’s Kavvanat ha-peraḳim; then follows the text, with a few
marginal notes of a later hand, mostly adverse criticisms and
references to ʻArama’s ʻAḳedah and the Biblical commentaries of
Abarbanel. There is also a note in Latin. The text is followed by Ibn
Tibbon’s Vocabulary (Millot-zarot) and Masoret ha-pesuḳim (Index to the
Biblical quotations in the Moreh). In a poem, beginning Moreh asher
mennu derakav gabehu, the Moreh is compared to a musical instrument,
which delights when played by one that understands music, but is
spoiled when touched by an ignorant person.
Add. 27068 (Almanzi coll.). At the end the following remark is added:
I, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, finished the translation of this work in the
month of Tebet 4965 (1205). The text is preceded by the well-known
epigrams, De’i holek and Moreh-nebuchim sa shelomi; the last page
contains the epigram Ḳarob meod. There are some notes in the margin,
mostly referring to various readings.
Add. 14763. This codex, written 1273 at Viterbo, contains the preface
of Ḥarizi to his translation of the Moreh and his index of contents,
Ibn Tibbon’s version with a few marginal notes of different hands,
including some remarks of the translator, and the contents of the
chapters. The codex contains besides the following treatises:
Commentary of Maimonides on Abot; Comm. of Maim. on Mishnah Sanhedrin
x. 1; Letter of Maimonides on the Resurrection of the Dead; Vocabulary
of difficult words by Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Maimonides’ Letter to the wise
men of Marseilles; his Letter to Rabbi Jonathan; Keter-malkut,
Mesharet-mosheh, Ruaḥ-ḥen, Otot ha-shamayim, translated from the Arabic
by Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Hatḥalot ha-nimẓaot, of Alfarabi; Sefer
ha-ḥappuaḥ, Mishle ḥamishim ha-talmidim; on the seven zones of the
earth; a fragment of a chronicle from the exile of Babylon down to the
fourth year of the Emperor Nicepheros of Constantinople, and a poem,
which begins asher yishal, and has the following sense:—“If one asks
the old and experienced for advice, you may expect his success in all
he undertakes; but if one consults the young, remember the fate of
Rehoboam, son of Solomon.”
Add. 14764. In addition to the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (from end
of I. xxvii.) with a few marginal notes and index, the codex contains
at the end of Part I. an Index of references made by the author to
explanations given in preceding or succeeding chapters. At the end of
the text the statement is added, that the translation was finished in
the month of Tebet 968 (1208). The Moreh is followed by Ruaḥ-ḥen, and
Ibn Tibbon’s Vocabulary of millot-zarot (incomplete), and is preceded
by four poems in praise of the Moreh, beginning Shim’u nebone leb,
Moreh nebuchim sa shelomi, De’i holek and Nofet maḥkim.
Bibl. Reg. 16 A, xi. This codex, written in Prov. curs. characters in
the year 1308, has in front a fragment of III. i., then follows the
poem of Meshullam, beginning Yehgu mezimmotai (Grätz Leket-shoshannim,
p. 151), and other poems.
The following MS. copies of Ibn Tibbon’s version are included in the
Oxford Bodleian Library; the numbers refer to Dr. Neubauer’s catalogue
of the MSS.:—
An index of the passages from the Bible referred to in the work,
and an index of the contents precede the version. The marginal notes
contain chiefly omissions.This codex was written in 1675. The marginal notes contain
omissions and explanations.The marginal notes contain the translator’s remarks on I. lxxiv.
4, and III. xlvii. The version is followed by Ibn Tibbon’s vocabulary,
and his additional remarks on the reasons for the commandments. The MS.
was bought by Samuel ben Moses from a Christian after the pillage of
Padua, where it had belonged to a Synagogue of foreigners (lo’azim); he
gave it to a Synagogue of the same character at Mantua.The marginal notes include that of the translator on III. xlvii.
- Text with marginal notes containing omissions.
The marginal notes include those of the translator on I. xlvi.
and lxxiv. 5.The marginal notes contain various readings, notes relating to
Ḥarizi’s translation and the Arabic text; on fol. 80 there is a note in
Latin. There are in this codex six epigrams concerning the Moreh.Text incomplete; with marginal notes.
Fragments of the Version are contained in the following codices: 2047,
3, p. 65; 2283, 8; 2309, 2, and 2336.
Among the MS. copies of the Moreh in the Bibl. Nat. in Paris, there is
one that has been the property of R. Eliah Mizraḥi, and another that
had been in the hands of Azariah de Rossi (No. 685 and No. 691); the
Günzburg Library (Paris) possesses a copy (No. 771), that was written
1452 by Samuel son of Isaac for Rabbi Moses de Leon, and Eliah del
Medigo’s copy of the Moreh is in the possession of Dr. Ginsburg
(London); it contains six poems, beginning Moreh nebuchim sa; Emet
moreh emet; Bi-leshon esh; Mah-baʻaru; Kamu more shav.
The editio princeps of this version has no statement as to where and
when it was printed, and is without pagination. According to Fürst
(Bibliogr.) it is printed before 1480. The copy in the British Museum
has some MS. notes. Subsequent editions contain besides the Hebrew text
the Commentaries of Shem-ṭob and Efodi, and the index of contents by
Ḥarizi (Venice, 1551, fol.); also the Comm. of Crescas and Vocabulary
of Ibn Tibbon (Sabionetta, 1553, fol.; Jessnitz, 1742, fol. etc.); the
Commentaries of Narboni and S. Maimon (Berlin, 1791); the commentaries
of Efodi, Shem-ṭob, Crescas and Abarbanel (Warsaw, 1872, 4to); German
translation and Hebrew Commentary (Biur) Part I. (Krotoschin, 1839,
8vo); German translation and notes, Part II. (Wien, 1864), Part III.
(Frankfort-a.-M., 1838).
The Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (Part I. to ch. lxxii.) has been
translated into Mishnaic Hebrew by M. Levin (Zolkiew, 1829, 4to).
There is only one MS. known of Ḥarizi’s version, viz., No. 682 of the
Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. It has been edited by L. Schlosberg,
with notes. London, 1851 (Part I.), 1876 (II.), and 1879 (III.). The
notes on Part I. were supplied by S. Scheyer.
The first Latin translation of the Moreh has been discovered by Dr. J.
Perles among the Latin MSS. of the Munich Library, Catal. Cod.
latinorum bibl. regiae Monacensis, tom. I, pars iii. pag. 208 (Kaish.
36 b), 1700 (7936 b). This version is almost identical with that edited
by Augustinus Justinianus, Paris, 1520, and is based on Ḥarizi’s Hebrew
version of the Moreh. The name of the translator is not mentioned. In
the Commentary of Moses, son of Solomon, of Salerno, on the Moreh, a
Latin translation is quoted, and the quotations agree with this
version. It is called by this commentator ha ʻataḳat ha-noẓrit (“the
Christian translation”), and its author, ha-ma ʻatiḳ ha-noẓer (lit.
“the Christian translator”). Dr. Perles is, however, of opinion that
these terms do not necessarily imply that a Christian has made this
translation, as the word noẓer may have been used here for “Latin.” He
thinks that it is the result of the combined efforts of Jewish and
Christian scholars connected with the court of the German Emperor
Frederic II., especially as in the thirteenth century several Jewish
scholars distinguished themselves by translating Oriental works into
Latin. See Grätz Monatschrift, 1875, Jan.–June, “Die in einer Münchener
Handschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Uebersetzung,” etc., von Dr.
J. Perles. The title has been variously rendered into Latin: Director
neutrorum, directorium dubitantium, director neutrorum, nutantium or
dubitantium; doctor perplexorum.
Gedaliah ibn Yahyah, in Shalshelet ha-ḳabbalah, mentions a Latin
translation of the Moreh by Jacob Monteno; but nothing is known of it,
unless it be the anonymous translation of the Munich MS., mentioned
above. Augustinus Justinianus edited this version (Paris, 1520), with
slight alterations and a great number of mistakes. Joseph Scaliger’s
opinion of this version is expressed in a letter to Casaubonus, as
follows: Qui latine vertit, Hebraica, non Arabica, convertit, et quidem
sæpe hallucinatur, neque mentem Authoris assequitur. Magna seges
mendorum est in Latino. Præter illa quæ ab inertia Interpretis peccata
sunt accessit et inertia Librariorum aut Typographorum, e.g., prophetiæ
pro philosophiæ; altitudo pro aptitudo; bonitatem pro brevitatem.
(Buxtorf, Doctor Perplexorum, Præf.)
Johannes Buxtorfius, Fil., translated the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon
into Latin (Basileæ, 1629, 4to). In the Præfatio ad Lectorem, the
translator discusses the life and the works of Maimonides, and dwells
especially on the merits and the fate of the Moreh-nebuchim. The
preface is followed by a Hebrew poem of Rabbi Raphael Joseph of Trèves,
in praise of an edition of the Moreh containing the Commentaries of
Efodi, Shem-tob, and Crescas.
Italian was the first living language into which the Moreh has been
translated. This translation was made by Yedidyah ben Moses (Amadeo de
Moïse di Recanati), and dedicated by him to “divotissimo e divinissimo
Signor mio il Signor Immanuel da Fano” (i.e., the Kabbalist Menaḥem
Azarriah). The translator dictated it to his brother Eliah, who wrote
it in Hebrew characters; it was finished the 8th of February, 1583. The
MS. copy is contained in the Royal Library at Berlin, MS. Or. Qu. 487
(M. Steinschneider Catal., etc.)—The Moreh has been translated into
Italian a second time, and annotated by D. J. Maroni: Guida degli
Smarriti, Firenze, 1870, fol.
The Moreh has been translated into German by R. Fürstenthal (Part I.,
Krotoschin, 1839), M. Stern (Part II., Wien, 1864), and S. Scheyer
(Part III., Frankfort-a.-M., 1838). The translation is based on Ibn
Tibbon’s Hebrew version. The chapters on the Divine Attributes have
been translated into German, and fully discussed, by Dr. Kaufmann in
his Geschichte der Attributenlehre (Gotha, 1877). An excellent French
translation, based on the Arabic original, has been supplied by the
regenerator of the Guide, S. Munk. It was published together with the
Arabic text (Paris, 1850–1866).
The Moreh has also been translated into the Hungarian language by Dr.
Klein. The translation is accompanied by notes (Budapest, 1878–80).
The portion containing the reasons of the Commandments (Part III. ch.
xxvi.–xlix.) has been translated into English by James Townley (London,
1827). The translation is preceded by an account on the life and works
of Maimonides, and dissertations on various subjects; among others,
Talmudical and Rabbinical writings, the Originality of the Institutions
of Moses, and Judicial astrology.
III. Commentaries.—It is but natural that in a philosophical work like
the Moreh, the reader will meet with passages that at first thought
seem unintelligible, and require further explanation, and this want has
been supplied by the numerous commentators that devoted their attention
to the study of the Moreh. Joseph Solomon del Medigo (1591) saw
eighteen Commentaries. The four principal ones he characterizes thus
(in imitation of the Hagadah for Passover): Moses Narboni is rashaʻ,
has no piety, and reveals all the secrets of the Moreh. Shem-ṭob is
ḥakam, “wise,” expounds and criticises; Crescas is tam, “simple,”
explains the book in the style of the Rabbis; Epodi is she-eno yodeʻa
lishol, “does not understand to ask,” he simply explains in short notes
without criticism (Miktab-aḥuz; ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840, p. 18).
The earliest annotations were made by the author himself on those
passages, which the first translator of the Moreh was unable to
comprehend. They are contained in a letter addressed to Samuel Ibn
Tibbon, beginning, lefi siklo yehullal ish (Bodl. Library, No. 2218,
s.; comp. The Guide, etc., I. 21, 343; II. 8, 99). Ibn Tibbon, the
translator, likewise added a few notes, which are found in the margin
of MSS. of the Hebrew version of the Moreh (on I. xlv. lxxiv.; II.
xxiv.; and III. xlvii.—MSS. Bodl. 1252, 1; 1253, 1255, 1257; Brit. Mus.
Add. 14,763 and 27,068).
Both translators wrote explanations of the philosophical terms employed
in the versions. Ḥarizi wrote his vocabulary first, and Ibn Tibbon, in
the introductory remarks, to Perush millot zarot (“Explanation of
difficult words”), describes his rival’s vocabulary as full of
blunders. Ibn Tibbon’s Perush is found almost in every copy of his
version, both MS. and print; so also Ḥarizi’s index of the contents of
the chapters of the Moreh (Kavvanat ha-peraḳim).
The following is an alphabetical list of Commentaries on the Moreh:—
Abarbanel (Don Isaak) wrote a Commentary on I. i.–lv.; II. xxxi.–xlv.,
and a separate book Shamayim-ḥadashim, “New Heavens,” on II. xix., in
which he fully discusses the question concerning Creatio ex nihilo. The
opinion of Maimonides is not always accepted. Thus twenty-seven
objections are raised against his interpretation of the first chapter
of Ezekiel. These objections he wrote at Molin, in the house of R.
Abraham Treves Ẓarfati. The Commentary is followed by a short essay
(maamar) on the plan of the Moreh. The method adopted by Abarbanel in
all his Commentaries, is also employed in this essay. A series of
questions is put forth on the subject, and then the author sets about
to answer them. M. J. Landau edited the Commentary without text, with a
Preface, and with explanatory notes, called Moreh li-ẓeddakah (Prag.
1831; MS. Bodl. 2385). In addition to these the same author wrote
Teshubot “Answers” to several questions asked by Rabbi Shaul ha-Cohen
on topics discussed in the Moreh (Venice, 1754).
Abraham Abulafia wrote “Sodot ha-moreh,” or Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic
Commentary on the Moreh. He gives the expression, גן עדן (Paradise),
for the number (177) of the chapters of the Moreh. MS. Nat. Bibl. 226,
3. Leipsic Libr. 232, 4. MS. Bodl. 2360, 5, contains a portion of Part
III.
Buchner A. Ha-moreh li-ẓedaḳab (Warsaw, 1838). Commentary on “The
Reasons of the Laws,” Moreh III. xxix.–xlix. The Commentary is preceded
by an account of the life of Maimonides.
Comtino, Mordecai b. Eliezer, wrote a short commentary on the Moreh
(Dr. Ginsburg’s collection of MSS. No. 10). Narboni, who “spread light
on dark passages in the Guide,” is frequently quoted. Reference is also
made to his own commentary on Ibn Ezra’s Yesod-mora.
Crescas (Asher b. Abraham), expresses in the Preface to his Commentary
the conviction that he could not always comprehend the right sense of
the words of Maimonides, for “there is no searching to his
understanding.” He nevertheless thinks that his explanations will help
“the young” to study the Moreh with profit. A long poem in praise of
Maimonides and his work precedes the Preface. His notes are short and
clear, and in spite of his great respect of Maimonides, he now and then
criticises and corrects him.
David Yaḥya is named by Joseph Del Medigo (Miktab-aḥuz ed. A. Geiger,
Berlin, 1840; p. 18, and note 76), as having written a Commentary on
the Moreh.
David ben Yehudah Leon Rabbino wrote ʻEn ha-ḳore, MS. Bodl. 1263. He
quotes in his Commentary among others ʻArama’s ʻAkedat yiẓḥaḳ. The
Preface is written by Immanuel ben Raphael Ibn Meir, after the death of
the author.
Efodi is the name of the Commentary written by Isaac ben Moses, who
during the persecution of 1391 had passed as Christian under the name
of Profiat Duran. He returned to Judaism, and wrote against
Christianity the famous satire “Al tehee ka-aboteka” (“Be not like your
Fathers”), which misled Christians to cite it as written in favour of
Christianity. It is addressed to the apostate En Bonet Bon Giorno. The
same author also wrote a grammatical work, Maʻaseh-efod. The name Efod
(אפד), is explained as composed of the initials Amar Profiat Duran.
His Commentary consists of short notes, explanatory of the text. The
beginning of this Commentary is contained in an Arabic translation in
MS. Bodl. 2422, 16.
Ephraim Al-Naqavah in Shaʻar Kebod ha-shem (MS. Bodl. 939, 2 and 1258,
2), answers some questions addressed to him concerning the Moreh. He
quotes Ḥisdai’s Or adonai.
Fürstenthal, R., translator and commentator of the Maḥzor, added a
Biur, short explanatory notes, to his German translation of Part I. of
the Moreh (Krotoschin, 1839).
Gershon, Moreh-derek, Commentary on Part I. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl.
1265).
Hillel b. Samuel b. Elazar of Verona explained the Introduction to Part
II. (the 25 Propos.). S. H. Halberstam edited this Commentary together
with Tagmule ha-nefesh of the same author, for the Society
Meḳiẓe-nirdamim (Lyck, 1874).
Joseph ben Aba-mari b. Joseph, of Caspi (Argentière), wrote three
Commentaries on the Moreh. The first is contained in a Munich MS. (No.
263); and seems to have been recast by the author, and divided into two
separate Commentaries: ʻAmmude Kesef, and Maskiyot Kesef. The former
was to contain plain and ordinary explanation, whilst profound and
mysterious matter was reserved for the second (Steinschn. Cat.). In
II., chap. xlviii., Caspi finds fault with Maimonides that he does not
place the book of Job among the highest class of inspired writings,
“its author being undoubtedly Moses.” These Commentaries have been
edited by T. Werblumer (Frankfort-a.-M., 1848). R. Kirchheim added a
Hebrew introduction discussing the character of these commentaries, and
describing the manuscripts from which these were copied; a Biography of
the author is added in German.
Joseph Giqatilia wrote notes on the Moreh, printed with “Questions of
Shaul ha-kohen” (Venice, 1574. MS. Bodl. 1911, 3).
Joseph b. Isaac ha-Levi’s Gib’at ha-Moreh is a short Commentary on
portions of the Moreh, with notes by R. Yom-ṭob Heller, the author of
Tosafot Yom-tob (Prag., 1612).
Isaac Satanov wrote a commentary on Parts II. and III. of the Moreh
(see Maimon Solomon p. xxi.).
Isaac ben Shem-ṭob ibn Shem-ṭob wrote a lengthy Commentary on the
Moreh, Part I. (MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 1388). The object of the Commentary
is to show that there is no contradiction between Maimonides and the
Divine Law. He praises Maimonides as a true believer in Creatio ex
nihilo, whilst Ibn Ezra and Gersonides assumed a prima materia (Yoẓer,
ḳadosh). Nachmanides is called ha-ḥasid ha-gadol, but is nevertheless
blamed, together with Narboni and Zeraḥyah ha-Levi, for criticising
Maimonides, instead of trying to explain startling utterances even in
“a forced way” (bederek raḥok); and Narboni, “in spite of his wisdom,
frequently misunderstood the Moreh.” At the end of each chapter a
résumé (derush) of the contents of the chapter is given, and the lesson
to be derived from it. The MS. is incomplete, chaps, xlvi.–xlviii. are
missing.
Kaufmann, D., in his Geschichte der Attributenlehre, translated Part I.
chap, l.–lxiii. into German, and added critical and explanatory notes.
Kalonymos wrote a kind of introduction to the Moreh (Mesharet Mosheh),
in which he especially discusses the theory of Maimonides on
Providence.
Leibnitz made extracts from Buxtorf’s Latin version of the Moreh, and
added his own remarks. Observationes ad R. Mosen Maimoniden (Foucher de
Careil. C.A., La Philosophie Juive, 1861).
Levin, M., wrote Allon-moreh as a kind of introduction to his
retranslation of Tibbon’s Hebrew version into the language of the
Mishnah.
Maimon, Solomon, is the author of Gib’at ha-moreh, a lengthy commentary
on Book I. (Berlin, 1791). The author is fond of expatiating on topics
of modern philosophy. In the introduction he gives a short history of
philosophy. The commentary on Books II. and III. was written by Isaac
Satanov.
Meir ben Jonah ha-mekunneh Ben-shneor wrote a commentary on the Moreh
in Fez 1560 (MS. Bodl. 1262).
Menaḥem Kara expounded the twenty-five propositions enumerated in the
Introduction to Part II. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1649, 13).
Mordecai Yaffe, in his Or Yeḳarot, or Pinnat Yiḳrat, one of his ten
Lebushim, comments upon the theories contained in the Moreh.
Moses, son of Abraham Provençal, explains the passage in Part I. chap,
lxxiii. Prop. 3, in which Maimonides refers to the difference between
commensurable and incommensurable lines (MS. Bodl. 2033, 8).
Moses, son of Jehudah Nagari, made an index of the subjects treated in
the Moreh, indicating in each case the chapters in which allusion is
made to the subject. He did so, “in obedience to the advice of
Maimonides, to consider the chapters in connected order” (Part I. p.
20). It has been printed together with the questions of Shaul ha-kohen
(Venice, 1574).
Moses, son of Solomon of Salerno, is one of the earliest expounders of
the Moreh. He wrote his commentary on Parts I. and II., perhaps
together with a Christian scholar. He quotes the opinion of “the
Christian scholar with whom he worked together.” Thus he names Petrus
de Bernia and Nicolo di Giovenazzo. R. Jacob Anatoli, author of the
Malmed ha-talmidim, is quoted as offering an explanation for the
passage from Pirḳe di-rabbi Eliezer, which Maimonides (II. chap, xxvi.)
considers as strange and inexplicable (Part I., written 1439; MS. of
Bet ha-midrash, London; Parts I.–II., MS. Bodl. 1261, written, 1547;
MS. Petersburg, No. 82; Munich MS. 60 and 370).
Moses ha-ḳatan, son of Jehudah, son of Moses, wrote To’aliyot pirḳe
ha-maamar (“Lessons taught in the chapters of this work”). It is an
index to the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1267).
Moses Leiden explained the 25 Prop. of the Introduction to Part II.
(MS. Günzburg, Paris).
Moses Narboni wrote a short commentary at Soria, 1362. He freely
criticizes Maimonides, and uses expressions like the following:—“He
went too far, may God pardon him” (II. viii.). Is. Euchel ed. Part I.
(Berlin, 1791); J. Goldenthal, I. to III. (Wien, 1852). The Bodl. Libr.
possesses several MS. copies of this commentary (Nos. 1260, 1264, 2,
and 1266).
Munk, S., added to his French translation of the Moreh numerous
critical and explanatory notes.
S. Sachs (Ha-teḥiyah, Berlin, 1850, p. 8) explains various passages of
the Moreh, with a view of discovering the names of those who are
attacked by Maimonides without being named.
Scheyer, S., added critical and explanatory notes to his German
translation of the Moreh, Part 3, and to the Hebrew version of Ḥarizi,
Part 1. He also wrote Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, an
Introduction to the Moreh (Frankf.-a.-M., 1845).
Shem ṭob Ibn Palquera’s Moreh ha-moreh consists of 3 parts: (1) a
philosophical explanation of the Moreh, (2) a description of the
contents of the chapters of the Moreh, Part I, i.-lvii. (Presburg,
1827); (3) Corrections of Ibn Tibbon’s version. He wrote the book for
himself, that in old age he might have a means of refreshing his
memory. The study of science and philosophy is to be recommended, but
only to those who have had a good training in “the fear of sin.” Ibn
Roshd (Averroes) is frequently quoted, and referred to as he-ḥakam
ha-nizkar (the philosopher mentioned above).
Shem-ṭob ben Joseph ben Shem-ṭob had the commentary of Efodi before
him, which he seems to have quoted frequently verbatim without naming
him. In the preface he dwells on the merits of the Moreh as the just
mediator between religion and philosophy. The commentary of Shem-ṭob is
profuse, and includes almost a paraphrase of the text. He apologises in
conclusion for having written many superfluous notes and added
explanation where no explanation was required; his excuse is that he
did not only intend to write a commentary (biur) but also a work
complete in itself (ḥibbur). He often calls the reader’s attention to
things which are plain and clear.
Shem-ṭob. Ibn Shem-ṭob, in Sefer ha-emunot (Ferrara, 1556), criticises
some of the various theories discussed in the Moreh, and rejects them
as heretic. His objections were examined by Moses Al-ashkar, and
answered in Hasagot ʻal mah she-katab Rabbi Shem-ṭob neged ha-Rambam
(Ferrara, 1556).
Solomon b. Jehudah ha-nasi wrote in Germany Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic
commentary on the Moreh, and dedicated it to his pupil Jacob b. Samuel
(MS. Bet-ha-midrash, London).
Tabrizi. The twenty-five Propositions forming the introduction to Part
2, have been fully explained by Mohammed Abu-becr ben Mohammed
al-tabrizi. His Arabic explanations have been translated by Isaac b.
Nathan of Majorca into Hebrew (Ferrara, 1556). At the end the following
eulogy is added:—The author of these Propositions is the chief whose
sceptre is “wisdom” and whose throne is “understanding,” the Israelite
prince, that has benefited his nation and all those who love God, etc.:
Moses b. Maimon b. Ebed-elohim, the Israelite.... May God lead us to
the truth. Amen!
Tishbi. In MS. Bodl. 2279, 1, there are some marginal notes on Part
III. which are signed Tishbi (Neub. Cat.).
Yaḥya Ibn Suleiman wrote in Arabic a Commentary on the Guide for the
Perplexed. A fragment is contained in the Berlin MS. Or. Qu., 554, 2
(Steinschneider, Cat. No. 92).
Zeraḥyah b. Isaac ha-Levi. Commentary on the Moreh, I., i.–lxxi., and
some other portions of the work. (See Maskir, 1861, p. 125).
MS. Bodl. 2360, 8, contains a letter of Jehudah b. Shelomoh on some
passages of the Moreh, and Zeraḥyah’s reply.
Anonymous Commentaries.—The MS. Brit. Mus. 1423 contains marginal and
interlineary notes in Arabic. No author or date is given, nor is any
other commentary referred to in the notes. The explanations given are
mostly preceded by a question, and introduced by the phrase, “the
answer is,” in the same style as is employed in the Hebrew-Arabic
Midrash, MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 2213. The Midrashic character is prominent
in the notes. Thus the verse “Open, ye gates, that the righteous nation
which keepeth the truth may enter in,” is explained as meaning: Open,
ye gates of wisdom, that human understanding that perceiveth truth may
enter. The notes are numerous, especially in the first part, explaining
almost every word; e.g., on “Rabbi”: Why does Maimonides employ this
title before the name of his pupil? The answer is: either the word is
not to be taken literally (“master”), but as a mere compliment, or it
has been added by later copyists. Of a similar style seem to be the
Arabic notes in the Berlin MS. Or. Oct. 258, 2, 8, 10. (Cat.
Steinschneider, No. 108.)—Anonymous marginal notes are met with almost
in every MS. of the Moreh; e.g., Brit. Mus. Harl. 5525; Add. 14,763,
14,764; Bodl. 1264, 1; 2282, 10; 2423, 3; Munich MS., 239, 6.
The explanation of passages from the Pentateuch contained in the Moreh
have been collected by D. Ottensosser, and given as an appendix
(Moreh-derek) to Derek-selulah (Pent. with Comm. etc., Furth, 1824).
IV. Controversies.—The seemingly new ideas put forth by Maimonides in
the Moreh and in the first section of his Mishneh-torah (Sefer
ha-maddaʻ) soon produced a lively controversy as regards the merits of
Maimonides’ theories. It was most perplexing to pious Talmudists to
learn how Maimonides explained the anthropomorphisms employed in the
Bible, the Midrashim and the Talmud, what he thought about the future
state of our soul, and that he considered the study of philosophy as
the highest degree of Divine worship, surpassing even the study of the
Law and the practice of its precepts. The objections and attacks of
Daniel of Damascus were easily silenced by a ḥerem (excommunication)
pronounced against him by the Rosh ha-golah Rabbi David. Stronger was
the opposition that had its centre in Montpellier. Rabbi Solomon ben
Abraham noticed with regret in his own community the fruit of the
theories of Maimonides in the neglect of the study of the Law and of
the practice of the Divine precepts. It happened to Moses Maimonides
what in modern times happened to Moses Mendelssohn. Many so-called
disciples and followers of the great master misunderstood or
misinterpreted his teaching in support of their dereliction of Jewish
law and Jewish practice, and thus brought disrepute on him in the eyes
of their opponents. Thus it came that Rabbi Solomon and his disciples
turned their wrath against the writings of Maimonides instead of
combating the arguments of the pseudo-Maimonists. The latter even
accused Solomon of having denounced the Moreh and the Sefer ha-maddaʻ
to the Dominicans, who condemned these writings to the flames; when
subsequently copies of the Talmud were burnt, and some of the followers
of the Rabbi of Montpellier were subjected to cruel tortures, the
Maimonists saw in this event a just punishment for offending
Maimonides. (Letters of Hillel of Verona, Ḥemdah Genuzah, ed. H.
Edelmann, p. 18 sqq.).
Meir b. Todros ha-levi Abulafia wrote already during the lifetime of
Maimonides to the wise men in Lunel about the heretic doctrines he
discovered in the works of Maimonides. Ahron b. Meshullam and Shesheth
Benvenisti defended Maimonides. About 1232 a correspondence opened
between the Maimonists and the Anti-Maimonists (Grätz, Gesch. d. J.
vii. note I). The Grammarian David Kimḥi wrote in defence of Maimonides
three letters to Jehudah Alfachar, who answered each of them in the
sense of Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier. Abraham b. Ḥisdai and Samuel b.
Abraham Saportas on the side of the Maimonists, took part in the
controversy. Meshullam b. Kalonymos b. Todros of Narbonne begged
Alfachar to treat Kimḥi with more consideration, whereupon Alfachar
resolved to withdraw from the controversy. Naḥmanides, though more on
the side of Rabbi Solomon, wrote two letters of a conciliatory
character, advising moderation on both sides. Representatives of the
congregations of Saragossa, Huesca, Monzon, Kalatajud, and Lerida
signed declarations against R. Solomon. A ḥerem was proclaimed from
Lunel and Narbonne against the Anti-Maimonists. The son of Maimonides,
Abraham, wrote a pamphlet Milḥamot adonai, in defence of the writings
of his father. The controversy raised about fifty years later by Abba
Mari Don Astruc and R. Solomon ben-Aderet of Barcelona, concerned the
Moreh less directly. The question was of a more general character: Is
the study of philosophy dangerous to the religious belief of young
students? The letters written in this controversy are contained in
Minḥat-ḳenaot by Abba Mari Don Astruc (Presburg, 1838), and Kitab
alrasail of Meir Abulafia ed. J. Brill (Paris, 1871). Yedaya Bedrasi
took part in this controversy, and wrote Ketab hitnaẓlut in defence of
the study of philosophy (Teshubot Rashba, Hanau, 1610, p. 111 b.). The
whole controversy ended in the victory of the Moreh and the other
writings of Maimonides. Stray remarks are found in various works, some
in praise and some in condemnation of Maimonides. A few instances may
suffice. Rabbi Jacob Emden in his Mitpaḥat-sefarim (Lemberg, 1870, p.
56) believes that parts of the Moreh are spurious; he even doubts
whether any portion of it is the work of “Maimonides, the author of the
Mishneh-torah, who was not capable of writing such heretic doctrines.”
S. D. Luzzato regards Maimonides with great reverence, but this does
not prevent him from severely criticising his philosophical theories
(Letters to S. Rappoport, No. 79, 83, 266, Iggeroth Shedal ed. E.
Graber, Przemys’l, 1882), and from expressing his conviction that the
saying “From Moses to Moses none rose like Moses,” was as untrue as
that suggested by Rappoport, “From Abraham to Abraham (Ibn-Ezra) none
rose like Abraham.” Rabbi Hirsch Chayyuth in Darke-Mosheh (Zolkiew,
1840) examines the attacks made upon the writings of Maimonides, and
tries to refute them, and to show that they can be reconciled with the
teaching of the Talmud.
The Bodl. MS. 2240, 3a, contains a document signed by Josselman and
other Rabbis, declaring that they accept the teaching of Maimonides as
correct, with the exception of his theory about angels and sacrifices.
Numerous poems were written, both in admiration and in condemnation of
the Moreh. Most of them precede or follow the Moreh in the printed
editions and in the various MS. copies of the work. A few have been
edited in Dibre-ḥakamim, pp. 75 and 86; in the Literaturblatt d. Or. I.
379, II. 26–27, IV. 748, and Leket-shoshannim by Dr. Grätz. In the
Sammelband of the Mekize Nirdamim (1885) a collection of 69 of these
poems is contained, edited and explained by Prof. Dr. A. Berliner. In
imitation of the Moreh and with a view of displacing Maimonides’ work,
the Karaite Ahron II. b. Eliah wrote a philosophical treatise,
Eẓ-ḥayyim (Ed. F. Delitzsch. Leipzig, 1841).
Of the works that discuss the whole or part of the philosophical system
of the Moreh the following are noteworthy:—
Bacher, W. Die Bibilexegese Moses Maimûni’s, in the Jahresbericht der
Landes Rabbinerschule zu Buda-Pest. 1896.
Eisler, M. Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters.
Abtheil. II., Moses Maimonides (Wien, 1870).
Geiger, A. Das Judenthum u. seine Geschichte (Breslau, 1865), Zehnte
Vorlesung: Aben Ezra u. Maimonides.
Grätz, H. Geschichte d. Juden, VI. p. 363 sqq.
Joel, M. Religionsphilosophie des Moses b. Maimon (Breslau, 1859).
Joel, M. Albertus Magnus u. sein Verhältniss zu Maimonides (Breslau,
1863).
Kaufmann, D. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, VII. Gotha, 1874.
Philippsohn, L. Die Philosophie des Maimonides. Predigt und
Schul-Magazin, I. xviii. (Magdeburg, 1834.)
Rosin, D. Die Ethik d. Maimonides (Breslau, 1876).
Rubin, S. Spinoza u. Maimonides, ein Psychologisch-Philosophisches
Antitheton (Wien, 1868).
Scheyer, S. Das psychologische System des Maimonides. Frankfort-a.-M.,
1845.
Weiss, T. H. Beth-Talmud, I. x. p. 289.
David Yellin and Israel Abrahams, Maimonides.
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
It is the object of this work “to afford a guide for the perplexed,”
i.e. “to thinkers whose studies have brought them into collision with
religion” (p. 9), “who have studied philosophy and have acquired sound
knowledge, and who, while firm in religious matters, are perplexed and
bewildered on account of the ambiguous and figurative expressions
employed in the holy writings” (p. 5). Joseph, the son of Jehudah Ibn
Aknin, a disciple of Maimonides, is addressed by his teacher as an
example of this kind of students. It was “for him and for those like
him” that the treatise was composed, and to him this work is inscribed
in the dedicatory letter with which the Introduction begins.
Maimonides, having discovered that his disciple was sufficiently
advanced for an exposition of the esoteric ideas in the books of the
Prophets, commenced to give him such expositions “by way of hints.” His
disciple then begged him to give him further explanations, to treat of
metaphysical themes, and to expound the system and the method of the
Kalām, or Mohammedan Theology. [1] In compliance with this request,
Maimonides composed the Guide for the Perplexed. The reader has,
therefore, to expect that the subjects mentioned in the disciple’s
request indicate the design and arrangement of the present work, and
that the Guide consists of the following parts:—1. An exposition of the
esoteric ideas (sodot) in the books of the Prophets. 2. A treatment of
certain metaphysical problems. 3. An examination of the system and
method of the Kalām. This, in fact, is a correct account of the
contents of the book; but in the second part of the Introduction, in
which the theme of this work is defined, the author mentions only the
first-named subject. He observes: “My primary object is to explain
certain terms occurring in the prophetic book. Of these some are
homonymous, some figurative, and some hybrid terms.” “This work has
also a second object. It is designed to explain certain obscure figures
which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterised as
being figures” (p. 2). Yet from this observation it must not be
inferred that Maimonides abandoned his original purpose; for he
examines the Kalām in the last chapters of the First Part (ch.
lxx.–lxxvi.), and treats of certain metaphysical themes in the
beginning of the Second Part (Introd. and ch. i.–xxv.). But in the
passage quoted above he confines himself to a delineation of the main
object of this treatise, and advisedly leaves unmentioned the other two
subjects, which, however important they may be, are here of subordinate
interest. Nor did he consider it necessary to expatiate on these
subjects; he only wrote for the student, for whom a mere reference to
works on philosophy and science was sufficient. We therefore meet now
and then with such phrases as the following: “This is fully discussed
in works on metaphysics.” By references of this kind the author may
have intended to create a taste for the study of philosophical works.
But our observation only holds good with regard to the Aristotelian
philosophy. The writings of the Mutakallemim are never commended by
him; he states their opinions, and tells his disciple that he would not
find any additional argument, even if he were to read all their
voluminous works (p. 133). Maimonides was a zealous disciple of
Aristotle, although the theory of the Kalām might seem to have been
more congenial to Jewish thought and belief. The Kalām upheld the
theory of God’s Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity, together with the
creatio ex nihilo. Maimonides nevertheless opposed the Kalām, and,
anticipating the question, why preference should be given to the system
of Aristotle, which included the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe, a theory contrary to the fundamental teaching of the
Scriptures, he exposed the weakness of the Kalām and its fallacies.
The exposition of Scriptural texts is divided by the author into two
parts; the first part treats of homonymous, figurative, and hybrid
terms, [2] employed in reference to God; the second part relates to
Biblical figures and allegories. These two parts do not closely follow
each other; they are separated by the examination of the Kalām, and the
discussion of metaphysical problems. It seems that the author adopted
this arrangement for the following reason: first of all, he intended to
establish the fact that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply
corporeality, and that the Divine Being of whom the Bible speaks could
therefore be regarded as identical with the Primal Cause of the
philosophers. Having established this principle, he discusses from a
purely metaphysical point of view the properties of the Primal Cause
and its relation to the universe. A solid foundation is thus
established for the esoteric exposition of Scriptural passages. Before
discussing metaphysical problems, which he treats in accordance with
Aristotelian philosophy, he disposes of the Kalām, and demonstrates
that its arguments are illogical and illusory.
The “Guide for the Perplexed” contains, therefore, an Introduction and
the following four parts:—1. On homonymous, figurative, and hybrid
terms. 2. On the Supreme Being and His relation to the universe,
according to the Kalām. 3. On the Primal Cause and its relation to the
universe, according to the philosophers. 4. Esoteric exposition of some
portions of the Bible (sodot): a, Maʻaseh bereshith, or the history of
the Creation (Genesis, ch. i.–iv.); b, on Prophecy; c, Maʻaseh
mercabhah, or the description of the divine chariot (Ezekiel, ch. i.).
According to this plan, the work ends with the seventh chapter of the
Third Part. The chapters which follow may be considered as an appendix;
they treat of the following theological themes: the Existence of Evil,
Omniscience and Providence, Temptations, Design in Nature, in the Law,
and in the Biblical Narratives, and finally the true Worship of God.
In the Introduction to the “Guide,” Maimonides (1) describes the object
of the work and the method he has followed; (2) treats of similes; (3)
gives “directions for the study of the work”; and (4) discusses the
usual causes of inconsistencies in authors.
1 (pp. 2–3). Inquiring into the root of the evil which the Guide was
intended to remove, viz., the conflict between science and religion,
the author perceived that in most cases it originated in a
misinterpretation of the anthropomorphisms in Holy Writ. The main
difficulty is found in the ambiguity of the words employed by the
prophets when speaking of the Divine Being; the question arises whether
they are applied to the Deity and to other things in one and the same
sense or equivocally; in the latter case the author distinguishes
between homonyms pure and simple, figures, and hybrid terms. In order
to show that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply the
corporeality of the Deity, he seeks in each instance to demonstrate
that the expression under examination is a perfect homonym denoting
things which are totally distinct from each other, and whenever such a
demonstration is impossible, he assumes that the expression is a hybrid
term, that is, being employed in one instance figuratively and in
another homonymously. His explanation of “form” (ẓelem) may serve as an
illustration. According to his opinion, it invariably denotes “form” in
the philosophical acceptation of the term, viz., the complex of the
essential properties of a thing. But to obviate objections he proposes
an alternative view, to take ẓelem as a hybrid term that may be
explained as a class noun denoting only things of the same class, or as
a homonym employed for totally different things, viz., “form” in the
philosophical sense, and “form” in the ordinary meaning of the word.
Maimonides seems to have refrained from explaining anthropomorphisms as
figurative expressions, lest by such interpretation he might implicitly
admit the existence of a certain relation and comparison between the
Creator and His creatures.
Jewish philosophers before Maimonides enunciated and demonstrated the
Unity and the Incorporeality of the Divine Being, and interpreted
Scriptural metaphors on the principle that “the Law speaks in the
language of man”; but our author adopted a new and altogether original
method. The Commentators, when treating of anthropomorphisms, generally
contented themselves with the statement that the term under
consideration must not be taken in its literal sense, or they
paraphrased the passage in expressions which implied a lesser degree of
corporeality. The Talmud, the Midrashim, and the Targumim abound in
paraphrases of this kind. Saadiah in “Emunot ve-deʻot,” Bahya in his
“Ḥobot ha-lebabot,” and Jehudah ha-levi in the “Cusari,” insist on the
necessity and the appropriateness of such interpretations. Saadiah
enumerates ten terms which primarily denote organs of the human body,
and are figuratively applied to God. To establish this point of view he
cites numerous instances in which the terms in question are used in a
figurative sense without being applied to God. Saadiah further shows
that the Divine attributes are either qualifications of such of God’s
actions as are perceived by man, or they imply a negation. The
correctness of this method was held to be so obvious that some authors
found it necessary to apologize to the reader for introducing such
well-known topics. From R. Abraham ben David’s strictures on the Yad
haḥazaḳah it is, however, evident that in the days of Maimonides
persons were not wanting who defended the literal interpretation of
certain anthropomorphisms. Maimonides, therefore, did not content
himself with the vague and general rule, “The Law speaks in the
language of man,” but sought carefully to define the meaning of each
term when applied to God, and to identify it with some transcendental
and metaphysical term. In pursuing this course he is sometimes forced
to venture upon an interpretation which is much too far-fetched to
commend itself even to the supposed philosophical reader. In such
instances he generally adds a simple and plain explanation, and leaves
it to the option of the reader to choose the one which appears to him
preferable. The enumeration of the different meanings of a word is
often, from a philological point of view, incomplete; he introduces
only such significations as serve his object. When treating of an
imperfect homonym, the several significations of which are derived from
one primary signification, he apparently follows a certain system which
he does not employ in the interpretation of perfect homonyms. The
homonymity of the term is not proved; the author confines himself to
the remark, “It is employed homonymously,” even when the various
meanings of a word might easily be traced to a common source.
2 (pag. 4–8). In addition to the explanation of homonyms Maimonides
undertakes to interpret similes and allegories. At first it had been
his intention to write two distinct works—Sefer ha-nebuah, “A Book on
Prophecy,” and Sefer ha-shevaah, “A Book of Reconciliation.” In the
former work he had intended to explain difficult passages of the Bible,
and in the latter to expound such passages in the Midrash and the
Talmud as seemed to be in conflict with common sense. With respect to
the “Book of Reconciliation,” he abandoned his plan, because he
apprehended that neither the learned nor the unlearned would profit by
it: the one would find it superfluous, the other tedious. The subject
of the “Book on Prophecy” is treated in the present work, and also
strange passages that occasionally occur in the Talmud and the Midrash
are explained.
The treatment of the simile must vary according as the simile is
compound or simple. In the first case, each part represents a separate
idea and demands a separate interpretation; in the other case, only one
idea is represented, and it is not necessary to assign to each part a
separate metaphorical meaning. This division the author illustrates by
citing the dream of Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 12 sqq.), and the description
of the adulteress (Prov. vii. 6 sqq.). He gives no rule by which it
might be ascertained to which of the two categories a simile belongs,
and, like other Commentators, he seems to treat as essential those
details of a simile for which he can offer an adequate interpretation.
As a general principle, he warns against the confusion and the errors
which arise when an attempt is made to expound every single detail of a
simile. His own explanations are not intended to be exhaustive; on the
contrary, they are to consist of brief allusions to the idea
represented by the simile, of mere suggestions, which the reader is
expected to develop and to complete. The author thus aspires to follow
in the wake of the Creator, whose works can only be understood after a
long and persevering study. Yet it is possible that he derived his
preference for a reserved and mysterious style from the example of
ancient philosophers, who discussed metaphysical problems in figurative
and enigmatic language. Like Ibn Ezra, who frequently concludes his
exposition of a Biblical passage with the phrase, “Here a profound idea
(sod) is hidden,” Maimonides somewhat mysteriously remarks at the end
of different chapters, “Note this,” “Consider it well.” In such phrases
some Commentators fancied that they found references to metaphysical
theories which the author was not willing fully to discuss. Whether
this was the case or not, in having recourse to that method he was not,
as some have suggested, actuated by fear of being charged with heresy.
He expresses his opinion on the principal theological questions without
reserve, and does not dread the searching inquiries of opponents; for
he boldly announces that their displeasure would not deter him from
teaching the truth and guiding those who are able and willing to follow
him, however few these might be. When, however, we examine the work
itself, we are at a loss to discover to which parts the professed
enigmatic method was applied. His theories concerning the Deity, the
Divine attributes, angels, creatio ex nihilo, prophecy, and other
subjects, are treated as fully as might be expected. It is true that a
cloud of mysterious phrases enshrouds the interpretation of Maʻaseh
bereshit (Gen. i.–iii.) and Maʻaseh mercabah (Ez. i.). But the
significant words occurring in these portions are explained in the
First Part of this work, and a full exposition is found in the Second
and Third Parts. Nevertheless the statement that the exposition was
never intended to be explicit occurs over and over again. The treatment
of the first three chapters of Genesis concludes thus: “These remarks,
together with what we have already observed on the subject, and what we
may have to add, must suffice both for the object and for the reader we
have in view” (II. xxx.). In like manner, he declares, after the
explanation of the first chapter of Ezekiel: “I have given you here as
many suggestions as may be of service to you, if you will give them a
further development.... Do not expect to hear from me anything more on
this subject, for I have, though with some hesitation, gone as far in
my explanation as I possibly could go” (III. vii.).
3 (pag. 8–9). In the next paragraph, headed, “Directions for the Study
of this Work,” he implores the reader not to be hasty with his
criticism, and to bear in mind that every sentence, indeed every word,
had been fully considered before it was written down. Yet it might
easily happen that the reader could not reconcile his own view with
that of the author, and in such a case he is asked to ignore the
disapproved chapter or section altogether. Such disapproval Maimonides
attributes to a mere misconception on the part of the reader, a fate
which awaits every work composed in a mystical style. In adopting this
peculiar style, he intended to reduce to a minimum the violation of the
rule laid down in the Mishnah (Ḥagigah ii. 1), that metaphysics should
not be taught publicly. The violation of this rule he justifies by
citing the following two Mishnaic maxims: “It is time to do something
in honour of the Lord” (Berakot ix. 5), and “Let all thy acts be guided
by pure intentions” (Abot ii. 17). Maimonides increased the
mysteriousness of the treatise, by expressing his wish that the reader
should abstain from expounding the work, lest he might spread in the
name of the author opinions which the latter never held. But it does
not occur to him that the views he enunciates might in themselves be
erroneous. He is positive that his own theory is unexceptionally
correct, that his esoteric interpretations of Scriptural texts are
sound, and that those who differed from him—viz., the Mutakallemim on
the one hand, and the unphilosophical Rabbis on the other—are
indefensibly wrong. In this respect other Jewish philosophers—e.g.
Saadiah and Baḥya—were far less positive; they were conscious of their
own fallibility, and invited the reader to make such corrections as
might appear needful. Owing to this strong self-reliance of Maimonides,
it is not to be expected that opponents would receive a fair and
impartial judgment at his hands.
4 (pag. 9–11). The same self-reliance is noticeable in the next and
concluding paragraph of the Introduction. Here he treats of the
contradictions which are to be found in literary works, and he divides
them with regard to their origin into seven classes. The first four
classes comprise the apparent contradictions, which can be traced back
to the employment of elliptical speech; the other three classes
comprise the real contradictions, and are due to carelessness and
oversight, or they are intended to serve some special purpose. The
Scriptures, the Talmud, and the Midrash abound in instances of apparent
contradictions; later works contain real contradictions, which escaped
the notice of the writers. In the present treatise, however, there
occur only such contradictions as are the result of intention and
design.
PART I.
The homonymous expressions which are discussed in the First Part
include—(1) nouns and verbs used in reference to God, ch. i. to ch.
xlix.; (2) attributes of the Deity, ch. l. to lx.; (3) expressions
commonly regarded as names of God, ch. lxi. to lxx. In the first
section the following groups can be distinguished—(a) expressions which
denote form and figure, ch. i. to ch. vi.; (b) space or relations of
space, ch. viii. to ch. xxv.; (c) parts of the animal body and their
functions, ch. xxviii. to ch. xlix. Each of these groups includes
chapters not connected with the main subject, but which serve as a help
for the better understanding of previous or succeeding interpretations.
Every word selected for discussion bears upon some Scriptural text
which, according to the opinion of the author, has been misinterpreted.
But such phrases as “the mouth of the Lord,” and “the hand of the
Lord,” are not introduced, because their figurative meaning is too
obvious to be misunderstood.
The lengthy digressions which are here and there interposed appear like
outbursts of feeling and passion which the author could not repress.
Yet they are “words fitly spoken in the right place”; for they
gradually unfold the author’s theory, and acquaint the reader with
those general principles on which he founds the interpretations in the
succeeding chapters. Moral reflections are of frequent occurrence, and
demonstrate the intimate connexion between a virtuous life and the
attainment of higher knowledge, in accordance with the maxim current
long before Maimonides, and expressed in the Biblical words, “The fear
of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” (Ps. cxi. 10). No opportunity
is lost to inculcate this lesson, be it in a passing remark or in an
elaborate essay.
The discussion of the term “ẓelem” (ch. i.) afforded the first occasion
for reflections of this kind. Man, “the image of God,” is defined as a
living and rational being, as though the moral faculties of man were
not an essential element of his existence, and his power to discern
between good and evil were the result of the first sin. According to
Maimonides, the moral faculty would, in fact, not have been required,
if man had remained a purely rational being. It is only through the
senses that “the knowledge of good and evil” has become indispensable.
The narrative of Adam’s fall is, according to Maimonides, an allegory
representing the relation which exists between sensation, moral
faculty, and intellect. In this early part (ch. ii.), however, the
author does not yet mention this theory; on the contrary, every
allusion to it is for the present studiously avoided, its full
exposition being reserved for the Second Part.
The treatment of ḥazah “he beheld” (ch. vi.), is followed by the advice
that the student should not approach metaphysics otherwise than after a
sound and thorough preparation, because a rash attempt to solve
abstruse problems brings nothing but injury upon the inexperienced
investigator. The author points to the “nobles of the children of
Israel” (Exod. xxiv. 11), who, according to his interpretation, fell
into this error, and received their deserved punishment. He gives
additional force to these exhortations by citing a dictum of Aristotle
to the same effect. In a like way he refers to the allegorical use of
certain terms by Plato (ch. xvii.) in support of his interpretation of
“ẓur” (lit., “rock”) as denoting “Primal Cause.”
The theory that nothing but a sound moral and intellectual training
would entitle a student to engage in metaphysical speculations is again
discussed in the digression which precedes the third group of homonyms
(xxxi.–xxxvi.). Man’s intellectual faculties, he argues, have this in
common with his physical forces, that their sphere of action is
limited, and they become inefficient whenever they are overstrained.
This happens when a student approaches metaphysics without due
preparation. Maimonides goes on to argue that the non-success of
metaphysical studies is attributable to the following causes: the
transcendental character of this discipline, the imperfect state of the
student’s knowledge, the persistent efforts which have to be made even
in the preliminary studies, and finally the waste of energy and time
owing to the physical demands of man. For these reasons the majority of
persons are debarred from pursuing the study of metaphysics.
Nevertheless, there are certain metaphysical truths which have to be
communicated to all men, e.g., that God is One, and that He is
incorporeal; for to assume that God is corporeal, or that He has any
properties, or to ascribe to Him any attributes, is a sin bordering on
idolatry.
Another digression occurs as an appendix to the second group of
homonyms (ch. xxvi.–xxvii.). Maimonides found that only a limited
number of terms are applied to God in a figurative sense; and again,
that in the “Targum” of Onkelos some of the figures are paraphrased,
while other figures received a literal rendering. He therefore seeks to
discover the principle which was applied both in the Sacred Text and in
the translation, and he found it in the Talmudical dictum, “The Law
speaketh the language of man.” For this reason all figures are eschewed
which, in their literal sense, would appear to the multitude as
implying debasement or a blemish. Onkelos, who rigorously guards
himself against using any term that might suggest corporification,
gives a literal rendering of figurative terms when there is no cause
for entertaining such an apprehension. Maimonides illustrates this rule
by the mode in which Onkelos renders “yarad” (“he went down,”), when
used in reference to God. It is generally paraphrased, but in one
exceptional instance, occurring in Jacob’s “visions of the night” (Gen.
xlvi. 4), it is translated literally; in this instance the literal
rendering does not lead to corporification; because visions and dreams
were generally regarded as mental operations, devoid of objective
reality. Simple and clear as this explanation may be, we do not
consider that it really explains the method of Onkelos. On the
contrary, the translator paraphrased anthropomorphic terms, even when
he found them in passages relating to dreams or visions; and indeed it
is doubtful whether Maimonides could produce a single instance in
favour of his view. He was equally unsuccessful in his explanation of
“ḥazah” “he saw” (ch. xlviii.). He says that when the object of the
vision was derogatory, it was not brought into direct relation with the
Deity; in such instances the verb is paraphrased, while in other
instances the rendering is literal. Although Maimonides grants that the
force of this observation is weakened by three exceptions, he does not
doubt its correctness.
The next Section (ch. l. to ch. lix.) “On the Divine Attributes” begins
with the explanation that “faith” consists in thought, not in mere
utterance; in conviction, not in mere profession. This explanation
forms the basis for the subsequent discussion. The several arguments
advanced by Maimonides against the employment of attributes are
intended to show that those who assume the real existence of Divine
attributes may possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity
and the Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it. A
demonstration of this fact would be needless, if the Attributists had
not put forth their false theses and defended them with the utmost
tenacity, though with the most absurd arguments.
After this explanation the author proceeds to discuss the impropriety
of assigning attributes to God. The Attributists admit that God is the
Primal Cause, One, incorporeal, free from emotion and privation, and
that He is not comparable to any of His creatures. Maimonides therefore
contends that any attributes which, either directly or indirectly, are
in contradiction to this creed, should not be applied to God. By this
rule he rejects four classes of attributes: viz., those which include a
definition, a partial definition, a quality, or a relation.
The definition of a thing includes its efficient cause; and since God
is the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or described by a partial
definition. A quality, whether psychical, physical, emotional, or
quantitative, is always regarded as something distinct from its
substratum; a thing which possesses any quality, consists, therefore,
of that quality and a substratum, and should not be called one. All
relations of time and space imply corporeality; all relations between
two objects are, to a certain degree, a comparison between these two
objects. To employ any of these attributes in reference to God would be
as much as to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is not
One, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to His creatures.
There is only one class of attributes to which Maimonides makes no
objection, viz. such as describe actions, and to this class belong all
the Divine attributes which occur in the Scriptures. The “Thirteen
Attributes” (shelosh esreh middot, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7) serve as an
illustration. They were communicated to Moses when he, as the chief of
the Israelites, wished to know the way in which God governs the
universe, in order that he himself in ruling the nation might follow
it, and thereby promote their real well-being.
On the whole, the opponents of Maimonides admit the correctness of this
theory. Only a small number of attributes are the subject of dispute.
The Scriptures unquestionably ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power,
Wisdom, Unity, Eternity, and Will. The Attributists regard these as
properties distinct from, but co-existing with, the Essence of God.
With great acumen, and with equally great acerbity, Maimonides shows
that their theory is irreconcilable with their belief in the Unity and
the Incorporeality of God. He points out three different ways of
interpreting these attributes:—1. They may be regarded as descriptive
of the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such
properties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result of the
will, the power, and the wisdom of a living being. 2. The terms
“existing,” “one,” “wise,” etc., are applied to God and to His
creatures homonymously; as attributes of God they coincide with His
Essence; as attributes of anything beside God they are distinct from
the essence of the thing. 3. These terms do not describe a positive
quality, but express a negation of its opposite. This third
interpretation appears to have been preferred by the author; he
discusses it more fully than the two others. He observes that the
knowledge of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative
character, and he shows by simple and appropriate examples that an
approximate knowledge of a thing can be attained by mere negations,
that such knowledge increases with the number of these negations, and
that an error in positive assertions is more injurious than an error in
negative assertions. In describing the evils which arise from the
application of positive attributes to God, he unsparingly censures the
hymnologists, because he found them profuse in attributing positive
epithets to the Deity. On the basis of his own theory he could easily
have interpreted these epithets in the same way as he explains the
Scriptural attributes of God. His severity may, however, be accounted
for by the fact that the frequent recurrence of positive attributes in
the literary composition of the Jews was the cause that the Mohammedans
charged the Jews with entertaining false notions of the Deity.
The inquiry into the attributes is followed by a treatment of the names
of God. It seems to have been beyond the design of the author to
elucidate the etymology of each name, or to establish methodically its
signification; for he does not support his explanations by any proof.
His sole aim is to show that the Scriptural names of God in their true
meaning strictly harmonize with the philosophical conception of the
Primal Cause. There are two things which have to be distinguished in
the treatment of the Primal Cause: the Primal Cause per se, and its
relation to the Universe. The first is expressed by the tetragrammaton
and its cognates, the second by the several attributes, especially by
rokeb baʻarabot, “He who rideth on the ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4)
The tetragrammaton exclusively expresses the essence of God, and
therefore it is employed as a nomen proprium. In the mystery of this
name, and others mentioned in the Talmud, as consisting of twelve and
of forty-two letters, Maimonides finds no other secret than the
solution of some metaphysical problems. The subject of these problems
is not actually known, but the author supposes that it referred to the
“absolute existence of the Deity.” He discovers the same idea in ehyeh
(Exod. iii. 14), in accordance with the explanation added in the Sacred
Text: asher ehyeh, “that is, I am.” In the course of this discussion he
exposes the folly or sinfulness of those who pretend to work miracles
by the aid of these and similar names.
With a view of preparing the way for his peculiar interpretation of
rokeb baʻarabot, he explains a variety of Scriptural passages, and
treats of several philosophical terms relative to the Supreme Being.
Such expressions as “the word of God,” “the work of God,” “the work of
His fingers,” “He made,” “He spake,” must be taken in a figurative
sense; they merely represent God as the cause that some work has been
produced, and that some person has acquired a certain knowledge. The
passage, “And He rested on the seventh day” (Exod. xx. 11) is
interpreted as follows: On the seventh Day the forces and laws were
complete, which during the previous six days were in the state of being
established for the preservation of the Universe. They were not to be
increased or modified.
It seems that Maimonides introduced this figurative explanation with a
view of showing that the Scriptural “God” does not differ from the
“Primal Cause” or “Ever-active Intellect” of the philosophers. On the
other hand, the latter do not reject the Unity of God, although they
assume that the Primal Cause comprises the causa efficiens, the agens,
and the causa finalis (or, the cause, the means, and the end); and that
the Ever-active Intellect comprises the intelligens, the intellectus,
and the intellectum (or, the thinking subject, the act of thought, and
the object thought of); because in this case these apparently different
elements are, in fact, identical. The Biblical term corresponding to
“Primal Cause” is rokeb baʻarabot, “riding on ʻarabot.” Maimonides is
at pains to prove that ʻarabot denotes “the highest sphere,” which
causes the motion of all other spheres, and which thus brings about the
natural course of production and destruction. By “the highest sphere”
he does not understand a material sphere, but the immaterial world of
intelligences and angels, “the seat of justice and judgment, stores of
life, peace, and blessings, the seat of the souls of the righteous,”
etc. Rokeb baʻarabot, therefore, means: He presides over the immaterial
beings, He is the source of their powers, by which they move the
spheres and regulate the course of nature. This theory is more fully
developed in the Second Part.
The next section (chap. lxxi.–lxxvi.) treats of the Kalām. According to
the author, the method of the Kalām is copied from the Christian
Fathers, who applied it in the defence of their religious doctrines.
The latter examined in their writings the views of the philosophers,
ostensibly in search of truth, in reality, however, with the object of
supporting their own dogmas. Subsequently Mohammedan theologians found
in these works arguments which seemed to confirm the truth of their own
religion; they blindly adopted these arguments, and made no inquiry
whence these had been derived. Maimonides rejects à priori the theories
of the Mutakallemim, because they explain the phenomena in the universe
in conformity with preconceived notions, instead of following the
scientific method of the philosophers. Among the Jews, especially in
the East and in Africa, there were also some who adopted the method of
the Kalām; in doing so they followed the Muʻtazilah (dissenting
Mohammedans), not because they found it more correct than the Kalām of
the Ashariyah (orthodox Mohammedans), but because at the time when the
Jews became acquainted with the Kalām it was only cultivated by the
Muʻtazilah. The Jews in Spain, however, remained faithful to the
Aristotelian philosophy.
The four principal dogmas upheld by the dominant religions were the
creatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God, His Incorporeality, and His
Unity. By the philosophers the creatio ex nihilo was rejected, but the
Mutakallemim defended it, and founded upon it their proofs for the
other three dogmas. Maimonides adopts the philosophical proofs for the
Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity of God, because they must be
admitted even by those who deny the creatio ex nihilo, the proofs being
independent of this dogma. In order to show that the Mutakallemim are
mistaken in ignoring the organization of the existing order of things,
the author gives a minute description of the analogy between the
Universe, or Kosmos, and man, the mikrokosmos (ch. lxxii.). This
analogy is merely asserted, and the reader is advised either to find
the proof by his own studies, or to accept the fact on the authority of
the learned. The Kalām does not admit the existence of law,
organization, and unity in the universe. Its adherents have,
accordingly, no trustworthy criterion to determine whether a thing is
possible or impossible. Everything that is conceivable by imagination
is by them held as possible. The several parts of the universe are in
no relation to each other; they all consist of equal elements; they are
not composed of substance and properties, but of atoms and accidents:
the law of causality is ignored; man’s actions are not the result of
will and design, but are mere accidents. Maimonides in enumerating and
discussing the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kalām (ch.
lxiii.), which embody these theories, had apparently no intention to
give a complete and impartial account of the Kalām; he solely aimed at
exposing the weakness of a system which he regarded as founded not on a
sound basis of positive facts, but on mere fiction; not on the
evidences of the senses and of reason, but on the illusions of
imagination.
After having shown that the twelve fundamental propositions of the
Kalām are utterly untenable, Maimonides finds no difficulty in
demonstrating the insufficiency of the proofs advanced by the
Mutakallemim in support of the above-named dogmas. Seven arguments are
cited which the Mutakallemim employ in support of the creatio ex
nihilo. [3] The first argument is based on the atomic theory, viz.,
that the universe consists of equal atoms without inherent properties:
all variety and change observed in nature must therefore be attributed
to an external force. Three arguments are supplied by the proposition
that finite things of an infinite number cannot exist (Propos. xi.).
Three other arguments derive their support from the following
proposition (x.): Everything that can be imagined can have an actual
existence. The present order of things is only one out of the many
forms which are possible, and exist through the fiat of a determining
power.
The Unity of God is demonstrated by the Mutakallemim as follows: Two
Gods would have been unable to produce the world; one would have
impeded the work of the other. Maimonides points out that this might
have been avoided by a suitable division of labour. Another argument is
as follows: The two Beings would have one element in common, and would
differ in another; each would thus consist of two elements, and would
not be God. Maimonides might have suggested that the argument moves in
a circle, the unity of God being proved by assuming His unity. The
following argument is altogether unintelligible: Both Gods are moved to
action by will; the will, being without a substratum, could not act
simultaneously in two separate beings. The fallacy of the following
argument is clear: The existence of one God is proved; the existence of
a second God is not proved, it would be possible; and as possibility is
inapplicable to God, there does not exist a second God. The possibility
of ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with
potentiality of existence. Again, if one God suffices, the second God
is superfluous; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and
cannot be a deity. Maimonides objects that it would not be an
imperfection in either deity to act exclusively within their respective
provinces. As in the criticism of the first argument, Maimonides seems
here to forget that the existence of separate provinces would require a
superior determining Power, and the two Beings would not properly be
called Gods.
The weakest of all arguments are, according to Maimonides, those by
which the Mutakallemim sought to support the doctrine of God’s
Incorporeality. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and
would not be one; or He would be comparable to other beings: but a
comparison implies the existence of similar and of dissimilar elements,
and God would thus not be one. A corporeal God would be finite, and an
external power would be required to define those limits.
PART II.
The Second Part includes the following sections:—1. Introduction; 2.
Philosophical Proof of the Existence of One Incorporeal Primal Cause
(ch. i.); 3. On the Spheres and the Intelligences (ii.–xii.); 4. On the
theory of the Eternity of the Universe (xiii.–xxix.); 5. Exposition of
Gen. i.–iv. (xxx., xxxi.); 6. On Prophecy (xxxii.–xlviii.).
The enumeration of twenty-six propositions, by the aid of which the
philosophers prove the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorporeality of
the Primal Cause, forms the introduction to the Second Part of this
work. The propositions treat of the properties of the finite and the
infinite (i.–iii., x.–xii., xvi.), of change and motion (iv.–ix.,
xiii.–xviii.), and of the possible and the absolute or necessary
(xx.–xxv.); they are simply enumerated, but are not demonstrated.
Whatever the value of these Propositions may be, they were inadequate
for their purpose, and the author is compelled to introduce auxiliary
propositions to prove the existence of an infinite, incorporeal, and
uncompounded Primal Cause. (Arguments I. and III.)
The first and the fourth arguments may be termed cosmological proofs.
They are based on the hypothesis that the series of causes for every
change is finite, and terminates in the Primal Cause. There is no
essential difference in the two arguments: in the first are discussed
the causes of the motion of a moving object; the fourth treats of the
causes which bring about the transition of a thing from potentiality to
reality. To prove that neither the spheres nor a force residing in them
constitute the Primal Cause, the philosophers employed two
propositions, of which the one asserts that the revolutions of the
spheres are infinite, and the other denies the possibility that an
infinite force should reside in a finite object. The distinction
between the finite in space and the finite in time appears to have been
ignored; for it is not shown why a force infinite in time could not
reside in a body finite in space. Moreover, those who, like Maimonides,
reject the eternity of the universe, necessarily reject this proof,
while those who hold that the universe is eternal do not admit that the
spheres have ever been only potential, and passed from potentiality to
actuality. The second argument is supported by the following
supplementary proposition: If two elements coexist in a state of
combination, and one of these elements is to be found at the same time
separate, in a free state, it is certain that the second element is
likewise to be found by itself. Now, since things exist which combine
in themselves motive power and mass moved by that power, and since mass
is found by itself, motive power must also be found by itself
independent of mass.
The third argument has a logical character: The universe is either
eternal or temporal, or partly eternal and partly temporal. It cannot
be eternal in all its parts, as many parts undergo destruction; it is
not altogether temporal, because, if so, the universe could not be
reproduced after being destroyed. The continued existence of the
universe leads, therefore, to the conclusion that there is an immortal
force, the Primal Cause, besides the transient world.
These arguments have this in common, that while proving the existence
of a Primal Cause, they at the same time demonstrate the Unity, the
Incorporeality, and the Eternity of that Cause. Special proofs are
nevertheless superadded for each of these postulates, and on the whole
they differ very little from those advanced by the Mohammedan
Theologians.
This philosophical theory of the Primal Cause was adapted by Jewish
scholars to the Biblical theory of the Creator. The universe is a
living, organized being, of which the earth is the centre. Any changes
on this earth are due to the revolutions of the spheres; the lowest or
innermost sphere, viz., the one nearest to the centre, is the sphere of
the moon; the outermost or uppermost is “the all-encompassing sphere.”
Numerous spheres are interposed; but Maimonides divides all the spheres
into four groups, corresponding to the moon, the sun, the planets, and
the fixed stars. This division is claimed by the author as his own
discovery; he believes that it stands in relation to the four causes of
their motions, the four elements of the sublunary world, and the four
classes of beings, viz., the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and
the rational. The spheres have souls, and are endowed with intellect;
their souls enable them to move freely, and the impulse to the motion
is given by the intellect in conceiving the idea of the Absolute
Intellect. Each sphere has an intellect peculiar to itself; the
intellect attached to the sphere of the moon is called “the active
intellect” (Sekel ha-poʻēl). In support of this theory numerous
passages are cited both from Holy Writ and from post-Biblical Jewish
literature. The angels (elohim, malakim) mentioned in the Bible are
assumed to be identical with the intellects of the spheres; they are
free agents, and their volition invariably tends to that which is good
and noble; they emanate from the Primal Cause, and form a descending
series of beings, ending with the active intellect. The transmission of
power from one element to the other is called “emanation” (shefaʻ).
This transmission is performed without the utterance of a sound; if any
voice is supposed to be heard, it is only an illusion, originating in
the human imagination, which is the source of all evils (ch. xii.).
In accordance with this doctrine, Maimonides explains that the three
men who appeared to Abraham, the angels whom Jacob saw ascend and
descend the ladder, and all other angels seen by man, are nothing but
the intellects of the spheres, four in number, which emanate from the
Primal Cause (ch. x.). In his description of the spheres he, as usual,
follows Aristotle. The spheres do not contain any of the four elements
of the sublunary world, but consist of a quintessence, an entirely
different element. Whilst things on this earth are transient, the
beings which inhabit the spheres above are eternal. According to
Aristotle, these spheres, as well as their intellects, coexist with the
Primal Cause. Maimonides, faithful to the teaching of the Scriptures,
here departs from his master, and holds that the spheres and the
intellects had a beginning, and were brought into existence by the will
of the Creator. He does not attempt to give a positive proof of his
doctrine; all he contends is that the theory of the creatio ex nihilo
is, from a philosophical point of view, not inferior to the doctrine
which asserts the eternity of the universe, and that he can refute all
objections advanced against his theory (ch. xiii.–xxviii.).
He next enumerates and criticises the various theories respecting the
origin of the Universe, viz.: A. God created the Universe out of
nothing. B. God formed the Universe from an eternal substance. C. The
Universe originating in the eternal Primal Cause is co-eternal.—It is
not held necessary by the author to discuss the view of those who do
not assume a Primal Cause, since the existence of such a cause has
already been proved (ch. xiii.).
The objections raised to a creatio ex nihilo by its opponents are
founded partly on the properties of Nature, and partly on those of the
Primal Cause. They infer from the properties of Nature the following
arguments: (1) The first moving force is eternal; for if it had a
beginning, another motion must have produced it, and then it would not
be the First moving force. (2) If the formless matter be not eternal,
it must have been produced out of another substance; it would then have
a certain form by which it might be distinguished from the primary
substance, and then it would not be formless. (3) The circular motion
of the spheres does not involve the necessity of termination; and
anything that is without an end, must be without a beginning. (4)
Anything brought to existence existed previously in potentia; something
must therefore have pre-existed of which potential existence could be
predicated. Some support for the theory of the eternity of the heavens
has been derived from the general belief in the eternity of the
heavens.—The properties of the Primal Cause furnished the following
arguments:—If it were assumed that the Universe was created from
nothing, it would imply that the First Cause had changed from the
condition of a potential Creator to that of an actual Creator, or that
His will had undergone a change, or that He must be imperfect, because
He produced a perishable work, or that He had been inactive during a
certain period. All these contingencies would be contrary to a true
conception of the First Cause (ch. xiv.).
Maimonides is of opinion that the arguments based on the properties of
things in Nature are inadmissible, because the laws by which the
Universe is regulated need not have been in force before the Universe
was in existence. This refutation is styled by our author “a strong
wall built round the Law, able to resist all attacks” (ch. xvii.). In a
similar manner the author proceeds against the objections founded on
the properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual beings, he says,
are not subject to the same laws as material bodies; that which
necessitates a change in the latter or in the will of man need not
produce a change in immaterial beings. As to the belief that the
heavens are inhabited by angels and deities, it has not its origin in
the real existence of these supernatural beings; it was suggested to
man by meditation on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch.
xviii.).
Maimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of the authority
of Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief in the creatio ex
nihilo. Admitting that the great variety of the things in the sublunary
world can be traced to those immutable laws which regulate the
influence of the spheres on the beings below—the variety in the spheres
can only be explained as the result of God’s free will. According to
Aristotle—the principal authority for the eternity of the Universe—it
is impossible that a simple being should, according to the laws of
nature, be the cause of various and compound beings. Another reason for
the rejection of the Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact
that the astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view
which Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system of that
astronomer is likewise far from being perfect and final (ch. xxiv.). It
is impossible to obtain a correct notion of the properties of the
heavenly spheres; “the heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord’s, but
the earth hath He given to the children of man” (Ps. cxv. 16). The
author, observing that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are
untenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such prophets as
Abraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural quotation could, by a
figurative interpretation, be made to agree with the opposite theory,
Maimonides declines to ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be
in opposition to well-established truths, as is the case with
anthropomorphic expressions; for the latter, if taken literally, would
be contrary to the demonstrated truth of God’s incorporeality (ch.
xxv.). He is therefore surprised that the author of Pirke-di Rabbi
Eliezer ventured to assume the eternity of matter, and he thinks it
possible that Rabbi Eliezer carried the license of figurative speech
too far. (Ch. xxvi.).
The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the belief that
the Universe will at a future time be destroyed; the Bible distinctly
teaches the creation, but not the destruction of the world except in
passages which are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On
the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it is clearly
stated “He established them for ever.” (Ps. cxlviii. 5.) The
destruction of the Universe would be, as the creation has been, a
direct act of the Divine will, and not the result of those immutable
laws which govern the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set
aside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages of the
Universe. Within this interval, however, the laws remain undisturbed
(ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the miracles, originate in these
laws, although man is unable to perceive the causal relation. The
Biblical account of the creation concludes with the statement that God
rested on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the work
was complete; no new act of creation was to take place, and no new law
was to be introduced. It is true that the second and the third chapters
of Genesis appear to describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new
law, viz., that of man’s mortality, but these chapters are explained as
containing an allegorical representation of man’s psychical and
intellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the contents of the
first chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer the allegorical explanation
which, as it seems, he had in view without expressly stating it, in his
treatment of Adam’s sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is
certainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the pleasure of
the Almighty the laws of nature may become inoperative, and that the
whole Universe may become annihilated, and on the other hand to deny,
that during the existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever
have been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Maimonides could not
conceive the idea that the work of the All-wise should be, as the
Mutakallemim taught—without plan and system, or that the laws once laid
down should not be sufficient for all emergencies.
The account of the Creation given in the book of Genesis is explained
by the author according to the following two rules: First its language
is allegorical; and, Secondly, the terms employed are homonyms. The
words erez, mayim, ruaḥ, and ḥoshek in the second verse (ch. i.), are
homonyms and denote the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire; in
other instances erez is the terrestrial globe, mayim is water or
vapour, ruaḥ denotes wind, and ḥoshek darkness: According to
Maimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given thus; God
created the Universe by producing first the reshit the “beginning”
(Gen. i. 1), or hatḥalah, i.e., the intellects which give to the
spheres both existence and motion, and thus become the source of the
existence of the entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a
chaos of elements, but its form was successively developed by the
influence of the spheres, and more directly by the action of light and
darkness, the properties of which were fixed on the first day of the
Creation. In the subsequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and
the intellectual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which
the Universe was for the first time ruled by the same natural laws
which still continue in operation, was distinguished as a day blessed
and sanctified by the Creator, who designed it to proclaim the creatio
ex nihilo (Exod. xx. 11). The Israelites were moreover commanded to
keep this Sabbath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut.
v. 15), because during the period of the Egyptian bondage, they had not
been permitted to rest on that day. In the history of the first sin of
man, Adam, Eve, and the serpent represent the intellect, the body, and
the imagination. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan,
mentioned in the Midrash in connexion with this account, is added as
representing man’s appetitive faculties. Imagination, the source of
error, is directly aided by the appetitive faculty, and the two are
intimately connected with the body, to which man generally gives
paramount attention, and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in
the end, however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power.
Instead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms false
conceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to suffering, whilst
the imagination, instead of being guided by the intellect and attaining
a higher development becomes debased and depraved. In the three sons of
Adam, Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the three
elements in man: the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual.
First, the animal element (Abel) becomes extinct; then the vegetable
elements (Kain) are dissolved; only the third element, the intellect
(Seth), survives, and forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).
Maimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit terms, it is
difficult to understand what he had in view by the avowal that he could
not disclose everything. It is unquestionably no easy matter to adapt
each verse in the first chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory;
but such an adaptation is, according to the author’s own view (Part I.,
Introd., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objectionable.
In the next section (xxxii.–xlviii.) Maimonides treats of Prophecy. He
mentions the following three opinions:—1. Any person, irrespective of
his physical or moral qualifications, may be summoned by the Almighty
to the mission of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of
mental development, and can only be attained by training and study. 3.
The gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and mental training,
combined with inspiration. The author adopts the last-mentioned
opinion. He defines prophecy as an emanation (shefaʻ), which through
the will of the Almighty descends from the Active Intellect to the
intellect and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The
prophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose intellect alone
received the necessary impulse from the Active Intellect, and from
diviners or dreamers, whose imagination alone has been influenced by
the Active Intellect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of
this prophetic faculty depends on God’s will, this dependence is
nothing else but the relation which all things bear to the Primal
Cause; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity with the laws
established by the will of God; it gives an impulse to the intellect of
man, and, bringing to light those mental powers which lay dormant, it
merely turns potential faculty into real action. These faculties can be
perfected to such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest
truths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of research
required by ordinary persons. The same fact is noticed with respect to
imagination; man sometimes forms faithful images of objects and events
which cannot be traced to the ordinary channel of information, viz.,
impressions made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a
natural process, it may appear surprising that, of the numerous men
excelling in wisdom, so few became prophets. Maimonides accounts for
this fact by assuming that the moral faculties of such men had not been
duly trained. None of them had, in the author’s opinion, gone through
the moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet.
Besides this, everything which obstructs mental improvement, misdirects
the imagination or impairs the physical strength, and precludes man
from attaining to the rank of prophet. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed
to Jacob during the period of his anxieties on account of his
separation from Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a Divine message during
the years which the Israelites, under Divine punishment, spent in the
desert. On the other hand, music and song awakened the prophetic power
(comp. 2 Kings iii. 15), and “The spirit of prophecy alights only on
him who is wise, strong, and rich” (Babyl. Talm. Shabbat, 92a).
Although the preparation for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of
earnest and persevering study, as also the execution of the Divine
dictates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when the
prophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs were
suspended. The intellect then acquired true knowledge, which presented
itself to the prophet’s imagination in forms peculiar to that faculty.
Pure ideals are almost incomprehensible; man must translate them into
language which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to his
own mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and communicating them to
others the exercise of the prophet’s imagination was therefore as
essential as that of his intellect, and Maimonides seems to apply to
this imagination the term “angel,” which is so frequently mentioned in
the Bible as the medium of communication between the Supreme Being and
the prophet.
Only Moses held his bodily functions under such control that even
without their temporary suspension he was able to receive prophetic
inspiration; the interposition of the imagination was in his case not
needed: “God spoke to him mouth to mouth” (Num. xii. 8). Moses differed
so completely from other prophets that the term “prophet” could only
have been applied to him and other men by way of homonymy.
The impulses descending from the Active Intellect to man’s intellect
and to his imagination produce various effects, according to his
physical, moral, and intellectual condition. Some men are thus endowed
with extraordinary courage and with an ambition to perform great deeds,
or they feel themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen
by means of exalted and pure language. Such men are filled with “the
spirit of the Lord,” or, “with the spirit of holiness.” To this
distinguished class belonged Jephthah, Samson, David, Solomon, and the
authors of the Hagiographa. Though above the standard of ordinary men,
they were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides divides the
prophets into two groups, viz., those who receive inspiration in a
dream and those who receive it in a vision. The first group includes
the following five classes:—1. Those who see symbolic figures; 2. Those
who hear a voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker; 3.
Those who see a man and hear him addressing them; 4. Those who see an
angel addressing them; 5. Those who see God and hear His voice. The
other group is divided in a similar manner, but contains only the first
four classes, for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet
should see God in a vision. This classification is based on the various
expressions employed in the Scriptures to describe the several
prophecies.
When the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai, they distinctly
heard the first two commandments, which include the doctrines of the
Existence and the Unity of God; of the other eight commandments, which
enunciate moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere “sound of
words”; and it was through the mouth of Moses that the Divine
instruction was revealed to them. Maimonides defends this opinion by
quotations from the Talmud and the Midrashim.
The theory that imagination was an essential element in prophecy is
supported by the fact that figurative speech predominates in the
prophetical writings, which abound in figures, hyperbolical expressions
and allegories. The symbolical acts which are described in connexion
with the visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel
from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah’s walking about naked
and barefoot (Isa. xx. 2), Jacob’s wrestling with the angel (Gen.
xxxii. 27 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam’s ass (Num. xxii. 28), had
no positive reality. The prophets, employing an elliptical style,
frequently omitted to state that a certain event related by them was
part of a vision or a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech
events are described in the Bible as coming directly from God, although
they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of nature, and as such
depend on the will of God. Such passages cannot be misunderstood when
it is borne in mind that every event and every natural phenomenon can
for its origin be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the
prophets employ such phrases as the following: “And I will command the
clouds that they rain no rain upon it” (Isa. v. 6); “I have also called
my mighty men” (ibid. xi. 3).
PART III.
This part contains the following six sections:—1. Exposition of the
maʻaseh mercabah (Ez. i.), ch. i. vii.; 2. On the nature and the origin
of evil, ch. viii. xii.; 3. On the object of the creation, ch.
xiii.–xv.; 4. On Providence and Omniscience, ch. xvi.–xxv.; 5. On the
object of the Divine precepts (taʻame ha-miẓvot) and the historical
portions of the Bible, ch. xxv.–xl.; 6. A guide to the proper worship
of God.
With great caution Maimonides approaches the explanation of the maʻaseh
mercabah, the chariot which Ezekiel beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The
mysteries included in the description of the Divine chariot had been
orally transmitted from generation to generation, but in consequence of
the dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken, and the
knowledge of these mysteries had vanished. Whatever he knew of those
mysteries he owed exclusively to his own intellectual faculties; he
therefore could not reconcile himself to the idea that his knowledge
should die with him. He committed his exposition of the maʻaseh
mercabah and the maʻaseh bereshit to writing, but did not divest it of
its original mysterious character; so that the explanation was fully
intelligible to the initiated—that is to say, to the philosopher—but to
the ordinary reader it was a mere paraphrase of the Biblical
text.—(Introduction.)
The first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of the Divine
chariot. According to Maimonides three distinct parts are to be
noticed, each of which begins with the phrase, “And I saw.” These parts
correspond to the three parts of the Universe, the sublunary world, the
spheres and the intelligences. First of all the prophet is made to
behold the material world which consists of the earth and the spheres,
and of these the spheres, as the more important, are noticed first. In
the Second Part, in which the nature of the spheres is discussed, the
author dwells with pride on his discovery that they can be divided into
four groups. This discovery he now employs to show that the four
“hayyot” (animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He
points out that the terms which the prophet uses in the description of
the hayyot are identical with terms applied to the properties of the
spheres. For the four hayyot or “angels,” or cherubim, (1) have human
form; (2) have human faces; (3) possess characteristics of other
animals; (4) have human hands; (5) their feet are straight and round
(cylindrical); (6) their bodies are closely joined to each other; (7)
only their faces and their wings are separate; (8) their substance is
transparent and refulgent; (9) they move uniformly; (10) each moves in
its own direction; (11) they run; (12) swift as lightning they return
towards their starting point; and (13) they move in consequence of an
extraneous impulse (ruaḥ). In a similar manner the spheres are
described:—(1) they possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and
intellect; (2) they consist like man of body and soul; (3) they are
strong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the eagle; (4)
they perform all manner of work as though they had hands; (5) they are
round, and are not divided into parts; (6) no vacuum intervenes between
one sphere and the other; (7) they may be considered as one being, but
in respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their existence
and motion, they appear as four different beings; (8) they are
transparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere moves uniformly, (10) and
according to its special laws; (11) they revolve with great velocity;
(12) each point returns again to its previous position; (13) they are
self-moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.
In the second part of the vision the prophet saw the ofannim. These
represent the four elements of the sublunary world. For the ofannim (1)
are connected with the ḥayyot and with the earth; (2) they have four
faces, and are four separate beings, but interpenetrate each other “as
though it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel” (Ez. i. 16); (3) they
are covered with eyes; (4) they are not self-moving; (5) they are set
in motion by the ḥayyot; (6) their motion is not circular but
rectilinear. The same may almost be said of the four elements:—(1) they
are in close contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the sphere
of the moon; earth occupies the centre, water surrounds earth, air has
its position between water and fire; (2) this order is not invariably
maintained; the respective portions change and they become intermixed
and combined with each other; (3) though they are only four elements
they form an infinite number of things; (4) not being animated they do
not move of their own accord; (5) they are set in motion by the action
of the spheres; (6) when a portion is displaced it returns in a
straight line to its original position.
In the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above the ḥayyot. The
figure was divided in the middle; in the upper portion the prophet only
noticed that it was ḥashmal, (mysterious); from the loins downwards
there was “the vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory,” and “the
likeness of the throne.” The world of Intelligences was represented by
the figure; these can only be perceived in as far as they influence the
spheres, but their relation to the Creator is beyond human
comprehension. The Creator himself is not represented in this vision.
The key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the introductory words,
“And the heavens were opened,” and in the minute description of the
place and the time of the revelation. When pondering on the grandeur of
the spheres and their influences, which vary according to time and
place, man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the
conclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he will, in the
subsequent chapters, refrain from giving further explanation of the
maʻaseh mercabah. The foregoing summary, however, shows that the
opinion of the author on this subject is fully stated, and it is indeed
difficult to conceive what additional disclosures he could still have
made.
The task which the author has proposed to himself in the Preface he now
regarded as accomplished. He has discussed the method of the Kalām, the
system of the philosophers, and his own theory concerning the relation
between the Primal Cause and the Universe: he has explained the
Biblical account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the
mysteries in Ezekiel’s vision. In the remaining portion of the work the
author attempts to solve certain theological problems, as though he
wished to obviate the following objections, which might be raised to
his theory that there is a design throughout the creation, and that the
entire Universe is subject to the law of causation:—What is the purpose
of the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was the world
created? In how far does Providence interfere with the natural course
of events? Does God know and foresee man’s actions? To what end was the
Divine Law revealed? These problems are treated seriatim.
All evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material element of man’s
existence. Those who are able to emancipate themselves from the tyranny
of the body, and unconditionally to submit to the dictates of reason,
are protected from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the
body, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his thoughts far
away from them; convivial and erotic songs debase man’s noblest
gifts—thought and speech. Matter is the partition separating man from
the pure Intellects; it is “the thickness of the cloud” which true
knowledge has to traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is
the mere negative of good: “God saw all that He had made, and behold it
was very good” (Gen. i. 31). Evil does not exist at all. When evils are
mentioned in the Scriptures as the work of God, the Scriptural
expressions must not be taken in their literal sense.
There are three kinds of evils:—1. Evils necessitated by those laws of
production and destruction by which the species are perpetuated. 2.
Evils which men inflict on each other; they are comparatively few,
especially among civilized men. 3. Evils which man brings upon himself,
and which comprise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of
these three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that “the Lord is
good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works” (Ps. cxlv.
9).
The question, What is the object of the creation? must be left
unanswered. The creation is the result of the will of God. Also those
who believe that the Universe is eternal must admit that they are
unable to discover the purpose of the Universe. It would, however, not
be illogical to assume that the spheres have been created for the sake
of man, notwithstanding the great dimensions of the former and the
smallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even if
mankind were the main and central object of creation, there is no
absolute interdependence between them; for it is a matter of course
that, under altered conditions, man could exist without the spheres.
All teleological theories must therefore be confined within the limits
of the Universe as it now exists. They are only admissible in the
relation in which the several parts of the Universe stand to each
other; but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be accounted
for. It is simply an emanation from the will of God.
Regarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enumerates the following
five opinions:—1. There is no Providence; everything is subject to
chance; 2. Only a part of the Universe is governed by Providence, viz.,
the spheres, the species, and such individual beings as possess the
power of perpetuating their existence (e.g., the stars); the rest—that
is, the sublunary world—is left to mere chance. 3. Everything is
predetermined; according to this theory, revealed Law is inconceivable.
4. Providence assigns its blessings to all creatures, according to
their merits; accordingly, all beings, even the lowest animals, if
innocently injured or killed, receive compensation in a future life. 5.
According to the Jewish belief, all living beings are endowed with
free-will; God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits.
Maimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine love,
i.e. afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but as
means to procure for him a reward in times to come. Maimonides also
rejects the notion that God ordains special temptation. The Biblical
account, according to which God tempts men, “to know what is in their
hearts,” must not be taken in its literal sense; it merely states that
God made the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in
order that their good example should be followed. Of all creatures man
alone enjoys the especial care of Providence; because the acts of
Providence are identical with certain influences (shefaʻ) which the
Active Intellect brings to bear upon the human intellect; their effect
upon man varies according to his physical, moral, and intellectual
condition; irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these
influences. If we cannot in each individual case see how these
principles are applied, it must be borne in mind that God’s wisdom is
far above that of man. The author seems to have felt that his theory
has its weak points, for he introduces it as follows:—“My theory is not
established by demonstrative proof; it is based on the authority of the
Bible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the theories
previously mentioned.”
Providence implies Omniscience, and men who deny this, eo ipso, have no
belief in Providence. Some are unable to reconcile the fate of man with
Divine Justice, and are therefore of opinion that God takes no notice
whatever of the events which occur on earth. Others believe that God,
being an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multitude of
things, or of things that do not yet exist, or the number of which is
infinite. These objections, which are based on the nature of man’s
perception, are illogical; for God’s knowledge cannot be compared to
that of man; it is identical with His essence. Even the Attributists,
who assume that God’s knowledge is different from His essence, hold
that it is distinguished from man’s knowledge in the following five
points:—1. It is one, although it embraces a plurality. 2. It includes
even such things as do not yet exist. 3. It includes things which are
infinite in number. 4. It does not change when new objects of
perception present themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of
events.—However difficult this theory may appear to human
comprehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah (lv. 8):
“Your thoughts are not My thoughts, and your ways are not My ways.”
According to Maimonides, the difficulty is to be explained by the fact
that God is the Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things
is not dependent on their existence; while the knowledge of man is
solely dependent on the objects which come under his cognition.
According to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the several views
which have been mentioned above. Satan, that is, the material element
in human existence, is described as the cause of Job’s sufferings. Job
at first believed that man’s happiness depends on riches, health, and
children; being deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived
the notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal beings.
After a careful study of natural phenomena, he rejected this opinion.
Eliphaz held that all misfortunes of man serve as punishments of past
sins. Bildad, the second friend of Job, admitted the existence of those
afflictions which Divine love decrees in order that the patient
sufferer may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zofar, the third
friend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond human
comprehension; there is but one explanation assignable to all Divine
acts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu gives a fuller development to
this idea; he says that such evils as befell Job may be remedied once
or twice, but the course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is
true that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God can be
obtained, but there are only few who arrive at that exalted
intellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must content themselves
with acquiring a knowledge of God through the study of nature. Such a
study leads man to the conviction that his understanding cannot fathom
the secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.
The concluding section of the Third Part treats of the purpose of the
Divine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are described as the means of
acquiring wisdom, enduring happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch.
xxxi.). Generally a distinction is made between “ḥuḳḳim” (“statutes”)
and mishpaṭim (“judgments”). The object of the latter is, on the whole,
known, but the ḥuḳḳim are considered as tests of man’s obedience; no
reason is given why they have been enacted. Maimonides rejects this
distinction; he states that all precepts are the result of wisdom and
design, that all contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with
regard to the ḥuḳḳim this is less obvious. The author draws another
line of distinction between the general principles and the details of
rules. For the selection and the introduction of the latter there is
but one reason, viz.: “Such is the will of God.”
The laws are intended to promote man’s perfection; they improve both
his mental and his physical condition; the former in so far as they
lead him to the acquisition of true knowledge, the latter through the
training of his moral and social faculties. Each law thus imparts
knowledge, improves the moral condition of man, or conduces to the
well-being of society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to
correct false opinions. This object is not always clearly announced.
God in His wisdom sometimes withheld from the knowledge of man the
purpose of commandments and actions. There are other precepts which
tend to restrain man’s passions and desires. If the same end is
occasionally attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the
Divine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emotional state of
man, and not to exceptional circumstances. In this work, as in the Yad
ha-ḥazaḳah, Maimonides divides the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen
groups, and in each group he discusses the principal and the special
object of the laws included in it.
In addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes historical
information; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing the Biblical
narratives, shows that these are likewise intended to improve man’s
physical, moral, and intellectual condition. “It is not a vain thing
for you” (Deut. xxxii. 47), and when it proves vain to anyone, it is
his own fault.
In the final chapters the author describes the several degrees of human
perfection, from the sinners who have turned from the right path to the
best of men, who in all their thoughts and acts cling to the Most
Perfect Being, who aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God,
and strive to serve their Maker in the practice of “loving-kindness,
righteousness, and justice.” This degree of human perfection can only
be attained by those who never forget the presence of the Almighty, and
remain firm in their fear and love of God. These servants of the Most
High inherit the choicest of human blessings; they are endowed with
wisdom: they are godlike beings.
INTRODUCTION
[Letter of the Author to his Pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknin.]
In the name of God, Lord of the Universe.
To R. Joseph (may God protect him!), son of R. Jehudah (may his repose
be in Paradise!):—
“My dear pupil, ever since you resolved to come to me, from a distant
country, and to study under my direction, I thought highly of your
thirst for knowledge, and your fondness for speculative pursuits, which
found expression in your poems. I refer to the time when I received
your writings in prose and verse from Alexandria. I was then not yet
able to test your powers of apprehension, and I thought that your
desire might possibly exceed your capacity. But when you had gone with
me through a course of astronomy, after having completed the [other]
elementary studies which are indispensable for the understanding of
that science, I was still more gratified by the acuteness and the
quickness of your apprehension. Observing your great fondness for
mathematics, I let you study them more deeply, for I felt sure of your
ultimate success. Afterwards, when I took you through a course of
logic, I found that my great expectations of you were confirmed, and I
considered you fit to receive from me an exposition of the esoteric
ideas contained in the prophetic books, that you might understand them
as they are understood by men of culture. When I commenced by way of
hints, I noticed that you desired additional explanation, urging me to
expound some metaphysical problems; to teach you the system of the
Mutakallemim; to tell you whether their arguments were based on logical
proof; and if not, what their method was. I perceived that you had
acquired some knowledge in those matters from others, and that you were
perplexed and bewildered; yet you sought to find out a solution to your
difficulty. I urged you to desist from this pursuit, and enjoined you
to continue your studies systematically; for my object was that the
truth should present itself in connected order, and that you should not
hit upon it by mere chance. Whilst you studied with me I never refused
to explain difficult verses in the Bible or passages in rabbinical
literature which we happened to meet. When, by the will of God, we
parted, and you went your way, our discussions aroused in me a
resolution which had long been dormant. Your absence has prompted me to
compose this treatise for you and for those who are like you, however
few they may be. I have divided it into chapters, each of which shall
be sent to you as soon as it is completed. Farewell!”
[PREFATORY REMARKS.]
“Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk, for I lift
up my soul unto Thee.” (Psalm cxliii. 8.)
“Unto you, O men, I call, and my voice is to the sons of
men.” (Prov. viii. 4.)
“Bow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise, and
apply thine heart unto my knowledge.” (Prov. xxii. 17.)
My primary object in this work is to explain certain words occurring in
the prophetic books. Of these some are homonyms, and of their several
meanings the ignorant choose the wrong ones; other terms which are
employed in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons in
their primary signification. There are also hybrid terms, denoting
things which are of the same class from one point of view and of a
different class from another. It is not here intended to explain all
these expressions to the unlettered or to mere tyros, a previous
knowledge of Logic and Natural Philosophy being indispensable, or to
those who confine their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean
the study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of the
Torah is the special aim of this and similar works.
The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has
been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who
conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the same
time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has
attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to
accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of
the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from
those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost
in perplexity and anxiety. If he be guided solely by reason, and
renounce his previous views which are based on those expressions, he
would consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the
Law; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those
expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its
guidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious
convictions had suffered loss and injury. For he would then be left
with those errors which give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief
and great perplexity.
This work has also a second object in view. It seeks to explain certain
obscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly
characterized as being figures. Ignorant and superficial readers take
them in a literal, not in a figurative sense. Even well informed
persons are bewildered if they understand these passages in their
literal signification, but they are entirely relieved of their
perplexity when we explain the figure, or merely suggest that the terms
are figurative. For this reason I have called this book Guide for the
Perplexed.
I do not presume to think that this treatise settles every doubt in the
minds of those who understand it, but I maintain that it settles the
greater part of their difficulties. No intelligent man will require and
expect that on introducing any subject I shall completely exhaust it;
or that on commencing the exposition of a figure I shall fully explain
all its parts. Such a course could not be followed by a teacher in a
viva voce exposition, much less by an author in writing a book, without
becoming a target for every foolish conceited person to discharge the
arrows of folly at him. Some general principles bearing upon this point
have been fully discussed in our works on the Talmud, and we have there
called the attention of the reader to many themes of this kind. We also
stated (Mishneh torah, I. ii. 12, and iv. 10) that the expression
Maʻase Bereshit (Account of the Creation) signified “Natural Science,”
and Maʻaseh Mercabah (“Description of the Chariot”) Metaphysics, and we
explained the force of the Rabbinical dictum, “The Maʻaseh Mercabah
must not be fully expounded even in the presence of a single student,
unless he be wise and able to reason for himself, and even then you
should merely acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of
the subject.” (Babyl. Talm. Ḥagigah, fol. 11 b). You must, therefore,
not expect from me more than such heads. And even these have not been
methodically and systematically arranged in this work, but have been,
on the contrary, scattered, and are interspersed with other topics
which we shall have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this
arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at
another time concealed. Thus we shall not be in opposition to the
Divine Will (from which it is wrong to deviate) which has withheld from
the multitude the truths required for the knowledge of God, according
to the words, “The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him” (Ps.
xxv. 14).
Know that also in Natural Science there are topics which are not to be
fully explained. Our Sages laid down the rule, “The Maʻaseh Bereshith
must not be expounded in the presence of two.” If an author were to
explain these principles in writing, it would be equal to expounding
them unto thousands of men. For this reason the prophets treat these
subjects in figures, and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture,
speak of them in metaphors and allegories; because there is a close
affinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed they form
part of its mysteries. Do not imagine that these most difficult
problems can be thoroughly understood by any one of us. This is not the
case. At times the truth shines so brilliantly that we perceive it as
clear as day. Our nature and habit then draw a veil over our
perception, and we return to a darkness almost as dense as before. We
are like those who, though beholding frequent flashes of lightning,
still find themselves in the thickest darkness of the night. On some
the lightning flashes in rapid succession, and they seem to be in
continuous light, and their night is as clear as the day. This was the
degree of prophetic excellence attained by (Moses) the greatest of
prophets, to whom God said, “But as for thee, stand thou here by Me”
(Deut. v. 31), and of whom it is written “the skin of his face shone,”
etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 29). [Some perceive the prophetic flash at long
intervals; this is the degree of most prophets.] By others only once
during the whole night is a flash of lightning perceived. This is the
case with those of whom we are informed, “They prophesied, and did not
prophesy again” (Num. xi. 25). There are some to whom the flashes of
lightning appear with varying intervals; others are in the condition of
men, whose darkness is illumined not by lightning, but by some kind of
crystal or similar stone, or other substances that possess the property
of shining during the night; and to them even this small amount of
light is not continuous, but now it shines and now it vanishes, as if
it were “the flame of the rotating sword.”
The degrees in the perfection of men vary according to these
distinctions. Concerning those who never beheld the light even for one
day, but walk in continual darkness, it is written, “They know not,
neither will they understand; they walk on in darkness” (Ps. lxxxii.
5). Truth, in spite of all its powerful manifestations, is completely
withheld from them, and the following words of Scripture may be applied
to them, “And now men see not the light which is bright in the skies”
(Job xxxvii. 21). They are the multitude of ordinary men; there is no
need to notice them in this treatise.
You must know that if a person, who has attained a certain degree of
perfection, wishes to impart to others, either orally or in writing,
any portion of the knowledge which he has acquired of these subjects,
he is utterly unable to be as systematic and explicit as he could be in
a science of which the method is well known. The same difficulties
which he encountered when investigating the subject for himself will
attend him when endeavouring to instruct others; viz., at one time the
explanation will appear lucid, at another time, obscure; this property
of the subject appears to remain the same both to the advanced scholar
and to the beginner. For this reason, great theological scholars gave
instruction in all such matters only by means of metaphors and
allegories. They frequently employed them in forms varying more or less
essentially. In most cases they placed the lesson to be illustrated at
the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the simile. When they
could find no simile which from beginning to end corresponded to the
idea which was to be illustrated, they divided the subject of the
lesson, although in itself one whole, into different parts, and
expressed each by a separate figure. Still more obscure are those
instances in which one simile is employed to illustrate many subjects,
the beginning of the simile representing one thing, the end another.
Sometimes the whole metaphor may refer to two cognate subjects in the
same branch of knowledge.
If we were to teach in these disciplines, without the use of parables
and figures, we should be compelled to resort to expressions both
profound and transcendental, and by no means more intelligible than
metaphors and similes; as though the wise and learned were drawn into
this course by the Divine Will, in the same way as they are compelled
to follow the laws of nature in matters relating to the body. You are
no doubt aware that the Almighty, desiring to lead us to perfection and
to improve our state of society, has revealed to us laws which are to
regulate our actions. These laws, however, presuppose an advanced state
of intellectual culture. We must first form a conception of the
Existence of the Creator according to our capabilities; that is, we
must have a knowledge of Metaphysics. But this discipline can only be
approached after the study of Physics; for the science of Physics
borders on Metaphysics, and must even precede it in the course of our
studies, as is clear to all who are familiar with these questions.
Therefore the Almighty commenced Holy Writ with the description of the
Creation, that is, with Physical Science; the subject being on the one
hand most weighty and important, and on the other hand our means of
fully comprehending those great problems being limited. He described
those profound truths, which His Divine Wisdom found it necessary to
communicate to us, in allegorical, figurative, and metaphorical
language. Our Sages have said (Yemen Midrash on Gen. i. 1), “It is
impossible to give a full account of the Creation to man. Therefore
Scripture simply tells us, In the beginning God created the heavens and
the earth” (Gen. i. 1). Thus they have suggested that this subject is a
deep mystery, and in the words of Solomon, “Far off and exceedingly
deep, who can find it out?” (Eccles. vii. 24). It has been treated in
metaphors in order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to
the measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their
apprehension, while educated persons may take it in a different sense.
In our commentary on the Mishnah we stated our intention to explain
difficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony.
In the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash
which, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and
common sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively. Many years have
elapsed since I first commenced those works. I had proceeded but a
short way when I became dissatisfied with my original plan. For I
observed that by expounding these passages by means of allegorical and
mystical terms, we do not explain anything, but merely substitute one
thing for another of the same nature, whilst in explaining them fully
our efforts would displease most people; and my sole object in planning
to write those books was to make the contents of Midrashim and the
exoteric lessons of the prophecies intelligible to everybody. We have
further noticed that when an ill-informed Theologian reads these
Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of
the properties of things, he will not reject statements which involve
impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well
educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: either he
takes them literally, and questions the abilities of the author and the
soundness of his mind—doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the
principles of our faith,—or he will acquiesce in assuming that the
passages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to
hold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory
or not. As regards prophecy in its various degrees and the different
metaphors used in the prophetic books, we shall give in the present
work an explanation, according to a different method. Guided by these
considerations I have refrained from writing those two books as I had
previously intended. In my larger work, the Mishnah Torah, I have
contented myself with briefly stating the principles of our faith and
its fundamental truths, together with such hints as approach a clear
exposition. In this work, however, I address those who have studied
philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who while firm in
religious matters are perplexed and bewildered on account of the
ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings.
Some chapters may be found in this work which contain no reference
whatever to homonyms. Such chapters will serve as an introduction to
others; they will contain some reference to the signification of a
homonym which I do not wish to mention in that place, or explain some
figure; point out that a certain expression is a figure; treat of
difficult passages generally misunderstood in consequence of the
homonymy they include, or because the simile they contain is taken in
place of that which it represents, and vice versâ.
Having spoken of similes, I proceed to make the following remark:—The
key to the understanding and to the full comprehension of all that the
Prophets have said is found in the knowledge of the figures, their
general ideas, and the meaning of each word they contain. You know the
verse:—
“I have also spoken in similes by the Prophets” (Hosea xii. 10); and
also the verse, “Put forth a riddle and speak a parable” (Ezek. xvii.
2). And because the Prophets continually employ figures, Ezekiel said,
“Does He not speak parables?” (xxi. 5). Again, Solomon begins his book
of Proverbs with the words, “To understand a proverb and figurative
speech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings” (Prov. i. 6); and
we read in Midrash, (Shir ha-shirim Rabba, i. 1); “To what were the
words of the Law to be compared before the time of Solomon? To a well
the waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh,
yet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and
rope with rope, and drew up and drank. So Solomon went from figure to
figure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of
the Law.” So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any
intelligent man thinks that “the words of the Law” mentioned here as
requiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can
refer to the rules for building tabernacles, for preparing the lulab,
or for the four kinds of trustees. What is really meant is the
apprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our
Sages said, “If a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can
find it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in
themselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the
holy Law are rendered intelligible.” These likewise are the words of
our Sages; consider well their statement, that the deeper sense of the
words of the holy Law are pearls, and the literal acceptation of a
figure is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning
included in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark
room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in
the room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is
just as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been
stated, it affords him no benefit whatever until he kindles a light.
The same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile
represents. The wise king said, “A word fitly spoken is like apples of
gold in vessels of silver” (Prov. xxv. 11). Hear the explanation of
what he said:—The word maskiyoth, the Hebrew equivalent for “vessels,”
denotes “filigree network”—i.e., things in which there are very small
apertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are
called in Hebrew maskiyyoth (lit. “transpicuous,” from the verb sakah,
“he saw,” a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. xxvi.
8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus Solomon meant to say,
“Just as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is
a word fitly spoken.”
See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in
this figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a
literal one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable
as silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious; so that the
figurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold
to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase
shall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the
figure represents. Just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of
silver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is
mistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at
the object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is
gold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken
literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes,
among others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g.,
the Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense.
Their hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the
recognition of real truth.
Know that the figures employed by prophets are of two kinds: first,
where every word which occurs in the simile represents a certain idea;
and secondly, where the simile, as a whole, represents a general idea,
but has a great many points which have no reference whatever to that
idea; they are simply required to give to the simile its proper form
and order, or better to conceal the idea; the simile is therefore
continued as far as necessary, according to its literal sense. Consider
this well.
An example of the first class of prophetic figures is to be found in
Genesis:—“And, behold, a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it
reached to heaven; and, behold, the angels of God ascending and
descending on it” (Gen. xxviii. 12). The word “ladder” refers to one
idea; “set up on the earth” to another; “and the top of it reached to
heaven” to a third; “angels of God” to a fourth; “ascending” to a
fifth; “descending” to a sixth; “the Lord stood above it” (ver. 13) to
a seventh. Every word in this figure introduces a fresh element into
the idea represented by the figure.
An example of the second class of prophetic figures is found in
Proverbs (vii. 6–26):—“For at the window of my house I looked through
my casement, and beheld among the simple ones; I discerned among the
youths a young man void of understanding, passing through the street
near her corner: and he went the way to her house, in the twilight, in
the evening, in the black and dark night: and, behold, there met him a
woman with the attire of a harlot, and subtil of heart. (She is loud
and stubborn; her feet abide not in her house: now she is without, now
in the streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught him,
and kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto him, I have peace
offerings with me; this day have I paid my vows. Therefore came I forth
to meet thee, diligently to seek thy face, and I have found thee. I
have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with striped cloths of
the yarn of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and
cinnamon. Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning: let us
solace ourselves with loves. For the goodman is not at home, he is gone
a long journey: he hath taken a bag of money with him, and will come
home at the day appointed. With her much fair speech she caused him to
yield, with the flattering of her lips she forced him. He goeth after
her straightway, as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as fetters to the
correction of a fool: till a dart strike through his liver; as a bird
hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life. Hearken
unto me now therefore, O ye children, and attend to the words of my
mouth. Let not thine heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her
paths. For she hath cast down many wounded: yea, many strong men have
been slain by her.”
The general principle expounded in all these verses is to abstain from
excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures. The author compares the body,
which is the source of all sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at
the same time is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of
his entire book. We shall hereafter show the wisdom of Solomon in
comparing sensual pleasures to an adulterous harlot. We shall explain
how aptly he concludes that work with the praises of a faithful wife
who devotes herself to the welfare of her husband and of her household.
All obstacles which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life,
all the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil
propensities, are to be traced to the body alone. This will be
explained later on. The predominant idea running throughout the figure
is that man shall not be entirely guided by his animal, or material
nature; for the material substance of man is identical with that of the
brute creation.
An adequate explanation of the figure having been given, and its
meaning having been shown, do not imagine that you will find in its
application a corresponding element for each part of the figure; you
must not ask what is meant by “I have peace offerings with me” (ver.
14); by “I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry” (ver. 16); or
what is added to the force of the figure by the observation “for the
goodman is not at home” (ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter.
For all this is merely to complete the illustration of the metaphor in
its literal meaning. The circumstances described here are such as are
common to adulterers. Such conversations take place between all
adulterous persons. You must well understand what I have said, for it
is a principle of the utmost importance with respect to those things
which I intend to expound. If you observe in one of the chapters that I
explained the meaning of a certain figure, and pointed out to you its
general scope, do not trouble yourself further in order to find an
interpretation of each separate portion, for that would lead you to one
of the two following erroneous courses; either you will miss the sense
included in the metaphor, or you will be induced to explain certain
things which require no explanation, and which are not introduced for
that purpose. Through this unnecessary trouble you may fall into the
great error which besets most modern sects in their foolish writings
and discussions; they all endeavour to find some hidden meaning in
expressions which were never uttered by the author in that sense. Your
object should be to discover in most of the figures the general idea
which the author wishes to express. In some instances it will be
sufficient if you understand from my remarks that a certain expression
contains a figure, although I may offer no further comment. For when
you know that it is not to be taken literally, you will understand at
once to what subject it refers. My statement that it is a figurative
expression will, as it were, remove the screen from between the object
and the observer.
DIRECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THIS WORK.
If you desire to grasp all that is contained in this book so that
nothing shall escape your notice, consider the chapters in connected
order. In studying each chapter, do not content yourself with
comprehending its principal subject, but attend to every term mentioned
therein, although it may seem to have no connection with the principal
subject. For what I have written in this work was not the suggestion of
the moment; it is the result of deep study and great application. Care
has been taken that nothing that appeared doubtful should be left
unexplained. Nothing of what is mentioned is out of place, every remark
will be found to illustrate the subject-matter of the respective
chapter. Do not read superficially, lest you do me an injury, and
derive no benefit for yourself. You must study thoroughly and read
continually; for you will then find the solution of those important
problems of religion, which are a source of anxiety to all intelligent
men. I adjure any reader of my book, in the name of the Most High, not
to add any explanation even to a single word; nor to explain to another
any portion of it except such passages as have been fully treated of by
previous theological authorities; he must not teach others anything
that he has learnt from my work alone, and that has not been hitherto
discussed by any of our authorities. The reader must, moreover, beware
of raising objections to any of my statements, because it is very
probable that he may understand my words to mean the exact opposite to
what I intended to say. He will injure me, while I endeavoured to
benefit him. “He will requite me evil for good.” Let the reader make a
careful study of this work; and if his doubt be removed on even one
point, let him praise his Maker and rest contented with the knowledge
he has acquired. But if he derive from it no benefit whatever, he may
consider the book as if it had never been written. Should he notice any
opinions with which he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a
suitable explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, in order that he may
judge me charitably. Such a duty we owe to every one. We owe it
especially to our scholars and theologians, who endeavour to teach us
what is the truth according to the best of their ability. I feel
assured that those of my readers who have not studied philosophy, will
still derive profit from many a chapter. But the thinker whose studies
have brought him into collision with religion, will, as I have already
mentioned, derive much benefit from every chapter. How greatly will he
rejoice! How agreeably will my words strike his ears! Those, however,
whose minds are confused with false notions and perverse methods, who
regard their misleading studies as sciences, and imagine themselves
philosophers, though they have no knowledge that could truly be termed
science, will object to many chapters, and will find in them many
insuperable difficulties, because they do not understand their meaning,
and because I expose therein the absurdity of their perverse notions,
which constitute their riches and peculiar treasure, “stored up for
their ruin.” God knows that I hesitated very much before writing on the
subjects contained in this work, since they are profound mysteries;
they are topics which, since the time of our captivity have not been
treated by any of our scholars as far as we possess their writings; how
then shall I now make a beginning and discuss them? But I rely on two
precedents: first, to similar cases our Sages applied the verse, “It is
time to do something in honour of the Lord: for they have made void thy
law” (Ps. cxix. 126). Secondly, they have said, “Let all thy acts be
guided by pure intentions.” On these two principles I relied while
composing some parts of this work. Lastly, when I have a difficult
subject before me—when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way
of teaching a well established truth except by pleasing one intelligent
man and displeasing ten thousand fools—I prefer to address myself to
the one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the
multitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his
embarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may
attain perfection and be at peace.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.
[On Method.]
There are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met
with in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the
author collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the
other, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular
opinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur,
since any two statements may belong to two different authors. Second
cause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently
rejects; in his work, however, both his original and altered views are
retained. Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken
literally; some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while
in others figurative language is employed, which includes another
meaning besides the literal one: or, in the apparently inconsistent
passages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally,
would seem to be contradictories or contraries. Fourth cause: The
premises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons
they are not fully stated in these passages; or two propositions with
different subjects which are expressed by the same term without having
the difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The
contradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction
in reality. The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method
adopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a
difficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed
as known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible
subject which must be taught beforehand, the commencement being always
made with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in
any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems,
which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with
giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It
is, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the
students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to
understand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly
treated and fully developed in its right place. Sixth cause: The
contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a
series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to
prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the
chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not
perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by
means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the
enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other
conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many
times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are
contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook
such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the
original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while
writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater
deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: It
is sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may
partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed; while, therefore, on
one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that
the metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be
convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite
way. The author must endeavour, by concealing the fact as much as
possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the
contradiction.
Inconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Boraitot are traceable to
the first cause. You meet frequently in the Gemara with passages like
the following:—“Does not the beginning of the passage contradict the
end? No; the beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi; the end that
of another”; or “Rabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the opinion of a
certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, and having
accepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced that
view without naming the authority”; or “Who is the author of this
anonymous dictum? Rabbi A.” “Who is the author of that paragraph in the
Mishnah? Rabbi B.” Instances of this kind are innumerable.
Apparent contradictions or differences occurring in the Gemara may be
traced to the first cause and to the second, as e.g., “In this
particular case he agrees with this rabbi”; or “He agrees with him in
one point, but differs from him in another”; or “These two dicta are
the opinions of two Amoraim, who differ as regards the statement made
by a certain rabbi.” These are examples of contradictions traceable to
the first cause. The following are instances which may be traced to the
second cause. “Rabba altered his opinion on that point”; it then
becomes necessary to consider which of the two opinions came second.
Again, “In the first recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one
assertion, and in the second a different one.”
The inconsistencies and contradictions met with in some passages of the
prophetic books, if taken literally, are all traceable to the third or
fourth cause, and it is exclusively in reference to this subject that I
wrote the present Introduction. You know that the following expression
frequently occurs, “One verse says this, another that,” showing the
contradiction, and explaining that either some premise is wanting or
the subject is altered. Comp. “Solomon, it is not sufficient that thy
words contradict thy father; they are themselves inconsistent, etc.”
Many similar instances occur in the writings of our Sages. The passages
in the prophetical books which our Sages have explained, mostly refer
to religious or moral precepts. Our desire, however, is to discuss such
passages as contain apparent contradictions in regard to the principles
of our faith. I shall explain some of them in various chapters of the
present work; for this subject also belongs to the secrets of the
Torah.
Contradictions traceable to the seventh cause occurring in the
prophetical works require special investigation; and no one should
express his opinion on that matter by reasoning and arguing without
weighing the matter well in his mind.
Inconsistencies in the writings of true philosophers are traceable to
the fifth cause. Contradictions occurring in the writings of most
authors and commentators, such as are not included in the
above-mentioned works, are due to the sixth cause. Many examples of
this class of contradictions are found in the Midrash and the Agada;
hence the saying, “We must not raise questions concerning the
contradictions met with in the Agada.” You may also notice in them
contradictions due to the seventh cause. Any inconsistency discovered
in the present work will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth
cause or the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember it
well, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this book.
Having concluded these introductory remarks I proceed to examine those
expressions, to the true meaning of which, as apparent from the
context, it is necessary to direct your attention. This book will then
be a key admitting to places the gates of which would otherwise be
closed. When the gates are opened and men enter, their souls will enjoy
repose, their eyes will be gratified, and even their bodies, after all
toil and labour, will be refreshed.
PART I
“Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth
the truth may enter in.”—(Isa. xxvi. 2.)
CHAPTER I
Some have been of opinion that by the Hebrew ẓelem, the shape and
figure of a thing is to be understood, and this explanation led men to
believe in the corporeality [of the Divine Being]: for they thought
that the words “Let us make man in our ẓelem” (Gen. i. 26), implied
that God had the form of a human being, i.e., that He had figure and
shape, and that, consequently, He was corporeal. They adhered
faithfully to this view, and thought that if they were to relinquish it
they would eo ipso reject the truth of the Bible: and further, if they
did not conceive God as having a body possessed of face and limbs,
similar to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even the
existence of God. The sole difference which they admitted, was that He
excelled in greatness and splendour, and that His substance was not
flesh and blood. Thus far went their conception of the greatness and
glory of God. The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in
the true sense of the word—for there is no real unity without
incorporeality—will be fully proved in the course of the present
treatise. (Part II., ch. i.) In this chapter it is our sole intention
to explain the meaning of the words ẓelem and demut. I hold that the
Hebrew equivalent of “form” in the ordinary acceptation of the word,
viz., the figure and shape of a thing, is toär. Thus we find “[And
Joseph was] beautiful in toär (‘form’), and beautiful in appearance”
(Gen. xxxix. 6): “What form (toär) is he of?” (1 Sam. xxviii. 14): “As
the form (toär) of the children of a king” (Judges viii. 18). It is
also applied to form produced by human labour, as “He marketh its form
(toär) with a line,” “and he marketh its form (toär) with the compass”
(Isa. xliv. 13). This term is not at all applicable to God. The term
ẓelem, on the other hand, signifies the specific form, viz., that which
constitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what it is;
the reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular being. In man
the “form” is that constituent which gives him human perception: and on
account of this intellectual perception the term ẓelem is employed in
the sentences “In the ẓelem of God he created him” (Gen. i. 27). It is
therefore rightly said, “Thou despisest their ẓelem” (Ps. lxiii. 20);
the “contempt” can only concern the soul—the specific form of man, not
the properties and shape of his body. I am also of opinion that the
reason why this term is used for “idols” may be found in the
circumstance that they are worshipped on account of some idea
represented by them, not on account of their figure and shape. For the
same reason the term is used in the expression, “the forms (ẓalme) of
your emerods” (1 Sam. vi. 5), for the chief object was the removal of
the injury caused by the emerods, not a change of their shape. As,
however, it must be admitted that the term ẓelem is employed in these
two cases, viz. “the images of the emerods” and “the idols” on account
of the external shape, the term ẓelem is either a homonym or a hybrid
term, and would denote both the specific form and the outward shape,
and similar properties relating to the dimensions and the shape of
material bodies; and in the phrase “Let us make man in our ẓelem” (Gen.
i. 26), the term signifies “the specific form” of man, viz., his
intellectual perception, and does not refer to his “figure” or “shape.”
Thus we have shown the difference between ẓelem and toär, and explained
the meaning of ẓelem.
Demut is derived from the verb damah, “he is like.” This term likewise
denotes agreement with regard to some abstract relation: comp. “I am
like a pelican of the wilderness” (Ps. cii. 7); the author does not
compare himself to the pelican in point of wings and feathers, but in
point of sadness. “Nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him
in beauty” (Ezek. xxxi. 8); the comparison refers to the idea of
beauty. “Their poison is like the poison of a serpent” (Ps. lviii. 5);
“He is like unto a lion” (Ps. xvii. 12); the resemblance indicated in
these passages does not refer to the figure and shape, but to some
abstract idea. In the same manner is used “the likeness of the throne”
(Ezek. i. 26); the comparison is made with regard to greatness and
glory, not, as many believe, with regard to its square form, its
breadth, or the length of its legs: this explanation applies also to
the phrase “the likeness of the ḥayyot” (“living creatures,” Ezek. i.
13).
As man’s distinction consists in a property which no other creature on
earth possesses, viz., intellectual perception, in the exercise of
which he does not employ his senses, nor move his hand or his foot,
this perception has been compared—though only apparently, not in
truth—to the Divine perception, which requires no corporeal organ. On
this account, i.e., on account of the Divine intellect with which man
has been endowed, he is said to have been made in the form and likeness
of the Almighty, but far from it be the notion that the Supreme Being
is corporeal, having a material form.
CHAPTER II
Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance;
the problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the
closest attention. Before, however, entering upon this problem and its
solution I must premise that every Hebrew knows that the term Elohim is
a homonym, and denotes God, angels, judges, and the rulers of
countries, and that Onkelos the proselyte explained it in the true and
correct manner by taking Elohim in the sentence, “and ye shall be like
Elohim” (Gen. iii. 5) in the last-mentioned meaning, and rendering the
sentence “and ye shall be like princes.” Having pointed out the
homonymity of the term “Elohim” we return to the question under
consideration. “It would at first sight,” said the objector, “appear
from Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal
to the rest of the animal creation, which is not endowed with
intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil:
but that Adam’s disobedience to the command of God procured him that
great perfection which is the peculiarity of man, viz., the power of
distinguishing between good and evil—the noblest of all the faculties
of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus
appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the
means of elevating man to a pinnacle of perfection to which he had not
attained previously. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man
was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed
for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.”
Such was the purport and subject of the question, though not in the
exact words of the inquirer. Now mark our reply, which was as
follows:—“You appear to have studied the matter superficially, and
nevertheless you imagine that you can understand a book which has been
the guide of past and present generations, when you for a moment
withdraw from your lusts and appetites, and glance over its contents as
if you were reading a historical work or some poetical composition.
Collect your thoughts and examine the matter carefully, for it is not
to be understood as you at first sight think, but as you will find
after due deliberation; namely, the intellect which was granted to man
as the highest endowment, was bestowed on him before his disobedience.
With reference to this gift the Bible states that “man was created in
the form and likeness of God.” On account of this gift of intellect man
was addressed by God, and received His commandments, as it is said:
“And the Lord God commanded Adam” (Gen. ii. 16)—for no commandments are
given to the brute creation or to those who are devoid of
understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true
and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely.
The right and the wrong are terms employed in the science of apparent
truths (morals), not in that of necessary truths, as, e.g., it is not
correct to say, in reference to the proposition “the heavens are
spherical,” it is “good” or to declare the assertion that “the earth is
flat” to be “bad”; but we say of the one it is true, of the other it is
false. Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by
the terms emet and sheker, of the morally right and the morally wrong,
by tob and ra’. Thus it is the function of the intellect to
discriminate between the true and the false—a distinction which is
applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. When Adam was yet
in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and
reason—on account of which it is said: “Thou hast made him (man) little
lower than the angels” (Ps. viii. 6)—he was not at all able to follow
or to understand the principles of apparent truths; the most manifest
impropriety, viz., to appear in a state of nudity, was nothing
unbecoming according to his idea: he could not comprehend why it should
be so. After man’s disobedience, however, when he began to give way to
desires which had their source in his imagination and to the
gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, “And the wife saw
that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes” (Gen. iii.
6), he was punished by the loss of part of that intellectual faculty
which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command
with which he had been charged on the score of his reason; and having
obtained a knowledge of the apparent truths, he was wholly absorbed in
the study of what is proper and what improper. Then he fully understood
the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and
in what situation he was thereby placed. Hence we read, “And ye shall
be like elohim, knowing good and evil,” and not “knowing” or
“discerning the true and the false”: while in necessary truths we can
only apply the words “true and false,” not “good and evil.” Further
observe the passage, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew
they were naked” (Gen. iii. 7): it is not said, “And the eyes of both
were opened, and they saw”; for what the man had seen previously and
what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same; there had
been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty
whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as
wrong. Besides, you must know that the Hebrew word pakaḥ used in this
passage is exclusively employed in the figurative sense of receiving
new sources of knowledge, not in that of regaining the sense of sight.
Comp., “God opened her eyes” (Gen. xxi. 19). “Then shall the eyes of
the blind be opened” (Isaiah xxxviii. 8). “Open ears, he heareth not”
(ibid. xlii. 20), similar in sense to the verse, “Which have eyes to
see, and see not” (Ezek. xii. 2). When, however, Scripture says of
Adam, “He changed his face (panav) and thou sentest him forth” (Job
xiv. 20), it must be understood in the following way: On account of the
change of his original aim he was sent away. For panim, the Hebrew
equivalent of face, is derived from the verb panah, “he turned,” and
signifies also “aim,” because man generally turns his face towards the
thing he desires. In accordance with this interpretation, our text
suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his
thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished
from Paradise: this was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At
first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of
enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and
he followed his desires and impulses, (as we have already stated
above), and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was
deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of
food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion
and labour, as it is said, “Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee”
(Gen. iii. 18), “By the sweat of thy brow,” etc., and in explanation of
this the text continues, “And the Lord God drove him from the Garden of
Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken.” He was now with respect
to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower
animals; comp., “Thou shalt eat the grass of the field” (Gen. iii. 18).
Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says, “Adam unable to dwell
in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast” (Ps. xlix. 13).
“May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be
fathomed.”
CHAPTER III
It might be thought that the Hebrew words temunah and tabnit have one
and the same meaning, but this is not the case. Tabnit, derived from
the verb banah (he built), signifies the build and construction of a
thing—that is to say, its figure, whether square, round, triangular, or
of any other shape. Comp. “the pattern (tabnit) of the Tabernacle and
the pattern (tabnit) of all its vessels” (Exod. xxv. 9); “according to
the pattern (tabnit) which thou wast shown upon the mount” (Exod. xxv.
40); “the form of any bird” (Deut. iv. 17); “the form (tabnit) of a
hand” (Ezek. viii. 3); “the pattern (tabnit) of the porch” (1 Chron.
xxviii. 11). In all these quotations it is the shape which is referred
to. Therefore the Hebrew language never employs the word tabnit in
speaking of the qualities of God Almighty.
The term temunah, on the other hand, is used in the Bible in three
different senses. It signifies, first, the outlines of things which are
perceived by our bodily senses, i.e., their shape and form; as, e.g.,
“And ye make an image the form (temunat) of some likeness” (Deut. iv.
16); “for ye saw no likeness” (temunah) (Deut. iv. 15). Secondly, the
forms of our imagination, i.e., the impressions retained in imagination
when the objects have ceased to affect our senses. In this sense it is
used in the passage which begins “In thoughts from the visions of the
night” (Job iv. 13), and which concludes “it remained but I could not
recognize its sight, only an image—temunah—was before my eyes,” i.e.,
an image which presented itself to my sight during sleep. Thirdly, the
true form of an object, which is perceived only by the intellect: and
it is in this third signification that the term is applied to God. The
words “And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold” (Num. xii. 8)
therefore mean “he shall comprehend the true essence of the Lord.”
CHAPTER IV
The three verbs raah, hibbit, and ḥazah, which denote “he perceived
with the eye,” are also used figuratively in the sense of intellectual
perception. As regards the first of these verbs this is well known,
e.g., “And he looked (va-yar) and behold a well in the field” (Gen.
xxix. 2): here it signifies ocular perception; “yea, my heart has seen
(raah) much of wisdom and of knowledge” (Eccles. i. 16); in this
passage it refers to the intellectual perception.
In this figurative sense the verb is to be understood, when applied to
God; e.g., “I saw (raïti) the Lord” (1 Kings xxii. 19); “And the Lord
appeared (va-yera) unto him” (Gen. xviii. 1); “And God saw (va-yar)
that it was good” (Gen. i. 10); “I beseech thee, show me (hareni) thy
glory” (Exod. xxxiii. 18); “And they saw (va-yirü) the God of Israel”
(Exod. xxiv. 10). All these instances refer to intellectual perception,
and by no means to perception with the eye as in its literal meaning:
for, on the one hand, the eye can only perceive a corporeal object, and
in connection with it certain accidents, as colour, shape, etc.; and,
on the other hand, God does not perceive by means of a corporeal organ,
as will be explained.
In the same manner the Hebrew hibbit signifies “he viewed” with the
eye; comp. “Look (tabbit) not behind thee” (Gen. xix. 17); “But his
wife looked (va-tabbet) back from him” (Gen. xix. 26); “And if one look
(ve-nibbat) unto the land” (Isa. v. 30); and figuratively, “to view and
observe” with the intellect, “to contemplate” a thing till it be
understood. In this sense the verb is used in passages like the
following: “He hath not beheld (hibbit) iniquity in Jacob” (Num. xxiii.
21); for “iniquity” cannot be seen with the eye. The words, “And they
looked (ve-hibbitu) after Moses” (Exod. xxxiii. 8)—in addition to the
literal understanding of the phrase—were explained by our Sages in a
figurative sense. According to them, these words mean that the
Israelites examined and criticised the actions and sayings of Moses.
Compare also “Contemplate (habbet), I pray thee, the heaven” (Gen. xv.
5); for this took place in a prophetic vision. This verb, when applied
to God, is employed in this figurative sense; e.g., “to look
(me-habbit) upon God” (Exod. iii. 6); “And the similitude of the Lord
shall he behold” (yabbit) (Num. xii. 8); “And thou canst not look
(habbet) on iniquity” (Hab. i. 13).
The same explanation applies to ḥazah. It denotes to view with the eye,
as: “And let our eye look (ve-taḥaz) upon Zion” (Mic. iv. 11); and also
figuratively, to perceive mentally: “which he saw (ḥazah) concerning
Judah and Jerusalem” (Isa. i. 1); “The word of the Lord came unto
Abraham in a vision” (maḥazeh) (Gen. xv. 1): in this sense ḥazah is
used in the phrase, “Also they saw (va-yeḥezu) God” (Exod. xxiv. 11).
Note this well.
CHAPTER V
When the chief of philosophers [Aristotle] was about to inquire into
some very profound subjects, and to establish his theory by proofs, he
commenced his treatise with an apology, and requested the reader to
attribute the author’s inquiries not to presumption, vanity, egotism,
or arrogance, as though he were interfering with things of which he had
no knowledge, but rather to his zeal and his desire to discover and
establish true doctrines, as far as lay in human power. We take the
same position, and think that a man, when he commences to speculate,
ought not to embark at once on a subject so vast and important; he
should previously adapt himself to the study of the several branches of
science and knowledge, should most thoroughly refine his moral
character and subdue his passions and desires, the offspring of his
imagination; when, in addition, he has obtained a knowledge of the true
fundamental propositions, a comprehension of the several methods of
inference and proof, and the capacity of guarding against fallacies,
then he may approach the investigation of this subject. He must,
however, not decide any question by the first idea that suggests itself
to his mind, or at once direct his thoughts and force them to obtain a
knowledge of the Creator, but he must wait modestly and patiently, and
advance step by step.
In this sense we must understand the words “And Moses hid his face, for
he was afraid to look upon God” (Exod. iii. 6), though retaining also
the literal meaning of the passage, that Moses was afraid to gaze at
the light which appeared to his eye; but it must on no account be
assumed that the Being which is exalted far above every imperfection
can be perceived by the eye. This act of Moses was highly commended by
God, who bestowed on him a well deserved portion of His goodness, as it
is said: “And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold” (Num. xii.
8). This, say our Sages, was the reward for having previously hidden
his face, lest he should gaze at the Eternal. (Talm. B. Berakot Fa.)
But “the nobles of the Children of Israel” were impetuous, and allowed
their thoughts to go unrestrained: what they perceived was but
imperfect. Therefore it is said of them, “And they saw the God of
Israel, and there was under his feet,” etc. (Exod. xxiv. 10); and not
merely, “and they saw the God of Israel”; the purpose of the whole
passage is to criticize their act of seeing and not to describe it.
They are blamed for the nature of their perception, which was to a
certain extent corporeal—a result which necessarily followed, from the
fact that they ventured too far before being perfectly prepared. They
deserved to perish, but at the intercession of Moses this fate was
averted by God for the time. They were afterwards burnt at Taberah,
except Nadab and Abihu, who were burnt in the Tabernacle of the
congregation, according to what is stated by authentic tradition.
(Midr. Rabba ad locum.)
If such was the case with them, how much more is it incumbent on us who
are inferior, and on those who are below us, to persevere in perfecting
our knowledge of the elements, and in rightly understanding the
preliminaries which purify the mind from the defilement of error; then
we may enter the holy and divine camp in order to gaze: as the Bible
says, “And let the priests also, which come near to the Lord, sanctify
themselves, lest the Lord break forth upon them” (Exod. xix. 22).
Solomon, also, has cautioned all who endeavour to attain this high
degree of knowledge in the following figurative terms, “Keep thy foot
when thou goest to the house of God” (Eccles. iv. 17).
I will now return to complete what I commenced to explain. The nobles
of the Children of Israel, besides erring in their perception, were,
through this cause, also misled in their actions; for in consequence of
their confused perception, they gave way to bodily cravings. This is
meant by the words, “Also they saw God and did eat and drink” (Exod.
xxiv. 11). The principal part of that passage, viz., “And there was
under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone” (Exod.
xxiv. 10), will be further explained in the course of the present
treatise (ch. xxviii.). All we here intend to say is, that wherever in
a similar connection any one of the three verbs mentioned above occurs,
it has reference to intellectual perception, not to the sensation of
sight by the eye; for God is not a being to be perceived by the eye.
It will do no harm, however, if those who are unable to comprehend what
we here endeavour to explain should refer all the words in question to
sensuous perception, to seeing lights created [for the purpose],
angels, or similar beings.
CHAPTER VI
The two Hebrew nouns ish and ishshah were originally employed to
designate the “male and female” of human beings, but were afterwards
applied to the “male and female” of the other species of the animal
creation. For instance, we read, “Of every clean beast thou shalt take
to thee by sevens,” ish ve-ishto (Gen. vii. 2), in the same sense as
ish ve-ishshah, “male and female.” The term zakar u-nekebah was
afterwards applied to anything designed and prepared for union with
another object. Thus we read, “The five curtains shall be coupled
together, one (ishshah) to the other” (aḥotah) (Exod. xxvi. 3).
It will easily be seen that the Hebrew equivalents for “brother and
sister” are likewise treated as homonyms, and used, in a figurative
sense, like ish and ishshah.
CHAPTER VII
It is well known that the verb yalad means “to bear,” “they have born
(ve-yaledu) him children” (Deut. xxi. 15). The word was next used in a
figurative sense with reference to various objects in nature, meaning,
“to create,” e.g. “before the mountains were created” (yulladu) (Ps.
xc. 2); also, “to produce,” in reference to that which the earth causes
to come forth as if by birth, e.g., “He will cause her to bear
(holidah) and bring forth” (Isa. lv. 10). The verb further denotes, “to
bring forth,” said of changes in the process of time, as though they
were things which were born, e.g., “for thou knowest not what a day may
bring forth” (yeled) (Prov. xxvii. 1). Another figurative use of the
word is its application to the formation of thoughts and ideas, or of
opinions resulting from them; comp. “and brought forth (ve-yalad)
falsehood” (Ps. vii. 14); also, “and they please themselves in the
children (yalde) of strangers” (Isa. ii. 6), i.e., “they delight in the
opinions of strangers.” Jonathan the son of Uzziel paraphrases this
passage, “they walk in the customs of other nations.”
A man who has instructed another in any subject, and has improved his
knowledge, may in like manner be regarded as the parent of the person
taught, because he is the author of that knowledge; and thus the pupils
of the prophets are called “sons of the prophets,” as I shall explain
when treating of the homonymity of ben (son). In this figurative sense,
the verb yalad (to bear) is employed when it is said of Adam, “And Adam
lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat (va-yoled) a son in his
own likeness, in his form” (Gen. v. 3). As regards the words, “the form
of Adam, and his likeness,” we have already stated (ch. i.) their
meaning. Those sons of Adam who were born before that time were not
human in the true sense of the word, they had not “the form of man.”
With reference to Seth who had been instructed, enlightened and brought
to human perfection, it could rightly be said, “he (Adam) begat a son
in his likeness, in his form.” It is acknowledged that a man who does
not possess this “form” (the nature of which has just been explained)
is not human, but a mere animal in human shape and form. Yet such a
creature has the power of causing harm and injury: a power which does
not belong to other creatures. For those gifts of intelligence and
judgment with which he has been endowed for the purpose of acquiring
perfection, but which he has failed to apply to their proper aim, are
used by him for wicked and mischievous ends; he begets evil things, as
though he merely resembled man, or simulated his outward appearance.
Such was the condition of those sons of Adam who preceded Seth. In
reference to this subject the Midrash says: “During the 130 years when
Adam was under rebuke he begat spirits,” i.e., demons; when, however,
he was again restored to divine favour “he begat in his likeness, in
his form.” This is the sense of the passage, “Adam lived one hundred
and thirty years, and he begat in his likeness, in his form” (Gen. v.
3).
CHAPTER VIII
Originally the Hebrew term makom (place) applied both to a particular
spot and to space in general; subsequently it received a wider
signification and denoted “position,” or “degree,” as regards the
perfection of man in certain things. We say, e.g., this man occupies a
certain place in such and such a subject. In this sense this term, as
is well known, is frequently used by authors, e.g., “He fills his
ancestors’ place (makom) in point of wisdom and piety”; “the dispute
still remains in its place” (makom), i.e., in statu quo [ante]. In the
verse, “Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place” (mekomo)
(Ezek. iii. 12), makom has this figurative meaning, and the verse may
be paraphrased “Blessed be the Lord according to the exalted nature of
His existence,” and wherever makom is applied to God, it expresses the
same idea, namely, the distinguished position of His existence, to
which nothing is equal or comparable, as will be shown below (chap.
lvi.).
It should be observed that when we treat in this work of any homonym,
we do not desire you to confine yourself to that which is stated in
that particular chapter; but we open for you a portal and direct your
attention to those significations of the word which are suited to our
purpose, though they may not be complete from a philological point of
view. You should examine the prophetical books and other works composed
by men of science, notice the meaning of every word which occurs in
them, and take homonyms in that sense which is in harmony with the
context. What I say in a particular passage is a key for the
comprehension of all similar passages. For example, we have explained
here makom in the sentence “Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His
place” (mekomo); but you must understand that the word makom has the
same signification in the passage “Behold, a place (makom) is with me”
(Exod. xxxiii. 26), viz., a certain degree of contemplation and
intellectual intuition (not of ocular inspection), in addition to its
literal meaning “a place,” viz., the mountain which was pointed out to
Moses for seclusion and for the attainment of perfection.
CHAPTER IX
The original meaning of the word kisse, “throne,” requires no comment.
Since men of greatness and authority, as, e.g., kings, use the throne
as a seat, and “the throne” thus indicates the rank, dignity, and
position of the person for whom it is made, the Sanctuary has been
styled “the throne,” inasmuch as it likewise indicates the superiority
of Him who manifests Himself, and causes His light and glory to dwell
therein. Comp. “A glorious throne on high from the beginning is the
place of our sanctuary” (Jer. xvii. 12). For the same reason the
heavens are called “throne,” for to the mind of him who observes them
with intelligence they suggest the Omnipotence of the Being which has
called them into existence, regulates their motions, and governs the
sublunary world by their beneficial influence: as we read, “Thus saith
the Lord, The heavens are my throne and the earth my footstool” (Isa.
lxvi. 1); i.e., they testify to my Existence, my Essence, and my
Omnipotence, as the throne testifies to the greatness of him who is
worthy to occupy it.
This is the idea which true believers should entertain; not, however,
that the Omnipotent, Supreme God is supported by any material object;
for God is incorporeal, as we shall prove further on; how, then, can He
be said to occupy any space, or rest on a body? The fact which I wish
to point out is this: every place distinguished by the Almighty, and
chosen to receive His light and splendour, as, for instance, the
Sanctuary or the Heavens, is termed “throne”; and, taken in a wider
sense, as in the passage “For my hand is upon the throne of God” (Exod.
xvii. 16), “the throne” denotes here the Essence and Greatness of God.
These, however (the Essence and Greatness of God) need not be
considered as something separate from the God Himself or as part of the
Creation, so that God would appear to have existed both without the
throne, and with the throne; such a belief would be undoubtedly
heretical. It is distinctly stated, “Thou, O Lord, remainest for ever;
Thy throne from generation to generation” (Lam. v. 19). By “Thy throne”
we must, therefore, understand something inseparable from God. On that
account, both here and in all similar passages, the word “throne”
denotes God’s Greatness and Essence, which are inseparable from His
Being.
Our opinion will be further elucidated in the course of this Treatise.
CHAPTER X
We have already remarked that when we treat in this work of homonyms,
we have not the intention to exhaust the meanings of a word (for this
is not a philological treatise); we shall mention no other
significations but those which bear on our subject. We shall thus
proceed in our treatment of the terms ʻalah and yarad.
These two words, ʻalah, “he went up,” and yarad, “he went down,” are
Hebrew terms used in the sense of ascending and descending. When a body
moves from a higher to a lower place, the verb yarad, “to go down,” is
used; when it moves from a lower to a higher place, ʻalah, “to go up,”
is applied. These two verbs were afterwards employed with regard to
greatness and power. When a man falls from his high position, we say
“he has come down,” and when he rises in station “he has gone up.” Thus
the Almighty says, “The stranger that is within thee shall get up above
thee very high, and thou shalt come down very low” (Deut. xxviii. 43).
Again, “The Lord thy God will set thee on high (ʻelyon) above all
nations of the earth” (Deut. xxviii. 1): “And the Lord magnified
Solomon exceedingly” (lemaʻalah) (1 Chron. xxix. 25). The Sages often
employ these expressions, as: “In holy matters men must ascend
(maʻalin) and not descend (moridin).” The two words are also applied to
intellectual processes, namely, when we reflect on something beneath
ourselves we are said to go down, and when our attention is raised to a
subject above us we are said to rise.
Now, we occupy a lowly position, both in space and rank in comparison
with the heavenly sphere, and the Almighty is Most High not in space,
but with respect to absolute existence, greatness and power. When it
pleased the Almighty to grant to a human being a certain degree of
wisdom or prophetic inspiration, the divine communication thus made to
the prophet and the entrance of the Divine Presence into a certain
place is termed yeridah, “descending,” while the termination of the
prophetic communication or the departure of the divine glory from a
place is called ʻaliyah, “ascending.”
The expressions “to go up” and “to go down,” when used in reference to
God, must be interpreted in this sense. Again, when, in accordance with
the divine will, some misfortune befalls a nation or a region of the
earth, and when the biblical account of that misfortune is preceded by
the statement that the Almighty visited the actions of the people, and
that He punished them accordingly, then the prophetic author employs
the term “to descend”: for man is so low and insignificant that his
actions would not be visited and would not bring punishment on him,
were it not for the divine will: as is clearly stated in the Bible,
with regard to this idea, “What is man that thou shouldst remember him,
and the son of man that thou shouldst visit him” (Ps. viii. 5).
The design of the Deity to punish man is, therefore, introduced by the
verb “to descend”; comp. “Go to, let us go down and there confound
their language” (Gen. xi. 7); “And the Lord came down to see” (Gen. xi.
5); “I will go down now and see” (Gen. xviii. 21). All these instances
convey the idea that man here below is going to be punished.
More numerous, however, are the instances of the first case, viz., in
which these verbs are used in connection with the revelation of the
word and of the glory of God, e.g., “And I will come down and talk with
thee there” (Num. xi. 17); “And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai”
(Exod. xix. 20); “The Lord will come down in the sight of all the
people” (Exod. xix. 11); “And God went up from him” (Gen. xxxv. 13);
“And God went up from Abraham” (Gen. xvii. 22). When, on the other
hand, it says, “And Moses went up unto God” (Exod. xix. 3), it must be
taken in the third signification of these verbs, in addition to its
literal meaning that Moses also ascended to the top of the mount, upon
which a certain material light (the manifestation of God’s glory) was
visible; but we must not imagine that the Supreme Being occupies a
place to which we can ascend, or from which we can descend. He is far
from what the ignorant imagine.
CHAPTER XI
The primary meaning of the Hebrew yashab is “he was seated,” as “Now
Eli the priest sat (yashab) upon a seat” (1 Sam. i. 9); but, since a
person can best remain motionless and at rest when sitting, the term
was applied to everything that is permanent and unchanging; thus, in
the promise that Jerusalem should remain constantly and permanently in
an exalted condition, it is stated, “She will rise and sit in her
place” (Zech. xiv. 10); further, “He maketh the woman who was childless
to sit as a joyful mother of children” (Ps. cxiii. 9); i.e., He makes
her happy condition to be permanent and enduring.
When applied to God, the verb is to be taken in that latter sense:
“Thou, O Lord, remainest (tesheb) for ever” (Lam. v. 19); “O thou who
sittest (ha-yoshebi) in the heavens” (Ps. cxxiii. 1); “He who sitteth
in the heavens” (ii. 4), i.e., He who is everlasting, constant, and in
no way subject to change; immutable in His Essence, and as He consists
of nought but His Essence, He is mutable in no way whatever; not
mutable in His relation to other things; for there is no relation
whatever existing between Him and any other being, as will be explained
below, and therefore no change as regards such relations can take place
in Him. Hence He is immutable in every respect, as He expressly
declares, “I, the Lord, do not change” (Mal. iii. 6); i.e., in Me there
is not any change whatever. This idea is expressed by the term yashab
when referring to God.
The verb, when employed of God, is frequently complemented by “the
Heavens,” inasmuch as the heavens are without change or mutation, that
is to say, they do not individually change, as the individual beings on
earth, by transition from existence into non-existence.
The verb is also employed in descriptions of God’s relation (the term
“relation” is here used as a homonym) to existing species of evanescent
things; for those species are as constant, well organized, and
unvarying as the individuals of the heavenly hosts. Thus we find, “Who
sitteth over the circle of the earth” (Isa. xl. 22), Who remains
constantly and unremittingly over the sphere of the earth; that is to
say, over the things that come into existence within that sphere.
Again, “The Lord sitteth upon the flood” (Ps. xxix. 10), i.e., despite
the change and variation of earthly objects, no change takes place with
respect to God’s relation (to the earth): His relation to each of the
things which come into existence and perish again is stable and
constant, for it concerns only the existing species and not the
individuals. It should therefore be borne in mind, that whenever the
term “sitting” is applied to God, it is used in this sense.
CHAPTER XII
The term kam (he rose) is a homonym. In one of its significations it is
the opposite of “to sit,” as “He did not rise (kam) nor move for him”
(Esth. v. 9). It further denotes the confirmation and verification of a
thing, e.g.: “The Lord will verify (yakem) His promise” (1 Sam. i. 23);
“The field of Ephron was made sure (va-yakom) as the property of
Abraham” (Gen. xxiii. 17). “The house that is in the walled city shall
be established (ve-kam)” (Lev. xxv. 30); “And the kingdom of Israel
shall be firmly established (ve-kamah) in thy hand” (1 Sam. xxiv. 20).
It is always in this sense that the verb is employed with reference to
the Almighty; as “Now shall I rise (akum), saith the Lord” (Ps. xii.
7), which is the same as saying, “Now shall I verify my word and my
dispensation for good or evil.” “Thou shalt arise (takum) and have
mercy upon Zion” (Ps. cii. 13), which means: Thou wilt establish what
thou hast promised, viz., that thou wouldst pity Zion.
Generally a person who resolves to set about a matter, accompanies his
resolve by rising, hence the verb is employed to express “to resolve”
to do a certain thing; as, “That my son hath stirred up my servant
against me” (1 Sam. xxii. 8). The word is figuratively used to signify
the execution of a divine decree against a people sentenced to
extermination, as “And I will rise against the house of Jeroboam” (Amos
vii. 9); “but he will arise against the house of the evildoers” (Isa.
xxxi. 2). Possibly in Psalm xii. 7 the verb has this latter sense, as
also in Psalm cii. 13, namely: Thou wilt rise up against her enemies.
There are many passages to be interpreted in this manner, but in no way
should it be understood that He rises or sits—far be such a notion! Our
Sages expressed this idea in the formula, “In the world above there is
neither sitting nor standing (ʻamidah)”; for the two verbs ʻamad and
kam are synonyms [and what is said about the former is also applicable
to the latter].
CHAPTER XIII
The term ʻamad (he stood) is a homonym signifying in the first instance
“to stand upright,” as “When he stood (be-ʻomdo) before Pharaoh” (Gen.
xli. 46); “Though Moses and Samuel stood (yaʻamod)” (Jer. xv. 1); “He
stood by them” (Gen. xviii. 8). It further denotes “cessation and
interruption,” as “but they stood still (ʻamedu) and answered no more”
(Job xxxii. 16); “and she ceased (va-taʻamod) to bear” (Gen. xxix. 35).
Next it signifies “to be enduring and lasting,” as, “that they may
continue (yo-ʻamedu) many days” (Jer. xxxii. 14); “Then shalt thou be
able to endure (ʻamod)” (Exod. xviii. 23); “His taste remained (ʻamad)
in him” (Jer. xlviii. 11), i.e., it has continued and remained in
existence without any change; “His righteousness standeth for ever”
(Ps. cxi. 3), i.e., it is permanent and everlasting. The verb applied
to God must be understood in this latter sense, as in Zechariah xiv. 4,
“And his feet shall stand (ve-ʻamedu) in that day upon the Mount of
Olives” (Zech. xiv. 4), “His causes, i.e., the events of which He is
the cause, will remain efficient,” etc. This will be further elucidated
when we speak of the meaning of regel (foot). (Vide infra, chap,
xxviii.) In the same sense is this verb employed in Deuteronomy v. 28,
“But as for thee, stand thou here by me,” and Deuteronomy v. 5, “I
stood between the Lord and you.”
CHAPTER XIV
The homonymous term adam is in the first place the name of the first
man, being, as Scripture indicates, derived from adamah, “earth.” Next,
it means “mankind,” as “My spirit shall not strive with man (adam)”
(Gen. vi. 3). Again “Who knoweth the spirit of the children of man
(adam)” (Eccles. iii. 21); “so that a man (adam) has no pre-eminence
above a beast” (Eccles. iii. 19). Adam signifies also “the multitude,”
“the lower classes” as opposed to those distinguished from the rest, as
“Both low (bene adam) and high (bene ish)” (Ps. xlix. 3).
It is in this third signification that it occurs in the verses, “The
sons of the higher order (Elohim) saw the daughters of the lower order
(adam)” (Gen. vi. 2); and “Forsooth! as the humble man (adam) you shall
die” (Ps. lxxxii. 7).
CHAPTER XV
Although the two roots naẓab and yaẓab are distinct, yet their meaning
is, as you know, identical in all their various forms.
The verb has several meanings: in some instances it signifies “to
stand” or “to place oneself,” as “And his sister stood (va-tetaẓẓab)
afar off” (Exod. ii. 4); “The kings of the earth set themselves”
(yityaẓẓebu) (Ps. ii. 2); “They came out and stood” (niẓẓabim) (Num.
xvi. 27). In other instances it denotes continuance and permanence, as,
“Thy word is established (niẓẓab) in Heaven” (Ps. cxix. 89), i.e., it
remains for ever.
Whenever this term is applied to God it must be understood in the
latter sense, as, “And, behold, the Lord stood (niẓẓab) upon it” (Gen.
xxviii. 13), i.e., appeared as eternal and everlasting “upon it,”
namely, upon the ladder, the upper end of which reached to heaven,
while the lower end touched the earth. This ladder all may climb up who
wish to do so, and they must ultimately attain to a knowledge of Him
who is above the summit of the ladder, because He remains upon it
permanently. It must be well understood that the term “upon it” is
employed by me in harmony with this metaphor. “Angels of God” who were
going up represent the prophets. That the term “angel” was applied to
prophets may clearly be seen in the following passages: “He sent an
angel” (Num. xx. 16); “And an angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to
Bochim” (Judges ii. 1). How suggestive, too, is the expression
“ascending and descending on it”! The ascent is mentioned before the
descent, inasmuch as the “ascending” and arriving at a certain height
of the ladder precedes the “descending,” i.e., the application of the
knowledge acquired in the ascent for the training and instruction of
mankind. This application is termed “descent,” in accordance with our
explanation of the term yarad (chapter x.).
To return to our subject. The phrase “stood upon it” indicates the
permanence and constancy of God, and does not imply the idea of
physical position. This is also the sense of the phrase “Thou shalt
stand upon the rock” (Exod. xxxiii. 21). It is therefore clear that
niẓẓab and ʻamad are identical in this figurative signification. Comp.
“Behold, I will stand (ʻomed) before thee there upon the rock in Horeb”
(Exod. xvii. 6).
CHAPTER XVI
The word ẓur (rock) is a homonym. First, it denotes “rock,” as “And
thou shalt smite the rock” (ẓur) (Exod. xvii. 6). Then, “hard stone,”
like the flint, e.g., “Knives of stone” (ẓurim) (Josh. v. 2). It is
next employed to signify the quarry from which the stones are hewn;
comp. “Look unto the rock (ẓur) whence ye are hewn” (Isa. li. 1). From
this latter meaning of the term another figurative notion was
subsequently derived, viz., “the root and origin” of all things. It is
on this account that after the words “Look to the rock whence ye are
hewn,” the Prophet continues, “Look unto Abraham your father,” from
which we evidently may infer that the words “Abraham your father” serve
to explain “the rock whence ye are hewn”; and that the Prophet meant to
say, “Walk in his ways, put faith in his instruction, and conduct
yourselves according to the rule of his life! for the properties
contained in the quarry should be found again in those things which are
formed and hewn out of it.”
It is in the latter sense that the Almighty is called “rock,” He being
the origin and the causa efficiens of all things besides Himself. Thus
we read, “He is the Rock, His work is perfect” (Deut. xxxii. 4); “Of
the Rock that begat thee thou art unmindful” (Deut. xxxii. 18); “Their
Rock had sold them” (xxxi. 30); “There is no rock like our God” (1 Sam.
ii. 2): “The Rock of Eternity” (Isa. xxvi. 4). Again, “And thou shalt
stand upon the Rock” (Exod. xxxiii. 21), i.e., Be firm and steadfast in
the conviction that God is the source of all things, for this will lead
you towards the knowledge of the Divine Being. We have shown (chap.
viii.) that the words “Behold, a place is with me” (Exod. xxxiii. 21)
contain the same idea.
CHAPTER XVII
Do not imagine that only Metaphysics should be taught with reserve to
the common people and to the uninitiated; for the same is also the case
with the greater part of Natural Science. In this sense we have
repeatedly made use of the expression of the Sages, “Do not expound the
chapter on the Creation in the presence of two” [vide Introd. page 2].
This principle was not peculiar to our Sages; ancient philosophers and
scholars of other nations were likewise wont to treat of the principia
rerum obscurely, and to use figurative language in discussing such
subjects. Thus Plato and his predecessors called Substance the female,
and Form the male. (You are aware that the principia of all existing
transient things are three, viz., Substance, Form, and Absence of a
particular form; the last-named principle is always inherent in the
substance, for otherwise the substance would be incapable of receiving
a new form; and it is from this point of view that absence [of a
particular form] is included among the principia. As soon, then, as a
substance has received a certain form, the privation of that form,
namely, of that which has just been received, has ceased, and is
replaced by the privation of another form, and so on with all possible
forms, as is explained in treatises on natural philosophy.)—Now, if
those philosophers who have nothing to fear from a lucid explanation of
these metaphysical subjects still were in the habit of discussing them
in figures and metaphors, how much more should we, having the interest
of religion at heart, refrain from elucidating to the mass any subject
that is beyond their comprehension, or that might be taken in a sense
directly opposite to the one intended. This also deserves attention.
CHAPTER XVIII
The three words karab, “to come near,” nagaʻ, “to touch,” and nagash,
“to approach,” sometimes signify “contact” or “nearness in space,”
sometimes the approach of man’s knowledge to an object, as if it
resembled the physical approach of one body to another. As to the use
of karab in the first meaning, viz., to draw near a certain spot, comp.
“As he drew near (karab) the camp” (Exod. xxxii. 19); “And Pharaoh drew
near (hikrib)” (Exod. xiv. 10). Nagaʻ, in the first sense, viz.,
expressing the contact of two bodies, occurs in “And she cast it
(va-taggaʻ) at his feet” (Exod. iv. 25); “He caused it to touch
(va-yaggaʻ) my mouth” (Isa. vi. 7). And nagash in the first sense,
viz., to approach or move towards another person, is found, e.g., in
“And Judah drew near (va-yiggash) unto him” (Gen. xliv. 1).
The second meaning of these three words is “approach by means of
knowledge,” or “contact by comprehension,” not in reference to space.
As to nagaʻ in this second sense, comp. “for her judgment reacheth
(nagaʻ) unto heaven” (Jer. li. 9). An instance of karab being used in
this meaning is contained in the following passage, “And the cause that
is too hard for you, bring (takribun) it unto me” (Deut. i. 17); this
is equivalent to saying, “Ye shall make it known unto me.” The verb
karab (in the Hiphil) is thus employed in the sense of giving
information concerning a thing. The verb nagash is used figuratively in
the phrase, “And Abraham drew near (va-yiggash), and said” (Gen. xviii.
23); this took place in a prophetic vision and in a trance, as will be
explained (Part I. chap, xxi., and Part II. chap, xli.); also in
“Forasmuch as this people draw near (niggash) me with their mouths and
with their lips” (Isa. xxix. 13). Wherever a word denoting approach or
contact is employed in the prophetic writings to describe a certain
relation between the Almighty and any created being, it has to be
understood in this latter sense [viz., to approach mentally]. For, as
will be proved in this treatise (II. chap, iv.), the Supreme is
incorporeal, and consequently He does not approach or draw near a
thing, nor can aught approach or touch Him; for when a being is without
corporeality, it cannot occupy space, and all idea of approach,
contact, distance, conjunction, separation, touch, or proximity is
inapplicable to such a being.
There can be no doubt respecting the verses “The Lord is nigh (karob)
unto all them that call upon him” (Ps. cxlv. 18); “They take delight in
approaching (kirbat) to God” (Isa. lviii. 2); “The nearness (kirbat) of
God is pleasant to me” (Ps. lxxiii. 28); all such phrases intimate a
spiritual approach, i.e., the attainment of some knowledge, not,
however, approach in space. Thus also “who hath God so nigh (kerobim)
unto him” (Deut. iv. 7); “Draw thou near (kerab) and hear” (Deut. v.
27); “And Moses alone shall draw near (ve-niggash) the Lord; but they
shall not come nigh (yiggashu)” (Exod. xxiv. 2).
If, however, you wish to take the words “And Moses shall draw near” to
mean that he shall draw near a certain place in the mountain, whereon
the Divine Light shone, or, in the words of the Bible, “where the glory
of the Lord abode,” you may do so, provided you do not lose sight of
the truth that there is no difference whether a person stand at the
centre of the earth or at the highest point of the ninth sphere, if
this were possible; he is no further away from God in the one case, or
nearer to Him in the other; those only approach Him who obtain a
knowledge of Him; while those who remain ignorant of Him recede from
Him. In this approach towards, or recession from God there are numerous
grades one above the other, and I shall further elucidate, in one of
the subsequent chapters of the Treatise (I. chap, lx., and II. chap,
xxxvi.) what constitutes the difference in our perception of God.
In the passage, “Touch (gaʻ) the mountains, and they shall smoke” (Ps.
cxliv. 5), the verb “touch” is used in a figurative sense, viz., “Let
thy word touch them.” So also the words, “Touch thou him himself” (Job
ii. 5), have the same meaning as “Bring thy infliction upon him.” In a
similar manner must this verb, in whatever form it may be employed, be
interpreted in each place, according to the context; for in some cases
it denotes contact of two material objects, in others knowledge and
comprehension of a thing, as if he who now comprehends anything which
he had not comprehended previously had thereby approached a subject
which had been distant from him. This point is of considerable
importance.
CHAPTER XIX
The term male is a homonym which denotes that one substance enters
another, and fills it, as “And she filled (va-temalle) her pitcher”
(Gen. xxiv. 16); “An omer-full (melo) for each” (Exod. xvi. 32), and
many other instances. Next, it signifies the expiration or completion
of a fixed period of time, as “And when her days to be delivered were
fulfilled (va-yimleü)” (Gen. xxv. 24); “And forty days were completed
(va-yimleü) for him” (Gen. l. 3). It further denotes attainment of the
highest degree of excellency, as “Full (male) with the blessing of the
Lord” (Deut. xxxiii. 23); “Them hath he filled (mille) with wisdom of
heart” (Exod. xxxv. 35); “He was filled (va-yimmale) with wisdom, and
understanding, and cunning” (1 Kings vii. 14). In this sense it is said
“The whole earth is full (melo) of his glory” (Isa. vi. 4), “All the
earth gives evidence of his perfection,” i.e. leads to a knowledge of
it. Thus also “The glory of the Lord filled (male) the tabernacle”
(Exod. xl. 34); and, in fact, every application of the word to God must
be interpreted in this manner; and not that He has a body occupying
space. If, on the other hand, you prefer to think that in this passage
by “the glory of the Lord,” a certain light created for the purpose is
to be understood, that such light is always termed “glory,” and that
such light “filled the tabernacle,” we have no objection.
CHAPTER XX
The word ram (high) is a homonym, denoting elevation in space, and
elevation in dignity, i.e., greatness, honour, and power. It has the
first meaning in “And the ark was lifted up (va-tarom) above the earth”
(Gen. vii. 17); and the latter meaning in “I have exalted (harimoti)
one chosen out of the people” (Ps. lxxxix. 20); “Forasmuch as I have
exalted (harimoti) thee from amongst the dust” (1 Kings xvi. 2);
“Forasmuch as I exalted (harimoti) thee from among the people” (1 Kings
xiv. 7).
Whenever this term is employed in reference to God, it must be taken in
the second sense: “Be thou exalted (rumah), O God, above the heavens”
(Ps. lvii. 12). In the same manner does the root nasa (to lift up)
denote both elevation in space and elevation in rank and dignity. In
the former sense it occurs in “And they lifted up (va-yisseü) their
corn upon their asses” (Gen. xlii. 26); and there are many instances
like this in which this verb has the meaning “to carry,” “to move” from
place to place; for this implies elevation in space. In the second
sense we have “And his kingdom shall be exalted” (ve-tinnase) (Num.
xxiv. 7); “And he bare them, and carried them” (va-yenasseëm) (Isa.
lxiii. 9); “Wherefore do ye exalt yourselves” (titnasseü) (Num. xvi.
3).
Every form of this verb when applied to God has this latter sense—e.g.,
“Lift up thyself (hinnase), thou judge of the earth” (Ps. xciv. 2);
“Thus saith the High (ram) and Exalted (nissa) One” (Isa. lvii.
15)—denoting elevation in rank, quality, and power, and not elevation
in space.
You may be surprised that I employ the expression, “elevation in rank,
quality, and power,” and you may say, “How can you assert that several
distinct expressions denote the same thing?” It will be explained later
on (chap. l. seqq.) that those who possess a true knowledge of God do
not consider that He possesses many attributes, but believe that these
various attributes which describe His Might, Greatness, Power,
Perfection, Goodness, etc., are identical, denoting His Essence, and
not anything extraneous to His Essence. I shall devote special chapters
to the Names and Attributes of God; our intention here is solely to
show that “high and exalted” in the passage quoted denote elevation in
rank, not in space.
CHAPTER XXI
In its primary signification the Hebrew ʻabar, “to pass,” refers to the
motion of a body in space, and is chiefly applied to living creatures
moving at some distance in a straight line, e.g., “And He passed over
(ʻabar) before them” (Gen. xxxiii. 3); “Pass (ʻabor) before the people”
(Exod. xvii. 5). Instances of this kind are numerous. The verb was next
applied to the passage of sound through air, as “And they caused a
sound to pass (va-yaʻabiru) throughout the camp” (Exod. xxxvi. 6);
“That I hear the Lord’s people spreading the report” (maʻabirim) (1
Sam. ii. 24).
Figuratively it denoted the appearance of the Light and the Divine
Presence (Shechinah) which the prophets perceived in their prophetic
visions, as it is said, “And behold a smoking furnace, and a burning
lamp that passed (ʻabar) between those pieces” (Gen. xv. 17). This took
place in a prophetic vision, for the narrative commences, “And a deep
sleep fell upon Abram.” The verb has this latter meaning in Exodus xii.
12, “And I shall pass (ve-ʻabarti) through the land of Egypt” (denoting
“I shall reveal myself,” etc.), and in all similar phrases.
The verb is next employed to express that a person has gone too far,
and transgressed the usual limit, in the performance of some act, as
“And as a man who is drinking wine has passed (ʻabarv) the proper
limit” (Jer. xxiii. 9).
It is also used figuratively to denote: to abandon one aim, and turn to
a different aim and object, e.g., “He shot an arrow, causing it to miss
the aim (lehaʻabiro)” (1 Sam. xx. 36). This is the sense, it appears to
me, of this verb in “And the Lord passed by (va-yaʻabor) before his
face” (Exod. xxxiv. 6). I take “his face” to mean “the face of God”;
our Teachers likewise interpreted “his face” as being identical with
“the face of God.” And, although this is found in the midst of Agadic
interpretations which would be out of place in this our work, yet it is
some support of our view, that the pronoun “his” is employed in this
passage as a substitute for “God’s”—and the whole passage could in my
opinion be explained as follows: Moses sought to attain to a certain
perception which is called “the perception of the Divine face,” a term
occurring in the phrase “My face cannot be seen”; but God vouchsafed to
him a perception of a lower degree, viz., the one called, “the seeing
of the back,” in the words, “And thou shalt see my back” (Exod. xxxiii.
23). We have mentioned this subject in our work Mishneh Torah.
Accordingly, it is stated in the above-mentioned passage that the Lord
withheld from Moses that perception which is termed “the seeing of the
Divine face,” and substituted for it another gift, viz., the knowledge
of the acts attributed to God, which, as I shall explain (chap. liv.)
are considered to be different and separate attributes of the Supreme.
In asserting that God withheld from Moses (the higher knowledge) I mean
to say that this knowledge was unattainable, that by its nature it was
inaccessible to Moses; for man, whilst able to gain perfection by
applying his reasoning faculties to the attainment of what is within
the reach of his intellect, either weakens his reason or loses it
altogether as soon as he ventures to seek a higher degree of
knowledge—as I shall elucidate in one of the chapters of this
work—unless he be granted a special aid from heaven, as is described in
the words, “And I will cover thee with my hand until I pass by” (Exod.
xxxiii. 23).
Onkelos, in translating this verse, adopts the same method which he
applies to the explanation of similar passages, viz., every expression
implying corporeality or corporal properties, when referring to God, he
explains by assuming an ellipsis of a nomen regens before “God,” thus
connecting the expression (of corporeality) with another word which is
supplied, and which governs the genitive “God”; e.g., “And behold the
Lord stood upon it” (Gen. xxviii. 13), he explains, “The glory of the
Lord stood arrayed above it.” Again, “The Lord watch between me and
thee” (Gen. xxxi. 49), he paraphrases, “The word of the Lord shall
watch.” This is his ordinary method in explaining Scripture. He applies
it also to Exod. xxxiv. 6, which he paraphrases, “The Lord caused his
Presence to pass before his face and called.” According to this
rendering the thing which passed was unquestionably some physical
object, the pronoun “his” refers to Moses, and the phrase ʻal panav is
identical with lefanav, “before him.” Comp. “So went the present over
before him” (ʻal panav) (Gen. xxxii, 22). This is likewise an
appropriate and satisfactory explanation; and I can adduce still
further support for the opinion of Onkelos from the words “while my
glory passeth by” (ba-ʻabor) (Exod. xxxiii. 22), which expressly state
that the passing object was something ascribed to God, not God Himself;
and of this Divine glory it is also said, “until I pass by,” and “And
the Lord passed by before him.”
Should it, however, be considered necessary to assume here an ellipsis,
according to the method of Onkelos, who supplies in some instances the
term “the Glory,” in others “the Word,” and in others “the Divine
Presence,” as the context may require in each particular case, we may
also supply here the word “voice,” and explain the passage, “And a
voice from the Lord passed before him and called.” We have already
shown that the verb ʻabar, “he passed,” can be applied to the voice, as
in “And they caused a voice to pass through the camp” (Exod. xxxvi. 6).
According to this explanation, it was the voice which called. No
objection can be raised to applying the verb kara (he called) to kol
(voice), for a similar phrase occurs in the Bible in reference to God’s
commands to Moses, “He heard the voice speaking unto him”; and, in the
same manner as it can be said “the voice spoke,” we may also say “the
voice called”; indeed, we can even support this application of the
verbs “to say,” and “to call,” to “the voice,” by parallel passages, as
“A voice saith ‘Cry,’ and it says ‘What shall I cry?’” (Isa. xl. 6).
According to this view, the meaning of the passage under discussion
would be: “A voice of God passed before him and called, ‘Eternal,
Eternal, All-powerful, All-merciful, and All-gracious!’” (The word
Eternal is repeated; it is in the vocative, for the Eternal is the one
who is called. Comp. Moses, Moses! Abraham, Abraham!) This, again, is a
very appropriate explanation of the text.
You will surely not find it strange that this subject, so profound and
difficult, should bear various interpretations; for it will not impair
the force of the argument with which we are here concerned. Either
explanation may be adopted; you may take that grand scene altogether as
a prophetic vision, and the whole occurrence as a mental operation, and
consider that what Moses sought, what was withheld from him, and what
he attained, were things perceived by the intellect without the use of
the senses (as we have explained above): or you may assume that in
addition there was a certain ocular perception of a material object,
the sight of which would assist intellectual perception. The latter is
the view of Onkelos, unless he assumes that in this instance the ocular
perception was likewise a prophetic vision, as was the case with “a
smoking furnace and a burning lamp that passed between those pieces”
(Gen. xv. 17), mentioned in the history of Abraham. You may also assume
that in addition there was a perception of sound, and that there was a
voice which passed before him, and was undoubtedly something material.
You may choose either of these opinions, for our sole intention and
purpose is to guard you against the belief that the phrase “and the
Lord passed,” is analogous to “pass before the people” (Exod. xvii. 5),
for God, being incorporeal, cannot be said to move, and consequently
the verb “to pass” cannot with propriety be applied to Him in its
primary signification.
CHAPTER XXII
In Hebrew, the verb bo signifies “to come” as applied to a living
being, i.e., its arrival at a certain place, or approach to a certain
person, as “Thy brother came (ba) with subtilty” (Gen. xxvii. 35). It
next denotes (with regard to a living being) “to enter” a certain
place, e.g., “And when Joseph came (va-yabo) into the house” (Gen.
xliii. 26); “When ye come (ta-boü) into the land” (Exod. xii. 25). The
term was also employed metaphorically in the sense of “to come” applied
to a certain event, that is, to something incorporeal, as “When thy
sayings come to pass (yabo)” (Judg. xiii. 17); “Of that which will come
(yaboü) over thee” (Isa. xlvii. 13). Nay, it is even applied to
privatives, e.g., “Yet evil came (va-yabo)” (Job iii. 26); “And
darkness came (va-yabo)” Now, since the word has been applied to
incorporeal things, it has also been used in reference to God—to the
fulfilment of His word, or to the manifestation of His Presence (the
Shechinah). In this figurative sense it is said, “Lo, I come (ba) unto
thee in a thick cloud” (Exod. xix. 9); “For the Lord the God of Israel
cometh (ba) through it” (Ezek. xliv. 2). In these and all similar
passages, the coming of the Shechinah is meant, but the words, “And the
Lord my God shall come (u-ba)” (Zech. xiv. 5) are identical with “His
word will come,” that is to say, the promises which He made through the
Prophets will be fulfilled; therefore Scripture adds “all the holy ones
that are with thee,” that is to say, “The word of the Lord my God will
be performed, which has been spoken by all the holy ones who are with
thee, who address the Israelites.”
CHAPTER XXIII
Yaẓa (“he came out”) is the opposite of ba (“he came in”). The term
yaẓa is applied to the motion of a body from a place in which it had
previously rested, to another place (whether the body be a living being
or not), e.g., “And when they were gone out (yaẓeü) of the city” (Gen.
xliv. 4); “If fire break out (teẓe)” (Exod. xxii. 5). It was then
figuratively employed to denote the appearance of something
incorporeal, as, “The word went out (yaẓa) of the king’s mouth” (Esth.
vii. 8); “When this deed of the queen shall come abroad (yeẓe) unto all
women” (Esth. i. 17), that is to say, “the report will spread.” Again,
“For out of Zion shall go forth (teẓe) the Law” (Isa. ii. 3); further,
“The sun had risen (yaẓa) upon the earth” (Gen. xix. 23), i.e., its
light became visible.
In this figurative sense we must take every expression of coming out
when applied to the Almighty, e.g., “Behold, the Lord cometh out (yoẓe)
of his place” (Isa. xxvi. 21), i.e., “The word of God, which until now
has been in secret, cometh out, and will become manifest,” i.e.,
something will come into being which had not existed before; for
everything new emanating from God is ascribed to His word. Comp. “By
the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by
the breath of his mouth” (Ps. xxxiii. 6). This is a simile taken from
the conduct of kings, who employ the word as the means of carrying
their will into effect. God, however, requires no instrument wherewith
to operate in order to perform anything; the effect is produced solely
by His will alone. He does not employ any kind of speech, as will be
explained further on (chap. lv.).
The verb “to come out” is thus employed to designate the manifestation
of a certain work of God, as we noticed in our interpretation of the
phrase, “Behold, the Lord cometh out of his place.” In a similar manner
the term shub, “to return,” has been figuratively employed to denote
the discontinuance of a certain act according to the will of God, as in
“I will go and return to my place” (Hosea v. 15); that is to say, the
Divine presence (Shechinah) which had been in our midst departed from
us, the consequence of which has been the absence of Divine protection
from amongst us. Thus the Prophet foretelling misfortune says, “And I
will hide my face from them, and they shall be devoured” (Deut. xxxi.
17); for, when man is deprived of Divine protection he is exposed to
all dangers, and becomes the butt of all fortuitous circumstances; his
fortune and misfortune then depend on chance. Alas! how terrible a
threat!—This is the idea contained in the words, “I will go and return
to my place” (Hos. v. 15).
CHAPTER XXIV
The term halak is likewise one of the words which denote movements
performed by living beings, as in “And Jacob went (halak) on his way”
(Gen. xxxii. 1), and in many other instances. The verb “to go” was next
employed in describing movements of objects less solid than the bodies
of living beings, comp. “And the waters were going on (halok)
decreasing” (Gen. viii. 5); “And the fire went along (va-tihalak) upon
the ground” (Exod. ix. 23). Then it was employed to express the
spreading and manifestation of something incorporeal, comp. “The voice
thereof shall go like a serpent” (Jer. xlvi. 22); again, “The voice of
the Lord God walking in the garden” (Gen. iii. 8). It is “the voice”
that is qualified by “walking.”
Whenever the word “to go” is used in reference to God, it must be taken
in this figurative sense, i.e., it applies to incorporeal things, and
signifies either the manifestation of something incorporeal, or the
withdrawal of the Divine protection, an act corresponding in lifeless
beings to the removal of a thing, in living beings to the departure of
a living being, “walking.” The withdrawal of God’s protection is called
in the Bible “the hiding of God’s countenance,” as in Deuteronomy xxxi.
18, “As for me, I will hide my countenance.” On the same ground it has
been designated “going away,” or moving away from a thing, comp. “I
will depart and return to my place” (Hos. v. 15). But in the passage,
“And the anger of the Lord was kindled against them, and he went” (Num.
xii. 9), the two meanings of the verb are combined, viz., the
withdrawal of the Divine protection, expressed by “and he went,” and
the revelation, manifestation, and appearance of something namely, of
the anger which went forth and reached them, in consequence of which
Miriam became “leprous, white as snow.” The expression “to walk” was
further applied to conduct, which concerns only the inner life, and
which requires no bodily motion, as in the following passages, “And
thou shalt walk in his ways” (Deut. xxviii. 9); “Ye shall walk after
the Lord your God” (Deut. xiii. 5); “Come ye, and let us walk in the
light of the Lord.” (Isa. ii. 5).
CHAPTER XXV
The Hebrew shakan, as is well known, signifies “to dwell,” as, “And he
was dwelling (shoken) in the plains of Mamre” (Gen. xiv. 13); “And it
came to pass, when Israel dwelt (bishekon)” (Gen. xxxv. 22). This is
the most common meaning of the word. But “dwelling in a place” consists
in the continued stay in a place, general or special; when a living
being dwells long in a place, we say that it stays in that place,
although it unquestionably moves about in it, comp. “And he was staying
in the plains of Mamre” (Gen. xiv. 13), and, “And it came to pass, when
Israel stayed” (Gen. xxxv. 22).
The term was next applied metaphorically to inanimate objects, i.e., to
everything which has settled and remains fixed on one object, although
the object on which the thing remains is not a place, and the thing
itself is not a living being; for instance, “Let a cloud dwell upon it
[the day]” (Job iii. 5); there is no doubt that the cloud is not a
living being, and that the day is not a corporeal thing, but a division
of time.
In this sense the term is employed in reference to God, that is to say,
to denote the continuance of His Divine Presence (Shechinah) or of His
Providence in some place where the Divine Presence manifested itself
constantly, or in some object which was constantly protected by
Providence. Comp. “And the glory of the Lord abode” (Exod. xxiv. 16);
“And I will dwell among the children of Israel” (Exod. xxix. 45); “And
for the goodwill of him that dwelt in the bush” (Deut. xxxiii. 16).
Whenever the term is applied to the Almighty, it must be taken
consistently with the context in the sense either as referring to the
Presence of His Shechinah (i.e., of His light that was created for the
purpose) in a certain place, or of the continuance of His Providence
protecting a certain object.
CHAPTER XXVI
You, no doubt, know the Talmudical saying, which includes in itself all
the various kinds of interpretation connected with our subject. It runs
thus: “The Torah speaks according to the language of man,” that is to
say, expressions, which can easily be comprehended and understood by
all, are applied to the Creator. Hence the description of God by
attributes implying corporeality, in order to express His existence;
because the multitude of people do not easily conceive existence unless
in connection with a body, and that which is not a body nor connected
with a body has for them no existence. Whatever we regard as a state of
perfection, is likewise attributed to God, as expressing that He is
perfect in every respect, and that no imperfection or deficiency
whatever is found in Him. But there is not attributed to God anything
which the multitude consider a defect or want; thus He is never
represented as eating, drinking, sleeping, being ill, using violence,
and the like. Whatever, on the other hand, is commonly regarded as a
state of perfection is attributed to Him, although it is only a state
of perfection in relation to ourselves; for in relation to God, what we
consider to be a state of perfection, is in truth the highest degree of
imperfection. If, however, men were to think that those human
perfections were absent in God, they would consider Him as imperfect.
You are aware that locomotion is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of living beings, and is indispensable for them in
their progress towards perfection. As they require food and drink to
supply animal waste, so they require locomotion, in order to approach
that which is good for them and in harmony with their nature, and to
escape from what is injurious and contrary to their nature. It makes,
in fact, no difference whether we ascribe to God eating and drinking or
locomotion; but according to human modes of expression, that is to say,
according to common notions, eating and drinking would be an
imperfection in God, while motion would not, in spite of the fact that
the necessity of locomotion is the result of some want. Furthermore, it
has been clearly proved, that everything which moves is corporeal and
divisible; it will be shown below that God is incorporeal and that He
can have no locomotion; nor can rest be ascribed to Him; for rest can
only be applied to that which also moves. All expressions, however,
which imply the various modes of movement in living beings, are
employed with regard to God in the manner we have described and in the
same way as life is ascribed to Him; although motion is an accident
pertaining to living beings, and there is no doubt that, without
corporeality, expressions like the following could not be imagined: “to
descend, to ascend, to walk, to place, to stand, to surround, to sit,
to dwell, to depart, to enter, to pass, etc.”
It would have been superfluous thus to dilate on this subject, were it
not for the mass of the people, who are accustomed to such ideas. It
has been necessary to expatiate on the subject, as we have attempted,
for the benefit of those who are anxious to acquire perfection, to
remove from them such notions as have grown up with them from the days
of youth.
CHAPTER XXVII
Onkelos the Proselyte, who was thoroughly acquainted with the Hebrew
and Chaldaic languages, made it his task to oppose the belief in God’s
corporeality. Accordingly, any expression employed in the Pentateuch in
reference to God, and in any way implying corporeality, he paraphrases
in consonance with the context. All expressions denoting any mode of
motion, are explained by him to mean the appearance or manifestation of
a certain light that had been created [for the occasion], i.e., the
Shekhinah (Divine Presence), or Providence. Thus he paraphrases “the
Lord will come down” (Exod. xix. 11), “The Lord will manifest Himself”;
“And God came down” (xvi. 20), “And God manifested Himself”; and does
not say “And God came down”; “I will go down now and see” (Gen. xviii.
21), he paraphrases, “I will manifest myself now and see.” This is his
rendering [of the verb yarad, “he went down,” when used in reference to
God] throughout his version, with the exception of the following
passage, “I will go down (ered) with thee into Egypt” (Gen. xlvi. 4),
which he renders literally. A remarkable proof of this great man’s
talents, the excellence of his version, and the correctness of his
interpretation! By this version he discloses to us an important
principle as regards prophecy.
This narrative begins: “And God spake unto Israel in the visions of the
night, and said, Jacob, Jacob, etc. And He said, I am God, etc., I will
go down with thee into Egypt” (Gen. xlvi. 2, 3). Seeing that the whole
narrative is introduced as a vision of the night, Onkelos did not
hesitate to translate literally the words addressed to Jacob in the
nocturnal vision, and thus gave a faithful account of the occurrence.
For the passage in question contains a statement of what Jacob was
told, not what actually took place, as is the case in the words, “And
the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai” (Exod. xix. 20). Here we have an
account of what actually occurred in the physical world; the verb yarad
is therefore paraphrased “He manifested Himself,” and entirely detached
from the idea of motion. Accounts of what happened in the imagination
of man, I mean of what he was told, are not altered. A most remarkable
distinction!
Hence you may infer that there is a great difference between a
communication, designated as having been made in a dream, or a vision
of the night, and a vision or a manifestation simply introduced with
phrases like “And the word of the Lord came unto me, saying”; “And the
Lord spake unto me, saying.”
According to my opinion, it is also possible that Onkelos understood
Elohim in the above passage to signify “angel,” and that for this
reason he did not hesitate to translate literally, “I will go down with
thee to Egypt.” Do not think it strange that Onkelos should have
believed the Elohim, who said to Jacob, “I am God, the God of thy
father” (ib. 3), to be an angel, for this sentence can, in the same
form, also have been spoken by an angel. Thus Jacob says, “And the
angel of God spake unto me in a dream, saying, Jacob. And I said, Here
am I,” etc. (Gen. xxxi. 11); and concludes the report of the angel’s
words to him in the following way, “I am the God of Bethel, where thou
anointedst the pillar, and where thou vowedst a vow unto me” (ib. 13),
although there is no doubt that Jacob vowed to God, not to the angel.
It is the usual practice of prophets to relate words addressed to them
by an angel in the name of God, as though God Himself had spoken to
them. Such passages are all to be explained by supplying the nomen
regens, and by considering them as identical with “I am the messenger
of the God of thy father,” “I am the messenger of God who appeared to
thee in Bethel,” and the like. Prophecy with its various degrees, and
the nature of angels, will be fully discussed in the sequel, in
accordance with the object of this treatise (II. chap. xiv.).
CHAPTER XXVIII
The term regel is homonymous, signifying, in the first place, the foot
of a living being; comp. “Foot for foot” (Exod. xxi. 24). Next it
denotes an object which follows another; comp. “And all the people that
follow thee” (lit. that are at thy feet) (ib. xi. 18). Another
signification of the word is “cause”; comp. “And the Lord hath blessed
thee, I being the cause” (leragli) (Gen. xxx. 30), i.e., for my sake;
for that which exists for the sake of another thing has the latter for
its final cause. Examples of the term used in this sense are numerous.
It has that meaning in Genesis xxxiii. 14, “Because (leregel) of the
cattle that goeth before me, and because (leregel) of the children.”
Consequently, the Hebrew text, of which the literal rendering is: “And
his feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives” (Zech. xiv.
4) can be explained in the following way: “And the things caused by him
(raglav) on that day upon the Mount of Olives, that is to say, the
wonders which will then be seen, and of which God will be the Cause or
the Maker, will remain permanently.” To this explanation does Jonathan
son of Uzziel incline in paraphrasing the passage, “And he will appear
in his might on that day upon the Mount of Olives.” He generally
expresses terms denoting those parts of the body by which contact and
motion are effected, by “his might” [when referring to God], because
all such expressions denote acts done by His Will.
In the passage (Exod. xxiv. 10, lit., “And there was under his feet,
like the action of the whiteness of a sapphire stone”), Onkelos, as you
know, in his version, considers the word (raglav) “his feet” as a
figurative expression and a substitute for “throne”; the words “under
his feet” he therefore paraphrases, “And under the throne of his
glory.” Consider this well, and you will observe with wonder how
Onkelos keeps free from the idea of the corporeality of God, and from
everything that leads thereto, even in the remotest degree. For he does
not say, “and under His throne”; the direct relation of the throne to
God, implied in the literal sense of the phrase “His throne,” would
necessarily suggest the idea that God is supported by a material
object, and thus lead directly to the corporeality of God; he therefore
refers the throne to His glory, i.e., to the Shekhinah, which is a
light created for the purpose.
Similarly he paraphrases the words, “For my hand I lift up to the
throne of God” (Exod. xvii. 16), “An oath has been uttered by God,
whose Shekhinah is upon the throne of his glory.” This principle found
also expression in the popular phrase, “the Throne of the Glory.”
We have already gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, and
touched upon things which will be discussed in other chapters; we will
now return to our present theme. You are acquainted with the version of
Onkelos [of the passage quoted]. He contents himself with excluding
from his version all expressions of corporeality in reference to God,
and does not show us what they (the nobles of the children of Israel,
Exod. xxiv. 10) perceived, or what is meant by that figure. In all
similar instances Onkelos also abstains from entering into such
questions, and only endeavours to exclude every expression implying
corporeality; for the incorporeality of God is a demonstrative truth
and an indispensable element in our faith; he could decidedly state all
that was necessary in that respect. The interpretation of a simile is a
doubtful thing; it may possibly have that meaning, but it may also
refer to something else. It contains besides very profound matter, the
understanding of which is not a fundamental element in our faith, and
the comprehension of which is not easy for the common people. Onkelos,
therefore, did not enter at all into this subject.
We, however, remaining faithful to our task in this treatise, find
ourselves compelled to give our explanation. According to our opinion
“under his feet” (raglav) denotes “under that of which He is the
cause,” “that which exists through Him,” as we have already stated.
They (the nobles of the children of Israel) therefore comprehended the
real nature of the materia prima, which emanated from Him, and of whose
existence He is the only cause. Consider well the phrase, “like the
action of the whiteness of the sapphire stone.” If the colour were the
point of comparison, the words, “as the whiteness of the sapphire
stone” would have sufficed; but the addition of “like the action” was
necessary, because matter, as such, is, as you are well aware, always
receptive and passive, active only by some accident. On the other hand,
form, as such, is always active, and only passive by some accident, as
is explained in works on Physics. This explains the addition of “like
the action” in reference to the materia prima. The expression “the
whiteness of the sapphire” refers to the transparency, not to the white
colour; for “the whiteness” of the sapphire is not a white colour, but
the property of being transparent. Things, however, which are
transparent, have no colour of their own, as is proved in works on
Physics; for if they had a colour they would not permit all the colours
to pass through them nor would they receive colours; it is only when
the transparent object is totally colourless, that it is able to
receive successively all the colours. In this respect it (the whiteness
of the sapphire) is like the materia prima, which as such is entirely
formless, and thus receives all the forms one after the other. What
they (the nobles of the children of Israel) perceived was therefore the
materia prima, whose relation to God is distinctly mentioned, because
it is the source of those of his creatures which are subject to genesis
and destruction, and has been created by him. This subject also will be
treated later on more fully.
Observe that you must have recourse to an explanation of this kind,
even when adopting the rendering of Onkelos, “And under the throne of
His glory”; for in fact the materia prima is also under the heavens,
which are called “throne of God,” as we have remarked above. I should
not have thought of this unusual interpretation, or hit on this
argument were it not for an utterance of R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, which
will be discussed in one of the parts of this treatise (II. chap.
xxvi.). The primary object of every intelligent person must be to deny
the corporeality of God, and to believe that all those perceptions
(described in the above passage) were of a spiritual not of a material
character. Note this and consider it well.
CHAPTER XXIX
The term ʻeẓeb is homonymous, denoting, in the first place, pain and
trembling; comp. “In sorrow (be-ʻeẓeb) thou shalt bring forth children”
(Gen. iii. 16). Next it denotes anger; comp. “And his father had not
made him angry (ʻaẓabo) at any time” (1 Kings i. 6); “for he was angry
(neʻeẓab) for the sake of David” (1 Sam. xx. 34). The term signifies
also provocation; comp. “They rebelled, and vexed (ʻiẓẓebu) his holy
spirit” (Isa. lxiii. 10); “and provoked (yaʻaẓibahu) him in the desert”
(Ps. lxxviii. 40); “If there be any way of provocation (ʻoẓeb) in me”
(ib. cxxxix. 24); “Every day they rebel (yeʻaẓẓebu) against my words”
(ib. lvi. 6).
In Genesis vi. 6 the word has either the second or the third
signification. In the first case, the sense of the Hebrew va-yitʻaẓẓeb
el libbo is “God was angry with them on account of the wickedness of
their deeds”; as to the words “to his heart” used here, and also in the
history of Noah (ib. viii. 21) I will here explain what they mean. With
regard to man, we use the expression “he said to himself,” or “he said
in his heart,” in reference to a subject which he did not utter or
communicate to any other person. Similarly the phrase “And God said in
his heart,” is used in reference to an act which God decreed without
mentioning it to any prophet at the time the event took place according
to the will of God. And a figure of this kind is admissible, since “the
Torah speaketh in accordance with the language of man” (supra c.
xxvi.). This is plain and clear. In the Pentateuch no distinct mention
is made of a message sent to the wicked generation of the flood,
cautioning or threatening them with death; therefore, it is said
concerning them, that God was angry with them in His heart; likewise
when He decreed that no flood should happen again, He did not tell a
prophet to communicate it to others, and for that reason the words “in
his heart” are added.
Taking the verb in the third signification, we explain the passage
thus: “And man rebelled against God’s will concerning him”; for leb
(heart) also signifies “will,” as we shall explain when treating of the
homonymity of leb (heart).
CHAPTER XXX
In its primary meaning akal (to eat) is used in the sense of taking
food by animals; this needs no illustration. It was afterwards observed
that eating includes two processes—(1) the loss of the food, i.e., the
destruction of its form, which first takes place; (2) the growth of
animals, the preservation of their strength and their existence, and
the support of all the forces of their body, caused by the food they
take.
The consideration of the first process led to the figurative use of the
verb, in the sense of “consuming,” “destroying”; hence it includes all
modes of depriving a thing of its form; comp. “And the land of your
enemies shall destroy (lit. eat) you” (Lev. xxvi. 38); “A land that
destroyeth (lit. eateth) the inhabitants thereof” (Num. xiii. 32); “Ye
shall be destroyed (lit. eaten) with the sword” (Isa. i. 6); “Shall the
sword destroy (lit. eat)” (2 Sam. ii. 26); “And the fire of the Lord
burnt among them, and destroyed (lit. ate) them that were in the
uttermost parts of the camp” (Num. xi. 1); “(God) is a destroying (lit.
eating) fire” (Deut. iv. 24), that is, He destroys those who rebel
against Him, as the fire destroys everything that comes within its
reach. Instances of this kind are very frequent.
With reference to the second effect of the act of eating, the verb “to
eat” is figuratively used in the sense of “acquiring wisdom,”
“learning”; in short, for all intellectual perceptions. These preserve
the human form (intellect) constantly in the most perfect manner, in
the same way as food preserves the body in its best condition. Comp.
“Come ye, buy and eat” (Isa. lv. 1); “Hearken diligently unto me, and
eat ye that which is good” (ib. 2); “It is not good to eat much honey”
(Prov. xxv. 27); “My son, eat thou honey, because it is good, and the
honeycomb, which is sweet to thy taste; so shall the knowledge of
wisdom be unto thy soul” (ib. xxiv. 13, 14).
This figurative use of the verb “to eat” in the sense of “acquiring
wisdom” is frequently met with in the Talmud, e.g., “Come, eat fat meat
at Raba’s” (Baba Bathra 22a); comp. “All expressions of ‘eating’ and
‘drinking’ found in this book (of Proverbs) refer to wisdom,” or,
according to another reading, “to the Law” (Koh. rabba on Eccl. iii.
13). Wisdom has also been frequently called “water,” e.g., “Ho, every
one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters” (Isa. lv. 1).
The figurative meaning of these expressions has been so general and
common, that it was almost considered as its primitive signification,
and led to the employment “of hunger” and “thirst” in the sense of
“absence of wisdom and intelligence”; comp. “I will send a famine in
the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing
the words of the Lord”; “My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God”
(Ps. xlii. 3). Instances of this kind occur frequently. The words,
“With joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation” (Isa. xii.
3), are paraphrased by Jonathan son of Uzziel thus: “You will joyfully
receive new instruction from the chosen of the righteous.” Consider how
he explains “water” to indicate “the wisdom which will then spread,”
and “the wells” (maʻayene) as being identical with “the eyes of the
congregation” (Num. xv. 24), in the sense of “the chiefs,” or “the
wise.” By the phrase, “from the chosen of the righteous,” he expresses
his belief that righteousness is true salvation. You now see how he
gives to every word in this verse some signification referring to
wisdom and study. This should be well considered.
CHAPTER XXXI
Know that for the human mind there are certain objects of perception
which are within the scope of its nature and capacity; on the other
hand, there are, amongst things which actually exist, certain objects
which the mind can in no way and by no means grasp: the gates of
perception are closed against it. Further, there are things of which
the mind understands one part, but remains ignorant of the other; and
when man is able to comprehend certain things, it does not follow that
he must be able to comprehend everything. This also applies to the
senses: they are able to perceive things, but not at every distance;
and all other powers of the body are limited in a similar way. A man
can, e.g., carry two kikkar, but he cannot carry ten kikkar. How
individuals of the same species surpass each other in these sensations
and in other bodily faculties is universally known, but there is a
limit to them, and their power cannot extend to every distance or to
every degree.
All this is applicable to the intellectual faculties of man. There is a
considerable difference between one person and another as regards these
faculties, as is well known to philosophers. While one man can discover
a certain thing by himself, another is never able to understand it,
even if taught by means of all possible expressions and metaphors, and
during a long period; his mind can in no way grasp it, his capacity is
insufficient for it. This distinction is not unlimited. A boundary is
undoubtedly set to the human mind which it cannot pass. There are
things (beyond that boundary) which are acknowledged to be inaccessible
to human understanding, and man does not show any desire to comprehend
them, being aware that such knowledge is impossible, and that there are
no means of overcoming the difficulty; e.g., we do not know the number
of stars in heaven, whether the number is even or odd; we do not know
the number of animals, minerals, or plants, and the like. There are
other things, however, which man very much desires to know, and
strenuous efforts to examine and to investigate them have been made by
thinkers of all classes, and at all times. They differ and disagree,
and constantly raise new doubts with regard to them, because their
minds are bent on comprehending such things, that is to say, they are
moved by desire; and every one of them believes that he has discovered
the way leading to a true knowledge of the thing, although human reason
is entirely unable to demonstrate the fact by convincing evidence.—For
a proposition which can be proved by evidence is not subject to
dispute, denial, or rejection; none but the ignorant would contradict
it, and such contradiction is called “denial of a demonstrated proof.”
Thus you find men who deny the spherical form of the earth, or the
circular form of the line in which the stars move, and the like; such
men are not considered in this treatise. This confusion prevails mostly
in metaphysical subjects, less in problems relating to physics, and is
entirely absent from the exact sciences. Alexander Aphrodisius said
that there are three causes which prevent men from discovering the
exact truth: first, arrogance and vainglory; secondly, the subtlety,
depth, and difficulty of any subject which is being examined; thirdly,
ignorance and want of capacity to comprehend what might be
comprehended. These causes are enumerated by Alexander. At the present
time there is a fourth cause not mentioned by him, because it did not
then prevail, namely, habit and training. We naturally like what we
have been accustomed to, and are attracted towards it. This may be
observed amongst villagers; though they rarely enjoy the benefit of a
douche or bath, and have few enjoyments, and pass a life of privation,
they dislike town life and do not desire its pleasures, preferring the
inferior things to which they are accustomed, to the better things to
which they are strangers; it would give them no satisfaction to live in
palaces, to be clothed in silk, and to indulge in baths, ointments, and
perfumes.
The same is the case with those opinions of man to which he has been
accustomed from his youth; he likes them, defends them, and shuns the
opposite views. This is likewise one of the causes which prevent men
from finding truth, and which make them cling to their habitual
opinions. Such is, e.g., the case with the vulgar notions with respect
to the corporeality of God, and many other metaphysical questions, as
we shall explain. It is the result of long familiarity with passages of
the Bible, which they are accustomed to respect and to receive as true,
and the literal sense of which implies the corporeality of God and
other false notions; in truth, however, these words were employed as
figures and metaphors for reasons to be mentioned below. Do not imagine
that what we have said of the insufficiency of our understanding and of
its limited extent is an assertion founded only on the Bible; for
philosophers likewise assert the same, and perfectly understand it,
without having regard to any religion or opinion. It is a fact which is
only doubted by those who ignore things fully proved. This chapter is
intended as an introduction to the next.
CHAPTER XXXII
You must consider, when reading this treatise, that mental perception,
because connected with matter, is subject to conditions similar to
those to which physical perception is subject. That is to say, if your
eye looks around, you can perceive all that is within the range of your
vision; if, however, you overstrain your eye, exerting it too much by
attempting to see an object which is too distant for your eye, or to
examine writings or engravings too small for your sight, and forcing it
to obtain a correct perception of them, you will not only weaken your
sight with regard to that special object, but also for those things
which you otherwise are able to perceive: your eye will have become too
weak to perceive what you were able to see before you exerted yourself
and exceeded the limits of your vision.
The same is the case with the speculative faculties of one who devotes
himself to the study of any science. If a person studies too much and
exhausts his reflective powers, he will be confused, and will not be
able to apprehend even that which had been within the power of his
apprehension. For the powers of the body are all alike in this respect.
The mental perceptions are not exempt from a similar condition. If you
admit the doubt, and do not persuade yourself to believe that there is
a proof for things which cannot be demonstrated, or to try at once to
reject and positively to deny an assertion the opposite of which has
never been proved, or attempt to perceive things which are beyond your
perception, then you have attained the highest degree of human
perfection, then you are like R. Akibha, who “in peace entered [the
study of these theological problems], and came out in peace.” If, on
the other hand, you attempt to exceed the limit of your intellectual
power, or at once to reject things as impossible which have never been
proved to be impossible, or which are in fact possible, though their
possibility be very remote, then you will be like Elisha Aḥer; you will
not only fail to become perfect, but you will become exceedingly
imperfect. Ideas founded on mere imagination will prevail over you, you
will incline toward defects, and toward base and degraded habits, on
account of the confusion which troubles the mind, and of the dimness of
its light, just as weakness of sight causes invalids to see many kinds
of unreal images, especially when they have looked for a long time at
dazzling or at very minute objects.
Respecting this it has been said, “Hast thou found honey? eat so much
as is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled therewith, and vomit it”
(Prov. xxv. 16). Our Sages also applied this verse to Elisha Aḥer.
How excellent is this simile! In comparing knowledge to food (as we
observed in chap. xxx.), the author of Proverbs mentions the sweetest
food, namely, honey, which has the further property of irritating the
stomach, and of causing sickness. He thus fully describes the nature of
knowledge. Though great, excellent, noble and perfect, it is injurious
if not kept within bounds or not guarded properly; it is like honey
which gives nourishment and is pleasant, when eaten in moderation, but
is totally thrown away when eaten immoderately. Therefore, it is not
said “lest thou be filled and loathe it,” but “lest thou vomit it.” The
same idea is expressed in the words, “It is not good to eat much honey”
(Prov. xxv. 27); and in the words, “Neither make thyself over-wise; why
shouldst thou destroy thyself?” (Eccles. vii. 16); comp. “Keep thy foot
when thou goest to the house of God” (ibid. v. 1). The same subject is
alluded to in the words of David, “Neither do I exercise myself in
great matters, or in things too high for me” (Ps. cxxxi. 2), and in the
sayings of our Sages: “Do not inquire into things which are too
difficult for thee, do not search what is hidden from thee; study what
you are allowed to study, and do not occupy thyself with mysteries.”
They meant to say, Let thy mind only attempt things which are within
human perception; for the study of things which lie beyond man’s
comprehension is extremely injurious, as has been already stated. This
lesson is also contained in the Talmudical passage, which begins, “He
who considers four things,” etc., and concludes, “He who does not
regard the honour of his Creator”; here also is given the advice which
we have already mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly engage in
speculation with false conceptions, and when he is in doubt about
anything, or unable to find a proof for the object of his inquiry, he
must not at once abandon, reject and deny it; he must modestly keep
back, and from regard to the honour of his Creator, hesitate [from
uttering an opinion] and pause. This has already been explained.
It was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in these utterances
to close the gate of investigation entirely, and to prevent the mind
from comprehending what is within its reach, as is imagined by simple
and idle people, whom it suits better to put forth their ignorance and
incapacity as wisdom and perfection, and to regard the distinction and
wisdom of others as irreligion and imperfection, thus taking darkness
for light and light for darkness. The whole object of the Prophets and
the Sages was to declare that a limit is set to human reason where it
must halt. Do not criticise the words used in this chapter and in
others in reference to the mind, for we only intended to give some idea
of the subject in view, not to describe the essence of the intellect;
for other chapters have been dedicated to this subject.
CHAPTER XXXIII
You must know that it is very injurious to begin with this branch of
philosophy, viz., Metaphysics; or to explain [at first] the sense of
the similes occurring in prophecies, and interpret the metaphors which
are employed in historical accounts and which abound in the writings of
the Prophets. On the contrary, it is necessary to initiate the young
and to instruct the less intelligent according to their comprehension;
those who appear to be talented and to have capacity for the higher
method of study, i.e., that based on proof and on true logical
argument, should be gradually advanced towards perfection, either by
tuition or by self-instruction. He, however, who begins with
Metaphysics, will not only become confused in matters of religion, but
will fall into complete infidelity. I compare such a person to an
infant fed with wheaten bread, meat and wine; it will undoubtedly die,
not because such food is naturally unfit for the human body, but
because of the weakness of the child, who is unable to digest the food,
and cannot derive benefit from it. The same is the case with the true
principles of science. They were presented in enigmas, clad in riddles,
and taught by all wise men in the most mysterious way that could be
devised, not because they contain some secret evil, or are contrary to
the fundamental principles of the Law (as fools think who are only
philosophers in their own eyes), but because of the incapacity of man
to comprehend them at the beginning of his studies: only slight
allusions have been made to them to serve for the guidance of those who
are capable of understanding them. These sciences were, therefore,
called Mysteries (sodoth), and Secrets of the Law (sitre torah), as we
shall explain.
This also is the reason why “the Torah speaks the language of man,” as
we have explained, for it is the object of the Torah to serve as a
guide for the instruction of the young, of women, and of the common
people; and as all of them are incapable to comprehend the true sense
of the words, tradition was considered sufficient to convey all truths
which were to be established; and as regards ideals, only such remarks
were made as would lead towards a knowledge of their existence, though
not to a comprehension of their true essence. When a man attains to
perfection, and arrives at a knowledge of the “Secrets of the Law,”
either through the assistance of a teacher or by self-instruction,
being led by the understanding of one part to the study of the other,
he will belong to those who faithfully believe in the true principles,
either because of conclusive proof, where proof is possible, or by
forcible arguments, where argument is admissible; he will have a true
notion of those things which he previously received in similes and
metaphors, and he will fully understand their sense. We have frequently
mentioned in this treatise the principle of our Sages “not to discuss
the Maʻaseh Mercabah even in the presence of one pupil, except he be
wise and intelligent; and then only the headings of the chapters are to
be given to him.” We must, therefore, begin with teaching these
subjects according to the capacity of the pupil, and on two conditions,
first, that he be wise, i.e., that he should have successfully gone
through the preliminary studies, and secondly that he be intelligent,
talented, clear-headed, and of quick perception, that is, “have a mind
of his own” (mebin middaʻato), as our Sages termed it.
I will now proceed to explain the reasons why we should not instruct
the multitude in pure metaphysics, or begin with describing to them the
true essence of things, or with showing them that a thing must be as it
is, and cannot be otherwise. This will form the subject of the next
chapter; and I proceed to say—
CHAPTER XXXIV
There are five reasons why instruction should not begin with
Metaphysics, but should at first be restricted to pointing out what is
fitted for notice and what may be made manifest to the multitude.
First Reason.—The subject itself is difficult, subtle and profound,
“Far off and exceeding deep, who can find it out?” (Eccles. vii. 24).
The following words of Job may be applied to it: “Whence then cometh
wisdom? and where is the place of understanding?” (Job xxviii. 20).
Instruction should not begin with abstruse and difficult subjects. In
one of the similes contained in the Bible, wisdom is compared to water,
and amongst other interpretations given by our Sages of this simile,
occurs the following: He who can swim may bring up pearls from the
depth of the sea, he who is unable to swim will be drowned, therefore
only such persons as have had proper instruction should expose
themselves to the risk.
Second Reason.—The intelligence of man is at first insufficient; for he
is not endowed with perfection at the beginning, but at first possesses
perfection only in potentiâ, not in fact. Thus it is said, “And man is
born a wild ass” (Job xi. 12). If a man possesses a certain faculty in
potentiâ, it does not follow that it must become in him a reality. He
may possibly remain deficient either on account of some obstacle, or
from want of training in practices which would turn the possibility
into a reality. Thus it is distinctly stated in the Bible, “Not many
are wise” (ib., xxxii. 9); also our Sages say, “I noticed how few were
those who attained to a higher degree of perfection” (B. T. Succah
45a). There are many things which obstruct the path to perfection, and
which keep man away from it. Where can he find sufficient preparation
and leisure to learn all that is necessary in order to develop that
perfection which he has in potentiâ?
Third Reason.—The preparatory studies are of long duration, and man, in
his natural desire to reach the goal, finds them frequently too
wearisome, and does not wish to be troubled by them. Be convinced that,
if man were able to reach the end without preparatory studies, such
studies would not be preparatory but tiresome and utterly superfluous.
Suppose you awaken any person, even the most simple, as if from sleep,
and you say to him, Do you not desire to know what the heavens are,
what is their number and their form; what beings are contained in them;
what the angels are; how the creation of the whole world took place;
what is its purpose, and what is the relation of its various parts to
each other; what is the nature of the soul; how it enters the body;
whether it has an independent existence, and if so, how it can exist
independently of the body; by what means and to what purpose, and
similar problems. He would undoubtedly say “Yes,” and show a natural
desire for the true knowledge of these things; but he will wish to
satisfy that desire and to attain to that knowledge by listening to a
few words from you. Ask him to interrupt his usual pursuits for a week,
till he learn all this, he would not do it, and would be satisfied and
contented with imaginary and misleading notions; he would refuse to
believe that there is anything which requires preparatory studies and
persevering research.
You, however, know how all these subjects are connected together; for
there is nothing else in existence but God and His works, the latter
including all existing things besides Him; we can only obtain a
knowledge of Him through His works; His works give evidence of His
existence, and show what must be assumed concerning Him, that is to
say, what must be attributed to Him either affirmatively or negatively.
It is thus necessary to examine all things according to their essence,
to infer from every species such true and well established propositions
as may assist us in the solution of metaphysical problems. Again, many
propositions based on the nature of numbers and the properties of
geometrical figures, are useful in examining things which must be
negatived in reference to God, and these negations will lead us to
further inferences. You will certainly not doubt the necessity of
studying astronomy and physics, if you are desirous of comprehending
the relation between the world and Providence as it is in reality, and
not according to imagination. There are also many subjects of
speculation, which, though not preparing the way for metaphysics, help
to train the reasoning power, enabling it to understand the nature of a
proof, and to test truth by characteristics essential to it. They
remove the confusion arising in the minds of most thinkers, who
confound accidental with essential properties, and likewise the wrong
opinions resulting therefrom. We may add, that although they do not
form the basis for metaphysical research, they assist in forming a
correct notion of these things, and are certainly useful in many other
things connected with that discipline. Consequently he who wishes to
attain to human perfection, must therefore first study Logic, next the
various branches of Mathematics in their proper order, then Physics,
and lastly Metaphysics. We find that many who have advanced to a
certain point in the study of these disciplines become weary, and stop;
that others, who are endowed with sufficient capacity, are interrupted
in their studies by death, which surprises them while still engaged
with the preliminary course. Now, if no knowledge whatever had been
given to us by means of tradition, and if we had not been brought to
the belief in a thing through the medium of similes, we would have been
bound to form a perfect notion of things with their essential
characteristics, and to believe only what we could prove: a goal which
could only be attained by long preparation. In such a case most people
would die, without having known whether there was a God or not, much
less that certain things must be asserted about Him, and other things
denied as defects. From such a fate not even “one of a city or two of a
family” (Jer. iii. 14) would have escaped.
As regards the privileged few, “the remnant whom the Lord calls” (Joel
iii. 5), they only attain the perfection at which they aim after due
preparatory labour. The necessity of such a preparation and the need of
such a training for the acquisition of real knowledge, has been plainly
stated by King Solomon in the following words: “If the iron be blunt,
and he do not whet the edge, then must he put to more strength; and it
is profitable to prepare for wisdom” (Eccles. x. 10); “Hear counsel,
and receive instruction, that thou mayest be wise in thy latter end”
(Prov. xix. 20).
There is still another urgent reason why the preliminary disciplines
should be studied and understood. During the study many doubts present
themselves, and the difficulties, or the objections raised against
certain assertions, are soon understood, just as the demolition of a
building is easier than its erection; while, on the other hand, it is
impossible to prove an assertion, or to remove any doubts, without
having recourse to several propositions taken from these preliminary
studies. He who approaches metaphysical problems without proper
preparation is like a person who journeys towards a certain place, and
on the road falls into a deep pit, out of which he cannot rise, and he
must perish there; if he had not gone forth, but had remained at home,
it would have been better for him.
Solomon has expatiated in the book of Proverbs on sluggards and their
indolence, by which he figuratively refers to indolence in the search
after wisdom. He thus speaks of a man who desires to know the final
results, but does not exert himself to understand the preliminary
disciplines which lead to them, doing nothing else but desire. “The
desire of the slothful killeth him; for his hands refuse to labour. He
coveteth greedily all the day long; but the righteous giveth, and
spareth not” (Prov. xxi. 25, 26); that is to say, if the desire killeth
the slothful, it is because he neglects to seek the thing which might
satisfy his desire, he does nothing but desire, and hopes to obtain a
thing without using the means to reach it. It would be better for him
were he without that desire. Observe how the end of the simile throws
light on its beginning. It concludes with the words “but the righteous
giveth, and spareth not”; the antithesis of “righteous” and “slothful”
can only be justified on the basis of our interpretation. Solomon thus
indicates that only such a man is righteous who gives to everything its
due portion; that is to say, who gives to the study of a thing the
whole time required for it, and does not devote any part of that time
to another purpose. The passage may therefore be paraphrased thus: “And
the righteous man devotes his ways to wisdom, and does not withhold any
of them.” Comp. “Give not thy strength unto women” (Prov. xxxi. 3).
The majority of scholars, that is to say, the most famous in science,
are afflicted with this failing, viz., that of hurrying at once to the
final results, and of speaking about them, without treating of the
preliminary disciplines. Led by folly or ambition to disregard those
preparatory studies, for the attainment of which they are either
incapable or too idle, some scholars endeavour to prove that these are
injurious or superfluous. On reflection the truth will become obvious.
The Fourth Reason is taken from the physical constitution of man. It
has been proved that moral conduct is a preparation for intellectual
progress, and that only a man whose character is pure, calm and
steadfast, can attain to intellectual perfection; that is, acquire
correct conceptions. Many men are naturally so constituted that all
perfection is impossible; e.g., he whose heart is very warm and is
himself very powerful, is sure to be passionate, though he tries to
counteract that disposition by training; he whose testicles are warm,
humid, and vigorous, and the organs connected therewith are surcharged,
will not easily refrain from sin, even if he makes great efforts to
restrain himself. You also find persons of great levity and rashness,
whose excited manners and wild gestures prove that their constitution
is in disorder, and their temperament so bad that it cannot be cured.
Such persons can never attain to perfection; it is utterly useless to
occupy oneself with them on such a subject [as Metaphysics]. For this
science is, as you know, different from the science of Medicine and of
Geometry, and, from the reason already mentioned, it is not every
person who is capable of approaching it. It is impossible for a man to
study it successfully without moral preparation; he must acquire the
highest degree of uprightness and integrity, “for the froward is an
abomination to the Lord, but His secret is with the righteous” (Prov.
iii. 32). Therefore it was considered inadvisable to teach it to young
men; nay, it is impossible for them to comprehend it, on account of the
heat of their blood and the flame of youth, which confuses their minds;
that heat, which causes all the disorder, must first disappear; they
must have become moderate and settled, humble in their hearts, and
subdued in their temperament; only then will they be able to arrive at
the highest degree of the perception of God, i.e., the study of
Metaphysics, which is called Maʻaseh Mercabah Comp. “The Lord is nigh
unto them that are of a broken heart” (Ps. xxxiv. 18); “I dwell in the
high and lofty place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble
spirit; to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of
the contrite ones” (Isa. lvii. 15).
Therefore the rule, “the headings of the sections may be confided to
him,” is further restricted in the Talmud, in the following way: The
headings of the sections must only be handed down to an Ab-bet-din
(President of the Court), whose heart is full of care, i.e., in whom
wisdom is united with humility, meekness, and a great dread of sin. It
is further stated there: “The secrets of the Law can only be
communicated to a counsellor, scholar, and good orator.” These
qualities can only be acquired if the physical constitution of the
student favour their development. You certainly know that some persons,
though exceedingly able, are very weak in giving counsel, while others
are ready with proper counsel and good advice in social and political
matters. A person so endowed is called “counsellor” and may be unable
to comprehend purely abstract notions, even such as are similar to
common sense. He is unacquainted with them, and has no talent whatever
for them; we apply to him the words: “Wherefore is there a price in the
hand of a fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it?” (Prov.
xvii. 16). Others are intelligent and naturally clear-sighted, able to
convey complicated ideas in concise and well chosen language,—such a
person is called “a good orator,” but he has not been engaged in the
pursuit of science, or has not acquired any knowledge of it. Those who
have actually acquired a knowledge of the sciences, are called “wise in
arts” (or “scholars”); the Hebrew term for “wise in arts”—ḥakam
ḥarashim—has been explained in the Talmud as implying, that when such a
man speaks, all become, as it were, speechless.
Now, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the admission of a
person into discourses on metaphysics is made dependent on distinction
in social qualities, and study of philosophy, as well as on the
possession of clear-sightedness, intelligence, eloquence, and ability
to communicate things by slight allusions. If a person satisfies these
requirements, the secrets of the Law are confided to him. In the same
place we also read the following passage:—R. Jochanan said to R.
Elasar, “Come, I will teach you Maʻaseh Mercabah.” The reply was, “I am
not yet old,” or in other words, I have not yet become old, I still
perceive in myself the hot blood and the rashness of youth. You learn
from this that, in addition to the above-named good qualities, a
certain age is also required. How, then, could any person speak on
these metaphysical themes in the presence of ordinary people, of
children, and of women!
Fifth Reason.—Man is disturbed in his intellectual occupation by the
necessity of looking after the material wants of the body, especially
if the necessity of providing for wife and children be superadded; much
more so if he seeks superfluities in addition to his ordinary wants,
for by custom and bad habits these become a powerful motive. Even the
perfect man to whom we have referred, if too busy with these necessary
things, much more so if busy with unnecessary things, and filled with a
great desire for them—must weaken or altogether lose his desire for
study, to which he will apply himself with interruption, lassitude, and
want of attention. He will not attain to that for which he is fitted by
his abilities, or he will acquire imperfect knowledge, a confused mass
of true and false ideas. For these reasons it was proper that the study
of Metaphysics should have been exclusively cultivated by privileged
persons, and not entrusted to the common people. It is not for the
beginner, and he should abstain from it, as the little child has to
abstain from taking solid food and from carrying heavy weights.
CHAPTER XXXV
Do not think that what we have laid down in the preceding chapters on
the importance, obscurity, and difficulty of the subject, and its
unsuitableness for communication to ordinary persons, includes the
doctrine of God’s incorporeality and His exemption from all affections
(πάθη). This is not the case. For in the same way as all people must be
informed, and even children must be trained in the belief that God is
One, and that none besides Him is to be worshipped, so must all be
taught by simple authority that God is incorporeal; that there is no
similarity in any way whatsoever between Him and His creatures; that
His existence is not like the existence of His creatures, His life not
like that of any living being, His wisdom not like the wisdom of the
wisest of men; and that the difference between Him and His creatures is
not merely quantitative, but absolute [as between two individuals of
two different classes]; I mean to say that all must understand that our
wisdom and His, or our power and His do not differ quantitatively or
qualitatively, or in a similar manner; for two things, of which the one
is strong and the other weak, are necessarily similar, belong to the
same class, and can be included in one definition. The same is the case
with all other comparisons; they can only be made between two things
belonging to the same class, as has been shown in works on Natural
Science. Anything predicated of God is totally different from our
attributes; no definition can comprehend both; therefore His existence
and that of any other being totally differ from each other, and the
term existence is applied to both homonymously, as I shall explain.
This suffices for the guidance of children and of ordinary persons who
must believe that there is a Being existing, perfect, incorporeal, not
inherent in a body as a force in it—God, who is above all kinds of
deficiency, above all affections. But the question concerning the
attributes of God, their inadmissibility, and the meaning of those
attributes which are ascribed to Him; concerning the Creation, His
Providence, in providing for everything; concerning His will, His
perception, His knowledge of everything; concerning prophecy and its
various degrees; concerning the meaning of His names which imply the
idea of unity, though they are more than one; all these things are very
difficult problems, the true “Secrets of the Law” the “secrets”
mentioned so frequently in the books of the Prophets, and in the words
of our Teachers, the subjects of which we should only mention the
headings of the chapters, as we have already stated, and only in the
presence of a person satisfying the above-named conditions.
That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with His creatures,
that He is not subject to external influence; these are things which
must be explained to every one according to his capacity, and they must
be taught by way of tradition to children and women, to the stupid and
ignorant, as they are taught that God is One, that He is eternal, and
that He alone is to be worshipped. Without incorporeality there is no
unity, for a corporeal thing is in the first case not simple, but
composed of matter and form which are two separate things by
definition, and secondly, as it has extension it is also divisible.
When persons have received this doctrine, and have been trained in this
belief, and are in consequence at a loss to reconcile it with the
writings of the Prophets, the meaning of the latter must be made clear
and explained to them by pointing out the homonymity and the figurative
application of certain terms discussed in this part of the work. Their
belief in the unity of God and in the words of the Prophets will then
be a true and perfect belief.
Those who are not sufficiently intelligent to comprehend the true
interpretation of these passages in the Bible, or to understand that
the same term admits of two different interpretations, may simply be
told that the scriptural passage is clearly understood by the wise, but
that they should content themselves with knowing that God is
incorporeal, that He is never subject to external influence, as
passivity implies a change, while God is entirely free from all change,
that He cannot be compared to anything besides Himself, that no
definition includes Him together with any other being, that the words
of the Prophets are true, and that difficulties met with may be
explained on this principle. This may suffice for that class of
persons, and it is not proper to leave them in the belief that God is
corporeal, or that He has any of the properties of material objects,
just as there is no need to leave them in the belief that God does not
exist, that there are more Gods than one, or that any other being may
be worshipped.
CHAPTER XXXVI
I shall explain to you, when speaking on the attributes of God, in what
sense we can say that a particular thing pleases Him, or excites His
anger and His wrath, and in reference to certain persons that God was
pleased with them, was angry with them, or was in wrath against them.
This is not the subject of the present chapter; I intend to explain in
it what I am now going to say. You must know, that in examining the Law
and the books of the Prophets, you will not find the expressions
“burning anger,” “provocation,” or “jealousy” applied to God except in
reference to idolatry; and that none but the idolater called “enemy,”
“adversary,” or “hater of the Lord.” Comp. “And ye serve other gods,
... and then the Lord’s wrath will be kindled against you” (Deut. xi.
16, 17); “Lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindled against thee.”
etc. (ib. vi. 15); “To provoke him to anger through the work of your
hands” (ib. xxxi. 29); “They have moved me to jealousy with that which
is not God; they have provoked me to anger with their vanities” (ib.
xxxii. 21); “For the Lord thy God is a jealous God” (ib. vi. 15); “Why
have they provoked me to anger with their graven images, and with
strange vanities?” (Jer. viii. 19); “Because of the provoking of his
sons and of his daughters” (Deut. xxxii. 19); “For a fire is kindled in
mine anger” (ib. 22); “The Lord will take vengeance on His adversaries,
and he reserveth wrath for his enemies” (Nah. i. 2); “And repayeth them
that hate Him” (Deut. vii. 10); “Until He hath driven out His enemies
from before Him” (Num. xxxii. 21); “Which the Lord thy God hateth”
(Deut. xvi. 22); “For every abomination to the Lord, which He hateth,
have they done unto their gods” (ib. xii. 31). Instances like these are
innumerable; and if you examine all the examples met with in the holy
writings, you will find that they confirm our view.
The Prophets in their writings laid special stress on this, because it
concerns errors in reference to God, i.e., it concerns idolatry. For if
any one believes that, e.g., Zaid is standing, while in fact he is
sitting, he does not deviate from truth so much as one who believes
that fire is under the air, or that water is under the earth, or that
the earth is a plane, or things similar to these. The latter does not
deviate so much from truth as one who believes that the sun consists of
fire, or that the heavens form a hemisphere, and similar things; in the
third instance the deviation from truth is less than the deviation of a
man who believes that angels eat and drink, and the like. The latter
again deviates less from truth than one who believes that something
besides God is to be worshipped; for ignorance and error concerning a
great thing, i.e., a thing which has a high position in the universe,
are of greater importance than those which refer to a thing which
occupies a lower place;—by “error” I mean the belief that a thing is
different from what it really is; by “ignorance,” the want of knowledge
respecting things the knowledge of which can be obtained.
If a person does not know the measure of the cone, or the sphericity of
the sun, it is not so important as not to know whether God exists, or
whether the world exists without a God; and if a man assumes that the
cone is half (of the cylinder), or that the sun is a circle, it is not
so injurious as to believe that God is more than One. You must know
that idolaters when worshipping idols do not believe that there is no
God besides them; and no idolater ever did assume that any image made
of metal, stone, or wood has created the heavens and the earth, and
still governs them. Idolatry is founded on the idea that a particular
form represents the agent between God and His creatures. This is
plainly said in passages like the following: “Who would not fear thee,
O king of nations?” (Jer. x. 7); “And in every place incense is offered
unto my name” (Mal. i. 11); by “my name” allusion is made to the Being
which is called by them [i.e., the idolaters] “the First Cause.” We
have already explained this in our larger work (Mishneh Torah, I. On
Idolatry, chap. i.), and none of our co-religionists can doubt it.
The infidels, however, though believing in the existence of the
Creator, attack the exclusive prerogative of God, namely, the service
and worship which was commanded, in order that the belief of the people
in His existence should be firmly established, in the words, “And you
shall serve the Lord,” etc. (Exod. xxiii. 25). By transferring that
prerogative to other beings, they cause the people, who only notice the
rites, without comprehending their meaning or the true character of the
being which is worshipped, to renounce their belief in the existence of
God. They were therefore punished with death; comp. “Thou shalt save
alive nothing that breatheth” (Deut. xx. 16). The object of this
commandment, as is distinctly stated, is to extirpate that false
opinion, in order that other men should not be corrupted by it any
more; in the words of the Bible “that they teach you not,” etc. (ib.
18). They are called “enemies,” “foes,” “adversaries”; by worshipping
idols they are said to provoke God to jealousy, anger, and wrath. How
great, then, must be the offence of him who has a wrong opinion of God
Himself, and believes Him to be different from what He truly is, i.e.,
assumes that He does not exist, that He consists of two elements, that
He is corporeal, that He is subject to external influence, or ascribes
to Him any defect whatever. Such a person is undoubtedly worse than he
who worships idols in the belief that they, as agents, can do good or
evil.
Therefore bear in mind that by the belief in the corporeality or in
anything connected with corporeality, you would provoke God to jealousy
and wrath, kindle His fire and anger, become His foe, His enemy, and
His adversary in a higher degree than by the worship of idols. If you
think that there is an excuse for those who believe in the corporeality
of God on the ground of their training, their ignorance or their
defective comprehension, you must make the same concession to the
worshippers of idols; their worship is due to ignorance, or to early
training, “they continue in the custom of their fathers.” (T. B.
Hullin, 13a) You will perhaps say that the literal interpretation of
the Bible causes men to fall into that doubt, but you must know that
idolaters were likewise brought to their belief by false imaginations
and ideas. There is no excuse whatever for those who, being unable to
think for themselves, do not accept [the doctrine of the incorporeality
of God] from the true philosophers. I do not consider those men as
infidels who are unable to prove the incorporeality, but I hold those
to be so who do not believe it, especially when they see that Onkelos
and Jonathan avoid [in reference to God] expressions implying
corporeality as much as possible. This is all I intended to say in this
chapter.
CHAPTER XXXVII
The Hebrew term panim (face) is homonymous; most of its various
meanings have a figurative character. It denotes in the first place the
face of a living being; comp. “And all faces are turned into paleness”
(Jer. xxx. 6); “Wherefore are your faces so sad?” (Gen. xl. 7). In this
sense the term occurs frequently.
The next meaning of the word is “anger”; comp. “And her anger (paneha)
was gone” (1 Sam. i. 18). Accordingly, the term is frequently used in
reference to God in the sense of anger and wrath; comp. “The anger
(pene) of the Lord hath divided them” (Lam. iv. 16); “The anger (pene)
of the Lord is against them that do evil” (Ps. xxxiv. 17); “Mine anger
(panai) shall go and I will give thee rest” (Exod. xxxiii. 14); “Then
will I set mine anger” (panai) (Lev. xx. 3); there are many other
instances.
Another meaning of the word is “the presence and existence of a
person”; comp. “He died in the presence (pene) [i.e., in the lifetime]
of all his brethren” (Gen. xxv. 18); “And in the presence (pene) of all
the people I will be glorified” (Lev. x. 3); “He will surely curse thee
in thy very presence” (paneka) (Job i. 11). In the same sense the word
is used in the following passage, “And the Lord spake unto Moses face
to face,” i.e., both being present, without any intervening medium
between them. Comp. “Come, let us look one another in the face” (2
Kings xiv. 8); and also “The Lord talked with you face to face” (Deut.
v. 4); instead of which we read more plainly in another place, “Ye
heard the voice of the words, but saw no similitude; only ye heard a
voice” (ib. iv. 12). The hearing of the voice without seeing any
similitude is termed “face to face.” Similarly do the words, “And the
Lord spake unto Moses face to face” correspond to “There he heard the
voice of one speaking unto him” (Num. vii. 89), in the description of
God’s speaking to Moses. Thus it will be clear to you that the
perception of the Divine voice without the intervention of an angel is
expressed by “face to face.” In the same sense the word panim must be
understood in “And my face (panai) shall not be seen” (Exod. xxxiii.
23); i.e., my true existence, as it is, cannot be comprehended.
The word panim is also used in Hebrew as an adverb of place, in the
sense of “before,” or “between the hands.” In this sense it is
frequently employed in reference to God; so also in the passage, “And
my face (panai) shall not be seen,” according to Onkelos, who renders
it, “And those before me shall not be seen.” He finds here an allusion
to the fact, that there are also higher created beings of such
superiority that their true nature cannot be perceived by man; viz.,
the ideals, separate intellects, which in their relation to God are
described as being constantly before Him, or between His hands, i.e.,
as enjoying uninterruptedly the closest attention of Divine Providence.
He, i.e., Onkelos, considers that the things which are described as
completely perceptible are those beings which, as regards existence,
are inferior to the ideals, viz., substance and form; in reference to
which we are told, “And thou shalt see that which is behind me”
(ibid.), i.e., beings, from which, as it were, I turn away, and which I
leave behind me. This figure is to represent the utter remoteness of
such beings from the Deity. You shall later on (chap. liv.) hear my
explanation of what Moses, our teacher, asked for.
The word is also used as an adverb of time, meaning “before.” Comp. “In
former time (le-phanim) in Israel” (Ruth iv. 7); “Of old (le-phanim)
hast Thou laid the foundation of the earth” (Ps. cii. 25).
Another signification of the word is “attention and regard.” Comp.
“Thou shalt not have regard (pene) to the poor” (Lev. xx. 15); “And a
person receiving attention (panim)” (Isa. iii. 3); “Who does not show
regard (panim),” etc. (Deut. x. 17, etc.). The word panim (face) has a
similar signification in the blessing, “The Lord turn his face to thee”
(i.e., The Lord let his providence accompany thee), “and give thee
peace.”
CHAPTER XXXVIII
The Hebrew term aḥor is a homonym. It is a noun, signifying “back.”
Comp. “Behind (aḥare) the tabernacle” (Exod. xxvi. 12); “The spear came
out behind him (aḥarav)” (2 Sam. ii. 23).
It is next used in reference to time, signifying “after”; “neither
after him (aḥarav) arose there any like him” (2 Kings xxiii. 25);
“After (aḥar) these things” (Gen. xv. 1). In this sense the word occurs
frequently.
The term includes also the idea of following a thing and of conforming
with the moral principles of some other being. Comp. “Ye shall walk
after (aḥare) the Lord, your God” (Deut. xiii. 5); “They shall walk
after (aḥare) the Lord” (Hos. xi. 10), i.e., follow His will, walk in
the way of His actions, and imitate His virtues; “He walked after
(aḥare) the commandment” (ib. v. 11). In this sense the word occurs in
Exodus xxxiii. 20, “And thou shalt see my back” (aḥorai); thou shalt
perceive that which follows me, is similar to me, and is the result of
my will, i.e., all things created by me, as will be explained in the
course of this treatise.
CHAPTER XXXIX
The Hebrew leb (heart) is a homonymous noun, signifying that organ
which is the source of life to all beings possessing a heart. Comp.
“And thrust them through the heart of Absalom” (1 Sam. xviii. 14).
This organ being in the middle of the body, the word has been
figuratively applied to express “the middle part of a thing.” Comp.
“unto the midst (leb) of heaven” (Deut. iv. 11); “the midst (labbath)
of fire” (Exod. iii. 2).
It further denotes “thought.” Comp. “Went not mine heart with thee?” (2
Kings v. 26), i.e., I was with thee in my thought when a certain event
happened. Similarly must be explained, “And that ye seek not after your
own heart” (Num. xv. 39), i.e., after your own thoughts; “Whose heart
(i.e., whose thought), turneth away this day” (Deut. xxix. 18).
The word further signifies “counsel.” Comp. “All the rest of Israel
were of one heart (i.e., had one plan) to make David king” (1 Chron.
xii. 38); “but fools die for want of heart,” i.e., of counsel; “My
heart (i.e., my counsel) shall not turn away from this so long as I
live” (Job xxvii. 6); for this sentence is preceded by the words, “My
righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go”; and then follows,
“my heart shall never turn away from this.”—As regards the expression
yeḥeraf, I think that it may be compared with the same verb in the form
neḥrefet, “a handmaid betrothed (neḥrefet) to a man” (Lev. xix. 20),
where neḥrefetḥ is similar in meaning to the Arabic munḥarifat,
“turning away,” and signifies “turning from the state of slavery to
that of marriage.”
Leb (heart) denotes also “will”; comp. “And I shall give you pastors
according to my will (libbi)” (Jer. iii. 15), “Is thine heart right as
my heart is?” (2 Kings x. 15), i.e., is thy will right as my will is?
In this sense the word has been figuratively applied to God. Comp.
“That shall do according to that which is in mine heart and in my soul”
(1 Sam. ii. 35), i.e., according to My will; “And mine eyes and mine
heart (i.e., My providence and My will) shall be there perpetually” (1
Kings ix. 3).
The word is also used in the sense of “understanding.” Comp. “For vain
man will be endowed with a heart” (Job xi. 12), i.e., will be wise; “A
wise man’s heart is at his right hand” (Eccles. x. 2), i.e., his
understanding is engaged in perfect thoughts, the highest problems.
Instances of this kind are numerous. It is in this sense, namely, that
of understanding, that the word is used whenever figuratively applied
to God; but exceptionally it is also used in the sense of “will.” It
must, in each passage, be explained in accordance with the context.
Also, in the following and similar passages, it signifies
“understanding”; “Consider it in thine heart” (Deut. iv. 39); “And none
considereth in his heart” (Isa. xliv. 19). Thus, also, “Yet the Lord
hath not given you an heart to perceive,” is identical in its meaning
with “Unto thee it was shown that thou mightest know” (Deut. iv. 35).
As to the passage, “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine
heart” (Ib. vi. 5), I explain “with all thine heart” to mean “with all
the powers of thine heart,” that is, with all the powers of the body,
for they all have their origin in the heart; and the sense of the
entire passage is: make the knowledge of God the aim of all thy
actions, as we have stated in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Aboth,
Eight Chapters, v.), and in our Mishneh Torah, yesode hatorah, chap.
ii. 2.
CHAPTER XL
Ruaḥ is a homonym, signifying “air,” that is, one of the four elements.
Comp. “And the air of God moved” (Gen. i. 2).
It denotes also, “wind.” Comp. “And the east wind (ruaḥ) brought the
locusts” (Exod. x. 13); “west wind” (ruaḥ) (ib. 19). In this sense the
word occurs frequently.
Next, it signifies “breath.” Comp. “A breath (ruaḥ) that passeth away,
and does not come again” (Ps. lxxviii. 39); “wherein is the breath
(ruaḥ) of life” (Gen. vii. 15).
It signifies also that which remains of man after his death, and is not
subject to destruction. Comp. “And the spirit (ruaḥ) shall return unto
God who gave it” (Eccles. xii. 7).
Another signification of this word is “the divine inspiration of the
prophets whereby they prophesy”—as we shall explain, when speaking on
prophecy, as far as it is opportune to discuss this subject in a
treatise like this.—Comp. “And I will take of the spirit (ruaḥ) which
is upon thee, and will put it upon them” (Num. xi. 17); “And it came to
pass, when the spirit (ruaḥ) rested upon them” (ib. 25); “The spirit
(ruaḥ) of the Lord spake by me” (2 Sam. xxiii. 2). The term is
frequently used in this sense.
The meaning of “intention,” “will,” is likewise contained in the word
ruaḥ. Comp. “A fool uttereth all his spirit” (ruaḥ) (Prov. xxix. 11),
i.e., his intention and will; “And the spirit (ruaḥ) of Egypt shall
fail in the midst thereof, and I will destroy the counsel thereof”
(Isa. xix. 3), i.e., her intentions will be frustrated, and her plans
will be obscured; “Who has comprehended the spirit (ruaḥ) of the Lord,
or who is familiar with his counsel that he may tell us?” (Isa. xl.
13), i.e., Who knows the order fixed by His will, or perceives the
system of His Providence in the existing world, that he may tell us? as
we shall explain in the chapters in which we shall speak on Providence.
Thus the Hebrew ruaḥ, when used in reference to God, has generally the
fifth signification; sometimes, however, as explained above, the last
signification, viz., “will.” The meaning of the word in each individual
case is therefore to be determined by the context.
CHAPTER XLI
The Hebrew nefesh (soul) is a homonymous noun, signifying the vitality
which is common to all living, sentient beings. E.g. “wherein there is
a living soul” (nefesh) (Gen. i. 30). It denotes also blood, as in
“Thou shalt not eat the blood (nefesh) with the meat” (Deut. xii. 23).
Another signification of the term is “reason,” that is, the
distinguishing characteristic of man, as in “As the Lord liveth that
made us this soul” (Jer. xxxviii. 16). It denotes also the part of man
that remains after his death (nefesh, soul); comp. “But the soul
(nefesh) of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life” (1 Sam. xxv.
29). Lastly, it denotes “will”; comp. “To bind his princes at his will”
(be-nafsho) (Ps. cv. 22); “Thou wilt not deliver me unto the will
(be-nefesh) of my enemies” (Ps. xli. 3); and according to my opinion,
it has this meaning also in the following passages, “If it be your will
(nafshekem) that I should bury my dead” (Gen. xxiii. 8); “Though Moses
and Samuel stood before me, yet my will (nafshi) could not be toward
this people” (Jer. xv. 1), that is, I had no pleasure in them, I did
not wish to preserve them. When nefesh is used in reference to God, it
has the meaning “will,” as we have already explained with reference to
the passage, “That shall do according to that which is in my will
(bi-lebabi) and in mine intention (be-nafshi)” (1 Sam. ii. 35).
Similarly we explain the phrase, “And his will (nafsho) to trouble
Israel ceased” (Judg. x. 16). Jonathan, the son of Uzziel [in the
Targum of the Prophets], did not translate this passage, because he
understood nafshi to have the first signification, and finding,
therefore, in these words sensation ascribed to God, he omitted them
from his translation. If, however, nefesh be here taken in the last
signification, the sentence can well be explained. For in the passage
which precedes, it is stated that Providence abandoned the Israelites,
and left them on the brink of death; then they cried and prayed for
help, but in vain. When, however, they had thoroughly repented, when
their misery had increased, and their enemy had had power over them, He
showed mercy to them, and His will to continue their trouble and misery
ceased. Note it well, for it is remarkable. The preposition ba in this
passage has the force of the preposition min (“from” or “of”); and
baʻamal is identical with meʻamal. Grammarians give many instances of
this use of the preposition ba: “And that which remaineth of (ba) the
flesh and of (ba) the bread” (Lev. viii. 32); “If there remains but few
of (ba) the years” (ib. xxv. 52); “Of (ba) the strangers and of (ba)
those born in the land” (Exod. xii. 19).
CHAPTER XLII
Ḥai (“living”) signifies a sentient organism (lit. “growing” and
“having sensation”), comp. “Every moving thing that liveth” (Gen. ix.
3); it also denotes recovery from a severe illness: “And was recovered
(va-yeḥi) of his sickness” (Isa. xxxviii. 9); “In the camp till they
recovered” (ḥayotam) (Josh. v. 8); “quick, raw (ḥai) flesh” (Lev. xiii.
10).
Mavet signifies “death” and “severe illness,” as in “His heart died
(va-yamot) within him, and he became as a stone” (1 Sam. xxv. 37), that
is, his illness was severe. For this reason it is stated concerning the
son of the woman of Zarephath, “And his sickness was so sore, that
there was no breath left in him” (1 Kings xvii. 17). The simple
expression va-yamoth would have given the idea that he was very ill,
near death, like Nabal when he heard what had taken place.
Some of the Andalusian authors say that his breath was suspended, so
that no breathing could be perceived at all, as sometimes an invalid is
seized with a fainting fit or an attack of asphyxia, and it cannot be
discovered whether he is alive or dead; in this condition the patient
may remain a day or two.
The term ḥai has also been employed in reference to the acquisition of
wisdom. Comp. “So shall they be life (ḥayyim) unto thy soul” (Prov.
iii. 22); “For whoso findeth me findeth life” (ib. viii. 35); “For they
are life (ḥayyim) to those that find them” (ib. iv. 22). Such instances
are numerous. In accordance with this metaphor, true principles are
called life, and corrupt principles death. Thus the Almighty says,
“See, I have set before thee this day life and good and death and evil”
(Deut. xxx. 15), showing that “life” and “good,” “death” and “evil,”
are identical, and then He explains these terms. In the same way I
understand His words, “That ye may live” (ib. v. 33), in accordance
with the traditional interpretation of “That it may be well with thee”
[scil. in the life to come] (ib. xxii. 7). In consequence of the
frequent use of this figure in our language our Sages said, “The
righteous even in death are called living, while the wicked even in
life are called dead.” (Talm. B. Berakhoth, p. 78). Note this well.
CHAPTER XLIII
The Hebrew kanaf is a homonym; most of its meanings are metaphorical.
Its primary signification is “wing of a flying creature,” e.g., “Any
winged (kanaf) fowl that flieth in the air” (Deut. iv. 17).
The term was next applied figuratively to the wings or corners of
garments; comp. “upon the four corners (kanfoth) of thy vesture” (ib.
xxii. 12).
It was also used to denote the ends of the inhabited part of the earth,
and the corners that are most distant from our habitation. Comp. “That
it might take hold of the ends (kanfoth) of the earth” (Job xxxviii.
13); “From the uttermost part (kenaf) of the earth have we heard songs”
(Isa. xxiv. 16).
Ibn Ganaḥ (in his Book of Hebrew Roots) says that kenaf is used in the
sense of “concealing,” in analogy with the Arabic kanaftu alshaian, “I
have hidden something,” and accordingly explains, Isaiah xxx. 20, “And
thy teacher will no longer be hidden or concealed.” It is a good
explanation, and I think that kenaf has the same meaning in Deuteronomy
xxiii. 1, “He shall not take away the cover (kenaf) of his father”;
also in, “Spread, therefore, thy cover (kenafeka) over thine handmaid”
(Ruth iii. 9). In this sense, I think, the word is figuratively applied
to God and to angels (for angels are not corporeal, according to my
opinion, as I shall explain). Ruth ii. 12 must therefore be translated
“Under whose protection (kenafav) thou art come to trust”; and wherever
the word occurs in reference to angels, it means concealment. You have
surely noticed the words of Isaiah (Isa. vi. 2), “With twain he covered
his face, and with twain he covered his feet.” Their meaning is this:
The cause of his (the angel’s) existence is hidden and concealed; this
is meant by the covering of the face. The things of which he (the
angel) is the cause, and which are called “his feet” (as I stated in
speaking of the homonym regel), are likewise concealed; for the actions
of the intelligences are not seen, and their ways are, except after
long study, not understood, on account of two reasons—the one of which
is contained in their own properties, the other in ourselves; that is
to say, because our perception is imperfect and the ideals are
difficult to be fully comprehended. As regards the phrase “and with
twain he flieth,” I shall explain in a special chapter (xlix.) why
flight has been attributed to angels.
CHAPTER XLIV
The Hebrew ʻayin is a homonym, signifying “fountain”; e.g., “By a
fountain (ʻen) of water” (Gen. xvi. 7). It next denotes “eye”; comp.
(ʻayin) “Eye for eye” (Exod. xxi. 24). Another meaning of the word is
“providence,” as it is said concerning Jeremiah, “Take him and direct
thine attention (eneka) to him” (Jer. xxxix. 12). In this figurative
sense it is to be understood when used in reference to God; e.g., “And
my providence and my pleasure shall be there perpetually” (1 Kings ix.
3), as we have already explained (page 140); “The eyes (ʻene), i.e.,
the Providence of the Lord thy God, are always upon it” (Deut. xi. 12);
“They are the eyes (ʻene) of the Lord, which run to and fro through the
whole earth” (Zech. iv. 10), i.e., His providence is extended over
everything that is on earth, as will be explained in the chapters in
which we shall treat of Providence. When, however, the word “eye” is
connected with the verb “to see,” (raah or ḥazah) as in “Open thine
eyes, and see” (1 Kings xix. 16); “His eyes behold” (Ps. xi. 4), the
phrase denotes perception of the mind, not that of the senses; for
every sensation is a passive state, as is well known to you, and God is
active, never passive, as will be explained by me.
CHAPTER XLV
Shamaʻ is used homonymously. It signifies “to hear,” and also “to
obey.” As regards the first signification, comp. “Neither let it be
heard out of thy mouth” (Exod. xxiii. 13); “And the fame thereof was
heard in Pharaoh’s house” (Gen. xlv. 16). Instances of this kind are
numerous.
Equally frequent are the instances of this verb being used in the sense
of “to obey”: “And they hearkened (shameʻü) not unto Moses” (Exod. vi.
9). “If they obey (yishmeʻü) and serve him” (Job xxxvi. 11); “Shall we
then hearken (nishmaʻ) unto you” (Neh. xiii. 27); “Whosoever will not
hearken (yishmaʻ) unto thy words” (Josh. i. 18).
The verb also signifies “to know” (“to understand”), comp. “A nation
whose tongue, i.e., its language, thou shalt not understand” (tishmaʻ)
(Deut. xxviii. 49). The verb shamaʻ, used in reference to God, must be
taken in the sense of perceiving, which is part of the third
signification, whenever, according to the literal interpretation of the
passage, it appears to have the first meaning: comp. “And the Lord
heard it” (Num. xi. 1); “For that He heareth your murmurings” (Exod.
xvi. 7). In all such passages mental perception is meant. When,
however, according to the literal interpretation the verb appears to
have the second signification, it implies that God responded to the
prayer of man and fulfilled his wish, or did not respond and did not
fulfil his wish: “I will surely hear his cry” (Exod. xxii. 23); “I will
hear, for I am gracious” (ib. 27); “Bow down thine ear, and hear” (2
Kings xix. 16); “But the Lord would not hearken to your voice, nor give
ear unto you” (Deut. i. 45); “Yea, when ye make many prayers, I will
not hear” (Isa. i. 15); “For I will not hear thee” (Jer. vii. 16).
There are many instances in which shamaʻ has this sense.
Remarks will now be presented to you on these metaphors and similes,
which will quench your thirst, and explain to you all their meanings
without leaving a doubt.
CHAPTER XLVI
We have already stated, in one of the chapters of this treatise, that
there is a great difference between bringing to view the existence of a
thing and demonstrating its true essence. We can lead others to notice
the existence of an object by pointing to its accidents, actions, or
even most remote relations to other objects: e.g., if you wish to
describe the king of a country to one of his subjects who does not know
him, you can give a description and an account of his existence in many
ways. You will either say to him, the tall man with a fair complexion
and grey hair is the king, thus describing him by his accidents; or you
will say, the king is the person round whom are seen a great multitude
of men on horse and on foot, and soldiers with drawn swords, over whose
head banners are waving, and before whom trumpets are sounded; or it is
the person living in the palace in a particular region of a certain
country; or it is the person who ordered the building of that wall, or
the construction of that bridge; or by some other similar acts and
things relating to him. His existence can be demonstrated in a still
more indirect way, e.g., if you are asked whether this land has a king,
you will undoubtedly answer in the affirmative. “What proof have you?”
“The fact that this banker here, a weak and little person, stands
before this large mass of gold pieces, and that poor man, tall and
strong, who stands before him asking in vain for alms of the weight of
a carob-grain, is rebuked and is compelled to go away by the mere force
of words; for had he not feared the king, he would, without hesitation,
have killed the banker, or pushed him away and taken as much of the
money as he could.” Consequently, this is a proof that this country has
a ruler and his existence is proved by the well-regulated affairs of
the country, on account of which the king is respected and the
punishments decreed by him are feared. In this whole example nothing is
mentioned that indicated his characteristics, and his essential
properties, by virtue of which he is king. The same is the case with
the information concerning the Creator given to the ordinary classes of
men in all prophetical books and in the Law. For it was found necessary
to teach all of them that God exists, and that He is in every respect
the most perfect Being, that is to say, He exists not only in the sense
in which the earth and the heavens exist, but He exists and possesses
life, wisdom, power, activity, and all other properties which our
belief in His existence must include, as will be shown below. That God
exists was therefore shown to ordinary men by means of similes taken
from physical bodies; that He is living, by a simile taken from motion,
because ordinary men consider only the body as fully, truly, and
undoubtedly existing; that which is connected with a body but is itself
not a body, although believed to exist, has a lower degree of existence
on account of its dependence on the body for existence. That, however,
which is neither itself a body, nor a force within a body, is not
existent according to man’s first notions, and is above all excluded
from the range of imagination. In the same manner motion is considered
by the ordinary man as identical with life; what cannot move
voluntarily from place to place has no life, although motion is not
part of the definition of life, but an accident connected with it. The
perception by the senses, especially by hearing and seeing, is best
known to us; we have no idea or notion of any other mode of
communication between the soul of one person and that of another than
by means of speaking, i.e., by the sound produced by lips, tongue, and
the other organs of speech. When, therefore, we are to be informed that
God has a knowledge of things, and that communication is made by Him to
the Prophets who convey it to us, they represent Him to us as seeing
and hearing, i.e., as perceiving and knowing those things which can be
seen and heard. They represent Him to us as speaking, i.e., that
communications from Him reach the Prophets; that is to be understood by
the term “prophecy,” as will be fully explained. God is described as
working, because we do not know any other mode of producing a thing
except by direct touch. He is said to have a soul in the sense that He
is living, because all living beings are generally supposed to have a
soul; although the term soul is, as has been shown, a homonym.
Again, since we perform all these actions only by means of corporeal
organs, we figuratively ascribe to God the organs of locomotion, as
feet, and their soles; organs of hearing, seeing, and smelling, as ear,
eye, and nose; organs and substance of speech, as mouth, tongue, and
sound; organs for the performance of work, as hand, its fingers, its
palm, and the arm. In short, these organs of the body are figuratively
ascribed to God, who is above all imperfection, to express that He
performs certain acts; and these acts are figuratively ascribed to Him
to express that He possesses certain perfections different from those
acts themselves. E.g., we say that He has eyes, ears, hands, a mouth, a
tongue, to express that He sees, hears, acts, and speaks; but seeing
and hearing are attributed to Him to indicate simply that He perceives.
You thus find in Hebrew instances in which the perception of the one
sense is named instead of the other; thus, “See the word of the Lord”
(Jer. ii. 31), in the same meaning as “Hear the word of the Lord,” for
the sense of the phrase is, “Perceive what He says”; similarly the
phrase, “See the smell of my son” (Gen. xxvii. 27) has the same meaning
as “Smell the smell of my son,” for it relates to the perception of the
smell. In the same way are used the words, “And all the people saw the
thunders and the lightnings” (Exod. xx. 15), although the passage also
contains the description of a prophetical vision, as is well known and
understood among our people. Action and speech are likewise
figuratively applied to God, to express that a certain influence has
emanated from Him, as will be explained (chap. lxv. and chap. lxvi.).
The physical organs which are attributed to God in the writings of the
Prophets are either organs of locomotion, indicating life; organs of
sensation, indicating perception; organs of touch, indicating action;
or organs of speech, indicating the divine inspiration of the Prophets,
as will be explained.
The object of all these indications is to establish in our minds the
notion of the existence of a living being, the Maker of everything, who
also possesses a knowledge of the things which He has made. We shall
explain, when we come to speak of the inadmissibility of Divine
attributes, that all these various attributes convey but one notion,
viz., that of the essence of God. The sole object of this chapter is to
explain in what sense physical organs are ascribed to the Most Perfect
Being, namely, that they are mere indications of the actions generally
performed by means of these organs. Such actions being perfections
respecting ourselves, are predicated of God, because we wish to express
that He is most perfect in every respect, as we remarked above in
explaining the Rabbinical phrase, “The language of the Torah is like
the language of man.” Instances of organs of locomotion being applied
to the Creator occur as follows:—“My footstool” (Isa. lxvi. 1); “the
place of the soles of my feet” (Ezek. xliii. 7). For examples of organs
of touch applied to God, comp. “the hand of the Lord” (Exod. ix. 3);
“with the finger of God” (ib. xxxi. 18); “the work of thy fingers” (Ps.
viii. 4), “And thou hast laid thine hand upon me” (ib. cxxxix. 5); “The
arm of the Lord” (Isa. liii. 1); “Thy right hand, O Lord” (Exod. xv.
6). In instances like the following, organs of speech are attributed to
God: “The mouth of the Lord has spoken” (Isa. i. 20); “And He would
open His lips against thee” (Job xi. 5); “The voice of the Lord is
powerful” (Ps. xxix. 4); “And his tongue as a devouring fire” (Isa.
xxx. 27). Organs of sensation are attributed to God in instances like
the following: “His eyes behold, His eyelids try” (Ps. xi. 4); “The
eyes of the Lord which run to and fro” (Zech. iv. 10); “Bow down thine
ear unto me, and hear” (2 Kings xix. 16); “You have kindled a fire in
my nostril” (Jer. xvii. 5). Of the inner parts of the human body only
the heart is figuratively applied to God, because “heart” is a homonym,
and denotes also “intellect”; it is besides the source of animal life.
In phrases like “my bowels are troubled for him” (Jer. xxxi. 20); “The
sounding of thy bowels” (Isa. lxiii. 15), the term “bowels” is used in
the sense of “heart”; for the term “bowels” is used both in a general
and in a specific meaning; it denotes specifically “bowels,” but more
generally it can be used as the name of any inner organ, including
“heart.” The correctness of this argument can be proved by the phrase
“And thy law is within my bowels” (Ps. xl. 9), which is identical with
“And thy law is within my heart.” For that reason the prophet employed
in this verse the phrase “my bowels are troubled” (and “the sounding of
thy bowels”); the verb hamah is in fact used more frequently in
connection with “heart,” than with any other organ; comp. “My heart
maketh a noise (homeh) in me” (Jer. iv. 19). Similarly, the shoulder is
never used as a figure in reference to God, because it is known as a
mere instrument of transport, and also comes into close contact with
the thing which it carries. With far greater reason the organs of
nutrition are never attributed to God; they are at once recognized as
signs of imperfection. In fact all organs, both the external and the
internal, are employed in the various actions of the soul; some, as
e.g., all inner organs, are the means of preserving the individual for
a certain time; others, as the organs of generation, are the means of
preserving the species; others are the means of improving the condition
of man and bringing his actions to perfection, as the hands, the feet,
and the eyes, all of which tend to render motion, action, and
perception more perfect. Animate beings require motion in order to be
able to approach that which is conducive to their welfare, and to move
away from the opposite; they require the senses in order to be able to
discern what is injurious to them and what is beneficial. In addition,
man requires various kinds of handiwork, to prepare his food, clothing,
and dwelling; and he is compelled by his physical constitution to
perform such work, namely, to prepare what is good for him. Some kinds
of work also occur among certain animals, as far as such work is
required by those animals. I do not believe that any man can doubt the
correctness of the assertion that the Creator is not in need of
anything for the continuance of His existence, or for the improvement
of His condition. Therefore, God has no organs, or, what is the same,
He is not corporeal; His actions are accomplished by His Essence, not
by any organ, and as undoubtedly physical forces are connected with the
organs, He does not possess any such forces, that is to say, He has,
besides His Essence, nothing that could be the cause of His action, His
knowledge, or His will, for attributes are nothing but forces under a
different name. It is not my intention to discuss the question in this
chapter. Our Sages laid down a general principle, by which the literal
sense of the physical attributes of God mentioned by the prophets is
rejected; a principle which evidently shows that our Sages were far
from the belief in the corporeality of God, and that they did not think
any person capable of misunderstanding it, or entertaining any doubt
about it. For that reason they employ in the Talmud and the Midrashim
phrases similar to those contained in the prophecies, without any
circumlocution; they knew that there could not be any doubt about their
metaphorical character, or any danger whatever of their being
misunderstood; and that all such expressions would be understood as
figurative [language], employed to communicate to the intellect the
notion of His existence. Now, it was well known that in figurative
language God is compared to a king who commands, cautions, punishes,
and rewards, his subjects, and whose servants and attendants publish
his orders, so that they might be acted upon, and they also execute
whatever he wishes. Thus the Sages adopted that figure, used it
frequently, and introduced such speech, consent, and refusal of a king,
and other usual acts of kings, as became necessary by that figure. In
all these instances they were sure that no doubt or confusion would
arise from it. The general principle alluded to above is contained in
the following saying of our Sages, mentioned in Bereshith Rabba (c.
xxvii.), “Great was the power of the Prophets; they compared the
creature to its Creator; comp. ‘And over the resemblance of the throne
was a resemblance like the appearance of man’” (Ezek. i. 26). They have
thus plainly stated that all those images which the Prophets perceived,
i.e. in prophetic visions, are images created by God. This is perfectly
correct; for every image in our imagination has been created. How
pregnant is the expression, “Great is their boldness!” They indicated
by it, that they themselves found it very remarkable; for whenever they
perceived a word or act difficult to explain, or apparently
objectionable, they used that phrase; e.g., a certain Rabbi has
performed the act (of “ḥaliẓah”) with a slipper, alone and by night.
Another Rabbi, thereupon exclaimed “How great is his boldness to have
followed the opinion of the minority.” The Chaldee phrase rab gubreh in
the original of the latter quotation, and the Hebrew gadol koḥo in that
of the former quotation, have the same meaning, viz., Great is the
power of (or the boldness of). Hence, in the preceding quotation, the
sense is, How remarkable is the language which the Prophets were
obliged to use when they speak of God the Creator in terms signifying
properties of beings created by Him. This deserves attention. Our Sages
have thus stated in distinct and plain terms that they are far from
believing in the corporeality of God; and in the figures and forms seen
in a prophetical vision, though belonging to created beings, the
Prophets, to use the words of our Sages, “compared the creature to its
Creator.” If, however, after these explanations, any one wishes out of
malice to cavil at them, and to find fault with them, though their
method is neither comprehended nor understood by him, the Sages o.b.m.
will sustain no injury by it.
CHAPTER XLVII
We have already stated several times that the prophetic books never
attribute to God anything which ordinary men consider a defect, or
which they cannot in their imagination combine with the idea of the
Almighty, although such terms may not otherwise be different from those
which were employed as metaphors in relation to God. Indeed all things
which are attributed to God are considered in some way to be
perfection, or can at least be imagined [as appertaining to Him].
We must now show why, according to this principle, the senses of
hearing, sight and smell, are attributed to God, but not those of taste
and touch. He is equally elevated above the use of all the five senses;
they are all defective as regards perception, even for those who have
no other source of knowledge; because they are passive, receive
impressions from without, and are subject to interruptions and
sufferings, as much as the other organs of the body. By saying that God
sees, we mean to state that He perceives visible things; “He hears” is
identical with saying “He perceives audible things”; in the same way we
might say, “He tastes and He touches,” in the sense of “He perceives
objects which man perceives by means of taste and touch.” For, as
regards perception, the senses are identical; if we deny the existence
of one sensation in God, we must deny that of all other sensations,
i.e., the perceptions of the five senses; and if we attribute the
existence of one sensation to Him, i.e., the perception appertaining to
one of the senses, we must attribute all the five sensations.
Nevertheless, we find in Holy Writ, “And God saw” (Gen. vi. 5); “And
God heard” (Num. xi. 1); “And God smelt” (Gen. viii. 21); but we do not
meet with the expressions, “And God tasted,” “And God touched.”
According to our opinion the reason of this is to be found in the idea,
which has a firm hold in the minds of all men, that God does not come
into contact with a body in the same manner as one body comes into
contact with another, since He is not even seen by the eye. While these
two senses, namely, taste and touch, only act when in close contact
with the object, by sight, hearing, and smell, even distant objects are
perceived. These, therefore, were considered by the multitude
appropriate expressions [to be figuratively applied to God]. Besides,
the object in figuratively applying the sensations to Him, could only
have been to express that He perceives our actions; but hearing and
sight are sufficient for that, namely, for the perception of what a man
does or says. Thus our Sages, among other admonitions, gave the
following advice and warning: “Know what is above thee, a seeing eye,
and a hearing ear.” (Mishnah Abot, ii. 1.)
You, however, know that, strictly speaking, the condition of all the
sensations is the same, that the same argument which is employed
against the existence of touch and taste in God, may be used against
sight, hearing, and smell; for they all are material perceptions and
impressions which are subject to change. There is only this difference,
that the former, touch and taste, are at once recognized as
deficiencies, while the others are considered as perfections. In a
similar manner the defect of the imagination is easily seen, less
easily that of thinking and reasoning. Imagination (raʻayon) therefore,
was never employed as a figure in speaking of God, while thought and
reason are figuratively ascribed to Him. Comp. “The thoughts which the
Lord thought” (Jer. xlix. 20); “And with his understanding he stretched
out the heavens” (ib. x. 12). The inner senses were thus treated in the
same way as the external; some are figuratively applied to God, some
not. All this is according to the language of man; he ascribes to God
what he considers a perfection, and does not ascribe to Him what he
considers a defect. In truth, however, no real attribute, implying an
addition to His essence, can be applied to Him, as will be proved.
CHAPTER XLVIII
Whenever in the Pentateuch the term “to hear” is applied to God,
Onkelos, the Proselyte, does not translate it literally, but
paraphrases it, merely expressing that a certain speech reached Him,
i.e., He perceived it, or that He accepted it or did not accept, when
it refers to supplication and prayer as its object. The words “God
heard” are therefore paraphrased by him regularly either, “It was heard
before the Lord,” or “He accepted” when employed in reference to
supplication and prayer; [e.g.] “I will surely accept,” lit. “I will
surely hear” (Exod. xxii. 22). This principle is followed by Onkelos in
his translation of the Pentateuch without any exception. But as regards
the verb “to see,” (raah), his renderings vary in a remarkable manner,
and I was unable to discern his principle or method. In some instances
he translates literally, “and God saw”; in others he paraphrases “it
was revealed before the Lord.” The use of the phrase va-ḥaza adonai by
Onkelos is sufficient evidence that the term ḥaza in Chaldee is
homonymous, and that it denotes mental perception as well as the
sensation of sight. This being the case, I am surprised that, in some
instances avoiding the literal rendering, he substituted for it “And it
was revealed before the Lord.” When I, however, examined the various
readings in the version of Onkelos, which I either saw myself or heard
from others during the time of my studies, I found that the term “to
see” when connected with wrong, injury, or violence, was paraphrased,
“It was manifest before the Lord.” There is no doubt that the term ḥaza
in Chaldee denotes complete apprehension and reception of the object in
the state in which it has been perceived. When Onkelos, therefore,
found the verb “to see” connected with the object “wrong,” he did not
render it literally, but paraphrased it, “It was revealed before the
Lord.” Now, I noticed that in all instances of the Pentateuch where
seeing is ascribed to God, he translated it literally, except those
instances which I will mention to you: “For my affliction was revealed
before the Lord” (Gen. xxix. 32); “For all that Laban doeth unto thee
is revealed before me” (ib. xxxi. 12);—although the first person in the
sentence refers to the angel [and not to God], Onkelos does not ascribe
to him that perception which implies complete comprehension of the
object, because the object is “iniquity”—“The oppression of the
children of Israel was known to the Lord” (Exod. ii. 25); “The
oppression of my people was surely known to me” (ib. iii. 7); “The
affliction is known to me” (ib. 9); “Their oppression is known to me”
(ib. iv. 31); “This people is known to me” (ib. xxxii. 9), i.e., their
rebellion is known to me—comp. the Targum of the passage, “And God saw
the children of Israel” (ib. ii. 25), which is equal to “He saw their
affliction and their trouble”—“And it was known to the Lord, and he
abhorred them” (Deut. xxxii. 19); “It was known to him that their power
was gone” (ib. 36); in this instance the object of the perception is
likewise the wrong done to the Israelites, and the increasing power of
the enemy. In all these examples Onkelos is consistent, following the
maxim expressed in the words, “Thou canst not look on iniquity” (Hab.
i. 13); wherefore he renders the verb “to see,” when referring to
oppression or rebellion, It is revealed before him, etc. This
appropriate and satisfactory explanation, the correctness of which I do
not doubt, is weakened by three passages, in which, according to this
view, I expected to find the verb “to see” paraphrased “to be revealed
before him,” but found instead the literal rendering “to see” in the
various copies of the Targum. The following are the three passages:
“And God saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth” (Gen.
vi. 6); “And the Lord saw the earth, and behold it was corrupt” (ib.
vi. 12); “and God saw that Leah was hated” (ib. xxx. 31). It appears to
me that in these passages there is a mistake, which has crept into the
copies of the Targum, since we do not possess the Targum in the
original manuscript of Onkelos, for in that case we should have assumed
that he had a satisfactory explanation of it.
In rendering Genesis xxii. 8, “the lamb is known to the Lord,” he
either wished to indicate that the Lord was not expected to seek and to
bring it, or he considered it inappropriate, in Chaldee to connect the
divine perception with one of the lower animals.
However, the various copies of the Targum must be carefully examined
with regard to this point, and if you still find those passages the
same as I quoted them, I cannot explain what he meant.
CHAPTER XLIX
The angels are likewise incorporeal; they are intelligences without
matter, but they are nevertheless created beings, and God created them,
as will be explained below. In Bereshith Rabbah (on Gen. iii. 24) we
read the following remark of our Sages: “The angel is called ‘the flame
of the sword which turned every way’ (Gen. iii. 24), in accordance with
the words, ‘His ministers a flaming fire’ (Ps. civ. 4); the attribute,
‘which turned every way’ is added, because angels are changeable in
form; they appear at one time as males, at another as females; now as
spirits; now as angels.” By this remark they clearly stated that angels
are incorporeal, and have no permanent bodily form independent of the
mind [of him who perceives them], they exist entirely in prophetic
vision, and depend on the action of the imaginative power, as will be
explained when speaking on the true meaning of prophecy. As to the
words “at another time as females,” which imply that the Prophets in
prophetical vision perceived angels also in the form of women, they
refer to the vision of Zechariah (v. 9), “And, behold, there came out
two women, and the wind was in their wings.” You know very well how
difficult it is for men to form a notion of anything immaterial, and
entirely devoid of corporeality, except after considerable training: it
is especially difficult for those who do not distinguish between
objects of the intellect and objects of the imagination, and depend
mostly on the mere imaginative power. They believe that all imagined
things exist or at least have the possibility of existing; but that
which cannot be imagined does not exist, and cannot exist. For persons
of this class—and the majority of thinkers belong to it—cannot arrive
at the true solution of any question, or at the explanation of anything
doubtful. On account of this difficulty the prophetic books contain
expressions which, taken literally, imply that angels are corporeal,
moving about, endowed with human form, receiving commands of God,
obeying His word and performing whatever He wishes, according to His
command. All this only serves to lead to the belief that angels exist,
and are alive and perfect, in the same way as we have explained in
reference to God. If the figurative representation of angels were
limited to this, their true essence would be believed to be the same as
the essence of God, since, in reference to the Creator expressions are
likewise employed, which literally imply that He is corporeal, living,
moving and endowed with human form. In order, therefore, to give to the
mind of men the idea that the existence of angels is lower than the
existence of God, certain forms of lower animals were introduced in the
description of angels. It was thereby shown, that the existence of God
is more perfect than that of angels, as much as man is more perfect
than the lower animals. Nevertheless no organ of the brute creation was
attributed to the angels except wings. Without wings the act of flying
appears as impossible as that of walking without legs; for these two
modes of motion can only be imagined in connection with these organs.
The motion of flying has been chosen as a symbol to represent that
angels possess life, because it is the most perfect and most sublime
movement of the brute creation. Men consider this motion a perfection
to such an extent that they themselves wish to be able to fly, in order
to escape easily what is injurious, and to obtain quickly what is
useful, though it be at a distance. For this reason this motion has
been attributed to the angels.
There is besides another reason. The bird in its flight is sometimes
visible, sometimes withdrawn from our sight; one moment near to us, and
in the next far off; and these are exactly the circumstances which we
must associate with the idea of angels, as will be explained below.
This imaginary perfection, the motion of flight, being the exclusive
property of the brute creation, has never been attributed to God. You
must not be misled by the passage, “And he rode upon a cherub, and he
did fly” (Ps. xviii. 10), for it is the cherub that did fly, and the
simile only serves to denote the rapid arrival of that which is
referred to in that passage. Comp.: “Behold, the Lord rideth upon a
swift cloud, and shall come into Egypt” (Isa. xix. 1); that is, the
punishment alluded to will come down quickly upon Egypt. Nor should
expressions like “the face of an ox,” “the face of a lion,” “the face
of an eagle,” “the sole of the foot of a calf,” found in the prophecies
of Ezekiel (i. 10 and 7) mislead you; for all these are explained in a
different manner, as you will learn later, and besides, the prophet
only describes the animals (ḥayyot). The subject will be explained
(III. i.), though by mere hints, as far as necessary, for directing
your attention to the true interpretation.
The motion of flying, frequently mentioned in the Bible, necessitates,
according to our imagination, the existence of wings; wings are
therefore given to the angels as symbols expressive of their existence,
not of their true essence. You must also bear in mind that whenever a
thing moves very quickly, it is said to fly, as that term implies great
velocity of motion. Comp. “As the eagle flieth” (Deut. xxviii. 49). The
eagle flies and moves with greater velocity than any other bird, and
therefore it is introduced in this simile. Furthermore, the wings are
the organs [lit. causes] of flight; hence the number of the wings of
angels in the prophetic vision corresponds to the number of the causes
which set a thing in motion, but this does not belong to the theme of
this chapter. (Comp. II. iv. and x.)
CHAPTER L
When reading my present treatise, bear in mind that by “faith” we do
not understand merely that which is uttered with the lips, but also
that which is apprehended by the soul, the conviction that the object
[of belief] is exactly as it is apprehended. If, as regards real or
supposed truths, you content yourself with giving utterance to them in
words, without apprehending them or believing in them, especially if
you do not seek real truth, you have a very easy task as, in fact, you
will find many ignorant people professing articles of faith without
connecting any idea with them.
If, however, you have a desire to rise to a higher state, viz., that of
reflection, and truly to hold the conviction that God is One and
possesses true unity, without admitting plurality or divisibility in
any sense whatever, you must understand that God has no essential
attribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and that the rejection
of corporeality implies the rejection of essential attributes. Those
who believe that God is One, and that He has many attributes, declare
the unity with their lips, and assume plurality in their thoughts. This
is like the doctrine of the Christians, who say that He is one and He
is three, and that the three are one. Of the same character is the
doctrine of those who say that God is One, but that He has many
attributes; and that He with His attributes is One, although they deny
corporeality and affirm His most absolute freedom from matter; as if
our object were to seek forms of expression, not subjects of belief.
For belief is only possible after the apprehension of a thing; it
consists in the conviction that the thing apprehended has its existence
beyond the mind [in reality] exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If
in addition to this we are convinced that the thing cannot be different
in any way from what we believe it to be, and that no reasonable
argument can be found for the rejection of the belief or for the
admission of any deviation from it, then the belief is true. Renounce
desires and habits, follow your reason, and study what I am going to
say in the chapters which follow on the rejection of the attributes;
you will then be fully convinced of what we have said; you will be of
those who truly conceive the Unity of God, not of those who utter it
with their lips without thought, like men of whom it has been said,
“Thou art near in their mouth, and far from their reins” (Jer. xii. 2).
It is right that a man should belong to that class of men who have a
conception of truth and understand it, though they do not speak of it.
Thus the pious are advised and addressed, “Commune with your own heart
upon your bed and be still. Selah.” (Ps. iv. 5.)
CHAPTER LI
There are many things whose existence is manifest and obvious; some of
these are innate notions or objects of sensation, others are nearly so;
and in fact they would require no proof if man had been left in his
primitive state. Such are the existence of motion, of man’s free will,
of phases of production and destruction, and of the natural properties
perceived by the senses, e.g., the heat of fire, the coldness of water,
and many other similar things. False notions, however, may be spread
either by a person labouring under error, or by one who has some
particular end in view, and who establishes theories contrary to the
real nature of things, by denying the existence of things perceived by
the senses, or by affirming the existence of what does not exist.
Philosophers are thus required to establish by proof things which are
self-evident, and to disprove the existence of things which only exist
in man’s imagination. Thus Aristotle gives a proof for the existence of
motion, because it had been denied; he disproves the reality of atoms,
because it had been asserted.
To the same class belongs the rejection of essential attributes in
reference to God. For it is a self-evident truth that the attribute is
not inherent in the object to which it is ascribed, but it is
superadded to its essence, and is consequently an accident; if the
attribute denoted the essence [τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι] of the object, it would
be either mere tautology, as if, e.g., one would say “man is man,” or
the explanation of a name, as, e.g., “man is a speaking animal”; for
the words “speaking animal” include the true essence of man, and there
is no third element besides life and speech in the definition of man;
when he, therefore, is described by the attributes of life and speech,
these are nothing but an explanation of the name “man,” that is to say,
that the thing which is called man, consists of life and speech. It
will now be clear that the attribute must be one of two things, either
the essence of the object described—in that case it is a mere
explanation of a name, and on that account we might admit the attribute
in reference to God, but we reject it from another cause as will be
shown—or the attribute is something different from the object
described, some extraneous superadded element; in that case the
attribute would be an accident, and he who merely rejects the
appellation “accidents” in reference to the attributes of God, does not
thereby alter their character; for everything superadded to the essence
of an object joins it without forming part of its essential properties,
and that constitutes an accident. Add to this the logical consequence
of admitting many attributes, viz., the existence of many eternal
beings. There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by
admitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or
plurality of elements; one from whatever side you view it, and by
whatever test you examine it; not divisible into two parts in any way
and by any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either
objectively or subjectively, as will be proved in this treatise.
Some thinkers have gone so far as to say that the attributes of God are
neither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence. This is
like the assertion of some theorists, that the ideals, i.e., the
universalia, are neither existing nor non-existent, and like the views
of others, that the atom does not fill a definite place, but keeps an
atom of space occupied; that man has no freedom of action at all, but
has acquirement. Such things are only said; they exist only in words,
not in thought, much less in reality. But as you know, and as all know
who do not delude themselves, these theories are preserved by a
multitude of words, by misleading similes sustained by declamation and
invective, and by numerous methods borrowed both from dialectics and
sophistry. If after uttering them and supporting them by such words, a
man were to examine for himself his own belief on this subject, he
would see nothing but confusion and stupidity in an endeavour to prove
the existence of things which do not exist, or to find a mean between
two opposites that have no mean. Or is there a mean between existence
and non-existence, or between the identity and non-identity of two
things? But, as we said, to such absurdities men were forced by the
great licence given to the imagination, and by the fact that every
existing material thing is necessarily imagined as a certain substance
possessing several attributes; for nothing has ever been found that
consists of one simple substance without any attribute. Guided by such
imaginations, men thought that God was also composed of many different
elements, viz., of His essence and of the attributes superadded to His
essence. Following up this comparison, some believed that God was
corporeal, and that He possessed attributes; others, abandoning this
theory, denied the corporeality, but retained the attributes. The
adherence to the literal sense of the text of Holy Writ is the source
of all this error, as I shall show in some of the chapters devoted to
this theme.
CHAPTER LII
Every description of an object by an affirmative attribute, which
includes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must be
made in one of the following five ways:—
First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man is
described as a being that lives and has reason; such a description,
containing the true essence of the object, is, as we have already
shown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree that this
kind of description cannot be given of God; for there are no previous
causes to His existence, by which He could be defined: and on that
account it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers,
who are precise in their statements, that no definition can be given of
God.
Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when,
e.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. This
kind of description includes the necessary connection [of the two
ideas]; for when we say that every man is rational we mean by it that
every being which has the characteristics of man must also have reason.
All agree that this kind of description is inappropriate in reference
to God; for if we were to speak of a portion of His essence, we should
consider His essence to be a compound. The inappropriateness of this
kind of description in reference to God is the same as that of the
preceding kind.
Thirdly. An object is described by something different from its true
essence, by something that does not complement or establish the essence
of the object. The description, therefore, relates to a quality; but
quality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If God could be
described in this way, He would be the substratum of accidents: a
sufficient reason for rejecting the idea that He possesses quality,
since it diverges from the true conception of His essence. It is
surprising how those who admit the application of attributes to God can
reject, in reference to Him, comparison and qualification. For when
they say “He cannot be qualified,” they can only mean that He possesses
no quality; and yet every positive essential attribute of an object
either constitutes its essence,—and in that case it is identical with
the essence,—or it contains a quality of the object.
There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give you
instances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that this
class of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man is
described by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any of
the dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when, e.g.,
we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or
who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say, a carpenter, or a
sage, or a physician; by all these we represent certain physical
dispositions; nor does it make any difference whether we say
“sin-fearing” or “merciful.” Every trade, every profession, and every
settled habit of man are certain physical dispositions. All this is
clear to those who have occupied themselves with the study of Logic.
(b) A thing is described by some physical quality it possesses, or by
the absence of the same, e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no
difference whether we say “soft or hard,” or “strong or weak”; in both
cases we speak of physical conditions. (c) A man is described by his
passive qualities, or by his emotions; we speak, e.g., of a person who
is passionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that these
conditions have become permanent. The description of a thing by its
colour, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this
class of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of its qualities
resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g., of a thing which is
long, short, curved, straight, etc.
Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find that they
cannot be employed in reference to God. He is not a magnitude that any
quality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him; He
is not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess
any quality resulting from emotion. He is not subject to physical
conditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar
qualities; He is not an animate being, that He should have a certain
disposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness,
modesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are
subject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows
that no attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest sense,
can be predicated of God. Consequently, these three classes of
attributes, describing the essence of a thing, or part of the essence,
or a quality of it, are clearly inadmissible in reference to God, for
they imply composition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question as
regards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, that He
is absolutely One.
Fourthly. A thing is described by its relation to another thing, e.g.,
to time, to space, or to a different individual; thus we say, Zaid, the
father of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, or
who lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does not necessarily
imply plurality or change in the essence of the object described; for
the same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is the partner of Amru, the
father of Becr, the master of Khalid, the friend of Zaid, dwells in a
certain house, and was born in a certain year. Such relations are not
the essence of a thing, nor are they so intimately connected with it as
qualities. At first thought, it would seem that they may be employed in
reference to God, but after careful and thorough consideration we are
convinced of their inadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no
relation between God and time or space. For time is an accident
connected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of
anteriority and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is
explained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of
the conditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God is
immaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time. Similarly
there is no relation between Him and space. But what we have to
investigate and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists
between God and any of the substances created by Him, by which He could
be described? That there is no correlation between Him and any of His
creatures can easily be seen; for the characteristic of two objects
correlative to each other is the equality of their reciprocal relation.
Now, as God has absolute existence, while all other beings have only
possible existence, as we shall show, there consequently cannot be any
correlation [between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of
relation does exist between them is by some considered possible, but
wrongly. It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellect and
sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence is common to
both; how, then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and
God, who has nothing in common with any other being; for even the term
existence is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion,
only by way of pure homonymity. Consequently there is no relation
whatever between Him and any other being. For whenever we speak of a
relation between two things, these belong to the same kind; but when
two things belong to different kinds though of the same class, there is
no relation between them. We therefore do not say, this red compared
with that green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although both
belong to the same class—colour; when they belong to two different
classes, there does not appear to exist any relation between them, not
even to a man of ordinary intellect, although the two things belong to
the same category; e.g., between a hundred cubits and the heat of
pepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the other a
quantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between meekness and
bitterness, although all these come under the head of quality in its
more general signification. How, then, could there be any relation
between God and His creatures, considering the important difference
between them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all
differences. Besides, if any relation existed between them, God would
be subject to the accident of relation; and although that would not be
an accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a
kind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you applied
affirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though they
contained only relations; these, however, are the most appropriate of
all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in reference to
God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things
exists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when
those things change to which God is in relation.
Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean by “its
actions” the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressed in
“carpenter,” “painter,” or “smith”—for these belong to the class of
qualities which have been mentioned above—but I mean the action the
latter has performed—we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built
that wall, wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from
the essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be
employed in describing the Creator, especially since we know that these
different actions do not imply that different elements must be
contained in the substance of the agent, by which the different actions
are produced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions of
God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded
to His essence, as we have shown.
What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God is one
in every respect, containing no plurality or any element superadded to
His essence: and that the many attributes of different significations
applied in Scripture to God, originate in the multitude of His actions,
not in a plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed
with the object of conveying to us some notion of His perfection, in
accordance with what we consider perfection, as has been explained by
us. The possibility of one simple substance excluding plurality, though
accomplishing different actions, will be illustrated by examples in the
next chapter.
CHAPTER LIII
The circumstance which caused men to believe in the existence of divine
attributes is similar to that which caused others to believe in the
corporeality of God. The latter have not arrived at that belief by
speculation, but by following the literal sense of certain passages in
the Bible. The same is the case with the attributes; when in the books
of the Prophets and of the Law, God is described by attributes, such
passages are taken in their literal sense, and it is then believed that
God possesses attributes; as if He were to be exalted above
corporeality, and not above things connected with corporeality, i.e.,
the accidents, I mean psychical dispositions, all of which are
qualities [and connected with corporeality]. Every attribute which the
followers of this doctrine assume to be essential to the Creator, you
will find to express, although they do not distinctly say so, a quality
similar to those which they are accustomed to notice in the bodies of
all living beings. We apply to all such passages the principle, “The
Torah speaketh in the language of man,” and say that the object of all
these terms is to describe God as the most perfect being, not as
possessing those qualities which are only perfections in relation to
created living beings. Many of the attributes express different acts of
God, but that difference does not necessitate any difference as regards
Him from whom the acts proceed. This fact, viz., that from one agency
different effects may result, although that agency has not free will,
and much more so if it has free will, I will illustrate by an instance
taken from our own sphere. Fire melts certain things and makes others
hard, it boils and burns, it bleaches and blackens. If we described the
fire as bleaching, blackening, burning, boiling, hardening and melting,
we should be correct, and yet he who does not know the nature of fire,
would think that it included six different elements, one by which it
blackens, another by which it bleaches, a third by which it boils, a
fourth by which it consumes, a fifth by which it melts, a sixth by
which it hardens things—actions which are opposed to one another, and
of which each has its peculiar property. He, however, who knows the
nature of fire, will know that by virtue of one quality in action,
namely, by heat, it produces all these effects. If this is the case
with that which is done by nature, how much more is it the case with
regard to beings that act by free will, and still more with regard to
God, who is above all description. If we, therefore, perceive in God
certain relations of various kinds—for wisdom in us is different from
power, and power from will—it does by no means follow that different
elements are really contained in Him, that He contains one element by
which He knows, another by which He wills, and another by which He
exercises power, as is, in fact, the signification of the attributes of
God according to the Attributists. Some of them express it plainly, and
enumerate the attributes as elements added to the essence. Others,
however, are more reserved with regard to this matter, but indicate
their opinion, though they do not express it in distinct and
intelligible words. Thus, e.g., some of them say: “God is omnipotent by
His essence, wise by His essence, living by His essence, and endowed
with a will by His essence.” (I will mention to you, as an instance,
man’s reason, which being one faculty and implying no plurality,
enables him to know many arts and sciences; by the same faculty man is
able to sow, to do carpenter’s work, to weave, to build, to study, to
acquire a knowledge of geometry, and to govern a state. These various
acts resulting from one simple faculty, which involves no plurality,
are very numerous; their number, that is, the number of the actions
originating in man’s reason, is almost infinite. It is therefore
intelligible how in reference to God, those different actions can be
caused by one simple substance, that does not include any plurality or
any additional element. The attributes found in Holy Scripture are
either qualifications of His actions, without any reference to His
essence, or indicate absolute perfection, but do not imply that the
essence of God is a compound of various elements.) For in not admitting
the term “compound,” they do not reject the idea of a compound when
they admit a substance with attributes.
There still remains one difficulty which led them to that error, and
which I am now going to mention. Those who assert the existence of the
attributes do not found their opinion on the variety of God’s actions;
they say it is true that one substance can be the source of various
effects, but His essential attributes cannot be qualifications of His
actions, because it is impossible to imagine that the Creator created
Himself. They vary with regard to the so-called essential attributes—I
mean as regards their number—according to the text of the Scripture
which each of them follows. I will enumerate those on which all agree,
and the knowledge of which they believe that they have derived from
reasoning, not from some words of the Prophets, namely, the following
four:—life, power, wisdom, and will. They believe that these are four
different things, and such perfections as cannot possibly be absent
from the Creator, and that these cannot be qualifications of His
actions. This is their opinion. But you must know that wisdom and life
in reference to God are not different from each other; for in every
being that is conscious of itself, life and wisdom are the same thing,
that is to say, if by wisdom we understand the consciousness of self.
Besides, the subject and the object of that consciousness are
undoubtedly identical [as regards God]; for according to our opinion,
He is not composed of an element that apprehends, and another that does
not apprehend; He is not like man, who is a combination of a conscious
soul and an unconscious body. If, therefore, by “wisdom” we mean the
faculty of self-consciousness, wisdom and life are one and the same
thing. They, however, do not speak of wisdom in this sense, but of His
power to apprehend His creatures. There is also no doubt that power and
will do not exist in God in reference to Himself; for He cannot have
power or will as regards Himself; we cannot imagine such a thing. They
take these attributes as different relations between God and His
creatures, signifying that He has power in creating things, will in
giving to things existence as He desires, and wisdom in knowing what He
created. Consequently, these attributes do not refer to the essence of
God, but express relations between Him and His creatures.
Therefore we, who truly believe in the Unity of God, declare, that as
we do not believe that some element is included in His essence by which
He created the heavens, another by which He created the [four]
elements, a third by which He created the ideals, in the same way we
reject the idea that His essence contains an element by which He has
power, another element by which He has will, and a third by which He
has a knowledge of His creatures. On the contrary, He is a simple
essence, without any additional element whatever; He created the
universe, and knows it, but not by any extraneous force. There is no
difference whether these various attributes refer to His actions or to
relations between Him and His works; in fact, these relations, as we
have also shown, exist only in the thoughts of men. This is what we
must believe concerning the attributes occurring in the books of the
Prophets; some may also be taken as expressive of the perfection of God
by way of comparison with what we consider as perfections in us, as we
shall explain.
CHAPTER LIV
The wisest man, our Teacher Moses, asked two things of God, and
received a reply respecting both. The one thing he asked was, that God
should let him know His true essence; the other, which in fact he asked
first, that God should let him know His attributes. In answer to both
these petitions God promised that He would let him know all His
attributes, and that these were nothing but His actions. He also told
him that His true essence could not be perceived, and pointed out a
method by which he could obtain the utmost knowledge of God possible
for man to acquire. The knowledge obtained by Moses has not been
possessed by any human being before him or after him. His petition to
know the attributes of God is contained in the following words: “Show
me now thy way, that I may know thee, that I may find grace in thy
sight” (Exod. xxxiii. 13). Consider how many excellent ideas found
expression in the words, “Show me thy way, that I may know thee.” We
learn from them that God is known by His attributes, for Moses believed
that he knew Him, when he was shown the way of God. The words “That I
may find grace in thy sight,” imply that he who knows God finds grace
in His eyes. Not only is he acceptable and welcome to God who fasts and
prays, but everyone who knows Him. He who has no knowledge of God is
the object of His wrath and displeasure. The pleasure and the
displeasure of God, the approach to Him and the withdrawal from Him are
proportional to the amount of man’s knowledge or ignorance concerning
the Creator. We have already gone too far away from our subject, let us
now return to it.
Moses prayed to God to grant him knowledge of His attributes, and also
pardon for His people; when the latter had been granted, he continued
to pray for the knowledge of God’s essence in the words, “Show me thy
glory” (ib. 18), and then received, respecting his first request, “Show
me thy way,” the following favourable reply, “I will make all my
goodness to pass before thee” (ib. 19); as regards the second request,
however, he was told, “Thou canst not see my face” (ib. 20). The words
“all my goodness” imply that God promised to show him the whole
creation, concerning which it has been stated, “And God saw everything
that he had made, and, behold, it was very good” (Gen. i. 31); when I
say “to show him the whole creation,” I mean to imply that God promised
to make him comprehend the nature of all things, their relation to each
other, and the way they are governed by God both in reference to the
universe as a whole and to each creature in particular. This knowledge
is referred to when we are told of Moses, “he is firmly established in
all mine house” (Num. xii. 7); that is, “his knowledge of all the
creatures in My universe is correct and firmly established”; for false
opinions are not firmly established. Consequently the knowledge of the
works of God is the knowledge of His attributes, by which He can be
known. The fact that God promised Moses to give him a knowledge of His
works, may be inferred from the circumstance that God taught him such
attributes as refer exclusively to His works, viz., “merciful and
gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness,” etc., (Exod. xxxiv.
6). It is therefore clear that the ways which Moses wished to know, and
which God taught him, are the actions emanating from God. Our Sages
call them middot (qualities), and speak of the thirteen middoth of God
(Talm. B. Rosh ha-shanah, p. 17b); they used the term also in reference
to man; comp. “there are four different middoth (characters) among
those who go to the house of learning”; “There are four different
middoth (characters) among those who give charity” (Mishnah Abot, v.
13, 14). They do not mean to say that God really possesses middot
(qualities), but that He performs actions similar to such of our
actions as originate in certain qualities, i.e., in certain psychical
dispositions; not that God has really such dispositions. Although Moses
was shown “all His goodness,” i.e., all His works, only the thirteen
middot are mentioned, because they include those acts of God which
refer to the creation and the government of mankind, and to know these
acts was the principal object of the prayer of Moses. This is shown by
the conclusion of his prayer, “that I may know thee, that I may find
grace in thy sight, and consider that this nation is thy people” (Exod.
xxxiii. 16), that is to say, the people whom I have to rule by certain
acts in the performance of which I must be guided by Thy own acts in
governing them. We have thus shown that “the ways” used in the Bible,
and “middot” used in the Mishnah, are identical, denoting the acts
emanating from God in reference to the universe.
Whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe to God
that emotion which is the source of the act when performed by
ourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is formed from the verb
expressing that emotion. We see, e.g., how well He provides for the
life of the embryo of living beings; how He endows with certain
faculties both the embryo itself and those who have to rear it after
its birth, in order that it may be protected from death and
destruction, guarded against all harm, and assisted in the performance
of all that is required [for its development]. Similar acts, when
performed by us, are due to a certain emotion and tenderness called
mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to be merciful; e.g., “Like as
a father is merciful to his children, so the Lord is merciful to them
that fear Him” (Ps. ciii. 13); “And I will spare them, as a man spareth
(yaḥamol) his own son that serveth him” (Mal. iii. 17). Such instances
do not imply that God is influenced by a feeling of mercy, but that
acts similar to those which a father performs for his son, out of pity,
mercy and real affection, emanate from God solely for the benefit of
His pious men, and are by no means the result of any impression or
change—[produced in God].—When we give something to a person who has no
claim upon us, we perform an act of grace; e.g., “Grant them graciously
unto us” (Judges xxi. 22). [The same term is used in reference to God,
e.g.] “which God hath graciously given” (Gen. xxxiii. 5); “Because God
hath dealt graciously with me” (ib. 11). Instances of this kind are
numerous. God creates and guides beings who have no claim upon Him to
be created and guided by Him; He is therefore called gracious
(ḥannun).—His actions towards mankind also include great calamities,
which overtake individuals and bring death to them, or affect whole
families and even entire regions, spread death, destroy generation
after generation, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence there occur
inundations, earthquakes, destructive storms, expeditions of one nation
against the other for the sake of destroying it with the sword and
blotting out its memory, and many other evils of the same kind.
Whenever such evils are caused by us to any person, they originate in
great anger, violent jealousy, or a desire for revenge. God is
therefore called, because of these acts, “jealous,” “revengeful,”
“wrathful,” and “keeping anger” (Nah. i. 2); that is to say, He
performs acts similar to those which, when performed by us, originate
in certain psychical dispositions, in jealousy, desire for retaliation,
revenge, or anger; they are in accordance with the guilt of those who
are to be punished, and not the result of any emotion; for He is above
all defect! The same is the case with all divine acts; though
resembling those acts which emanate from our passions and psychical
dispositions, they are not due to anything superadded to His
essence.—The governor of a country, if he is a prophet, should conform
to these attributes. Acts [of punishment] must be performed by him
moderately and in accordance with justice, not merely as an outlet of
his passion. He must not let loose his anger, nor allow his passion to
overcome him; for all passions are bad, and they must be guarded
against as far as it lies in man’s power. At times and towards some
persons he must be merciful and gracious, not only from motives of
mercy and compassion, but according to their merits; at other times and
towards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath in
proportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion. He must be
able to condemn a person to death by fire without anger, passion, or
loathing against him, and must exclusively be guided by what he
perceives of the guilt of the person, and by a sense of the great
benefit which a large number will derive from such a sentence. You
have, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how the commandment to annihilate
the seven nations, and “to save alive nothing that breatheth” (Deut.
xx. 16) is followed immediately by the words, “That they teach you not
to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their
gods; so should you sin against the Lord your God” (ib. 18); that is to
say, you shall not think that this commandment implies an act of
cruelty or of retaliation; it is an act demanded by the tendency of man
to remove everything that might turn him away from the right path, and
to clear away all obstacles in the road to perfection, that is, to the
knowledge of God. Nevertheless, acts of mercy, pardon, pity, and grace
should more frequently be performed by the governor of a country than
acts of punishment; seeing that all the thirteen middoth of God are
attributes of mercy with only one exception, namely, “visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children” (Exod. xxxiv. 7); for the
meaning of the preceding attribute (in the original ve-nakkeh lo
yenakkeh) is “and he will not utterly destroy”; (and not “He will by no
means clear the guilty”); comp. “And she will be utterly destroyed
(ve-nikketah), she shall sit upon the ground” (Isa. iii. 26). When it
is said that God is visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children, this refers exclusively to the sin of idolatry, and to no
other sin. That this is the case may be inferred from what is said in
the ten commandments, “upon the third and fourth generation of my
enemies” (Exod. xx. 5), none except idolaters being called “enemy”;
comp. also “every abomination to the Lord, which he hateth” (Deut. xii.
31). It was, however, considered sufficient to extend the punishment to
the fourth generation, because the fourth generation is the utmost a
man can see of his posterity; and when, therefore, the idolaters of a
place are destroyed, the old man worshipping idols is killed, his son,
his grandson, and his great-grandson, that is, the fourth generation.
By the mention of this attribute we are, as it were, told that His
commandments, undoubtedly in harmony with His acts, include the death
even of the little children of idolaters because of the sin of their
fathers and grandfathers. This principle we find frequently applied in
the Law, as, e.g., we read concerning the city that has been led astray
to idolatry, “destroy it utterly, and all that is therein” (Deut. xiii.
15). All this has been ordained in order that every vestige of that
which would lead to great injury should be blotted out, as we have
explained.
We have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, but we have
shown why it has been considered sufficient to mention only these
(thirteen) out of all His acts; namely, because they are required for
the good government of a country; for the chief aim of man should be to
make himself, as far as possible, similar to God: that is to say, to
make his acts similar to the acts of God, or as our Sages expressed it
in explaining the verse, “Ye shall be holy” (Lev. xxi. 2): “He is
gracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful, so be you also
merciful.”
The principal object of this chapter was to show that all attributes
ascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and do not imply that God
has any qualities.
CHAPTER LV
We have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise that
everything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to be negatived
in reference to God, for all passiveness implies change; and the agent
producing that state is undoubtedly different from the object affected
by it; and if God could be affected in any way whatever, another being
beside Him would act on Him and cause change in Him. All kinds of
non-existence must likewise be negatived in reference to Him; no
perfection whatever can therefore be imagined to be at one time absent
from Him, and at another present in Him: for if this were the case, He
would [at a certain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality
always implies non-existence, and when anything has to pass from
potentiality into reality, another thing that exists in reality is
required to effect that transition. Hence it follows that all
perfections must really exist in God, and none of them must in any way
be a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise to be denied in
reference to God, is similarity to any existing being. This has been
generally accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of the Prophets;
e.g., “To whom, then, will you liken me?” (Isa. xl. 25); “To whom,
then, will you liken God?” (ib. 18); “There is none like unto Thee”
(Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind are frequent. In short, it is
necessary to demonstrate by proof that nothing can be predicated of God
that implies any of the following four things: corporeality, emotion or
change, non-existence,—e.g., that something would be potential at one
time and real at another—and similarity with any of His creatures. In
this respect our knowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural
Science. For he who is ignorant of the latter cannot understand the
defect implied in emotions, the difference between potentiality and
reality, the non-existence implied in all potentiality, the inferiority
of a thing that exists in potentiâ to that which moves in order to
cause its transition from potentiality into reality, and the
inferiority of that which moves for this purpose compared with its
condition when the transition has been effected. He who knows these
things, but without their proofs, does not know the details which
logically result from these general propositions; and therefore he
cannot prove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned above
are inadmissible in reference to God.
Having premised these remarks, I shall explain in the next chapter the
error of those who believe that God has essential attributes; those who
have some knowledge of Logic and Natural Science will understand it.
CHAPTER LVI
Similarity is based on a certain relation between two things; if
between two things no relation can be found, there can be no similarity
between them, and there is no relation between two things that have no
similarity to each other; e.g., we do not say this heat is similar to
that colour, or this voice is similar to that sweetness. This is
self-evident. Since the existence of a relation between God and man, or
between Him and other beings has been denied, similarity must likewise
be denied. You must know that two things of the same kind—i.e., whose
essential properties are the same, and which are distinguished from
each other by greatness and smallness, strength and weakness, etc.—are
necessarily similar, though different in this one way; e.g., a grain of
mustard and the sphere of the fixed stars are similar as regards the
three dimensions, although the one is exceedingly great, the other
exceedingly small, the property of having [three] dimensions is the
same in both; or the heat of wax melted by the sun and the heat of the
element of fire, are similar as regards heat; although the heat is
exceedingly great in the one case, and exceedingly small in the other,
the existence of that quality (heat) is the same in both. Thus those
who believe in the presence of essential attributes in God, viz.,
Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, and Will, should know that these
attributes, when applied to God, have not the same meaning as when
applied to us, and that the difference does not only consist in
magnitude, or in the degree of perfection, stability, and durability.
It cannot be said, as they practically believe, that His existence is
only more stable, His life more permanent, His power greater, His
wisdom more perfect, and His will more general than ours, and that the
same definition applies to both. This is in no way admissible, for the
expression “more than” is used in comparing two things as regards a
certain attribute predicated of both of them in exactly the same sense,
and consequently implies similarity [between God and His creatures].
When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-called
essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes
of other things, and should according to their own opinion not be
included in one of the same definition, just as there is no similarity
between the essence of God and that of other beings. They do not follow
this principle, for they hold that one definition may include them, and
that, nevertheless, there is no similarity between them. Those who are
familiar with the meaning of similarity will certainly understand that
the term existence, when applied to God and to other beings, is
perfectly homonymous. In like manner, the terms Wisdom, Power, Will,
and Life are applied to God and to other beings by way of perfect
homonymity, admitting of no comparison whatever. Nor must you think
that these attributes are employed as hybrid terms; for hybrid terms
are such as are applied to two things which have a similarity to each
other in respect to a certain property which is in both of them an
accident, not an essential, constituent element. The attributes of God,
however, are not considered as accidental by any intelligent person,
while all attributes applied to man are accidents, according to the
Mutakallemim. I am therefore at a loss to see how they can find any
similarity [between the attributes of God and those of man]; how their
definitions can be identical, and their significations the same! This
is a decisive proof that there is, in no way or sense, anything common
to the attributes predicated of God, and those used in reference to
ourselves; they have only the same names, and nothing else is common to
them. Such being the case, it is not proper to believe, on account of
the use of the same attributes, that there is in God something
additional to His essence, in the same way as attributes are joined to
our essence. This is most important for those who understand it. Keep
it in memory, and study it thoroughly, in order to be well prepared for
that which I am going to explain to you.
CHAPTER LVII
On attributes; remarks more recondite than the preceding. It is known
that existence is an accident appertaining to all things, and therefore
an element superadded to their essence. This must evidently be the case
as regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its
existence is an element superadded to its essence. But as regards a
being whose existence is not due to any cause—God alone is that being,
for His existence, as we have said, is absolute—existence and essence
are perfectly identical; He is not a substance to which existence is
joined as an accident, as an additional element. His existence is
always absolute, and has never been a new element or an accident in
Him. Consequently God exists without possessing the attribute of
existence. Similarly He lives, without possessing the attribute of
life; knows, without possessing the attribute of knowledge; is
omnipotent without possessing the attribute of omnipotence; is wise,
without possessing the attribute of wisdom; all this reduces itself to
one and the same entity; there is no plurality in Him, as will be
shown. It is further necessary to consider that unity and plurality are
accidents supervening to an object according as it consists of many
elements or of one. This is fully explained in the book called
Metaphysics. In the same way as number is not the substance of the
things numbered, so is unity not the substance of the thing which has
the attribute of unity, for unity and plurality are accidents belonging
to the category of discrete quantity, and supervening to such objects
as are capable of receiving them.
To that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute existence, and
in which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity is as
inadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say, God’s unity
is not an element superadded, but He is One without possessing the
attribute of unity. The investigation of this subject, which is almost
too subtle for our understanding, must not be based on current
expressions employed in describing it, for these are the great source
of error. It would be extremely difficult for us to find, in any
language whatsoever, words adequate to this subject, and we can only
employ inadequate language. In our endeavour to show that God does not
include a plurality, we can only say “He is one,” although “one” and
“many” are both terms which serve to distinguish quantity. We therefore
make the subject clearer, and show to the understanding the way of
truth by saying He is one but does not possess the attribute of unity.
The same is the case when we say God is the First (Kadmon), to express
that He has not been created; the term “First” is decidedly inaccurate,
for it can in its true sense only be applied to a being that is subject
to the relation of time; the latter, however, is an accident to motion
which again is connected with a body. Besides the attribute “first” is
a relative term, being in regard to time the same as the terms “long”
and “short” are in regard to a line. Both expressions, “first” and
“created,” are equally inadmissible in reference to any being to which
the attribute of time is not applicable, just as we do not say
“crooked” or “straight” in reference to taste, “salted” or “insipid” in
reference to the voice. These subjects are not unknown to those who
have accustomed themselves to seek a true understanding of the things,
and to establish their properties in accordance with the abstract
notions which the mind has formed of them, and who are not misled by
the inaccuracy of the words employed. All attributes, such as “the
First,” “the Last,” occurring in the Scriptures in reference to God,
are as metaphorical as the expressions “ear” and “eye.” They simply
signify that God is not subject to any change or innovation whatever;
they do not imply that God can be described by time, or that there is
any comparison between Him and any other being as regards time, and
that He is called on that account “the first” and “the last.” In short,
all similar expressions are borrowed from the language commonly used
among the people. In the same way we use “One” in reference to God, to
express that there is nothing similar to Him, but we do not mean to say
that an attribute of unity is added to His essence.
CHAPTER LVIII
This chapter is even more recondite than the preceding. Know that the
negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include
any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God,
while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate, as we
have already shown. It is now necessary to explain how negative
expressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes, and how
they are distinguished from positive attributes. Then I shall show that
we cannot describe the Creator by any means except by negative
attributes. An attribute does not exclusively belong to the one object
to which it is related; while qualifying one thing, it can also be
employed to qualify other things, and is in that case not peculiar to
that one thing. E.g., if you see an object from a distance, and on
enquiring what it is, are told that it is a living being, you have
certainly learnt an attribute of the object seen, and although that
attribute does not exclusively belong to the object perceived, it
expresses that the object is not a plant or a mineral. Again, if a man
is in a certain house, and you know that something is in the house, but
not exactly what, you ask what is in that house, and you are told, not
a plant nor a mineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge
of the thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you
do not yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negative
attributes have this in common with the positive, that they necessarily
circumscribe the object to some extent, although such circumscription
consists only in the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded.
In the following point, however, the negative attributes are
distinguished from the positive. The positive attributes, although not
peculiar to one thing, describe a portion of what we desire to know,
either some part of its essence or some of its accidents; the negative
attributes, on the other hand, do not, as regards the essence of the
thing which we desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it
be indirectly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.
After this introduction, I would observe that,—as has already been
shown—God’s existence is absolute, that it includes no composition, as
will be proved, and that we comprehend only the fact that He exists,
not His essence. Consequently it is a false assumption to hold that He
has any positive attribute; for He does not possess existence in
addition to His essence; it therefore cannot be said that the one may
be described as an attribute [of the other]; much less has He [in
addition to His existence] a compound essence, consisting of two
constituent elements to which the attribute could refer; still less has
He accidents, which could be described by an attribute. Hence it is
clear that He has no positive attribute whatever. The negative
attributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the mind
to the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on the one
hand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other, they convey
to man the highest possible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been
established by proof that some being must exist besides those things
which can be perceived by the senses, or apprehended by the mind; when
we say of this being, that it exists, we mean that its non-existence is
impossible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance,
like the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore say that
it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We call such a
being incorporeal, because we notice that it is unlike the heavens,
which are living, but material. Seeing that it is also different from
the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living, owes its existence
to some cause, we say it is the first, expressing thereby that its
existence is not due to any cause. We further notice, that the
existence, that is the essence, of this being is not limited to its own
existence; many existences emanate from it, and its influence is not
like that of the fire in producing heat, or that of the sun in sending
forth light, but consists in constantly giving them stability and order
by well-established rule, as we shall show: we say, on that account, it
has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not feeble or ignorant, or
hasty, and does not abandon its creatures; when we say that it is not
feeble, we mean that its existence is capable of producing the
existence of many other things; by saying that it is not ignorant, we
mean “it perceives” or “it lives,”—for everything that perceives is
living—by saying “it is not hasty, and does not abandon its creatures,”
we mean that all these creatures preserve a certain order and
arrangement; they are not left to themselves; they are not produced
aimlessly, but whatever condition they receive from that being is given
with design and intention. We thus learn that there is no other being
like unto God, and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods
than one.
It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God either
denotes the quality of an action, or—when the attribute is intended to
convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of His actions—the
negation of the opposite. Even these negative attributes must not be
formed and applied to God, except in the way in which, as you know,
sometimes an attribute is negatived in reference to a thing, although
that attribute can naturally never be applied to it in the same sense,
as, e.g., we say, “This wall does not see.” Those who read the present
work are aware that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we
can obtain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens—a revolving
substance which has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and
examined even as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each
other and respecting most of their motions—although we know that they
must consist of matter and form; but the matter not being the same as
sublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms expressing
negative properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities. Thus
we say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, not passive and
therefore not subject to impressions, and that they do not possess the
sensations of taste and smell; or we use similar negative attributes.
All this we do, because we do not know their substance. What, then, can
be the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a knowledge of a
Being that is free from substance, that is most simple, whose existence
is absolute, and not due to any cause, to whose perfect essence nothing
can be superadded, and whose perfection consists, as we have shown, in
the absence of all defects. All we understand is the fact that He
exists, that He is a Being to whom none of His creatures is similar,
who has nothing in common with them, who does not include plurality,
who is never too feeble to produce other beings, and whose relation to
the universe is that of a steersman to a boat; and even this is not a
real relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea
that God rules the universe; that is, that He gives it duration, and
preserves its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treated more
fully. Praised be He! In the contemplation of His essence, our
comprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in the examination of
His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge
proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol Him in words, all
our efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure!
CHAPTER LIX
The following question might perhaps be asked: Since there is no
possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true essence of God, and
since it has also been proved that the only thing that man can
apprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positive
attributes are inadmissible, as has been shown; what is the difference
among those who have obtained a knowledge of God? Must not the
knowledge obtained by our teacher Moses, and by Solomon, be the same as
that obtained by any one of the lowest class of philosophers, since
there can be no addition to this knowledge? But, on the other hand, it
is generally accepted among theologians and also among philosophers,
that there can be a great difference between two persons as regards the
knowledge of God obtained by them. Know that this is really the case,
that those who have obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from
each other; for in the same way as by each additional attribute an
object is more specified, and is brought nearer to the true
apprehension of the observer, so by each additional negative attribute
you advance toward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than
he who does not negative, in reference to God, those qualities which
you are convinced by proof must be negatived. There may thus be a man
who after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuit of one
science, and to the true understanding of its principles, till he is
fully convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result of this
study the conviction that a certain quality must be negatived in
reference to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it is
impossible to apply it to Him. Superficial thinkers will have no proof
for this, will doubtfully ask, Is that thing existing in the Creator,
or not? And those who are deprived of sight will positively ascribe it
to God, although it has been clearly shown that He does not possess it.
E.g., while I show that God is incorporeal, another doubts and is not
certain whether He is corporeal or incorporeal; others even positively
declare that He is corporeal, and appear before the Lord with that
belief. Now see how great the difference is between these three men;
the first is undoubtedly nearest to the Almighty; the second is remote,
and the third still more distant from Him. If there be a fourth person
who holds himself convinced by proof that emotions are impossible in
God, while the first who rejects the corporeality, is not convinced of
that impossibility, that fourth person is undoubtedly nearer the
knowledge of God than the first, and so on, so that a person who,
convinced by proof, negatives a number of things in reference to God,
which according to our belief may possibly be in Him or emanate from
Him, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than we are, and would surpass
us still more if we positively believed these things to be properties
of God. It will now be clear to you, that every time you establish by
proof the negation of a thing in reference to God, you become more
perfect, while with every additional positive assertion you follow your
imagination and recede from the true knowledge of God. Only by such
ways must we approach the knowledge of God, and by such researches and
studies as would show us the inapplicability of what is inadmissible as
regards the Creator, not by such methods as would prove the necessity
of ascribing to Him anything extraneous to His essence, or asserting
that He has a certain perfection, when we find it to be a perfection in
relation to us. The perfections are all to some extent acquired
properties, and a property which must be acquired does not exist in
everything capable of making such acquisition.
You must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of God, you are
removed from Him in two respects; first, whatever you affirm, is only a
perfection in relation to us; secondly, He does not possess anything
superadded to this essence; His essence includes all His perfections,
as we have shown. Since it is a well-known fact that even that
knowledge of God which is accessible to man cannot be attained except
by negations, and that negations do not convey a true idea of the being
to which they refer, all people, both of past and present generations,
declared that God cannot be the object of human comprehension, that
none but Himself comprehends what He is, and that our knowledge
consists in knowing that we are unable truly to comprehend Him. All
philosophers say, “He has overpowered us by His grace, and is invisible
to us through the intensity of His light,” like the sun which cannot be
perceived by eyes which are too weak to bear its rays. Much more has
been said on this topic, but it is useless to repeat it here. The idea
is best expressed in the book of Psalms, “Silence is praise to Thee”
(lxv. 2). It is a very expressive remark on this subject; for whatever
we utter with the intention of extolling and of praising Him, contains
something that cannot be applied to God, and includes derogatory
expressions; it is therefore more becoming to be silent, and to be
content with intellectual reflection, as has been recommended by men of
the highest culture, in the words “Commune with your own heart upon
your bed, and be still” (Ps. iv. 4). You must surely know the following
celebrated passage in the Talmud—would that all passages in the Talmud
were like that!—although it is known to you, I quote it literally, as I
wish to point out to you the ideas contained in it: “A certain person,
reading prayers in the presence of Rabbi Ḥaninah, said, ‘God, the
great, the valiant and the tremendous, the powerful, the strong, and
the mighty.’—The rabbi said to him, Have you finished all the praises
of your Master? The three epithets, ‘God, the great, the valiant and
the tremendous,’ we should not have applied to God, had Moses not
mentioned them in the Law, and had not the men of the Great Synagogue
come forward subsequently and established their use in the prayer; and
you say all this! Let this be illustrated by a parable. There was once
an earthly king, possessing millions of gold coin; he was praised for
owning millions of silver coin; was this not really dispraise to him?”
Thus far the opinion of the pious rabbi. Consider, first, how repulsive
and annoying the accumulation of all these positive attributes was to
him; next, how he showed that, if we had only to follow our reason, we
should never have composed these prayers, and we should not have
uttered any of them. It has, however, become necessary to address men
in words that should leave some idea in their minds, and, in accordance
with the saying of our Sages, “The Torah speaks in the language of
men,” the Creator has been described to us in terms of our own
perfections; but we should not on that account have uttered any other
than the three above-mentioned attributes, and we should not have used
them as names of God except when meeting with them in reading the Law.
Subsequently, the men of the Great Synagogue, who were prophets,
introduced these expressions also into the prayer, but we should not on
that account use [in our prayers] any other attributes of God. The
principal lesson to be derived from this passage is that there are two
reasons for our employing those phrases in our prayers: first, they
occur in the Pentateuch; secondly, the Prophets introduced them into
the prayer. Were it not for the first reason, we should never have
uttered them; and were it not for the second reason, we should not have
copied them from the Pentateuch to recite them in our prayers; how then
could we approve of the use of those numerous attributes! You also
learn from this that we ought not to mention and employ in our prayers
all the attributes we find applied to God in the books of the Prophets;
for he does not say, “Were it not that Moses, our Teacher, said them,
we should not have been able to use them”; but he adds another
condition—“and had not the men of the Great Synagogue come forward and
established their use in the prayer,” because only for that reason are
we allowed to use them in our prayers. We cannot approve of what those
foolish persons do who are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in
the prayers they compose, and in the hymns they make in the desire to
approach the Creator. They describe God in attributes which would be an
offence if applied to a human being; for those persons have no
knowledge of these great and important principles, which are not
accessible to the ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creator as
a familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in any
expressions they think proper; they eloquently continue to praise Him
in that manner, and believe that they can thereby influence Him and
produce an effect on Him. If they find some phrase suited to their
object in the words of the Prophets they are still more inclined to
consider that they are free to make use of such texts—which should at
least be explained—to employ them in their literal sense, to derive new
expressions from them, to form from them numerous variations, and to
found whole compositions on them. This license is frequently met with
in the compositions of the singers, preachers, and others who imagine
themselves to be able to compose a poem. Such authors write things
which partly are real heresy, partly contain such folly and absurdity
that they naturally cause those who hear them to laugh, but also to
feel grieved at the thought that such things can be uttered in
reference to God. Were it not that I pitied the authors for their
defects, and did not wish to injure them, I should have cited some
passages to show you their mistakes; besides, the fault of their
compositions is obvious to all intelligent persons. You must consider
it, and think thus: If slander and libel is a great sin, how much
greater is the sin of those who speak with looseness of tongue in
reference to God, and describe Him by attributes which are far below
Him; and I declare that they not only commit an ordinary sin, but
unconsciously at least incur the guilt of profanity and blasphemy. This
applies both to the multitude that listens to such prayers, and to the
foolish man that recites them. Men, however, who understand the fault
of such compositions, and, nevertheless, recite them, may be classed,
according to my opinion, among those to whom the following words are
applied: “And the children of Israel used words that were not right
against the Lord their God” (2 Kings xvii. 9); and “utter error against
the Lord” (Isa. xxxii. 6). If you are of those who regard the honour of
their Creator, do not listen in any way to them, much less utter what
they say, and still less compose such prayers, knowing how great is the
offence of one who hurls aspersions against the Supreme Being. There is
no necessity at all for you to use positive attributes of God with the
view of magnifying Him in your thoughts, or to go beyond the limits
which the men of the Great Synagogue have introduced in the prayers and
in the blessings, for this is sufficient for all purposes, and even
more than sufficient, as Rabbi Ḥaninah said. Other attributes, such as
occur in the books of the Prophets, may be uttered when we meet with
them in reading those books; but we must bear in mind what has already
been explained, that they are either attributes of God’s actions, or
expressions implying the negation of the opposite. This likewise should
not be divulged to the multitude; but a reflection of this kind is
fitted for the few only who believe that the glorification of God does
not consist in uttering that which is not to be uttered, but in
reflecting on that on which man should reflect.
We will now conclude our exposition of the wise words of R. Ḥaninah. He
does not employ any such simile as: “A king who possesses millions of
gold denarii, and is praised as having hundreds”; for this would imply
that God’s perfections, although more perfect than those ascribed to
man are still of the same kind; but this is not the case, as has been
proved. The excellence of the simile consists in the words: “who
possesses golden denarii, and is praised as having silver denarii”;
this implies that these attributes, though perfections as regards
ourselves, are not such as regards God; in reference to Him they would
all be defects, as is distinctly suggested in the remark, “Is this not
an offence to Him?”
I have already told you that all these attributes, whatever perfection
they may denote according to your idea, imply defects in reference to
God, if applied to Him in the same sense as they are used in reference
to ourselves. Solomon has already given us sufficient instruction on
this subject by saying, “For God is in heaven, and thou upon earth;
therefore let thy words be few” (Eccles. v. 2).
CHAPTER LX
I will give you in this chapter some illustrations, in order that you
may better understand the propriety of forming as many negative
attributes as possible, and the impropriety of ascribing to God any
positive attributes. A person may know for certain that a “ship” is in
existence, but he may not know to what object that name is applied,
whether to a substance or to an accident; a second person then learns
that the ship is not an accident; a third, that it is not a mineral; a
fourth, that it is not a plant growing in the earth; a fifth, that it
is not a body whose parts are joined together by nature; a sixth, that
it is not a flat object like boards or doors; a seventh, that it is not
a sphere; an eighth, that it is not pointed; a ninth, that it is not
round-shaped; nor equilateral; a tenth, that it is not solid. It is
clear that this tenth person has almost arrived at the correct notion
of a “ship” by the foregoing negative attributes, as if he had exactly
the same notion as those have who imagine it to be a wooden substance
which is hollow, long, and composed of many pieces of wood, that is to
say, who know it by positive attributes. Of the other persons in our
illustration, each one is more remote from the correct notion of a ship
than the next mentioned, so that the first knows nothing about it but
the name. In the same manner you will come nearer to the knowledge and
comprehension of God by the negative attributes. But you must be
careful, in what you negative, to negative by proof, not by mere words,
for each time you ascertain by proof that a certain thing, believed to
exist in the Creator, must be negatived, you have undoubtedly come one
step nearer to the knowledge of God.
It is in this sense that some men come very near to God, and others
remain exceedingly remote from Him, not in the sense of those who are
deprived of vision, and believe that God occupies a place, which man
can physically approach or from which he can recede. Examine this well,
know it, and be content with it. The way which will bring you nearer to
God has been clearly shown to you; walk in it, if you have the desire.
On the other hand, there is a great danger in applying positive
attributes to God. For it has been shown that every perfection we could
imagine, even if existing in God in accordance with the opinion of
those who assert the existence of attributes, would in reality not be
of the same kind as that imagined by us, but would only be called by
the same name, according to our explanation; it would in fact amount to
a negation. Suppose, e.g., you say He has knowledge, and that
knowledge, which admits of no change and of no plurality, embraces many
changeable things; His knowledge remains unaltered, while new things
are constantly formed, and His knowledge of a thing before it exists,
while it exists, and when it has ceased to exist, is the same without
the least change: you would thereby declare that His knowledge is not
like ours; and similarly that His existence is not like ours. You thus
necessarily arrive at some negation, without obtaining a true
conception of an essential attribute; on the contrary, you are led to
assume that there is a plurality in God, and to believe that He, though
one essence, has several unknown attributes. For if you intend to
affirm them, you cannot compare them with those attributes known by us,
and they are consequently not of the same kind. You are, as it were,
brought by the belief in the reality of the attributes, to say that God
is one subject of which several things are predicated; though the
subject is not like ordinary subjects, and the predicates are not like
ordinary predicates. This belief would ultimately lead us to associate
other things with God, and not to believe that He is One. For of every
subject certain things can undoubtedly be predicated, and although in
reality subject and predicate are combined in one thing, by the actual
definition they consist of two elements, the notion contained in the
subject not being the same as that contained in the predicate. In the
course of this treatise it will be proved to you that God cannot be a
compound, and that He is simple in the strictest sense of the word.
I do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of God has not
sufficient knowledge concerning the Creator, admits some association
with God, or conceives Him to be different from what He is; but I say
that he unconsciously loses his belief in God. For he whose knowledge
concerning a thing is insufficient, understands one part of it while he
is ignorant of the other, as, e.g., a person who knows that man
possesses life, but does not know that man possesses understanding; but
in reference to God, in whose real existence there is no plurality, it
is impossible that one thing should be known, and another unknown.
Similarly he who associates an object with [the properties of] another
object, conceives a true and correct notion of the one object, and
applies that notion also to the other; while those who admit the
attributes of God, do not consider them as identical with His essence,
but as extraneous elements. Again, he who conceives an incorrect notion
of an object, must necessarily have a correct idea of the object to
some extent; he, however, who says that taste belongs to the category
of quantity has not, according to my opinion, an incorrect notion of
taste, but is entirely ignorant of its nature, for he does not know to
what object the term “taste” is to be applied.—This is a very difficult
subject; consider it well.
According to this explanation you will understand, that those who do
not recognize, in reference to God, the negation of things, which
others negative by clear proof, are deficient in the knowledge of God,
and are remote from comprehending Him. Consequently, the smaller the
number of things is which a person can negative in relation to God, the
less he knows of Him, as has been explained in the beginning of this
chapter; but the man who affirms an attribute of God, knows nothing but
the same; for the object to which, in his imagination, he applies that
name, does not exist; it is a mere fiction and invention, as if he
applied that name to a non-existing being, for there is, in reality, no
such object. E.g., some one has heard of the elephant, and knows that
it is an animal, and wishes to know its form and nature. A person, who
is either misled or misleading, tells him it is an animal with one leg,
three wings, lives in the depth of the sea, has a transparent body; its
face is wide like that of a man, has the same form and shape, speaks
like a man, flies sometimes in the air, and sometimes swims like a
fish. I should not say, that he described the elephant incorrectly, or
that he has an insufficient knowledge of the elephant, but I would say
that the thing thus described is an invention and fiction, and that in
reality there exists nothing like it; it is a non-existing being,
called by the name of a really existing being, and like the griffin,
the centaur, and similar imaginary combinations for which simple and
compound names have been borrowed from real things. The present case is
analogous; namely, God, praised be His name, exists, and His existence
has been proved to be absolute and perfectly simple, as I shall
explain. If such a simple, absolutely existing essence were said to
have attributes, as has been contended, and were combined with
extraneous elements, it would in no way be an existing thing, as has
been proved by us; and when we say that that essence, which is called
“God,” is a substance with many properties by which it can be
described, we apply that name to an object which does not at all exist.
Consider, therefore, what are the consequences of affirming attributes
to God! As to those attributes of God which occur in the Pentateuch, or
in the books of the Prophets, we must assume that they are exclusively
employed, as has been stated by us, to convey to us some notion of the
perfections of the Creator, or to express qualities of actions
emanating from Him.
CHAPTER LXI
It is well known that all the names of God occurring in Scripture are
derived from His actions, except one, namely, the Tetragrammaton, which
consists of the letters yod, hé, vau and hé. This name is applied
exclusively to God, and is on that account called Shem ha-meforash,
“The nomen proprium.” It is the distinct and exclusive designation of
the Divine Being; whilst His other names are common nouns, and are
derived from actions, to which some of our own are similar, as we have
already explained. Even the name Adonay, “Lord,” which has been
substituted for the Tetragrammaton, is derived from the appellative
“lord”; comp. “The man who is the lord (adone) of the land spake
roughly to us” (Gen. xliii. 30). The difference between Adoni, “my
lord,” (with ḥirek under the nun), or Adonay (with kameẓ) is similar to
the difference between Sari, “my prince,” and Saraï, Abraham’s wife
(ib. xvi. 1), the latter form denoting majesty and distinction. An
angel is also addressed as “Adonay”; e.g., “Adonay (My lord), pass not
away, I pray thee” (ib. xviii. 3). I have restricted my explanation to
the term Adonay, the substitute for the Tetragrammaton, because it is
more commonly applied to God than any of the other names which are in
frequent use, like dayyan, “judge,” shadday, “almighty,” ẓaddik,
“righteous,” ḥannun, “gracious,” raḥum “merciful,” and elohim “chief”;
all these terms are unquestionably appellations and derivatives. The
derivation of the name, consisting of yod, hé, vau, and hé, is not
positively known, the word having no additional signification. This
sacred name, which, as you know, was not pronounced except in the
sanctuary by the appointed priests, when they gave the sacerdotal
blessing, and by the high priest on the Day of Atonement, undoubtedly
denotes something which is peculiar to God, and is not found in any
other being. It is possible that in the Hebrew language, of which we
have now but a slight knowledge, the Tetragrammaton, in the way it was
pronounced, conveyed the meaning of “absolute existence.” In short, the
majesty of the name and the great dread of uttering it, are connected
with the fact that it denotes God Himself, without including in its
meaning any names of the things created by Him. Thus our Sages say:
“‘My name’ (Num. vi. 27) means the name which is peculiar to Me.” All
other names of God have reference to qualities, and do not signify a
simple substance, but a substance with attributes, they being
derivatives. On that account it is believed that they imply the
presence of a plurality in God, I mean to say, the presence of
attributes, that is, of some extraneous element superadded to His
essence. Such is the meaning of all derivative names; they imply the
presence of some attribute and its substratum, though this be not
distinctly named. As, however, it has been proved, that God is not a
substratum capable of attributes, we are convinced that those
appellatives when employed as names of God, only indicate the relation
of certain actions to Him, or they convey to us some notion of His
perfection.
Hence R. Ḥaninah would have objected to the expression “the great, the
mighty, and the tremendous,” had it not been for the two reasons
mentioned by him; because such expressions lead men to think that the
attributes are essential, i.e., they are perfections actually present
in God. The frequent use of names of God derived from actions, led to
the belief that He had as many [essential] attributes as there were
actions from which the names were derived. The following promise was
therefore made, implying that mankind will at a certain future time
understand this subject, and be free from the error it involves: “In
that day will the Lord be One, and His name One” (Zech. xiv. 9). The
meaning of this prophecy is this: He being One, will then be called by
one name, which will indicate the essence of God; but it does not mean
that His sole name will be a derivative [viz., “One”]. In the Pirke
Rabbi Eliezer (chap. iii.) occurs the following passage: “Before the
universe was created, there was only the Almighty and His name.”
Observe how clearly the author states that all these appellatives
employed as names of God came into existence after the Creation. This
is true; for they all refer to actions manifested in the Universe. If,
however, you consider His essence as separate and as abstracted from
all actions, you will not describe it by an appellative, but by a
proper noun, which exclusively indicates that essence. Every other name
of God is a derivative, only the Tetragrammaton is a real nomen
proprium, and must not be considered from any other point of view. You
must beware of sharing the error of those who write amulets (kameot).
Whatever you hear from them, or read in their works, especially in
reference to the names which they form by combination, is utterly
senseless; they call these combinations shemot (names) and believe that
their pronunciation demands sanctification and purification, and that
by using them they are enabled to work miracles. Rational persons ought
not to listen to such men, nor in any way believe their assertions. No
other name is called shem ha-meforash except this Tetragrammaton, which
is written, but is not pronounced according to its letters. The words,
“Thus shall ye bless the children of Israel” (Num. vi. 23) are
interpreted in Siphri as follows: “‘Thus,’ in the holy language; again
‘thus,’ with the Shem ha-meforash.” The following remark is also found
there: “In the sanctuary [the name of God is pronounced] as it is
spelt, but elsewhere by its substitutes.” In the Talmud, the following
passage occurs: “‘Thus,’ i.e., with the shem ha-meforash.—You say [that
the priests, when blessing the people, had to pronounce] the shem
ha-meforash; this was perhaps not the case, and they may have used
other names instead.—We infer it from the words: ‘And they shall put My
name’ (Num. vi. 27), i.e., My name, which is peculiar to Me.” It has
thus been shown that the shem ha-meforash (the proper name of God) is
the Tetragrammaton, and that this is the only name which indicates
nothing but His essence, and therefore our Sages in referring to this
sacred term said “‘My name’ means the one which is peculiar to Me
alone.”
In the next chapter I will explain the circumstances which brought men
to a belief in the power of Shemot (names of God); I will point out the
main subject of discussion, and lay open to you its mystery, and then
not any doubt will be left in your mind, unless you prefer to be
misguided.
CHAPTER LXII
We were commanded that, in the sacerdotal blessing, the name of the
Lord should be pronounced as it is written in the form of the
Tetragrammaton, the shem ha-meforash. It was not known to every one how
the name was to be pronounced, what vowels were to be given to each
consonant, and whether some of the letters capable of reduplication
should receive a dagesh. Wise men successively transmitted the
pronunciation of the name; it occurred only once in seven years that
the pronunciation was communicated to a distinguished disciple. I must,
however, add that the statement, “The wise men communicated the
Tetragrammaton to their children and their disciples once in seven
years,” does not only refer to the pronunciation but also to its
meaning, because of which the Tetragrammaton was made a nomen proprium
of God, and which includes certain metaphysical principles.
Our Sages knew in addition a name of God which consisted of twelve
letters, inferior in sanctity to the Tetragrammaton. I believe that
this was not a single noun, but consisted of two or three words, the
sum of their letters being twelve, and that these words were used by
our Sages as a substitute for the Tetragrammaton, whenever they met
with it in the course of their reading the Scriptures, in the same
manner as we at present substitute for it aleph, daleth, etc. [i.e.,
Adonay, “the Lord”]. There is no doubt that this name also, consisting
of twelve letters, was in this sense more distinctive than the name
Adonay: it was never withheld from any of the students; whoever wished
to learn it, had the opportunity given to him without any reserve: not
so the Tetragrammaton; those who knew it did not communicate it except
to a son or a disciple, once in seven years. When, however,
unprincipled men had become acquainted with that name which consists of
twelve letters and in consequence had become corrupt in faith—as is
sometimes the case when persons with imperfect knowledge become aware
that a thing is not such as they had imagined—the Sages concealed also
that name, and only communicated it to the worthiest among the priests,
that they should pronounce it when they blessed the people in the
Temple; for the Tetragrammaton was then no longer uttered in the
sanctuary on account of the corruption of the people. There is a
tradition, that with the death of Simeon the Just, his brother priests
discontinued the pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton in the blessing;
they used, instead, this name of twelve letters. It is further stated,
that at first the name of twelve letters was communicated to every man;
but when the number of impious men increased it was only entrusted to
the worthiest among the priests, whose voice, in pronouncing it, was
drowned amid the singing of their brother priests. Rabbi Tarphon said,
“Once I followed my grandfather to the daïs [where the blessing was
pronounced]; I inclined my ear to listen to a priest [who pronounced
the name], and noticed that his voice was drowned amid the singing of
his brother priests.”
There was also a name of forty-two letters known among them. Every
intelligent person knows that one word of forty-two letters is
impossible. But it was a phrase of several words which had together
forty-two letters. There is no doubt that the words had such a meaning
as to convey a correct notion of the essence of God, in the way we have
stated. This phrase of so many letters is called a name because, like
other proper nouns, they represent one single object, and several words
have been employed in order to explain more clearly the idea which the
name represents; for an idea can more easily be comprehended if
expressed in many words. Mark this and observe now that the instruction
in regard to the names of God extended to the signification of each of
those names, and did not confine itself to the pronunciation of the
single letters which, in themselves, are destitute of an idea. Shem
ha-meforash applied neither to the name of forty-two letters nor to
that of twelve, but only to the Tetragrammaton, the proper name of God,
as we have explained. Those two names must have included some
metaphysical ideas. It can be proved that one of them conveyed profound
knowledge, from the following rule laid down by our Sages: “The name of
forty-two letters is exceedingly holy; it can only be entrusted to him
who is modest, in the midway of life, not easily provoked to anger,
temperate, gentle, and who speaks kindly to his fellow men. He who
understands it, is cautious with it, and keeps it in purity, is loved
above and is liked here below; he is respected by his fellow men; his
learning remaineth with him, and he enjoys both this world and the
world to come.” So far in the Talmud. How grievously has this passage
been misunderstood! Many believe that the forty-two letters are merely
to be pronounced mechanically; that by knowledge of these, without any
further interpretation, they can attain to these exalted ends, although
it is stated that he who desires to obtain a knowledge of that name
must be trained in the virtues named before, and go through all the
great preparations which are mentioned in that passage. On the
contrary, it is evident that all this preparation aims at a knowledge
of Metaphysics, and includes ideas which constitute the “secrets of the
Law,” as we have explained (chap. xxxv.). In works on Metaphysics it
has been shown that such knowledge, i.e., the perception of the active
intellect, can never be forgotten; and this is meant by the phrase “his
learning remaineth with him.”
When bad and foolish men were reading such passages, they considered
them to be a support of their false pretensions and of their assertion
that they could, by means of an arbitrary combination of letters, form
a shem (“a name”) which would act and operate miraculously when written
or spoken in a certain particular way. Such fictions, originally
invented by foolish men, were in the course of time committed to
writing, and came into the hands of good but weak-minded and ignorant
persons who were unable to discriminate between truth and falsehood,
and made a secret of these shemot (names). When after the death of such
persons those writings were discovered among their papers, it was
believed that they contained truths; for, “the simple believeth every
word” (Prov. xiv. 15).
We have already gone too far away from our interesting subject and
recondite inquiry, endeavouring to refute a perverse notion, the
absurdity of which every one must perceive who gives a thought to the
subject. We have, however, been compelled to mention it, in treating of
the divine names, their meanings, and the opinions commonly held
concerning them. We shall now return to our theme. Having shown that
all names of God, with the exception of the Tetragrammaton (Shem
ha-meforash), are appellatives, we must now, in a separate chapter,
speak on the phrase Ehyeh asher Ehyeh, (Exod. iii. 14), because it is
connected with the difficult subject under discussion, namely, the
inadmissibility of divine attributes.
CHAPTER LXIII
Before approaching the subject of this chapter, we will first consider
the words of Moses, “And they shall say unto me, What is His name? what
shall I say unto them?” (Exod. iii. 13). How far was this question,
anticipated by Moses, appropriate, and how far was he justified in
seeking to be prepared with the answer? Moses was correct in declaring,
“But, behold, they will not believe me, for they will say, The Lord
hath not appeared unto thee” (ib. iv. 1); for any man claiming the
authority of a prophet must expect to meet with such an objection so
long as he has not given a proof of his mission. Again, if the
question, as appears at first sight, referred only to the name, as a
mere utterance of the lips, the following dilemma would present itself:
either the Israelites knew the name, or they had never heard it; if the
name was known to them, they would perceive in it no argument in favour
of the mission of Moses, his knowledge and their knowledge of the
divine name being the same. If, on the other hand, they had never heard
it mentioned, and if the knowledge of it was to prove the mission of
Moses, what evidence would they have that this was really the name of
God? Moreover, after God had made known that name to Moses, and had
told him, “Go and gather the elders of Israel, ... and they shall
hearken to thy voice” (ib. xvi. 18), he replied, “Behold, they will not
believe me nor hearken unto my voice,” although God had told him, “And
they will hearken to thy voice”; whereupon God answered, “What is that
in thine hand?” and he said, “A rod” (ib. iv. 2). In order to obviate
this dilemma, you must understand what I am about to tell you. You know
how widespread were in those days the opinions of the Sabeans; all men,
except a few individuals, were idolaters, that is to say, they believed
in spirits, in man’s power to direct the influences of the heavenly
bodies, and in the effect of talismans. Any one who in those days laid
claim to authority, based it either, like Abraham, on the fact that, by
reasoning and by proof he had been convinced of the existence of a
Being who rules the whole Universe, or that some spiritual power was
conferred upon him by a star, by an angel, or by a similar agency; but
no one could establish his claim on prophecy, that is to say, on the
fact that God had spoken to him, or had entrusted a mission to him;
before the days of Moses no such assertion had ever been made. You must
not be misled by the statements that God spoke to the Patriarchs, or
that He had appeared to them. For you do not find any mention of a
prophecy which appealed to others, or which directed them. Abraham,
Isaac, or Jacob, or any other person before them did not tell the
people, “God said unto me, you shall do this thing, or you shall not do
that thing,” or “God has sent me to you.” Far from it! for God spoke to
them on nothing but of what especially concerned them, i.e., He
communicated to them things relating to their perfection, directed them
in what they should do, and foretold them what the condition of their
descendants would be; nothing beyond this. They guided their fellow-men
by means of argument and instruction, as is implied, according to the
interpretation generally received amongst us, in the words “and the
souls that they had gotten in Haran” (Gen. xii. 5). When God appeared
to our Teacher Moses, and commanded him to address the people and to
bring them the message, Moses replied that he might first be asked to
prove the existence of God in the Universe, and that only after doing
so he would be able to announce to them that God had sent him. For all
men, with few exceptions, were ignorant of the existence of God; their
highest thoughts did not extend beyond the heavenly sphere, its forms
or its influences. They could not yet emancipate themselves from
sensation, and had not yet attained to any intellectual perfection.
Then God taught Moses how to teach them, and how to establish amongst
them the belief in the existence of Himself, namely, by saying Ehyeh
asher Ehyeh, a name derived from the verb hayah in the sense of
“existing,” for the verb hayah denotes “to be,” and in Hebrew no
difference is made between the verbs “to be” and “to exist.” The
principal point in this phrase is that the same word which denotes
“existence,” is repeated as an attribute. The word asher, “that,”
corresponds to the Arabic illadi and illati, and is an incomplete noun
that must be completed by another noun; it may be considered as the
subject of the predicate which follows. The first noun which is to be
described is ehyeh; the second, by which the first is described, is
likewise ehyeh, the identical word, as if to show that the object which
is to be described and the attribute by which it is described are in
this case necessarily identical. This is, therefore, the expression of
the idea that God exists, but not in the ordinary sense of the term;
or, in other words, He is “the existing Being which is the existing
Being,” that is to say, the Being whose existence is absolute. The
proof which he was to give consisted in demonstrating that there is a
Being of absolute existence, that has never been and never will be
without existence. This I will clearly prove (II. Introd. Prop. 20 and
chap. i.).
God thus showed Moses the proofs by which His existence would be firmly
established among the wise men of His people. Therefore the explanation
of the name is followed by the words, “Go, gather the elders of
Israel,” and by the assurance that the elders would understand what God
had shown to him, and would accept it, as is stated in the words, “And
they will hearken to thy voice.” Then Moses replied as follows: They
will accept the doctrine that God exists convinced by these
intelligible proofs. But, said Moses, by what means shall I be able to
show that this existing God has sent me? Thereupon God gave him the
sign. We have thus shown that the question, “What is His name?” means
“Who is that Being, which according to thy belief has sent thee?” The
sentence, “What is his name” (instead of, Who is He), has here been
used as a tribute of praise and homage, as though it had been said,
Nobody can be ignorant of Thy essence and of Thy real existence; if,
nevertheless, I ask what is Thy name, I mean, What idea is to be
expressed by the name? (Moses considered it inappropriate to say to God
that any person was ignorant of God’s existence, and therefore
described the Israelites as ignorant of God’s name, not as ignorant of
Him who was called by that name.)—The name Jah likewise implies eternal
existence. Shadday, however, is derived from day, “enough”; comp. “for
the stuff they had was sufficient” (dayyam, Exod. xxxvi. 7); the shin
is equal to asher, “which,” as in she-kebar, “which already” (Eccles.
ii. 16). The name Shadday, therefore, signifies “he who is sufficient”;
that is to say, He does not require any other being for effecting the
existence of what He created, or its conservation: His existence is
sufficient for that. In a similar manner the name ḥasin implies
“strength”; comp. “he was strong (ḥason) as the oaks” (Amos ii. 9). The
same is the case with “rock,” which is a homonym, as we have explained
(chap. xvi.). It is, therefore, clear that all these names of God are
appellatives, or are applied to God by way of homonymy, like ẓur and
others, the only exception being the tetragrammaton, the Shem
ha-meforash (the nomen proprium of God), which is not an appellative;
it does not denote any attribute of God, nor does it imply anything
except His existence. Absolute existence includes the idea of eternity,
i.e., the necessity of existence. Note well the result at which we have
arrived in this chapter.
CHAPTER LXIV
Know that in some instances by the phrase “the name of the Lord,”
nothing but the name alone is to be understood; comp. “Thou shalt not
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain” (Exod. xx. 7); “And he that
blasphemeth the name of the Lord” (Lev. xxiv. 16). This occurs in
numerous other passages. In other instances it means the essence and
reality of God Himself, as in the phrase “They shall say to me, What is
his name?” Sometimes it stands for “the word of God,” so that “the name
of God,” “the word of God,” and “the command of God,” are identical
phrases; comp. “for my name is in him” (Exod. xxiii. 21), that is, My
word or My command is in him; i.e., he is the instrument of My desire
and will. I shall explain this fully in treating of the homonymity of
the term “angel” (II. chap. vi. and xxxiv.).—The same is the case with
“The glory of the Lord.” The phrase sometimes signifies “the material
light,” which God caused to rest on a certain place in order to show
the distinction of that place, e.g., “And the glory of the Lord (kebod
adonay) abode upon Mount Sinai and the cloud covered it” (Exod. xxiv.
16): “And the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle” (ib. xl. 35).
Sometimes the essence, the reality of God is meant by that expression,
as in the words of Moses, “Show me thy glory” (ib. xxxiii. 18), to
which the reply was given, “For no man shall see me and live” (ib.
xx.). This shows that the glory of the Lord in this instance is the
same as He Himself, and that “Thy glory” has been substituted for
“Thyself,” as a tribute of homage; an explanation which we also gave of
the words, “And they shall say unto me, What is his name?” Sometimes
the term “glory” denotes the glorification of the Lord by man or by any
other being. For the true glorification of the Lord consists in the
comprehension of His greatness, and all who comprehend His greatness
and perfection, glorify Him according to their capacity, with this
difference, that man alone magnifies God in words, expressive of what
he has received in his mind, and what he desires to communicate to
others. Things not endowed with comprehension, as e.g., minerals, may
also be considered as glorifying the Lord, for by their natural
properties they testify to the omnipotence and wisdom of their Creator,
and cause him who examines them to praise God, by means of speech or
without the use of words, if the power of speech be wanting. In Hebrew
this licence has been extended still further, and the use of the verb
“to speak” has been admitted as applicable in such a case; things which
have no comprehension are therefore said to give utterance to praise,
e.g., “All my bones shall say, Lord, who is like unto thee?” (Ps. xxxv.
10). Because a consideration of the properties of the bones leads to
the discovery of that truth, and it is through them that it became
known, they are represented as having uttered the divine praise; and
since this [cause of God’s praise] is itself called “praise,” it has
been said “the fulness of the whole earth is his praise” (Isa. vi. 3),
in the same sense as “the earth is full of his praise” (Hab. iii. 3).
As to kabod being employed in the sense of praise, comp. “Give praise
(kabod) to the Lord your God” (Jer. xiii. 16); also “and in his temple
does every one speak of his praise (kabod)” (Ps. xxix. 9), etc.
Consider well the homonymity of this term, and explain it in each
instance in accordance with the context; you will thus escape great
embarrassment.
CHAPTER LXV
After you have advanced thus far, and truly comprehended that God
exists without having the attribute of existence, and that He is One,
without having the attribute of unity, I do not think that I need
explain to you the inadmissibility of the attribute of speech in
reference to God, especially since our people generally believe that
the Law, i.e., the word ascribed to Him, was created. Speech is
attributed to Him, in so far as the word which Moses heard, was
produced and brought to existence by God in the same manner as He
produced all His other works and creations. As we shall have to speak
more fully on prophecy, we shall here merely show that speech is
attributed to God in the same way as all other actions, which are
similar to our own. When we are told that God addressed the Prophets
and spoke to them, our minds are merely to receive a notion that there
is a Divine knowledge to which the Prophets attain; we are to be
impressed with the idea that the things which the Prophets communicate
to us come from the Lord, and are not altogether the products of their
own conceptions and ideas. This subject, which we have already
mentioned above, will receive further explanation. It is the object of
this chapter to show that the words “speaking” and “saying” are
synonymous terms denoting (a) “Speech”; as, e.g., “Moses shall speak
(yedabber)” (Exod. xix. 19); “And Pharaoh said (va-yomer)” (ib. v. 5);
(b) “Thought” as formed in the mind without being expressed in words;
e.g., “And I thought (ve-amarti) in my heart” (Eccles. ii. 15); “And I
thought (vedibbarti) in my heart” (ib.); “And thy heart will imagine
(yedabber)” (Prov. xxiii. 33); “Concerning Thee my heart thought
(amar)” (Ps. xxvii. 8); “And Esau thought (va-yomer) in his heart”
(Gen. xxvii. 41); examples of this kind are numerous; (c) Will; e.g.,
“And he said (va-yomer) to slay David” (2 Sam. xxi. 16), that is to
say, he wished or he intended to slay him; “Dost thou desire (omer) to
slay me” (Exod. ii. 14); “And the whole congregation intended
(va-yomeru) to stone them” (Num. xiv. 10). Instances of this kind are
likewise numerous.
The two terms, when applied to God, can only have one of the two
last-mentioned significations, viz., he wills and he desires, or he
thinks, and there is no difference whether the divine thought became
known to man by means of an actual voice, or by one of those kinds of
inspiration which I shall explain further on (II. chap, xxxviii.). We
must not suppose that in speaking God employed voice or sound, or that
He has a soul in which the thoughts reside, and that these thoughts are
things superadded to His essence; but we ascribe and attribute to Him
thoughts in the same manner as we ascribe to Him any other attributes.
The use of these words in the sense of will and desire, is based, as I
have explained, on the homonymity of these terms. In addition they are
figures borrowed from our common practices, as has been already pointed
out. For we cannot, at a first glance, see how anything can be produced
by a mere desire; we think that he who wishes to produce a thing, must
perform a certain act, or command some one else to perform it.
Therefore the command is figuratively ascribed to God when that takes
place which He wishes, and we then say that He commanded that a certain
thing should be accomplished. All this has its origin in our comparing
the acts of God to our own acts, and also in the use of the term amar
in the sense of “He desired,” as we have already explained. The words
“And He said,” occurring in the account of the creation, signify “He
wished,” or “He desired.” This has already been stated by other
authors, and is well known. A proof for this, namely that the phrase
“God said,” in the first chapter of Genesis, must be taken in a
figurative sense “He willed,” and not in its literal meaning, is found
in the circumstance that a command can only be given to a being which
exists and is capable of receiving the command. Comp. “By the word of
the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath
of his mouth” (Ps. xxxiii. 6). “His mouth,” and “the breath of his
mouth,” are undoubtedly figurative expressions, and the same is the
case with “His word” and “His speech.” The meaning of the verse is
therefore that they [the heavens and all their host] exist through His
will and desire. All our eminent authorities are cognisant of this;
and, I need not explain that in Hebrew amar and dibber have the same
meaning, as is proved by the passage, “For it has heard all the words
(imre) of the Lord which he spake (dibber) unto us” (Josh. xxiv. 27).
CHAPTER LXVI
“And the tables were the work of God” (Exod. xxxii. 16), that is to
say, they were the product of nature, not of art; for all natural
things are called “the work of the Lord,” e.g., “These see the works of
the Lord” (Ps. cvii. 24); and the description of the several things in
nature, as plants, animals, winds, rain, etc., is followed by the
exclamation, “O Lord, how manifold are thy works!” (Ps. civ. 24). Still
more striking is the relation between God and His creatures, as
expressed in the phrase, “The cedars of Lebanon, which he hath planted”
(ib. 16); the cedars being the product of nature, and not of art, are
described as having been planted by the Lord. Similarly we explain,
“And the writing was the writing of God” (Exod. xxxii. 16); the
relation in which the writing stood to God has already been defined in
the words “written with the finger of God” (ib. xxxi. 18), and the
meaning of this phrase is the same as that of “the work of thy fingers”
(Ps. viii. 4), this being said of the heavens; of the latter it has
been stated distinctly that they were made by a word; comp. “By the
word of the Lord were the heavens made” (ib. xxxiii. 6). Hence you
learn that in the Bible, the creation of a thing is figuratively
expressed by terms denoting “word” and “speech.” The same thing which
according to one passage has been made by the word, is represented in
another passage as made by the “finger of God.” The phrase “written by
the finger of God” is therefore identical with “written by the word of
God”; and if the latter phrase had been used, it would have been equal
to “written by the will and desire of God.” Onkelos adopted in this
place a strange explanation, and rendered the words literally “written
by the finger of the Lord”; he thought that “the finger” was a certain
thing ascribed to God; so that “the finger of the Lord” is to be
interpreted in the same way as “the mountain of God” (Exod. iii. 1),
“the rod of God” (ib. iv. 20), that is, as being an instrument created
by Him, which by His will engraved the writing on the tables. I cannot
see why Onkelos preferred this explanation. It would have been more
reasonable to say “written by the word of the Lord,” in imitation of
the verse “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made.” Or was the
creation of the writing on the tables more difficult than the creation
of the stars in the spheres? As the latter were made by the direct will
of God, not by means of an instrument, the writing may also have been
produced by His direct will, not by means of an instrument. You know
what the Mishnah says, “Ten things were created on Friday in the
twilight of the evening,” and “the writing” is one of the ten things.
This shows how generally it was assumed by our forefathers that the
writing of the tables was produced in the same manner as the rest of
the creation, as we have shown in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Aboth,
v. 6).
CHAPTER LXVII
Since the verb “to say” has been figuratively used to express the will
of the Creator, and the phrase “And he said” has repeatedly been
employed in the account of all the things created in “the six days of
the beginning,” the expression “to rest” has likewise been figuratively
applied to God in reference to the Sabbath-day, on which there was no
creation; it is therefore said, “And he rested (va-yishbot) on the
seventh day” (Gen. ii. 2). For “to leave off speaking” is, in Hebrew,
likewise expressed by the same verb, as, e.g., “So these three men
ceased (va-yishbetu) to answer Job” (Job xxxii. 1); also by nuaḥ, as,
in “They spake to Nabal according to all those words in the name of
David, and ceased (va-yanuḥu)” (1 Sam. xxv. 9). In my opinion,
(va-yanuḥu) means “they ceased to speak,” and waited for the answer;
for no allusion to exertion whatever having previously been mentioned,
the words, “and they rested,” in its primary signification, would have
been entirely out of place in that narrative, even if the young men who
spoke had really used some exertion. The author relates that having
delivered that whole speech, which, as you find, consisted of gentle
expressions, they were silent, that is to say, they did not add any
word or act by which the reply of Nabal could be justified; it being
the object of the entire passage to represent Nabal’s conduct as
extremely reprehensible. In that sense [viz., “to cease,” or “to leave
off”] the verb nuaḥ is used in the phrase “And he left off (va-yanaḥ)
on the seventh day.”
Our Sages, and some of the Commentators, took, however, nuaḥ in its
primary sense “to rest,” but as a transitive form (hiphil), explaining
the phrase thus: “and he gave rest to the world on the seventh day,”
i.e., no further act of creation took place on that day.
It is possible that the word va-yanaḥ is derived either from yanaḥ, a
verb of the class pe-yod, or naḥah, a verb of the class lamed-he, and
has this meaning: “he established” or “he governed” the Universe in
accordance with the properties it possessed on the seventh day; that is
to say, while on each of the six days events took place contrary to the
natural laws now in operation throughout the Universe, on the seventh
day the Universe was merely upheld and left in the condition in which
it continues to exist. Our explanation is not impaired by the fact that
the form of the word deviates from the rules of verbs of these two
classes; for there are frequent exceptions to the rules of
conjugations, and especially of the weak verbs; and any interpretation
which removes such a source of error must not be abandoned because of
certain grammatical rules. We know that we are ignorant of the sacred
language, and that grammatical rules only apply to the majority of
cases.—The same root is also found as a verb ʻayin-vav in the sense “to
place” and “to set,” as e.g., “and it shall be established and she
shall be placed (ve-hunniḥah) there upon her own base” (Zech. v. 11),
and “she suffered neither the birds of the air to settle (la-nuaḥ) on
them” (2 Sam. xxi. 10). According to my opinion, the verb has the same
signification in Hab. iii. 16, “that I might remain firm (anuaḥ) in the
day of trouble.”
The word (va-yinnafash) is a verb derived from nefesh, the homonymity
of which we have already explained (chap. xli.), namely, that it has
the signification of intention or will; (va-yinnafash) accordingly
means: “that which he desired was accomplished, and what he wished had
come into existence.”
CHAPTER LXVIII
You are acquainted with the well-known principle of the philosophers
that God is the intellectus, the ens intelligens, and the ens
intelligibile. These three things are in God one and the same, and do
not in any way constitute a plurality. We have also mentioned it in our
larger work, “Mishneh Torah,” and we have explained there that it is a
fundamental principle of our religion, namely, that He is absolutely
one, that nothing combines with Him; that is to say, there is no
Eternal thing besides Him. On that account we say ḥai adonay, “the Lord
liveth” (Ruth iii. 13), and not ḥe adonay, “the life of the Lord,” for
His life is not a thing distinct from His essence, as we have explained
in treating of the inadmissibility of the attributes. There is no doubt
that he who has not studied any works on mental philosophy, who has not
comprehended the nature of the mind, who has no knowledge of its
essence, and considers it in no other way than he would consider the
nature of whiteness and of blackness, will find this subject extremely
difficult, and to him our principle that the intellectus, the
intelligens, and the intelligibile, are in God one and the same thing,
will appear as unintelligible as if we said that the whiteness, the
whitening substance, and the material which is whitened are one and the
same thing. And, indeed, many ignorant people refute at once our
principle by using such comparisons. Even amongst those who imagine
that they are wise, many find this subject difficult, and are of
opinion that it is impossible for the mind to grasp the truth of this
proposition, although it is a demonstrated truth, as has been shown by
Metaphysicians. I will tell you now what has been proved. Man, before
comprehending a thing, comprehends it in potentia (δυνάμει); when,
however, he comprehends a thing, e.g., the form of a certain tree which
is pointed out to him, when he abstracts its form from its substance,
and reproduces the abstract form, an act performed by the intellect, he
comprehends in reality (ἐνεργείᾳ), and the intellect which he has
acquired in actuality, is the abstract form of the tree in man’s mind.
For in such a case the intellect is not a thing distinct from the thing
comprehended. It is therefore clear to you that the thing comprehended
is the abstract form of the tree, and at the same time it is the
intellect in action; and that the intellect and the abstract form of
the tree are not two different things, for the intellect in action is
nothing but the thing comprehended, and that agent by which the form of
the tree has been turned into an intellectual and abstract object,
namely, that which comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action.
All intellect is identical with its action; the intellect in action is
not a thing different from its action, for the true nature and essence
of the intellect is comprehension, and you must not think that the
intellect in action is a thing existing by itself, separate from
comprehension, and that comprehension is a different thing connected
with it; for the very essence of the intellect is comprehension. In
assuming an intellect in action you assume the comprehension of the
thing comprehended. This is quite clear to all who have made themselves
familiar with the figurative language common to this discipline. You
therefore accept it as proved that the intellect consists in its
action, which is its true nature and essence. Consequently the very
thing by which the form of that tree has been made abstract and
intelligible, viz., the intellect, is at the same time the intelligens,
for the intellect is itself the agens which abstracts the form and
comprehends it, and that is the action, on account of which it is
called the intelligens; but itself and its action are identical; and
that which is called intellect in action consists [in the
above-mentioned instance] of nothing else but of the form of the tree.
It must now be obvious to you that whenever the intellect is found in
action, the intellect and the thing comprehended are one and the same
thing; and also that the function of all intellect, namely, the act of
comprehending, is its essence. The intellect, that which comprehends
and that which is comprehended, are therefore the same, whenever a real
comprehension takes place. But, when we speak of the power of
comprehension, we necessarily distinguish two things: the power itself,
and the thing which can be comprehended; e.g., that hylic intellect of
Zaid is the power of comprehension, and this tree is, in like manner, a
thing which is capable of being comprehended; these, undoubtedly, are
two different things. When, however, the potential is replaced by the
actual, and when the form of the tree has really been comprehended, the
form comprehended is the intellect, and it is by that same intellect,
by the intellect in action, that the tree has been converted into an
abstract idea, and has been comprehended. For everything in which a
real action takes place exists in reality. On the other hand, the power
of comprehension, and the object capable of comprehension are two
things; but that which is only potential cannot be imagined otherwise
than in connexion with an object possessing that capacity, as, e.g.,
man, and thus we have three things: the man who possesses the power,
and is capable of comprehending; that power itself, namely, the power
of comprehension, and the object which presents itself as an object of
comprehension, and is capable of being comprehended; to use the
foregoing example, the man, the hylic intellect, and the abstract form
of the tree, are three different things. They become one and the same
thing when the intellect is in action, and you will never find the
intellect different from the comprehensible object, unless the power of
comprehending and the power of being comprehended be referred to. Now,
it has been proved, that God is an intellect which always is in action,
and that—as has been stated, and as will be proved hereafter—there is
in Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He does not comprehend at
one time, and is without comprehension at another time, but He
comprehends constantly; consequently, He and the things comprehended
are one and the same thing, that is to say, His essence; and the act of
comprehending because of which it is said that He comprehends, is the
intellect itself, which is likewise His essence, God is therefore
always the intellectus, the intelligens, and the intelligibile.
We have thus shown that the identity of the intellect, the intelligens
and the intelligibile, is not only a fact as regards the Creator, but
as regards all intellect, when in action. There is, however, this
difference, that from time to time our intellect passes over from mere
potentiality to reality, and that the pure intellect, i.e., the active
intellect, finds sometimes obstacles, though not in itself, but
accidentally in some external cause. It is not our present intention to
explain this subject, but we will merely show that God alone, and none
besides Him, is an intellect constantly in action, and there is,
neither in Himself nor in anything beside Him, any obstacle whereby His
comprehension would be hindered. Therefore He always includes the
intelligens, the intellectus, and the intelligibile, and His essence is
at the same time the intelligens, the intelligibile, and the
intellectus, as is necessarily the case with all intellect in action.
We have reiterated this idea in the present chapter because it is
exceedingly abstruse, and I do not apprehend that the reader will
confound intellectual comprehension with the representative
faculty—with the reproduction of the material image in our imagination,
since this work is designed only for those who have studied philosophy,
and who know what has already been said on the soul and its faculties.
CHAPTER LXIX
The philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause (in Hebrew
ʻillah and sibbah): but those who are known by the name of Mutakallemim
are very much opposed to the use of that name, and call Him Agens,
believing that there is a great difference whether we say that God is
the Cause or that He is the Agens. They argue thus: If we say that God
is the Cause, the coexistence of the Cause with that which was produced
by that Cause would necessarily be implied; this again would involve
the belief that the Universe was eternal, and that it was inseparable
from God. When, however, we say that God is the Agens, the co-existence
of the Agens with its product is not implied; for the agens can exist
anterior to its product; we cannot even imagine how an agens can be in
action unless it existed before its own production. This is an argument
advanced by persons who do not distinguish between the potential and
the actual. You, however, should know that in this case there is no
difference whether you employ the term “cause” or “agens”; for if you
take the term “cause” in the sense of a mere potentiality, it precedes
its effect; but if you mean the cause in action, then the effect must
necessarily co-exist with the cause in action. The same is the case
with the agens; take it as an agens in reality, the work must
necessarily co-exist with its agens. For the builder, before he builds
the house, is not in reality a builder, but has the faculty for
building a house—in the same way as the materials for the house before
it is being built are merely in potentiâ—but when the house has been
built, he is the builder in reality, and his product must likewise be
in actual existence. Nothing is therefore gained by choosing the term
“agens” and rejecting the term “cause.” My object here is to show that
these two terms are equal, and in the same manner as we call God an
Agens, although the work does not yet exist, only because there is no
hindrance or obstacle which might prevent Him from doing it whenever He
pleases, we may also call Him the Cause, although the effect may not
yet be in existence.
The reason why the philosophers called God the Cause, and did not call
Him the Agens, is not to be sought in their belief that the universe is
eternal, but in other motives, which I will briefly describe to you. It
has been shown in the science of Physics that everything, except the
Primal Cause, owes its origin to the following four causes:—the
substance, the form, the agens, the final cause. These are sometimes
direct, sometimes indirect causes; but each by itself is called “a
cause.” They also believe—and I do not differ from their opinion—that
God Himself is the agens, the form, and the end; therefore they call
God “the Cause,” in order to express that He unites in Himself these
three causes, viz., that He is the agens, the form, and the final cause
of the universe. In the present chapter I only wish to show you in what
sense it may be said of God that He is the agens, the form, and also
the final cause of the universe. You need not trouble yourself now with
the question whether the universe has been created by God, or whether,
as the philosophers have assumed, it is eternal, co-existing with Him.
You will find [in the pages of this treatise] full and instructive
information on the subject. Here I wish to show that God is the “cause”
of every event that takes place in the world, just as He is the Creator
of the whole universe as it now exists. It has already been explained
in the science of Physics, that a cause must again be sought for each
of the four divisions of causes. When we have found for any existing
thing those four causes which are in immediate connexion with it, we
find for these again causes, and for these again other causes, and so
on until we arrive at the first causes. E.g., a certain production has
its agens, this agens again has its agens, and so on and on until at
last we arrive at a first agens, which is the true agens throughout all
the intervening links. If the letter aleph be moved by bet, bet by
gimel, gimel by dalet, and dalet by hé—and as the series does not
extend to infinity, let us stop at hé—there is no doubt that the hé
moves the letters aleph, bet, gimel, and dalet, and we say correctly
that the aleph is moved by hé. In that sense everything occurring in
the universe, although directly produced by certain nearer causes, is
ascribed to the Creator, as we shall explain. He is the Agens, and He
is therefore the ultimate cause. We shall also find, after careful
examination, that every physical and transient form must be preceded by
another such form, by which the substance has been fitted to receive
the next form; the previous form again has been preceded by another,
and we arrive at length at that form which is necessary for the
existence of all intermediate forms, which are the causes of the
present form. That form to which the forms of all existing things are
traced is God. You must not imagine that when we say that God is the
first form of all forms existing in the Universe, we refer to that
first form which Aristotle, in the Book of Metaphysics, describes as
being without beginning and without end, for he treats of a form which
is a physical, and not a purely intellectual one. When we call God the
ultimate form of the universe, we do not use this term in the sense of
form connected with substance, namely, as the form of that substance,
as though God were the form of a material being. It is not in this
sense that we use it, but in the following: Everything existing and
endowed with a form, is whatever it is through its form, and when that
form is destroyed its whole existence terminates and is obliterated.
The same is the case as regards the relation between God and all
distant causes of existing beings; it is through the existence of God
that all things exist, and it is He who maintains their existence by
that process which is called emanation (in Hebrew shepha’), as will be
explained in one of the chapters of the present work. If God did not
exist, suppose this were possible, the universe would not exist, and
there would be an end to the existence of the distant causes, the final
effects, and the intermediate causes. Consequently God maintains the
same relation to the world as the form has to a thing endowed with a
form; through the form it is what it is, and on it the reality and
essence of the thing depends. In this sense we may say that God is the
ultimate form, that He is the form of all forms; that is to say, the
existence and continuance of all forms in the last instance depend on
Him, the forms are maintained by Him, in the same way as all things
endowed with forms retain their existence through their forms. On that
account God is called, in the sacred language, ḥe ha-ʻolamim, “the life
of the Universe,” as will be explained (chap. lxxii.). The same
argument holds good in reference to all final causes. If you assign to
a thing a certain purpose, you can find for that purpose another
purpose. We mention, e.g., a (wooden) chair; its substance is wood, the
joiner is its agens, the square its form, and its purpose is that one
should sit upon it. You may then ask, For what purpose does one sit
upon it? The answer will be that he who is sitting upon it desires to
be high above the ground. If again you ask, For what purpose does he
desire to be high above the ground, you will receive the answer that he
wishes to appear high in the eyes of those who see him. For what
purpose does he wish to appear higher in the eyes of those who see him?
That the people may respect and fear him. What is the good of his being
feared? His commands will be respected. For what purpose are his
commands to be respected? That people shall refrain from injuring each
other. What is the object of this precaution? To maintain order amongst
the people. In this way one purpose necessitates the pre-existence of
another, except the final purpose, which is the execution of the will
of God, according to one of the opinions which have been propounded, as
will be explained (III. xiii. and xvii.), and the final answer will be,
“It is the will of God.” According to the view of others, which will
likewise be explained, the final purpose is the execution of the decree
of His wisdom, and the final answer will be, “It has been decreed by
His wisdom.” According to either opinion, the series of the successive
purposes terminates, as has been shown, in God’s will or wisdom, which,
in our opinion, are identical with His essence, and are not any thing
separate from Himself or different from His essence. Consequently, God
is the final purpose of everything. Again, it is the aim of everything
to become, according to its faculties, similar to God in perfection;
this is meant by the expression, “His will, which is identical with His
essence,” as will be shown below (ibid.). In this sense God is called
the End of all ends.
I have thus explained to you in what sense God is said to be the Agens,
the Form, and the End. This is the reason why the philosophers not only
call Him “the Maker” but also the “Cause.” Some of the scholars
belonging to the Mutakallemim (Mohammedan theologians), went so far in
their folly and in their vainglory as to say that the non-existence of
the Creator, if that were possible, would not necessarily imply the
non-existence of the things created by Him, i.e., the Universe: for a
production need not necessarily cease to exist when the producer, after
having produced it, has ceased to exist. They would be right, if God
were only the maker of the Universe, and if its permanent existence
were not dependent on Him. The storehouse does not cease to exist at
the death of the builder; for he does not give permanent existence to
the building. God, however, is Himself the form of the Universe, as we
have already shown, and it is He who causes its continuance and
permanency. It is therefore wrong to say that a thing can remain
durable and permanent, after the being that makes it durable and
permanent has ceased to exist, since that thing can possess no more
durability and permanency than it has received from that being. Now you
understand the greatness of the error into which they have fallen
through their assumption that God is only the Agens, and not the End or
the Form.
CHAPTER LXX
The term rakab, “to ride,” is a synonym. In its primary signification
it is applied to man’s riding on an animal, in the usual way; e.g.,
“Now he was riding (rokeb) upon his ass” (Num. xxii. 22). It has then
been figuratively used to denote “dominion over a thing”; because the
rider governs and rules the animal he rides upon; e.g., “He made him
ride (yarkibehu) on the high places of the earth” (Deut. xxxii. 13);
“and I will cause thee to ride (ve-hirkabtika) upon the high places of
the earth” (Isa. lviii. 14), that is, you shall have dominion over the
highest (people) on earth; “I will make Ephraim to ride (arkib)” (Hos.
x. 11), i.e., I shall give him rule and dominion. In this same sense it
is said of God, “who rideth (rokeb) upon the heaven in thy help” (Deut.
xxxiii. 26), that is, who rules the heaven; and “Him that rideth
(la-rokeb) upon the ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4), i.e., who rules the
ʻarabot, the uppermost, all-encompassing sphere. It has also been
repeatedly stated by our Sages that there are seven rekiʻim
(firmaments, heavens), and that the uppermost of them, the
all-surrounding, is called ʻarabot. Do not object to the number seven
given by them, although there are more rekiʻim, for there are spheres
which contain several circles (gilgallim), and are counted as one; this
is clear to those who have studied that subject, and I shall also
explain it; here I wish merely to point out that our Sages always
assumed that ʻarabot is the uppermost sphere. The ʻarabot is also
referred to in the words, “who rideth upon the heaven in thy help.”
Thus we read in Talm. B. Ḥagigah, p. 12, “The high and exalted dwelleth
on ʻarabot, as it is said, ‘Extol Him that rideth upon ʻarabot’” (Ps.
lxviii. 4). How is it proved that “heaven” and “ʻarabot” are identical?
The one passage has “who rideth on ʻarabot,” the other “who rideth upon
the heaven.” Hence it is clear that in all these passages reference is
made to the same all-surrounding sphere, concerning which you will
hereafter (II. xxiv.) receive more information. Consider well that the
expression “dwelling over it,” is used by them, and not “dwelling in
it.” The latter expression would have implied that God occupies a place
or is a power in the sphere, as was in fact believed by the Sabeans,
who held that God was the soul of the sphere. By saying “dwelling over
it,” they indicated that God was separate from the sphere, and was not
a power in it. Know also that the term “riding upon the heavens,” has
figuratively been applied to God in order to show the following
excellent comparison. The rider is better than the animal upon which he
rides—the comparative is only used for the sake of convenience, for the
rider is not of the same class as the animal upon which he
rides—furthermore, the rider moves the animal and leads it as he likes;
it is as it were his instrument, which he uses according to his will;
he is separate from it, apart from it, not connected with it. In like
manner the uppermost sphere, by the rotation of which everything
moveable is set in motion, is moved by God, who is separate from the
sphere, and is not a power in it. In Bereshit Rabba we read that in
commenting on the Divine words, “The eternal God is a refuge” (lit., a
dwelling, Deut. xxxiii. 27), our Sages said, “He is the dwelling of His
world, the world is not His dwelling.” This explanation is then
followed by the remark, “The horse is secondary to the rider, the rider
is not subservient to the horse; this is meant by ‘Thou wilt ride upon
thy horses’” (Hab. iii. 8). Consider and learn how they described the
relation of God to the sphere, asserting that the latter is His
instrument, by means of which He rules the universe. For whenever you
find our Sages saying that in a certain heaven are certain things, they
do not mean to say that in the heavens there are any extraneous things,
but that from a certain heaven the force emanates which is required for
the production of certain things, and for their continuing in proper
order. The proof for my statement you may find in the following sayings
of our Sages—“The ʻarabot, in which there are justice, charity, right,
treasures of life and peace, treasures of blessing, of the souls of the
righteous, of the souls and the spirits of those to be born, and of the
dew by which God will at some future time revive the dead, etc.” It is
clear that the things enumerated here are not material, and do not
occupy a place—for “dew” is not to be taken in its literal
sense.—Consider also that here the phrase “in which,” meaning “in the
ʻarabot,” is used, and not “over which,” as if to say that all the
things existing in the universe derive their existence from powers
emanating from the ʻarabot, which God made to be the origin and the
place of these powers. They are said to include “the treasures of
life”; a perfectly true and correct assertion! For all existing life
originates in that treasure of life, as will be mentioned below (chap.
lxii., and II. chap. x.). Reflect on the fact that the souls of the
righteous as well as the souls and the spirits of those to be born are
mentioned here! How sublime is this idea to him who understands it! for
the soul that remains after the death of man, is not the soul that
lives in a man when he is born; the latter is a mere faculty, while
that which has a separate existence after death, is a reality; again,
the soul and the spirit of man during his life are two different
things; therefore the souls and the spirits are both named as existing
in man; but separate from the body only one of them exists. We have
already explained the homonymity of ruaḥ (spirit) in this work, and
also at the end of Sefer ha maddaʻ (Mishneh torah Hil. teshubah, viii.
3–4) we treated of the homonymity of these expressions. Consider how
these excellent and true ideas, comprehended only by the greatest
philosophers, are found scattered in the Midrashim. When a student who
disavows truth reads them, he will at first sight deride them, as being
contrary to the real state of things. The cause of this is the
circumstance, that our Sages spoke of these subjects in metaphors; they
are too difficult for the common understanding of the people, as has
been noticed by us several times.
I will now return to the subject which I commenced to explain, in order
to bring it to a conclusion. Our Sages commenced to adduce proofs from
Scripture for their assertion that the things enumerated above are
contained in the ʻarabot. As to justice and right they quote “Justice
and judgment are the habitation of thy throne” (Ps. lxxxix. 18). In the
same way they prove their assertion concerning all things enumerated by
them, by showing that they are described as being related to God, as
being near Him. Note this. In the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer it is said: God
created seven rekiʻim (heavens), and out of all of them He selected the
ʻaraboth for His royal throne; comp. “Exalt him who rideth upon the
ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4). These are his (Rabbi Eliezer’s) words. Note
them likewise.
You must know that in Hebrew the collective noun denoting animals used
for riding is “mercabah.” Instances of this noun are not rare. “And
Joseph made ready his chariot” (merkabto) (Gen. xlvi. 29); “in the
second chariot” (be-mirkebet) (ib. xli. 43); “Pharaoh’s chariots”
(markebot) (Exod. xv. 4). The following passage especially proves that
the Hebrew merkabah denotes a collection of animals: “And a merkabah
came up and went out of Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver, and a
horse for an hundred and fifty” (1 Kings x. 21). Hence we may learn
that mercabah denotes here four horses. Therefore I think that when it
was stated, according to the literal sense of the words, that four
Ḥayyot (beasts) carry the Throne of Glory, our Sages called this
“mercabah” on account of its similarity with the mercabah consisting of
four single animals. So far has the theme of this chapter carried us,
and we shall be compelled to make many further remarks on this subject.
Here, however, it is our object, and the aim of all we have said, to
show that “who rideth upon heaven” (Deut. xxxiii. 26) means “who sets
the all-surrounding sphere in motion, and turns it by His power and
will.” The same sense is contained in the conclusion of that verse:
“and in his excellency the spheres,” i.e., who in His excellency moves
the spheres (sheḥakim). In reference to the first sphere, the ʻarabot,
the verb “to ride” is used, in reference to the rest, the noun
“excellency,” because through the motion of the uppermost sphere in its
daily circuit, all the spheres move, participating as parts in the
motion of the whole; and this being that great power that sets
everything in motion, it is called “excellency.” Let this subject
constantly remain in your memory when you study what I am going to say;
for it—i.e., the motion of the uppermost sphere—is the greatest proof
for the existence of God, as I shall demonstrate. Note this.
CHAPTER LXXI
Know that many branches of science relating to the correct solution of
these problems, were once cultivated by our forefathers, but were in
the course of time neglected, especially in consequence of the tyranny
which barbarous nations exercised over us. Besides, speculative studies
were not open to all men, as we have already stated (Introd. p. 2, and
I. chap, xxxi.), only the subjects taught in the Scriptures were
accessible to all. Even the traditional Law, as you are well aware, was
not originally committed to writing, in conformity with the rule to
which our nation generally adhered, “Things which I have communicated
to you orally, you must not communicate to others in writing.” With
reference to the Law, this rule was very opportune; for while it
remained in force it averted the evils which happened subsequently,
viz., great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the meaning of written
words, slips of the pen, dissensions among the people, formation of new
sects, and confused notions about practical subjects. The traditional
teaching was in fact, according to the words of the Law, entrusted to
the Great Tribunal, as we have already stated in our works on the
Talmud. (Introd. to Mishneh Torah and Introd. to Commen. on the
Mishnah).
Care having been taken, for the sake of obviating injurious influences,
that the Oral Law should not be recorded in a form accessible to all,
it was but natural that no portion of “the secrets of the Law” (i.e.,
metaphysical problems) would be permitted to be written down or
divulged for the use of all men. These secrets, as has been explained,
were orally communicated by a few able men to others who were equally
distinguished. Hence the principle applied by our teachers, “The
secrets of the Law can only be entrusted to him who is a councillor, a
cunning artificer, etc.” The natural effect of this practice was that
our nation lost the knowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing
but a few remarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the
Midrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity of husk,
that the reader is generally occupied with the husk, and forgets that
it encloses a kernel.
In addition you will find that in the few works composed by the Geonim
and the Karaites on the unity of God and on such matter as is connected
with this doctrine, they followed the lead of the Mohammedan
Mutakallemim, and what they wrote is insignificant in comparison with
the kindred works of the Mohammedans. It also happened, that at the
time when the Mohammedans adopted this method of the Kalam, there arose
among them a certain sect, called Muʻtazilah, i.e., Separatists. In
certain things our scholars followed the theory and the method of these
Muʻtazilah. Although another sect, the Asha’ariyah, with their own
peculiar views, was subsequently established amongst the Mohammedans,
you will not find any of these views in the writings of our authors;
not because these authors preferred the opinions of the first-named
sect to those of the latter, but because they chanced first to become
acquainted with the theory of the Muʻtazilah, which they adopted and
treated as demonstrated truth. On the other hand our Andalusian
scholars followed the teachings of the philosophers, from whom they
accepted those opinions which were not opposed to our own religious
principles. You will find that they did not adopt any of the methods of
the Mutakallemim; in many respects they approached the view expressed
in the present treatise, as may be noticed in the few works which were
recently written by authors of that school. You should also know that
whatever the Mohammedans, that is, the Muʻtazilah and the Asha’ariyah,
said on those subjects, consists in nothing but theories founded on
propositions which are taken from the works of those Greek and Syrian
scholars who attempted to oppose the system of the philosophers, and to
refute their arguments. The following was the cause of that opposition:
At the time when the Christian Church brought the Greeks and Syrians
into its fold, and promulgated its well-known dogmas, the opinions of
the philosophers were current amongst those nations; and whilst
philosophy flourished, kings became defenders of the Christian faith.
The learned Greek and Syrian Christians of the age, seeing that their
dogmas were unquestionably exposed to severe attacks from the existing
philosophical systems, laid the foundation for this science of
Dogmatics; they commenced by putting forth such propositions as would
support their doctrines, and be useful for the refutation of opinions
opposed to the fundamental principles of the Christian religion.
When the Mohammedans caused Arabic translations of the writings of the
Philosophers to be made, those criticisms were likewise translated.
When the opinions of John the Grammarian, of Ibn Adi, and of kindred
authors on those subjects were made accessible to them, they adopted
them, and imagined that they had arrived at the solution of important
problems. Moreover, they selected from the opinions of the ancient
philosophers whatever seemed serviceable to their purposes, although
later critics had proved that those theories were false; as, e.g., the
theories of atoms and of a vacuum. They believed that the discussions
of those authors were of a general character, and contained
propositions useful for the defence of positive religion. At a
subsequent period the same theories were more fully developed, and
presented an aspect unknown to those Theologians of the Greeks and
other nations who were the immediate successors of the Philosophers. At
a later time, when the Mohammedans adopted certain peculiar theological
theories they were naturally obliged to defend them; and when their new
theories, again became the subject of controversy among them, each
party laid down such propositions as suited their special doctrine.
Their arguments undoubtedly involved certain principles which concerned
the three communities—Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, such as the
creatio ex nihilo, which afforded support to the belief in miracles and
to various other doctrines. There are, however, other subjects of
belief which the Christians and Mohammedans have undertaken to defend,
such as the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological works of the
former, and “the Word” in the works of some Mohammedan sects; in order
to prove the dogmas which they thus desired to establish, they were
compelled to resort to certain hypotheses. It is not our object to
criticize things which are peculiar to either creed, or books which
were written exclusively in the interest of the one community or the
other. We merely maintain that the earlier Theologians, both of the
Greek Christians and of the Mohammedans, when they laid down their
propositions, did not investigate the real properties of things; first
of all they considered what must be the properties of the things which
should yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was
found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those
properties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the
identical arguments which had led to the assertion, and by which they
either supported or refuted a certain opinion. This course was followed
by able men who originated this method, and adopted it in their
writings. They professed to be free from preconceived opinions, and to
have been led to a stated result by actual research. Therefore when
philosophers of a subsequent date studied the same writings they did
not perceive the true character of the arguments; on the contrary, they
found in the ancient works strong proofs and a valuable support for the
acceptance or the rejection of certain opinions, and thus thought that,
so far as religious principles were concerned, there was no necessity
whatever to prove or refute any of their propositions, and that the
first Mutakallemim had discussed those subjects with the sole object of
defeating certain views of the philosophers, and demonstrating the
insufficiency of their proofs. Persons who hold this opinion, do not
suspect how much they are mistaken; for the first Mutakallemim tried to
prove a proposition when it was expedient to demonstrate its truth; and
to disprove it, when its rejection was desirable, and when it was
contrary to the opinion which they wished to uphold, although the
contradiction might only become obvious after the application of a
hundred successive propositions. In this manner the earlier
Mutakallemim effected a radical cure of the malady! I tell you,
however, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying that
the properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but
our opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.
Having studied the works of these Mutakallemim, as far as I had an
opportunity, just as I had studied the writings of the philosophers
according to the best of my ability, I found that the method of all
Mutakallemim was the same in its general characteristics, namely, they
assume that the really existing form of things proves nothing at all,
because it is merely one of the various phases of the things, the
opposite of which is equally admissible to our minds. In many instances
these Theologians were guided by their imagination, and thought that
they were following the dictates of the intellect. They set forth the
propositions which I shall describe to you, and demonstrated by their
peculiar mode of arguing that the Universe had a beginning. The theory
of the creatio ex nihilo being thus established, they asserted, as a
logical consequence, that undoubtedly there must be a Maker who created
the Universe. Next they showed that this Maker is One, and from the
Unity of the Creator they deduced His Incorporeality. This method was
adopted by every Mohammedan Mutakallem in the discussion of this
subject, and by those of our co-religionists who imitated them and
walked in their footsteps. Although the Mutakallemim disagree in the
methods of their proofs, and employ different propositions in
demonstrating the act of creation or in rejecting the eternity of the
Universe, they invariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and
establish on that proof the existence of God. I have examined this
method, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because
all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be
considered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference
between a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who
understand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all
the proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have
been employed which have never been proved. I think that the utmost
that can be effected by believers in the truth of Revelation is to
expose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers who hold that the
Universe is eternal, and if forsooth a man has effected this, he has
accomplished a great deed! For it is well known to all clear and
correct thinkers who do not wish to deceive themselves, that this
question, namely, whether the Universe has been created or is eternal,
cannot be answered with mathematical certainty; here human intellect
must pause. We shall have occasion to speak more fully on this subject,
but for the present it may suffice to state that the philosophers have
for the last three thousand years been continually divided on that
subject, as far as we can learn from their works and the record of
their opinions.
Such being the nature of this theory, how can we employ it as an axiom
and establish on it the existence of the Creator? In that case the
existence of God would be uncertain; if the universe had a beginning,
God does exist; if it be eternal, God does not exist; the existence of
God would therefore remain either an open question, or we should have
to declare that the creation had been proved, and compel others by mere
force to accept this doctrine, in order thus to be enabled to declare
that we have proved the existence of God. Such a process is utterly
inadmissible. The true method, which is based on a logical and
indubitable proof, consists, according to my opinion, in demonstrating
the existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality by such
philosophical arguments as are founded on the theory of the eternity of
the Universe. I do not propose this method as though I believed in the
eternity of the Universe, for I do not follow the philosophers on this
point, but because by the aid of this method these three principles,
viz., the existence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be
fully proved and verified, irrespectively of the question whether the
universe has had a beginning or not. After firmly establishing these
three principles by an exact proof, we shall treat of the problem of
creation and discuss it as fully as possible. You are at liberty to
content yourself with the declaration of the Mutakallemim, and to
believe that the act of creation has been demonstrated by proof; nor
can there be any harm if you consider it unproven that the universe had
a beginning, and accept this theory as supported by the authority of
the Prophets. Before you learn our opinion on prophecy, which will be
given in the present work, do not ask, how could the belief in prophecy
be justified, if it were assumed that the universe was eternal. We will
not now expatiate on that subject. You should, however, know that some
of the propositions, started and proved by the Radicals, i.e., the
Mutakallemim, in order to prove the act of creation, imply an order of
things contrary to that which really exists, and involve a complete
change in the laws of nature; this fact will be pointed out to you, for
it will be necessary to mention their propositions and their
argumentation. My method, as far as I now can explain it in general
terms, is as follows. The universe is either eternal or has had a
beginning; if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being
which caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing
that has had a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning,
another must have caused it. The universe was, therefore, created by
God. If on the other hand the universe were eternal, it could in
various ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the
universe, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a
body, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and
immutable. That being is God. You see that the proofs for the
Existence, the Unity and the Incorporeality of God must vary according
to the propositions admitted by us. Only in this way can we succeed in
obtaining a perfect proof, whether we assume the eternity or the
creation of the universe. For this reason you will find in my works on
the Talmud, whenever I have to speak of the fundamental principles of
our religion, or to prove the existence of God, that I employ arguments
which imply the eternity of the universe. I do not believe in that
eternity, but I wish to establish the principle of the existence of God
by an indisputable proof, and should not like to see this most
important principle founded on a basis which every one could shake or
attempt to demolish, and which others might consider as not being
established at all; especially when I see that the proofs of the
philosophers are based on those visible properties of things, which can
only be ignored by persons possessing certain preconceived notions,
while the Mutakallemim establish their arguments on propositions which
are to such an extent contrary to the actual state of things as to
compel these arguers to deny altogether the existence of the laws of
nature. When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a
special chapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the
same end which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view, yet I shall
not contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the
Aristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct. Even the most
cogent of the proofs offered by the Mutakallemim respecting the act of
creation, has only been obtained by reversing the whole order of things
and by rejecting everything fully demonstrated by the philosophers. I,
however, shall be able to give a similar proof without ignoring the
laws of nature and without being forced to contradict facts which have
been clearly perceived. I find it necessary to mention to you the
general propositions of the Mutakallemim, by which they prove the act
of creation, the Existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality. I
intend to explain their method, and also to point out the inferences
which are to be drawn from each proposition. After this, I shall
describe those theories of the philosophers which are closely connected
with our subject, and I shall then explain their method.
Do not ask me to prove in this work the propositions of the
philosophers, which I shall briefly mention to you; they form the
principal part of Physics and Metaphysics. Nor must you expect that I
should repeat the arguments of the Mutakallemim in support of their
propositions, with which they wasted their time, with which the time of
future generations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous books
have been written. Their propositions, with few exceptions, are
contradicted by the visible properties of things, and beset with
numerous objections. For this reason they were obliged to write many
books and controversial works in defence of their theories, for the
refutation of objections, and for the reconciliation of all apparent
contradictions, although in reality this object cannot be attained by
any sophistical contrivance. As to the propositions of the philosophers
which I shall briefly explain, and which are indispensable for the
demonstration of the three principles—the Existence, the Unity, and the
Incorporeality of God, they will for the greater part be admitted by
you as soon as you shall hear them and understand their meaning; whilst
in the discussion of other parts reference must be made for their
proofs to works on Physics and Metaphysics, and if you direct your
attention to such passages as will be pointed out to you, you will find
everything verified that requires verification.
I have already told you that nothing exists except God and this
universe, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence but
this universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequently
the universe must be examined as it is; the propositions must be
derived from those properties of the universe which are clearly
perceived, and hence you must know its visible form and its nature.
Then only will you find in the universe evidence for the existence of a
being not included therein. I have considered it, therefore, necessary
to discuss first in a merely colloquial manner, in the next chapter,
the totality of existing things, and to confine our remarks to such as
have been fully proved and established beyond all doubt. In subsequent
chapters I shall treat of the propositions of the Mutakallemim, and
describe the method by which they explain the four fundamental
principles. In the chapters which will follow, I propose to expound the
propositions of the philosophers and the methods applied by them in
verifying those principles. In the last place, I shall explain to you
the method applied by me in proving those four principles, as I have
stated to you.
CHAPTER LXXII
Know that this Universe, in its entirety, is nothing else but one
individual being; that is to say, the outermost heavenly sphere,
together with all included therein, is as regards individuality beyond
all question a single being like Said and Omar. The variety of its
substances—I mean the substances of that sphere and all its component
parts—is like the variety of the substances of a human being: just as,
e.g., Said is one individual, consisting of various solid substances,
such as flesh, bones, sinews, of various humours, and of various
spiritual elements; in like manner this sphere in its totality is
composed of the celestial orbs, the four elements and their
combinations; there is no vacuum whatever therein, but the whole space
is filled up with matter. Its centre is occupied by the earth, earth is
surrounded by water, air encompasses the water, fire envelopes the air,
and this again is enveloped by the fifth substance (quintessence).
These substances form numerous spheres, one being enclosed within
another so that no intermediate empty space, no vacuum, is left. One
sphere surrounds and closely joins the other. All the spheres revolve
with constant uniformity, without acceleration or retardation; that is
to say, each sphere retains its individual nature as regards its
velocity and the peculiarity of its motion; it does not move at one
time quicker, at another slower. Compared with each other, however,
some of the spheres move with less, others with greater velocity. The
outermost, all-encompassing sphere, revolves with the greatest speed;
it completes its revolution in one day, and causes everything to
participate in its motion, just as every particle of a thing moves when
the entire body is in motion; for existing beings stand in the same
relation to that sphere as a part of a thing stands to the whole. These
spheres have not a common centre; the centres of some of them are
identical with the centre of the Universe, while those of the rest are
different from it. Some of the spheres have a motion independent of
that of the whole Universe, constantly revolving from East to West,
while other spheres move from West to East. The stars contained in
those spheres are part of their respective orbits; they are fixed in
them, and have no motion of their own, but participating in the motion
of the sphere of which they are a part, they appear themselves to move.
The entire substance of this revolving fifth element is unlike the
substance of those bodies which consist of the other four elements, and
are enclosed by the fifth element.
The number of these spheres encompassing the Universe cannot possibly
be less than eighteen; it may even be larger; but this is a matter for
further investigation. It also remains an open question whether there
are spheres which, without moving round the centre of the Universe,
have nevertheless a circular motion. Within that sphere which is
nearest to us, a substance is contained which is different from the
substance of the fifth element; it first received four primary forms,
and then became in these four forms, four kinds of matter: earth,
water, air, fire. Each of the four elements occupies a certain position
of its own assigned to it by nature; it is not found in another place,
so long as no other but its own natural force acts upon it; it is a
dead body; it has no life, no perception, no spontaneous motion, and
remains at rest in its natural place. When moved from its place by some
external force, it returns towards its natural place as soon as that
force ceases to operate. For the elements have the property of moving
back to their place in a straight line, but they have no properties
which would cause them to remain where they are, or to move otherwise
than in a straight line. The rectilinear motions of these four elements
when returning to their original place are of two kinds, either
centrifugal, viz., the motion of the air and the fire; or centripetal,
viz., the motion of the earth, and the water; and when the elements
have reached their original place, they remain at rest.
The spherical bodies, on the other hand, have life, possess a soul by
which they move spontaneously; they have no properties by which they
could at any time come to a state of rest; in their perpetual rotations
they are not subject to any change, except that of position. The
question whether they are endowed with an intellect, enabling them to
comprehend, cannot be solved without deep research. Through the
constant revolution of the fifth element, with all contained therein,
the four elements are forced to move and to change their respective
positions, so that fire and air are driven into the water, and again
these three elements enter the depth of the earth. Thus are the
elements mixed together; and when they return to their respective
places, parts of the earth, in quitting their places, move together
with the water, the air and the fire. In this whole process the
elements act and react upon each other. The elements intermixed, are
then combined, and form at first various kinds of vapours; afterwards
the several kinds of minerals, every species of plants, and many
species of living beings, according to the relative proportion of the
constituent parts. All transient beings have their origin in the
elements, into which again they resolve when their existence comes to
an end. The elements themselves are subject to being transformed from
one into another; for although one substance is common to all,
substance without form is in reality impossible, just as the physical
form of these transient beings cannot exist without substance. The
formation and the dissolution of the elements, together with the things
composed of them, and resolving into them, follow each other in
rotation. The changes of the finite substance, in successively
receiving one form after the other, may therefore be compared to the
revolution of the sphere in space, when each part of the sphere
periodically reappears in the same position.
As the human body consists both of principal organs and of other
members which depend on them and cannot exist without the control of
those organs, so does the universe consist both of principal parts,
viz., the quintessence, which encompasses the four elements and of
other parts which are subordinated and require a leader, viz., the four
elements and the things composed of them.
Again, the principal part in the human body, namely, the heart, is in
constant motion, and is the source of every motion noticed in the body;
it rules over the other members, and communicates to them through its
own pulsations the force required for their functions. The outermost
sphere by its motion rules in a similar way over all other parts of the
universe, and supplies all things with their special properties. Every
motion in the universe has thus its origin in the motion of that
sphere; and the soul of every animated being derives its origin from
the soul of that same sphere.
The forces which according to this explanation are communicated by the
spheres to this sublunary world are four in number, viz., (a) the force
which effects the mixture and the composition of the elements, and
which undoubtedly suffices to form the minerals; (b) the force which
supplies every growing thing with its vegetative functions; (c) the
force which gives to each living being its vitality, and (d) the force
which endows rational beings with intellect. All this is effected
through the action of light and darkness, which are regulated by the
position and the motion of the spheres round the earth.
When for one instant the beating of the heart is interrupted, man dies,
and all his motions and powers come to an end. In a like manner would
the whole universe perish, and everything therein cease to exist if the
spheres were to come to a standstill.
The living being as such is one through the action of its heart,
although some parts of the body are devoid of motion and sensation, as,
e.g., the bones, the cartilage, and similar parts. The same is the case
with the entire universe; although it includes many beings without
motion and without life, it is a single being living through the motion
of the sphere, which may be compared to the heart of an animated being.
You must therefore consider the entire globe as one individual being
which is endowed with life, motion, and a soul. This mode of
considering the universe is, as will be explained, indispensable, that
is to say, it is very useful for demonstrating the unity of God; it
also helps to elucidate the principle that He who is One has created
only one being.
Again, it is impossible that any of the members of a human body should
exist by themselves, not connected with the body, and at the same time
should actually be organic parts of that body, that is to say, that the
liver should exist by itself, the heart by itself, or the flesh by
itself. In like manner, it is impossible that one part of the Universe
should exist independently of the other parts in the existing order of
things as here considered, viz., that the fire should exist without the
co-existence of the earth, or the earth without the heaven, or the
heaven without the earth.
In man there is a certain force which unites the members of the body,
controls them, and gives to each of them what it requires for the
conservation of its condition, and for the repulsion of injury—the
physicians distinctly call it the leading force in the body of the
living being; sometimes they call it “nature.” The Universe likewise
possesses a force which unites the several parts with each other,
protects the species from destruction, maintains the individuals of
each species as long as possible, and endows some individual beings
with permanent existence. Whether this force operates through the
medium of the sphere or otherwise remains an open question.
Again, in the body of each individual there are parts which are
intended for a certain purpose, as the organs of nutrition for the
preservation of the individual, the organs of generation for the
preservation of the species, the hands and eyes for administering to
certain wants, as to food, etc.; there are also parts which, in
themselves, are not intended for any purpose, but are mere accessories
and adjuncts to the constitution of the other parts. The peculiar
constitution of the organs, indispensable for the conservation of their
particular forms and for the performance of their primary functions,
produces, whilst it serves its special purpose, according to the nature
of the substance, other things, such as the hair and the complexion of
the body. Being mere accessories, they are not formed according to a
fixed rule; some are altogether absent in many individuals; and vary
considerably in others. This is not the case with the organs of the
body. You never find that the liver of one person is ten times larger
than that of another person, but you may find a person without a beard,
or without hair on certain parts of his body, or with a beard ten times
longer than that of another man. Instances of this phenomenon, viz.,
great variation as regards hair and colour, are not rare. The same
differences occur in the constitution of the Universe. Some species
exist as an integral part of the whole system; these are constant and
follow a fixed law; though they vary as far as their nature permits,
this variation is insignificant in quantity and quality. Other species
do not serve any purpose; they are the mere result of the general
nature of transient things, as, e.g., the various insects which are
generated in dunghills, the animals generated in rotten fruit, or in
fetid liquids, and worms generated in the intestines, etc. In short,
everything devoid of the power of generation belongs to this class. You
will, therefore, find that these things do not follow a fixed law,
although their entire absence is just as impossible as the absence of
different complexions and of different kinds of hair amongst human
beings.
In man there are substances the individual existence of which is
permanent, and there are other substances which are only constant in
the species not in the individuals, as, e.g., the four humours. The
same is the case in the Universe; there are substances which are
constant in individuals, such as the fifth element, which is constant
in all its formations, and other substances which are constant in the
species, as, e.g., the four elements and all that is composed of them.
The same forces which operate in the birth and the temporal existence
of the human being operate also in his destruction and death. This
truth holds good with regard to this whole transient world. The causes
of production are at the same time the causes of destruction. This may
be illustrated by the following example. If the four forces which are
present in every being sustained by food, viz., attraction, retention,
digestion, and secretion, were, like intelligent forces, able to
confine themselves to what is necessary, and to act at the proper time
and within the proper limits, man would be exempt from those great
sufferings and the numerous diseases [to which he is exposed]. Since,
however, such is not the case, and since the forces perform their
natural functions without thought and intelligence, without any
consciousness of their action, they necessarily cause dangerous
maladies and great pains, although they are the direct cause of the
birth and the temporal existence of the human being. This fact is to be
explained as follows: if the attractive force would absorb nothing but
that which is absolutely beneficial, and nothing but the quantity which
is required, man would be free from many such sufferings and disorders.
But such is not the case; the attractive force absorbs any humour that
comes within the range of its action, although such humour be
ill-adapted in quality or in quantity. It is, therefore, natural that
sometimes a humour is absorbed which is too warm, too cold, too thick,
or too thin, or that too much humour is absorbed, and thus the veins
are choked, obstruction and decay ensue, the quality of the humour is
deteriorated, its quantities altered, diseases are originated, such as
scurvy, leprosy, abscess, or a dangerous illness, such as cancer,
elephantiasis, gangrene, and at last the organ or organs are destroyed.
The same is the case with every one of the four forces, and with all
existing beings. The same force that originates all things, and causes
them to exist for a certain time, namely, the combination of the
elements which are moved and penetrated by the forces of the heavenly
spheres, that same cause becomes throughout the world a source of
calamities, such as devastating rain, showers, snow-storms, hail,
hurricanes, thunder, lightning, malaria, or other terrible catastrophes
by which a place or many places or an entire country may be laid waste,
such as landslips, earthquakes, meteoric showers and floods issuing
forth from the seas and from the interior of the earth.
Bear in mind, however, that in all that we have noticed about the
similarity between the Universe and the human being, nothing would
warrant us to assert that man is a microcosm; for although the
comparison in all its parts applies to the Universe and any living
being in its normal state, we never heard that any ancient author
called the ass or the horse a microcosm. This attribute has been given
to man alone on account of his peculiar faculty of thinking, I mean the
intellect, viz., the hylic intellect which appertains to no other
living being. This may be explained as follows. An animal does not
require for its sustenance any plan, thought or scheme; each animal
moves and acts by its nature, eats as much as it can find of suitable
things, it makes its resting-place wherever it happens to be, cohabits
with any mate it meets while in heat in the periods of its sexual
excitement. In this manner does each individual conserve itself for a
certain time, and perpetuates the existence of its species without
requiring for its maintenance the assistance or support of any of its
fellow creatures; for all the things to which it has to attend it
performs by itself. With man it is different; if an individual had a
solitary existence, and were, like an animal, left without guidance, he
would soon perish, he would not endure even one day, unless it were by
mere chance, unless he happened to find something upon which he might
feed. For the food which man requires for his subsistence demands much
work and preparation, which can only be accomplished by reflection and
by plan; many vessels must be used, and many individuals, each in his
peculiar work, must be employed. It is therefore necessary that one
person should organize the work and direct men in such a manner that
they should properly co-operate, and that they should assist each
other. The protection from heat in summer and from cold in winter, and
shelter from rain, snow, and wind, require in the same manner the
preparation of many things, none of which can properly be done without
design and thought. For this reason man has been endowed with
intellectual faculties, which enable him to think, consider, and act,
and by various labours to prepare and procure for himself food,
dwelling and clothing, and to control every organ of his body, causing
both the principal and the secondary organs to perform their respective
functions. Consequently, if a man, being deprived of his intellectual
faculties, only possessed vitality, he would in a short time be lost.
The intellect is the highest of all faculties of living creatures; it
is very difficult to comprehend, and its true character cannot be
understood as easily as man’s other faculties.
There also exists in the Universe a certain force which controls the
whole, which sets in motion the chief and principal parts, and gives
them the motive power for governing the rest. Without that force, the
existence of this sphere, with its principal and secondary parts, would
be impossible. It is the source of the existence of the Universe in all
its parts. That force is God; blessed be His name! It is on account of
this force that man is called microcosm; for he likewise possesses a
certain principle which governs all the forces of the body, and on
account of this comparison God is called “the life of the Universe”;
comp. “and he swore by the life of the Universe” (Dan. xii. 7).
You must understand that in the parallel which we have drawn between
the whole universe, on the one hand, and the individual man, on the
other, there is a complete harmony in all the points which we mentioned
above; only in the following three points a discrepancy may be noticed.
First, the principal organ of any living being which has a heart,
derives a benefit from the organs under the control of the heart, and
the benefits of the organs thus become the benefits of the heart. This
is not the case in the constitution of the universe. That part which
bestows authority or distributes power, does not receive in return any
benefit from the things under its control; whatever it grants, is
granted in the manner of a generous benefactor, not from any selfish
motive, but from a natural generosity and kindliness; only for the sake
of imitating the ways of the Most High.
Secondly, living creatures endowed with a heart have it within the body
and in the midst thereof; there it is surrounded by organs which it
governs. Thus it derives a benefit from them, for they guard and
protect it, and they do not allow that any injury from without should
approach it. The reverse occurs in the case of the Universe. The
superior part encompasses the inferior parts, it being certain that it
cannot be affected by the action of any other being; and even if it
could be affected, there is nobody without it that could affect it.
While it influences all that is contained within, it is not influenced
by any act or force of any material being. There is, however, some
similarity [between the universe and man] in this point. In the body of
animals, the organs more distant from the principal organ are of less
importance than those nearer to it. Also in the universe, the nearer
the parts are to the centre, the greater is their turbidness, their
solidity, their inertness, their dimness and darkness, because they are
further away from the loftiest element, from the source of light and
brightness, which moves by itself and the substance of which is the
most rarefied and simplest: from the outermost sphere. At the same
ratio at which a body is nearer this sphere, it derives properties from
it, and rises above the spheres below it.
Thirdly. The faculty of thinking is a force inherent in the body, and
is not separated from it, but God is not a force inherent in the body
of the universe, but is separate from all its parts. How God rules the
universe and provides for it is a complete mystery; man is unable to
solve it. For, on the one hand, it can be proved that God is separate
from the universe, and in no contact whatever with it; but, on the
other hand, His rule and providence can be proved to exist in all parts
of the universe, even in the smallest. Praised be He whose perfection
is above our comprehension.
It is true, we might have compared the relation between God and the
universe, to the relation between the absolute acquired intellect and
man; it is not a power inherent in the body, but a power which is
absolutely separate from the body, and is from without brought into
contact with the body. The rational faculty of man may be further
compared to the intelligence of the spheres, which are, as it were,
material bodies. But the intelligence of the spheres, purely spiritual
beings, as well as man’s absolute and acquired intellect, are subjects
of deep study and research; the proof of their existence, though
correct, is abstruse, and includes arguments which present doubts, are
exposed to criticism, and can be easily attacked by objectors. We have,
therefore, preferred to illustrate the relation of God to the universe
by a simile which is clear, and which will not be contradicted in any
of the points which have been laid down by us without any
qualification. The opposition can only emanate either from an ignorant
man, who contradicts truths even if they are perfectly obvious, just as
a person unacquainted with geometry rejects elementary propositions
which have been clearly demonstrated, or from the prejudiced man who
deceives himself. Those, however, who wish to study the subject must
persevere in their studies until they are convinced that all our
observations are true, and until they understand that our account of
this universe unquestionably agrees with the existing order of things.
If a man is willing to accept this theory from one who understands how
to prove things which can be proved, let him accept it, and let him
establish on it his arguments and proofs. If, on the other hand, he
refuses to accept without proof even the foregoing principles, let him
inquire for himself, and ultimately he will find that they are correct.
“Lo this, we have searched it, so it is; hear it, and know thou it for
thy good” (Job v. 27).
After these preliminary remarks, we will treat of the subject which we
promised to introduce and to explain.
CHAPTER LXXIII
There are twelve propositions common to all Mutakallemim, however
different their individual opinions and methods may be; the
Mutakallemim require them in order to establish their views on the four
principles. I shall first enumerate these propositions, and then
discuss each separately, together with the inferences which may be
drawn from it.
Proposition I. All things are composed of atoms.
Proposition II. There is a vacuum.
Proposition III. Time is composed of time-atoms.
Proposition IV. Substance cannot exist without numerous accidents.
Proposition V. Each atom is completely furnished with the accidents
(which I will describe), and cannot exist without them.
Proposition VI. Accidents do not continue in existence during two
time-atoms.
Proposition VII. Both positive and negative properties have a real
existence, and are accidents which owe their existence to some causa
efficiens.
Proposition VIII. All existing things, i.e., all creatures, consist of
substance and of accidents, and the physical form of a thing is
likewise an accident.
Proposition IX. No accident can form the substratum for another
accident.
Proposition X. The test for the possibility of an imagined object does
not consist in its conformity with the existing laws of nature.
Proposition XI. The idea of the infinite is equally inadmissible,
whether the infinite be actual, potential, or accidental, i.e., there
is no difference whether the infinite be formed by a number of
co-existing things, or by a series of things, of which one part comes
into existence when another has ceased to exist, in which case it is
called accidental infinite; in both cases the infinite is rejected by
the Mutakallemim as fallacious.
Proposition XII. The senses mislead, and are in many cases inefficient;
their perceptions, therefore, cannot form the basis of any law, or
yield data for any proof.
First Proposition.
“The Universe, that is, everything contained in it, is composed of very
small parts [atoms] which are indivisible on account of their
smallness; such an atom has no magnitude; but when several atoms
combine, the sum has a magnitude, and thus forms a body.” If,
therefore, two atoms were joined together, each atom would become a
body, and they would thus form two bodies, a theory which in fact has
been proposed by some Mutakallemim. All these atoms are perfectly
alike; they do not differ from each other in any point. The
Mutakallemim further assert, that it is impossible to find a body that
is not composed of such equal atoms which are placed side by side.
According to this view genesis and composition are identical;
destruction is the same as decomposition. They do not use the term
“destruction,” for they hold that “genesis” implies composition and
decomposition, motion and rest. These atoms, they believe, are not, as
was supposed by Epicurus and other Atomists numerically constant; but
are created anew whenever it pleases the Creator; their annihilation is
therefore not impossible. Now I will explain to you their opinion
concerning the vacuum.
Second Proposition.
On the vacuum. The original Mutakallemim also believe that there is a
vacuum, i.e., one space, or several spaces which contain nothing, which
are not occupied by anything whatsoever, and which are devoid of all
substance. This proposition is to them an indispensable sequel to the
first. For, if the Universe were full of such atoms, how could any of
them move? For it is impossible to conceive that one atom should move
into another. And yet the composition, as well as the decomposition of
things, can only be effected by the motion of atoms! Thus the
Mutakallemim are compelled to assume a vacuum, in order that the atoms
may combine, separate, and move in that vacuum which does not contain
any thing or any atom.
Third Proposition.
“Time is composed of time-atoms,” i.e., of many parts, which on account
of their short duration cannot be divided. This proposition also is a
logical consequence of the first. The Mutakallemim undoubtedly saw how
Aristotle proved that time, space, and locomotion are of the same
nature, that is to say, they can be divided into parts which stand in
the same proportion to each other: if one of them is divided, the other
is divided in the same proportion. They, therefore, knew that if time
were continuous and divisible ad infinitum, their assumed atom of space
would of necessity likewise be divisible. Similarly, if it were
supposed that space is continuous, it would necessarily follow, that
the time-element, which they considered to be indivisible, could also
be divided. This has been shown by Aristotle in the treatise called
Acroasis. Hence they concluded that space was not continuous, but was
composed of elements that could not be divided; and that time could
likewise be reduced to time-elements, which were indivisible. An hour
is, e.g., divided into sixty minutes, the minute into sixty seconds,
the second into sixty parts, and so on; at last after ten or more
successive divisions by sixty, time-elements are obtained, which are
not subjected to division, and in fact are indivisible, just as is the
case with space. Time would thus be an object of position and order.
The Mutakallemim did not at all understand the nature of time. This is
a matter of course; for if the greatest philosophers became embarrassed
when they investigated the nature of time, if some of them were
altogether unable to comprehend what time really was, and if even
Galenus declared time to be something divine and incomprehensible, what
can be expected of those who do not regard the nature of things?
Now, mark what conclusions were drawn from these three propositions,
and were accepted by the Mutakallemim as true. They held that
locomotion consisted in the translation of each atom of a body from one
point to the next one; accordingly the velocity of one body in motion
cannot be greater than that of another body. When, nevertheless, two
bodies are observed to move during the same time through different
spaces, the cause of this difference is not attributed by them to the
fact that the body which has moved through a larger distance had a
greater velocity, but to the circumstance that motion which in ordinary
language is called slow, has been interrupted by more moments of rest,
while the motion which ordinarily is called quick has been interrupted
by fewer moments of rest. When it is shown that the motion of an arrow,
which is shot from a powerful bow, is in contradiction to their theory,
they declare that in this case too the motion is interrupted by moments
of rest. They believe that it is the fault of man’s senses if he
believes that the arrow moves continuously, for there are many things
which cannot be perceived by the senses, as they assert in the twelfth
proposition. But we ask them: “Have you observed a complete revolution
of a millstone? Each point in the extreme circumference of the stone
describes a large circle in the very same time in which a point nearer
the centre describes a small circle; the velocity of the outer circle
is therefore greater than that of the inner circle. You cannot say that
the motion of the latter was interrupted by more moments of rest; for
the whole moving body, i.e., the millstone, is one coherent body.” They
reply, “During the circular motion, the parts of the millstone separate
from each other, and the moments of rest interrupting the motion of the
portions nearer the centre are more than those which interrupt the
motion of the outer portions.” We ask again, “How is it that the
millstone, which we perceive as one body, and which cannot be easily
broken, even with a hammer, resolves into its atoms when it moves, and
becomes again one coherent body, returning to its previous state as
soon as it comes to rest, while no one is able to notice the breaking
up [of the stone]?” Again their reply is based on the twelfth
proposition, which is to the effect that the perception of the senses
cannot be trusted, and thus only the evidence of the intellect is
admissible. Do not imagine that you have seen in the foregoing example
the most absurd of the inferences which may be drawn from these three
propositions: the proposition relating to the existence of a vacuum
leads to more preposterous and extravagant conclusions. Nor must you
suppose that the aforegoing theory concerning motion is less irrational
than the proposition resulting from this theory, that the diagonal of a
square is equal to one of its sides, and some of the Mutakallemim go so
far as to declare that the square is not a thing of real existence. In
short, the adoption of the first proposition would be tantamount to the
rejection of all that has been proved in Geometry. The propositions in
Geometry would, in this respect, be divided into two classes: some
would be absolutely rejected; e.g., those which relate to properties of
the incommensurability and the commensurability of lines and planes, to
rational and irrational lines, and all other propositions contained in
the tenth book of Euclid, and in similar works. Other propositions
would appear to be only partially correct; e.g., the solution of the
problem to divide a line into two equal parts, if the line consists of
an odd number of atoms; according to the theory of the Mutakallemim
such a line cannot be bisected. Furthermore, in the well-known book of
problems by the sons of Shakir are contained more than a hundred
problems, all solved and practically demonstrated; but if there really
were a vacuum, not one of these problems could be solved, and many of
the waterworks [described in that book] could not have been
constructed. The refutation of such propositions is a mere waste of
time. I will now proceed to treat of the other propositions mentioned
above.
Fourth Proposition.
“The accidents of things have real existence; they are elements
superadded to the substance itself, and no material thing can be
without them.” Had this proposition been left by the Mutakallemim in
this form it would have been correct, simple, dear, and indisputable.
They have, however, gone further, asserting that a substance which has
not the attribute of life, must necessarily have that of death; for it
must always have one of two contrasting properties. According to their
opinion, colour, taste, motion or rest, combination or separation,
etc., can be predicated of all substances, and, if a substance have the
attribute of life, it must at the same time possess such other kinds of
accidents, as wisdom or folly, freewill or the reverse, power or
weakness, perception or any of its opposites, and, in short, the
substance must have the one or the other of all correlative accidents
appertaining to a living being.
Fifth Proposition.
“The atom is fully provided with all these foregoing accidents, and
cannot exist if any be wanting.” The meaning of the proposition is
this: The Mutakallemim say that each of the atoms created by God must
have accidents, such as colour, smell, motion, or rest, except the
accident of quantity: for according to their opinion an atom has no
magnitude; and they do not designate quantity as an accident, nor do
they apply to it the laws of accidents. In accordance with this
proposition, they do not say, when an accident is noticed in a body,
that it is peculiar to the body as such, but that it exists in each of
the atoms which form the constituent elements of that body. E.g., take
a heap of snow; the whiteness does not exist in that heap as a whole,
but each atom of the snow is white, and therefore the aggregate of
these atoms is likewise white. Similarly they say that when a body
moves each atom of it moves, and thus the whole body is in motion. Life
likewise exists, according to their view, in each atom of a living
body. The same is the case according to their opinion with the senses;
in each atom of the aggregate they notice the faculty of perception.
Life, sensation, intellect and wisdom are considered by them as
accidents, like blackness and whiteness, as will be shown in the
further discussion of their theory.
Concerning the soul, they do not agree. The view most predominant among
them is the following:—The soul is an accident existing in one of the
atoms of which, e.g., man is composed; the aggregate is called a being
endowed with a soul, in so far as it includes that atom. Others are of
opinion that the soul is composed of ethereal atoms, which have a
peculiar faculty by virtue of which they constitute the soul, and that
these atoms are mixed with the atoms of the body. Consequently they
maintain that the soul is an accident.
As to the intellect, I found that all of them agreed in considering it
to be an accident joined to one of the atoms which constitute the whole
of the intelligent being. But there is a confusion among them about
knowledge; they are uncertain whether it is an accident to each of the
atoms which form the knowing aggregate, or whether it belongs only to
one atom. Both views can be disproved by a reductio ad absurdum, when
the following facts are pointed out to them. Generally metals and
stones have a peculiar colour, which is strongly pronounced, but
disappears when they are pulverised. Vitriol, which is intensely green,
becomes white dust when pounded; this shows that that accident exists
only in the aggregate, not in the atoms. This fact is more striking in
the following instance: when parts of a living being are cut off they
cease to live, a proof that the accident [of life] belongs to the
aggregate of the living being, not to each atom. In order to meet this
objection they say that the accident is of no duration, but is
constantly renewed. In discussing the next proposition I shall explain
their view on this subject.
Sixth Proposition.
“The accidents do not exist during two time-atoms.”—The sense of the
proposition is this: They believe that God creates a substance, and
simultaneously its accidents; that the Creator is incapable of creating
a substance devoid of an accident, for that is impossible; that the
essential characteristic of an accident is its incapability of enduring
for two periods, for two time-atoms; that immediately after its
creation it is utterly destroyed, and another accident of the same kind
is created; this again is destroyed and a third accident of the same
kind is created, and so on, so long as God is pleased to preserve [in
that substance] this kind of accident; but He can at His will create in
the same substance an accident of a different kind, and if He were to
discontinue the creation and not produce a new accident, that substance
would at once cease to exist. This is one of the opinions held by the
Mutakallemim; it has been accepted by most of them, and it is the
so-called “theory of the creation of the accidents.” Some of them,
however, and they belong to the sect of the Muʻtazilah, say that there
are accidents which endure for a certain period, and other accidents
which do not endure for two atoms of time; they do not follow a fixed
principle in deciding what class of accidents has and what class has
not a certain duration. The object of this proposition is to oppose the
theory that there exists a natural force from which each body derives
its peculiar properties. They prefer to assume that God himself creates
these properties without the intervention of a natural force or of any
other agency: a theory which implies that no accident can have any
duration. For suppose that certain accidents could endure for a certain
period and then cease to exist, the question would naturally be asked,
What is the cause of that non-existence? They would not be satisfied
with the reply that God by His will brought about this non-existence,
and non-existence does not at all require any agens whatever; for as
soon as the agens leaves off acting, the product of the agens ceases
likewise to exist. This is true to some extent. Having thus chosen to
establish the theory that there does not exist any natural force upon
which the existence or non-existence of a thing depends, they were
compelled to assume that the properties of things were successively
renewed. When God desires to deprive a thing of its existence, He,
according to some of the Mutakallemim, discontinues the creation of its
accidents, and eo ipso the body ceases to exist. Others, however, say
that if it pleased the Almighty to destroy the world, He would create
the accident of destruction, which would be without any substratum. The
destruction of the Universe would be the correlative accident to that
of existence.—In accordance with this [sixth] proposition they say,
that the cloth which according to our belief we dyed red, has not been
dyed by us at all, but God created that colour in the cloth when it
came into contact with the red pigment; we believe that colour to have
penetrated into the cloth, but they assert that this is not the case.
They say that God generally acts in such a way, that, e.g., the black
colour is not created unless the cloth is brought into contact with
indigo; but this blackness, which God creates in the instant when the
cloth touches the black pigment is of no duration, and another creation
of blackness then takes place; they further say that after the
blackness is gone, He does not create a red or green colour, but again
a black colour.
According to this principle, the knowledge which we have of certain
things to-day, is not the same which we had of them yesterday; that
knowledge is gone, and another like it has been created. They
positively believe that this does take place, knowledge being an
accident. In like manner it would follow that the soul, according to
those who believe that it is an accident, is renewed each moment in
every animated being, say a hundred thousand times; for, as you know,
time is composed of time-atoms. In accordance with this principle they
assert that when man is perceived to move a pen, it is not he who has
really moved it; the motion produced in the pen is an accident which
God has created in the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which moves
the pen is likewise an accident which God has created in the moving
hand; but the creative act of God is performed in such a manner that
the motion of the hand and the motion of the pen follow each other
closely; but the hand does not act, and is not the cause of the pen’s
motion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one thing to
another. Some of the Mutakallemim accordingly contend that this white
cloth, which is coloured when put into the vessel filled with indigo,
has not been blackened by the indigo; for blackness being an attribute
of indigo, does not pass from one object to another. There does not
exist any thing to which an action could be ascribed; the real agens is
God, and He has [in the foregoing instance] created the blackness in
the substance of the cloth when it came into contact with the indigo,
for this is the method adopted by Him. In short, most of the
Mutakallemim believe that it must never be said that one thing is the
cause of another; some of them who assumed causality were blamed for
doing so. As regards, however, the acts of man their opinions are
divided. Most of them, especially the sect of the Asha’ariyah, assume
that when the pen is set in motion God has created four accidents, none
of which is the cause of any of the rest, they are only related to each
other as regards the time of their co-existence, and have no other
relation to each other. The first accident is man’s will to move the
pen, the second is man’s power to do so, the third is the bodily motion
itself, i.e., the motion of the hand, and the fourth is the motion of
the pen. They believe that when a man has the will to do a thing and,
as he believes, does it, the will has been created for him, then the
power to conform to the will, and lastly the act itself. The act is not
accomplished by the power created in man; for, in reality, no act can
be ascribed to that power. The Muʻtazilah contend that man acts by
virtue of the power which has been created in him. Some of the
Asha’ariyah assert that the power created in man participates in the
act, and is connected with it, an opinion which has been rejected by
the majority of them. The will and the power created in man, according
to the concurrent belief of the Mutakallemim, together with the act
created in him, according to some of them, are accidents without
duration. In the instance of the pen, God continually creates one
motion after the other so long as the pen is in motion; it only then
ceases to move when God has created in it the accident of rest; and so
long as the pen is at rest, God continually renews in it that accident.
Consequently in every one of these moments, i.e., of the time-atoms,
God creates some accident in every existing individual, e.g., in the
angels, in the spheres and in other things; this creation takes place
continually and without interruption. Such is, according to their
opinion, the right interpretation of the creed that God is the causa
efficiens. But I, together with all rational persons, apply to those
theories the words, “Will you mock at Him, as you mock at man?” for
their words are indeed nothing but mockery.
Seventh Proposition.
“The absence of a property is itself a property that exists in the
body, a something superadded to its substance, an actual accident,
which is constantly renewed; as soon as it is destroyed it is
reproduced.” The reason why they hold this opinion is this: they do not
understand that rest is the absence of motion; death the absence of
life; that blindness is the absence of sight, and that all similar
negative properties are the absence of the positive correlatives. The
relation between motion and rest is, according to their theory, the
same as the relation between heat and cold, namely, as heat and cold
are two accidents found in two objects which have the properties of
heat and cold, so motion is an accident created in the thing which
moves, and rest an accident created in the thing which rests; it does
not remain in existence during two consecutive time-atoms, as we have
stated in treating of the previous proposition. Accordingly, when a
body is at rest, God has created the rest in each atom of that body,
and so long as the body remains at rest God continually renews that
property. The same, they believe, is the case with a man’s wisdom and
ignorance; the latter is considered by them as an actual accident,
which is subject to the constant changes of destruction and creation,
so long as there remains a thing of which such a man is ignorant. Death
and life are likewise accidents, and as the Mutakallemim distinctly
state, life is constantly destroyed and renewed during the whole
existence of a living being; when God decrees its death, He creates in
it the accident of death after the accident of life, which does not
continue during two time-atoms, has ceased to exist. All this they
state clearly.
The logical consequence of this proposition is that the accident of
death created by God instantly ceases to exist, and is replaced by
another death which again is created by God; otherwise death could not
continue. Death is thus continually created in the same manner as life
is renewed every moment. But I should wish to know how long God
continues to create death in a dead body. Does He do so whilst the form
remains, or whilst one of the atoms exists? For in each of the atoms of
the body the accident of death which God creates is produced, and there
are to be found teeth of persons who died thousands of years ago; we
see that those teeth have not been deprived of existence, and therefore
the accident of death has during all these thousands of years been
renewed, and according to the opinion prevailing amongst those
theorists, death was continually replaced by death. Some of the
Muʻtazilah hold that there are cases in which the absence of a physical
property is not a real property, that weariness is the absence of
strength, and ignorance the absence of knowledge; but this cannot be
said in every case of negative properties: it cannot be said that
darkness is the mere absence of light, or that rest is the absence of
motion. Some negative properties are thus considered by them as having
a real existence, while other negative properties are considered as
non-existing, just as suits their belief. Here they proceed in the same
manner as they proceed respecting the duration of accidents, and they
contend that some accidents exist a long time, and other accidents do
not last two time-atoms. Their sole object is to fashion the Universe
according to their peculiar opinions and beliefs.
Eighth Proposition.
“There exists nothing but substance and accident, and the physical form
of things belong to the class of accidents.” It is the object of this
proposition to show that all bodies are composed of similar atoms, as
we have pointed out in explaining the first proposition. The difference
of bodies from each other is caused by the accidents, and by nothing
else. Animality, humanity, sensibility, and speech, are denoted as
accidents like blackness, whiteness, bitterness, and sweetness, and the
difference between two individuals of two classes is the same as the
difference of two individuals of the same class. Also the body of the
heaven, the body of the angels, the body of the Divine Throne—such as
it is assumed to be—the body of anything creeping on the earth, and the
body of any plant, have one and the same substance; they only differ in
the peculiarity of the accidents, and in nothing else; the substance of
all things is made up of equal atoms.
Ninth Proposition.
“None of the accidents form the substratum of another accident; it
cannot be said, This is an accident to a thing which is itself an
accident to a substance. All accidents are directly connected with the
substance.” The Mutakallemim deny the indirect relation of the accident
to the substance, because if such a relation were assumed it would
follow that the second accident could only exist in the substance after
another accident had preceded it, a conclusion to which they would
object even with regard to some special accidents; they prefer to show
that these accidents can exist in every possible substance, although
such substance is not determined by any other accident; for they hold
that all the accidents collectively determine the thing. They advance
also another proof [in support of this proposition], namely: The
substratum which is the bearer of certain attributes must continue to
exist for a certain time; how, then, could the accident;
which—according to their opinion—does not remain in existence for two
moments, become the substratum of something else?
Tenth Proposition.
This proposition concerns the theory of “admissibility,” which is
mentioned by the Mutakallemim, and forms the principal support of their
doctrine. Mark its purport: they observe that everything conceived by
the imagination is admitted by the intellect as possible; e.g., that
the terrestrial globe should become the all-encompassing sphere, or
that this sphere should become the terrestrial globe; reason does not
find here an impossibility; or that the sphere of fire should move
towards the centre, and the sphere of earth towards the circumference.
Human intellect does not perceive any reason why a body should be in a
certain place instead of being in another. In the same manner they say
that reason admits the possibility that an existing being should be
larger or smaller than it really is, or that it should be different in
form and position from what it really is; e.g., a man might have the
height of a mountain, might have several heads, and fly in the air; or
an elephant might be as small as an insect, or an insect as huge as an
elephant. This method of admitting possibilities is applied to the
whole Universe. Whenever they affirm that a thing belongs to this class
of admitted possibilities, they say that it can have this form, and
that it is also possible that it be found differently, and that the one
form is not more possible than the other; but they do not ask whether
the reality confirms their assumption. They say that the thing which
exists with certain constant and permanent forms, dimensions, and
properties, only follows the direction of habit, just as the king
generally rides on horseback through the streets of the city, and is
never found departing from this habit; but reason does not find it
impossible that he should walk on foot through the place; there is no
doubt that he may do so, and this possibility is fully admitted by the
intellect. Similarly, earth moves towards the centre, fire turns away
from the centre; fire causes heat, water causes cold, in accordance
with a certain habit; but it is logically not impossible that a
deviation from this habit should occur, namely, that fire should cause
cold, move downward, and still be fire; that the water should cause
heat, move upward, and still be water. On this foundation their whole
fabric is constructed. They admit, however, the impossibility of two
opposite properties coexisting at the same time in one substance. This
is impossible; reason would not admit this possibility. Again, reason
does not admit the possibility of a substance existing without an
accident, or an accident existing without a substance, a possibility
admitted by some of the Mutakallemim. It is also impossible that a
substance should become an accident, that an accident should become a
substance, or that one substance should penetrate another. They admit
that reason rejects all these things as impossible. It is perfectly
true that no notion whatever can be formed of those things which they
describe as impossible; whilst a notion can be formed of those things
which they consider as possible. The philosophers object to this
method, and say, You call a thing impossible because it cannot be
imagined, or possible because it can be imagined; and thus you consider
as possible that which is found possible by imagination, not by the
intellect, consequently you determine that a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible in some instances, by the aid of the
imagination—not by the intellect—and in other instances by the ordinary
common sense, as Abu Nasr says in speaking of that which the
Mutakallemim call intellect. It is clear that they describe as possible
that which can be imagined, whether the reality correspond to it or
not, and as impossible that which cannot be imagined. This proposition
can only be established by the nine aforementioned propositions, and no
doubt these were exclusively required for the support of this
proposition. This you will see clearly when I shall show and explain to
you some important parts of this theory, which I shall now introduce in
the form of a discussion supposed to have taken place between a
Mutakallem and a philosopher.
The Mutakallem said to the philosopher: What is the reason that we find
the substance of iron extremely hard and strong, with a dark colour;
the substance of cream, on the other hand, extremely soft and white?
The philosopher replied as follows: All physical bodies have two kinds
of accidents: those which concern their substance, as, e.g., the health
and the illness of a man; and those which concern their form, as, e.g.,
the astonishment and laughter of a man. The substances of compound
bodies differ very much in their ultimate form, according to the
difference of the forms peculiar to each component substance. Hence the
substance of iron has become in its properties the opposite of the
substance of cream, and this difference is attended by the difference
of accidents. You notice, therefore, hardness in the one, and softness
in the other: two accidents, whose difference results from the
difference which exists in the forms of the substances; while the
darkness and the whiteness are accidents whose divergence corresponds
to that of the two substances in their ultimate condition. The
Mutakallem refuted this reply by means of his propositions, as I am now
going to state:—There does not exist a form which, as you believe,
modifies the substance, and thus causes substances to be different from
each other; this difference is exclusively effected by the
accidents—according to the theory of the Kalâm, which we mentioned in
explaining the eighth proposition. He then continued thus: There is no
difference between the substance of iron and that of cream; all things
are composed of the same kind of atoms.—We explained the view of the
Mutakallemim on this point in treating of the first proposition, the
logical consequences of which are, as we have shown, the second and the
third propositions; they further require the twelfth proposition, in
order to establish the theory of atoms. Nor do they admit that any
accidents determine the nature of a substance, or predispose it to
receive certain other accidents; for, according to their opinion, an
accident cannot be the substratum of another accident, as we have shown
in explaining the ninth proposition; nor can it have any duration,
according to the sixth proposition. When the Mutakallemim have
established all that they wish to infer from these propositions, they
arrive at the conclusion that the component atoms of cream and of iron
are alike.—The relation of each atom to each of the accidents is the
same; one atom is not more adapted than another to receive a certain
accident; and as a certain atom is not more fitted to move than to
rest, so one atom is not more apt than another to receive the accident
of life, of reason, of sensation. It is here of no moment whether a
thing contains a larger or smaller quantity of atoms, for, according to
the view of the Mutakallemim, which we explained in treating of the
fifth proposition, every accident [of a thing] exists in each of its
atoms. All these propositions lead to the conclusion that a human being
is not better constituted to become wise than the bat, and establish
the theory of admissibility expressed in this [tenth] proposition.
Every effort was made to demonstrate this proposition, because it is
the best means for proving anything they like, as will be explained.
Note.—Mark, O reader, that if you know the nature of the soul and its
properties, and if you have a correct notion of everything which
concerns the soul, you will observe that most animals possess
imagination. As to the higher class of animals, that is, those which
have a heart, it is obvious that they have imagination. Man’s
distinction does not consist in the possession of imagination, and the
action of imagination is not the same as the action of the intellect,
but the reverse of it. For the intellect analyses and divides the
component parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of them, represents
them in their true form as well as in their causal relations, derives
from one object a great many facts, which—for the intellect—totally
differ from each other, just as two human individuals appear different
to the imagination; it distinguishes that which is the property of the
genus from that which is peculiar to the individual,—and no proof is
correct, unless founded on the former; the intellect further determines
whether certain qualities of a thing are essential or non-essential.
Imagination has none of these functions. It only perceives the
individual, the compound in that aggregate condition in which it
presents itself to the senses; or it combines things which exist
separately, joins some of them together, and represents them all as one
body or as a force of the body. Hence it is that some imagine a man
with a horse’s head, with wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a
phantasm; it is a thing to which nothing in the actual world
corresponds. Nor can imagination in any way obtain a purely immaterial
image of an object, however abstract the form of the image may be.
Imagination yields therefore no test for the reality of a thing.
Hear what profit we derive from the preliminary disciplines, and how
excellent the propositions are which we learn through them. Know that
there are certain things, which would appear impossible, if tested by
man’s imagination, being as inconceivable as the co-existence of two
opposite properties in one object; yet the existence of those same
things, which cannot be represented by imagination, is nevertheless
established by proof, and attested by their reality. E.g., Imagine a
large globe, of any magnitude you like, even as large as the
all-encompassing sphere; further an axis passing through the centre,
and two persons standing on the two extremities of the axis in such a
manner that their feet are in the same straight line with the axis,
which may be either in the plane of the horizon or not; in the first
case both persons would fall, in the second case one, namely the one
who stands on the lower extremity would fall, the other would remain
standing, as far as our imagination can perceive. It has however,
already been proved that the earth has the form of a globe, that it is
inhabited on both extremities of a certain diameter, that both the
inhabitants have their heads towards the heaven, and their legs towards
each other, and yet neither can possibly fall, nor can it be imagined;
for it is incorrect to say that the one extremity is above, the other
below; but the term “above” and “below” apply to both of them as
regards their relative position to each other. Similarly it has been
proved in the second chapter of the book on Conic Sections, that two
lines, which at first are at a certain distance from each other, may
approach each other in the same proportion as they are produced
further, and yet would never meet, even if they were produced to
infinity, although they are observed to be constantly converging. This
is a fact which cannot easily be conceived, and which does not come
within the scope of imagination. Of these two lines the one is
straight, the other curved, as stated in the aforementioned book. It
has consequently been proved that things which cannot be perceived or
imagined, and which would be found impossible if tested solely by
imagination, are nevertheless in real existence. The non-existence of
things which are represented by imagination as possible has likewise
been established by proof, e.g., the corporeality of God, and His
existence as a force residing in a body. Imagination perceives nothing
except bodies, or properties inherent in bodies.
It has thus been clearly shown that in man exists a certain faculty
which is entirely distinct from imagination, and by which the
necessary, the possible, and the impossible can be distinguished from
each other. This inquiry is most useful. It is of the greatest profit
to him who desires to guard himself against the errors of men guided by
imagination! Do not think that the Mutakallemim ignore this altogether;
to some extent they do take it into consideration; they know it, and
call that which can be imagined without having reality—as, e.g., the
corporeality of God—a phantom and a fancy; they state frequently that
such phantoms are not real. It is for this reason that they advance the
first nine propositions and establish on them the proof of the tenth,
according to which all those imaginable things which they wish to admit
as possible are really possible, because of the similarity of all atoms
and the equality of all accidents as regards their accidentality, as we
have explained.
Consider, O reader, and bear in mind that this requires deep research.
For there are certain notions which some believe to be founded on
reason, while others regard them as mere fictions. In such cases it
would be necessary to find something that could show the difference
between conceptions of the intellect and mere imaginary fancies. When
the philosopher, in his way of expressing himself, contends, “Reality
is my evidence; by its guidance I examine whether a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible,” the religionist replies, “This is exactly the
difference between us; that which actually exists, has, according to my
view, been produced by the will of the Creator, not by necessity; just
as it has been created with that special property, it might have been
created with any other property, unless the impossibility which you
postulate be proved by a logical demonstration.”
About this admissibility (of imaginable things) I shall have to say
more, and I shall return to it in various parts of this treatise; for
it is not a subject which should be rejected in haste and on the spur
of the moment.
Eleventh Proposition.
“The existence of the infinite is in every respect impossible.” The
following is an explanation of this proposition. The impossibility of
the existence of an infinite body has been clearly demonstrated; the
same can be said of an infinite number of bodies, though each of them
be finite, if these beings, infinite in number, exist at the same time;
equally impossible is the existence of an infinite series of causes,
namely, that a certain thing should be the cause of another thing, but
itself the effect of another cause, which again is the result of
another cause, and so on to infinity, or that things in an infinite
series, either bodies or ideals, should be in actual existence, and in
causal relation to each other. This causal relation is the essential
order of nature, in which, as has been fully proved, the infinite is
impossible. As regards the virtual and the accidental existence of the
infinite, it has been established in some cases; it has been proved,
e.g., that a body can virtually be divided ad infinitum, also that time
can be divided ad infinitum; in other cases it is still an open
question, as, e.g., the existence of the infinite in succession, which
is called the accidental infinite, i.e., a series of things in which
one thing comes forth when the other is gone, and this again in its
turn succeeded a thing which had ceased to exist, and so on ad
infinitum. This subject requires deep research.
Those who boast that they have proved the eternity of the Universe say
that time is infinite; an assertion which is not necessarily erroneous;
for only when one atom has ceased to exist, the other follows. Nor is
it absolutely wrong, when they assert, that the accidents of the
substance succeed each other in an infinite series, for these accidents
do not co-exist, but come in succession one after the other, and the
impossibility of the infinite in that case has not been proved. The
Mutakallemim, however, make no difference between the existence of an
infinite body and the divisibility of a body or of time ad infinitum,
between the co-existence of an infinite number of things, as e.g., the
individual human beings who exist at present, and the infinite number
of beings successively existing, as, e.g., Reuben the son of Jacob, and
Jacob the son of Isaac, and Isaac the son of Abraham, and so on to
infinity. This is according to their opinion as inadmissible as the
first case; they believe these four forms of the infinite to be quite
equal. Some of the Mutakallemim endeavour to establish their
proposition concerning the last named form of the infinite, and to
demonstrate its impossibility by a method which I shall explain in this
treatise; others say that this impossibility is a self-evident axiom
and requires no further proof. But if it were undoubtedly wrong to
assume that an infinite number of things can exist in succession,
although that link of the series which exists at present is finite, the
inadmissibility of the eternity of the Universe would be equally
self-evident, and would not require for its proof any other
proposition. This, however, is not the place for investigating the
subject.
Twelfth Proposition.
“The senses are not always to be trusted.” For two reasons the
Mutakallemim find fault with the perception of the senses. First, the
senses are precluded from perceiving many objects, either on account of
the smallness of the objects—this is the case with the atoms, as we
have already stated—or on account of the remoteness of the objects from
the person who desires to perceive them; e.g., we cannot see, hear, or
smell at a distance of many miles; nor do we perceive the motion of the
heavens. Secondly, the senses misapprehend the objects of their
perception: a large object appears small from a distance; a small
object immersed in water appears larger; a crooked thing appears
straight when partly placed in water, and partly out of it; things
appear yellow to a person suffering from jaundice; sweet things are
bitter to him whose tongue has imbibed red gall; and they mention many
other things of this kind. Therefore they say, we cannot trust our
senses so far as to establish any proof on their perceptions. You must
not believe that the Mutakallemim had no purpose in agreeing upon this
proposition, or as most of the later adherents of that school affirm,
that the first Mutakallemim had no ulterior object in endeavouring to
prove the existence of atoms. On the contrary, every proposition here
mentioned is indispensable; if one of these be rejected, the whole
theory falls to the ground. The last-mentioned proposition is of
particular importance; for when our senses perceive things by which any
of the foregoing propositions are confuted, the Mutakallemim say that
no notice should be taken of the perception of the senses so long as
the proposition is supported by the testimony of the intellect, and
established (as they believe) by proof. Thus they say that the
continuous motion is interrupted by moments of rest; that the millstone
in its motion is broken into atoms; that the white colour of a garment
ceases to exist, and another whiteness comes in its stead. All these
theories are contrary to what the eye perceives, and many inferences
are drawn from the assumed existence of a vacuum, all of which are
contradicted by the senses. The Mutakallemim, however, meet these
objections by saying, whenever they can do so, that the perception of
these things is withheld from the senses; in other instances they
maintain that the contradiction has its source in the deceptive
character of the senses. You know that this theory is very ancient, and
was the pride of the sophists, who asserted that they themselves were
its authors; this is stated by Galenus in his treatise on natural
forces; and you know well what he says of those who will not admit the
evidence of the senses.
Having discussed these propositions, I now proceed to explain the
theory of the Mutakallemim concerning the above-mentioned four
problems.
CHAPTER LXXIV
In this chapter will be given an outline of the proofs by which the
Mutakallemim attempt to demonstrate that the universe is not eternal.
You must of course not expect that I shall quote their lengthy
arguments verbatim; I only intend to give an abstract of each proof, to
show in what way it helps to establish the theory of the creatio ex
nihilo or to confute the eternity of the universe, and briefly to
notice the propositions they employed in support of their theory. If
you were to read their well-known and voluminous writings, you would
not discover any arguments with which they support their view left
unnoticed in the present outline, but you might find there greater
copiousness of words combined with more grace and elegance of style;
frequently they employ rhyme, rhythm, and poetical diction, and
sometimes mysterious phrases which perhaps are intended to startle
persons listening to their discourses, and to deter those who might
otherwise criticize them. You would also find many repetitions;
questions propounded and, as they believe, answered, and frequent
attacks on those who differ from their opinions.
The First Argument.
Some of the Mutakallemim thought that by proving the creation of one
thing, they demonstrated the creatio ex nihilo in reference to the
entire universe. E.g., Zaid, who from a small molecule had gradually
been brought to a state of perfection, has undoubtedly not effected
this change and development by his own efforts, but owes it to an
external agency. It is therefore clear that an agent is required for
such organization and successive transmutation. A palm-tree or any
other object might equally be selected to illustrate this idea. The
whole universe, they argue, is analogous to these instances. Thus you
see how they believe that a law discovered in one thing may equally be
applied to everything.
The Second Argument.
This argument is likewise based on the belief that the proof by which
the creation of one thing is demonstrated, holds good for the creatio
ex nihilo in reference to the whole universe. E.g., a certain
individual, called Zaid, who one time was not yet in existence,
subsequently came into existence; and if it be assumed that Amr, his
father, was the cause of his existence, Amr himself must likewise have
passed from non-existence into existence; suppose then that Zaid’s
father unquestionably owed his origin to Khaled, Zaid’s grandfather, it
would be found that Khaled himself did not exist from eternity, and the
series of causes could thus be carried back to infinity. But such an
infinite series of beings is inadmissible according to the theory of
the Mutakallemim, as we have shown in our discussion of the eleventh
proposition. In continuing this species of reasoning, you come to a
first man, who had no parent, viz. Adam. Then you will of course ask,
whence came this first man? If, e.g., the reply be given that he was
made out of earth, you will again inquire, “Whence came that earth?”
“Out of water.” “Whence came the water?” The inquiry would be carried
on, either ad infinitum, which is absurd, or until you meet with a
something that came into existence from absolute non-existence; in this
latter case you would arrive at the real truth; here the series of
inquiries ends. This result of the question proves, according to the
opinion of the Mutakallemim, that the whole universe came into
existence from absolute non-existence.
The Third Argument.
The atoms of things are necessarily either joined together or separate,
and even the same atoms may at one time be united at another disunited.
It is therefore evident that the nature of the atoms does not
necessitate either their combination or their separation; for if they
were separate by virtue of their nature they would never join, and if
they were joined by virtue of their nature, they could never again be
separated. Thus there is no reason why atoms should rather be combined
than separate, or vice versâ, why rather in a state of separation than
of combination. Seeing that some atoms are joined, others separate, and
again others subject to change, they being combined at one time and
separated at another, the fact may therefore be taken as a proof that
the atoms cannot combine or separate without an agent. This argument,
according to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, establishes the theory
that the universe has been created from nothing. You have already been
told, that those who employ this argument rely on the first proposition
of the Mutakallemim with its corollaries.
The Fourth Argument.
The whole Universe is composed of substance and accidents; every
substance must possess one accident or more, and since the accidents
are not eternal, the substance, the substratum of the accidents, cannot
be eternal; for that which is joined to transient things and cannot
exist without them is itself transient. Therefore the whole Universe
has had a beginning. To the objection, that the substance may possibly
be eternal while the accidents, though in themselves transient, succeed
each other in an infinite series, they reply that, in this case, an
infinite number of transient things would be in existence, an
eventuality which, according to their theory, is impossible. This
argument is considered by them the best and safest, and has been
accepted by many of them as a strict proof. Its acceptance implies the
admission of the following three propositions, the object of which is
well understood by philosophers. (1) An infinite series of things, of
which the one succeeds when the other has ceased to exist, is
impossible. (2) All accidents have a beginning.—Our opponent, who
defends the theory of the eternity of the universe, can refute this
proposition by pointing to one particular accident, namely to the
circular motion of the sphere; for it is held by Aristotle that this
circular motion is eternal, and, therefore, the spheres which perform
this motion are, according to his opinion, likewise eternal. It is of
no use to prove that all other accidents have a beginning; for our
opponent does not deny this; he says that accidents may supervene an
object which has existed from eternity, and may follow each other in
rotation. He contents himself with maintaining that this particular
accident, viz., circular motion, the motion of the heavenly sphere, is
eternal, and does not belong to the class of transient accidents. It is
therefore necessary to examine this accident by itself, and to prove
that it is not eternal. (3) The next proposition which the author of
this argument accepts is as follows: Every material object consists of
substance and accidents, that is to say, of atoms and accidents in the
sense in which the Mutakallemim use the term. But if a material object
were held to be a combination of matter and form, as has been proved by
our opponent, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the primal
matter and the primal form are transient, and only then the proof of
the creatio ex nihilo would be complete.
The Fifth Argument.
This argument is based on the theory of Determination, and is made much
of by the Mutakallemim. It is the same as the theory which I explained
in discussing the tenth proposition. Namely, when they treat either of
the Universe in general, or of any of its parts, they assume that it
can have such properties and such dimensions as it actually has; that
it may receive such accidents as in reality are noticed in it, and that
it may exist in such a place and at such a time as in fact is the case;
but it may be larger or smaller, may receive other properties and
accidents, and come to existence at an earlier or a later period, or in
a different place. Consequently, the fact that a thing has been
determined in its composition, size, place, accident and time—a
variation in all these points being possible—is a proof that a being
exists which freely chooses and determines these divers relations; and
the circumstance that the Universe or a part of it requires a being
able to make this selection, proves that the Universe has been created
ex nihilo. For there is no difference which of the following
expressions is used: to determine, to make, to create, to produce, to
originate, or to intend; these verbs have all one and the same meaning.
The Mutakallemim give a great many examples, both of a general and a
special character. They say it is not more natural for earth to be
under water than to be above water; who then determined its actual
position? Or, is it more natural that the sun is round than that it
should be square or triangular; for all qualities have the same
relation to a body capable of possessing them. Who then determined one
particular quality? In a similar way they treat of every individual
being; when, e.g., they notice flowers of different colours, they are
unable to explain the phenomenon, and they take it as a strong proof in
favour of their theory; they say, “Behold, the earth is everywhere
alike, the water is alike; why then is this flower red and that one
yellow?” Some being must have determined the colour of each, and that
being is God. A being must therefore exist which determines everything,
both as regards the Universe generally, and each of its parts
individually. All this is the logical consequence of the tenth
proposition. The theory of determination is moreover adopted by some of
those who assume the eternity of the Universe, as will be explained
below. In conclusion, I consider this to be the best argument; and in
another part I shall more fully acquaint you with the opinion I have
formed concerning the theory of Determination.
The Sixth Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he had found a very good
argument, much better than any advanced hitherto, namely, the argument
based on the triumph of existence over non-existence. He says that,
according to the common belief, the existence of the Universe is merely
possible; for if it were necessary, the Universe would be God—but he
seems to forget that we are at issue with those who, whilst they
believe in the existence of God, admit at the same time the eternity of
the Universe.—The expression “A thing is possible” denotes that the
thing may either be in existence or not in existence, and that there is
not more reason why it should exist than why it should not exist. The
fact that a thing, the existence of which is possible, actually does
exist—although it bears the same relation to the state of existence as
to that of non-existence—proves that there is a Being which gave the
preference to existence over non-existence. This argument is very
forcible; it is a modified form of the foregoing argument which is
based on the theory of determination. He only chose the term
“preference” instead of “determination,” and instead of applying it to
the properties of the existing being he applies it to “the existence of
the being itself.” He either had the intention to mislead, or he
misunderstood the proposition, that the existence of the Universe is
possible. Our opponent who assumes the eternity of the Universe,
employs the term “possible,” and says, “the existence of the Universe
is possible” in a sense different from that in which the Mutakallem
applies it, as will be explained below. Moreover it may be doubted
whether the conclusion, that the Universe owes its origin to a being
which is able to give preference to existence over non-existence, is
correct. For we may apply the terms “preference” and “determination” to
anything capable of receiving either of two properties which are
contrary or opposed to each other; and when we find that the thing
actually possesses one property and not the other, we are convinced
that there exists a determining agent. E.g., you say that a piece of
copper could just as well be formed into a kettle as into a lamp; when
we find that it is a lamp or a kettle, we have no doubt that a deciding
and determining agent had advisedly chosen one of the two possible
forms; for it is clear that the substance of copper existed, and that
before the determination took place it had neither of the two possible
forms which have just been mentioned. When, however, it is the question
whether a certain existing object is eternal, or whether it has passed
from non-existence into existence, this argument is inadmissible; for
it cannot be asked who decided in favour of the existence of a thing,
and rejected its non-existence, except when it has been admitted that
it has passed from non-existence into existence; in the present case
this is just the point under discussion. If we were to take the
existence and the non-existence of a thing as mere objects of
imagination, we should have to apply the tenth proposition which gives
prominence to imagination and fiction, and ignores the things which
exist in reality, or are conceived by the intellect. Our opponent,
however, who believes in the eternity of the Universe, will show that
we can imagine the non-existence of the universe as well as we can
imagine any other impossibility. It is not my intention to refute their
doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo: I only wish to show the
incorrectness of their belief that this argument differs from the one
which precedes; since in fact the two arguments are identical, and are
founded on the well-known principle of determination.
The Seventh Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim says that he is able to prove the
creation of the Universe from the theory put forth by the philosophers
concerning the immortality of the soul. He argues thus: If the world
were eternal the number of the dead would necessarily be infinite, and
consequently an infinite number of souls would coexist, but it has long
since been shown that the coexistence of an infinite number of things
is positively impossible. This is indeed a strange argument! One
difficulty is explained by another which is still greater! Here the
saying, well known among the Arameans, may be applied: “Your guarantee
wants himself a guarantee.” He rests his argument on the immortality of
the soul, as though he understood this immortality, in what respect the
soul is immortal, or what the thing is which is immortal! If, however,
he only meant to controvert the opinion of his opponent, who believed
in the eternity of the Universe, and also in the immortality of the
soul, he accomplished his task, provided the opponent admitted the
correctness of the idea which that Mutakallem formed of the
philosopher’s view on the immortality of the soul. Some of the later
philosophers explained this difficulty as follows: the immortal souls
are not substances which occupy a locality or a space, and their
existence in an infinite number is therefore not impossible. You must
bear in mind that those abstract beings which are neither bodies nor
forces dwelling in bodies, and which in fact are ideals—are altogether
incapable of being represented as a plurality unless some ideals be the
cause of the existence of others, and can be distinguished from each
other by the specific difference that some are the efficient cause and
others the effect; but that which remains of Zaid [after his death] is
neither the cause nor the effect of that which is left of Amr, and
therefore the souls of all the departed form only one being as has been
explained by Ibn Bekr Ibn Al-zaig, and others who ventured to speak on
these profound subjects. In short, such intricate disciplines, which
our mind can scarcely comprehend, cannot furnish any principles for the
explanation of other subjects.—It should be noted that whoever
endeavours to prove or to disprove the eternity of the Universe by
these arguments of the Mutakallemim, must necessarily rely on one of
the two following propositions, or on both of them; namely on the tenth
proposition, according to which the actual form of a thing is merely
one of many equally possible forms, and which implies that there must
be a being capable of making the special selection; or on the eleventh
proposition which rejects the existence of an infinite series of things
coming successively into existence. The last-named proposition is
demonstrated in various ways, e.g., they advert to a class of transient
individuals, and to a certain particular date. From the theory which
asserts the eternity of the Universe, it would follow that the
individuals of that class up to that particular date are infinite in
number; a thousand years later the individuals of that class are
likewise infinite in number; the last number must exceed the previous
one by the number of the individuals born in those thousand years, and
consequently one infinite number would be larger than another. The same
argument is applied to the revolutions of the heavenly sphere, and in
like manner it is shown that one infinite number of revolutions would
be larger than another; the same result is obtained when revolutions of
one sphere are compared with those of another moving more slowly; the
revolutions of both spheres [though unequal] would be infinite in
number. Similarly they proceed with all those accidents which are
subject to destruction and production; the individual accidents that
have passed into non-existence are counted and represented as though
they were still in existence, and as though they were things with a
definite beginning; this imaginary number is then either increased or
reduced. Yet all these things have no reality and are mere fictions.
Abunazar Alfarabi in criticizing this proposition, has exposed all its
weak points, as you will clearly perceive, when you study his book on
the changeable beings earnestly and dispassionately. These are the
principal arguments of the Mutakallemim in seeking to establish the
creatio ex nihilo. Having thus proved that the Universe is not eternal,
they necessarily infer that there is an Agens who created it in
accordance with His intention, desire and will. They then proceed to
prove the unity of that Agens as I am going to point out in the next
chapter.
CHAPTER LXXV
In this chapter I shall explain to you how the Mutakallemim prove the
Unity of God. They contend that the Maker and Creator of the Universe,
the existence of whom is testified by all nature, is One. Two
propositions are employed by them in demonstrating the Unity of God,
viz., two deities or more would neutralize each other, and if several
deities existed they would be distinguished from each other by a
specific difference.
First Argument.
The first argument is that of mutual neutralization, and is employed by
the majority of the Mutakallemim. It is to the following effect:—If the
Universe had two Gods, it would necessarily occur that the atom—subject
to a combination with one or two opposite qualities—either remained
without either of them, and that is impossible, or, though being only
one atom, included both qualities at the same time, and that is
likewise impossible. E.g., whilst one of the two deities determined
that one atom or more should be warm, the other deity might determine
that the same should be cold; the consequence of the mutual
neutralization of the two divine beings would thus be that the atoms
would be neither warm nor cold—a contingency which is impossible,
because all bodies must combine with one of two opposites; or they
would be at the same time both warm and cold. Similarly, it might occur
that whilst one of the deities desired that a body be in motion, the
other might desire that it be at rest; the body would then be either
without motion and rest, or would both move and rest at the same time.
Proofs of this kind are founded on the atomic theory contained in the
first proposition of the Mutakallemim, on the proposition which refers
to the creation of the accidents, and on the proposition that negatives
are properties of actual existence and require for their production an
agens. For if it were assumed that the substance of this world which,
according to the philosophers is subject to successive production and
destruction, is different from the substance of the world above, viz.,
from the substance of the spheres—a fact established by proof—and that
as the Dualists assert, there are two divine beings, one of whom rules
this world without influencing the spheres, whilst the other governs
the world above without interfering with this world—such theory would
not involve the mutual neutralization of the two deities. If it were
then objected, that the existence of two deities would necessitate an
imperfection in both of them, in so far as one deity would be unable to
influence the province of the other, the objection would be met by the
reply that this inability need not be considered a defect in either of
them; for that which is not included within the sphere of action of a
being can of course not be performed by that being, and an agens is not
deficient in power, if it is unable to perform what is intrinsically
impossible. Thus we, Monotheists, do not consider it a defect in God,
that He does not combine two opposites in one object, nor do we test
His omnipotence by the accomplishment of any similar impossibility.
When the Mutakallemim noticed the weakness of their argument, for which
they had some apparent support, they had recourse to another argument.
Second Argument.
If there were two Gods, there would necessarily be some element common
to both, whilst some element present in the one would be absent in the
other, and constitute the specific difference between them. This is a
philosophic and sound argument for those who are able to examine it,
and to obtain a clear insight into its premises, which will be further
explained, in our exposition of the view of the philosophers on this
point. But it cannot be accepted by those who admit the existence of
divine attributes. For according to their opinion, the Primal Cause
includes many different elements. They represent its wisdom and its
omnipotence as two different things, and again the omnipotence as
different from the will. Consequently it would not be impossible that
either of the two divine beings possessed several properties, some of
which would be common to both, and some peculiar to only one of them.
Third Argument.
This argument is likewise based on one of the Propositions of the
Kalâm. For some of the Mutakallemim belonging to the old school assume,
that when the Creator wills a thing, the will is not an element
superadded to the essence of God: it is a will without a substratum. In
accordance with the propositions which we have mentioned, and of which,
as you will see, it is difficult to form a true conception, they say
that one will, which is independent of any substratum, cannot be
ascribed to two beings; for, as they assert, one cause cannot be the
source of two laws for two essences. This is, as I told you, the method
of explaining one difficulty by means of another and still greater
difficulty. For as they define the Will, it is inconceivable, and some
have, therefore, considered it to be a mere non-entity; others who
admit its existence, meet with many insuperable difficulties. The
Mutakallemim, nevertheless, establish on its existence one of the
proofs for the unity of God.
Fourth Argument.
The existence of an action is necessarily positive evidence of the
existence of an agens, but does not prove the existence of more than
one agens. There is no difference whether the existence of one God be
assumed or the existence of two, or three, or twenty, or any number.
This is plain and clear. But the argument does not seem to prove the
non-existence of a multitude of deities; it only shows that their
number is unknown; the deity may be one sole being, but may also
include several divine beings. The following supplemental argument has
therefore been advanced: possibility is inapplicable to the existence
of God, which is absolute; the possibility of the existence of more
than one God must therefore be denied. This is the whole essence of the
proof, and its fallacy is self-evident; for although the notion of
possibility cannot be applied to the existence of God, it can be
applied to our knowledge of God: for an alternative in our knowledge of
a thing does not involve an alternative in the actual existence of the
thing, and perhaps there is neither a tripartite deity as the
Christians believe, nor an undivided Unity as we believe. This is clear
to those who have been taught to notice the conclusions implied in
given premises.
Fifth Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he found a proof of the
Unity of God in the idea of requisiteness. Suppose there were two
divine beings; if one of them were able to create the universe, the
second God would be superfluous, and there would be no need for his
existence. If, on the other hand, the entire universe could not be
created or governed except by both of them, each of them would be
imperfect in so far as he would require the co-operation of another
being, and would thus be limited in power. This argument is, in fact,
only a variation of “the mutual neutralization of two deities.” There
is this difficulty in such proofs, that a certain degree of
imperfection is ascribed to a Being which does not accomplish tasks
beyond its sphere. We do not call a person weak because he cannot move
a thousand hundredweights, and we do not say that God is imperfect
because He cannot transform Himself into a body, or cannot create
another being like Himself, or make a square whose diagonal should be
equal to one of its sides. In the same manner we should not consider it
an imperfection in God, if He were not the only Creator, and if it were
absolutely necessary that there should be two Creators; not because the
one God required the assistance of the other, but because the existence
of both of them was equally necessary, and because it was impossible
that it should be otherwise. Further we do not say that the Almighty is
imperfect, because He does not, according to the opinion of the
Mutakallemim, produce a body otherwise than by the creation of atoms,
and by their combination with accidents created in them. That inability
is not called want or imperfection, since another process is
impossible. In like manner the Dualist might say, that it is impossible
for one Being to act alone, and that this circumstance constitutes no
imperfection in either of the Deities, because the absolute existence
of one Deity necessitates the co-existence of the other. Some of the
Mutakallemim, weary of these arguments, declared that the Unity of God
is a doctrine which must be received as a matter of faith, but most of
them rejected this theory, and reviled its authors. I, however, hold,
that those who accept this theory are right-minded, and shrink from
admitting an erroneous opinion; when they do not perceive any cogency
in the arguments, and find that the proofs advanced in favour of the
doctrine are inconclusive, they prefer to assume that it could only be
received as a matter of faith. For the Mutakallemim do not hold that
the Universe has any defined properties on which a true proof could be
founded, or that man’s intellect is endowed with any such faculty as
would enable him to form correct conclusions. It is, however, not
without a motive that they defend this theory; they wish to assume such
a form of the Universe, as could be employed to support a doctrine for
which otherwise no proof could be found, and would lead us to neglect
the investigation of that which in fact can be proved. We can only
appeal to the Almighty and to those intelligent persons who confess
their error when they discover it.
CHAPTER LXXVI
The reasonings and arguments of the Mutakallemim to demonstrate the
Incorporeality of God are very weak, and indeed inferior to their
arguments for the Unity of God. They treat the doctrine of the
Incorporeality of God as if it were the logical sequence of the theory
of His Unity, and they say that the attribute “one” cannot be applied
to a corporeal object. Those who maintain that God is incorporeal
because a corporeal object consists of substance and form—a combination
known to be impossible in the Divine Being, are not in my opinion
Mutakallemim, and such an argument is not founded on the propositions
of the Kalâm; on the contrary, it is a logical proof based on the
theory of substance and form, and on a right conception of their
properties. It has the character of a philosophical argument, and I
shall fully explain it when treating of the arguments of the
philosophers. Here we only propose to discuss the arguments by which
the Mutakallemim desire to prove the Incorporeality of God in
accordance with their propositions and the method of their reasoning.
First Argument.
If God were corporeal, His true essence would necessarily either exist
entirely in every part of the body, that is to say, in each of its
atoms, or would be confined to one of the atoms. In the latter
alternative the other atoms would be superfluous, and the existence of
the corporeal being [with the exception of the one atom] would be of no
purpose. If, on the other hand, each atom fully represented the Divine
Being, the whole body would not be one deity, but a complex of deities,
and this would be contrary to the doctrine adopted by the Kalām that
God is one. An examination of this argument shows that it is based on
the first and fifth propositions. But there is room for the following
objection: “God does not consist of atoms, that is to say, He is not,
as you assert, composed of a number of elements created by Himself, but
is one continuous body, and indivisible except in man’s imagination,
which affords no test; for in man’s imagination the substance of the
heavens may be torn or rent asunder. The philosopher holds that such a
possibility results from assuming a similarity and an analogy between
the visible, i.e., the bodies which exist among us, and the invisible.”
Second Argument.
This argument, they believe, is of great importance. Its main support
is the impossibility of comparison, i.e., the belief that God cannot be
compared to any of His creatures; and that He would be comparable to
other corporeal objects if He were corporeal. They put great stress on
this argument, and say as follows: “If it were asserted that God is
corporeal, but that His substance is not like that of other corporeal
beings, it would be self-contradictory; for all bodies are alike as
regards their substance, and are distinguished from each other by other
things, viz., the accidents.” They also argue that if God were
corporeal it would follow that He has created another being like
Himself. This argument is refuted in two ways. First, the objector does
not admit the impossibility of comparison; he asks how it could be
proved that God cannot be compared to any of His creatures. No doubt
that, in support of their view, that a comparison between the Almighty
and any other being is inadmissible, they would have to cite the words
of the Prophets, and thus accept this doctrine by the authority of
tradition, not by the authority of reason. The argument that God, if
comparable to any of His creatures, would be found to have created
beings like Himself, is refuted by the objector in the following way:
“The created things are not like Him in every respect; for I do not
deny that God has many properties and peculiarities.” For he who admits
the corporeality of God does not deny the existence of properties in
the divine Being. Another and more forcible argument is this: All who
have studied philosophy, and have made themselves thoroughly acquainted
with philosophical theories, assume as demonstrated facts, first that
the term substance, when applied to the spheres above and to, the
corporeal objects here on earth is a perfect homonym, for the substance
of the one is not the substance of the other; and secondly that the
forms of the things on this earth are different from the forms of the
spheres; the terms substance and form when applied both to things below
and to the spheres above are homonyms; although there is no doubt that
the spheres have [like the things below, three] dimensions, they are
corporeal because they consist of substance and form, not because they
have dimensions. If this explanation is admitted with reference to the
spheres, how much more is he who believes that God is corporeal
justified in saying that God is a corporeal being which has dimensions,
but which in its substance, its true nature and properties is very
different from all created bodies, and that the term “substance” is
applied to Him and to His creatures homonymously, in the same manner as
the true believers, who have a correct conception of the divine idea,
apply the term “existence” homonymously to Him and to His creatures.
The Corporealists do not admit that all bodies consist of similar
atoms; they believe that God created all things, and that these differ
from each other both in their substances and in their constituent
properties; and just as the substance of dung differs from the
substance of the sun, so does, according to this theory, the substance
of the spheres and the stars differ from the substance of the created
light, i.e., the Divine Glory (Shechinah), and again the substance of
the Divine Glory, or the pillar of cloud created [for the purpose],
differ from the substance of the Most High; for the substance of the
latter is sublime, perfect, simple, constant and immutable. His
absolute existence remains always the same, and He creates all things
according to His will and desire. How could this argument, though it be
weak, be refuted by these strange methods of the Mutakallemim, which I
pointed out to you?
Third Argument.
If God were corporeal, He would be finite, and so far this argument is
correct; if He were finite, He would have certain dimensions and a
certain form; this is also a correct conclusion. But they continue
thus: Attribute to God any magnitude or form whatever: He might be
either larger or smaller, and might also have a different form. The
fact that He has one special magnitude and one special form presupposes
the existence of a determining agens. I have heard that they attach
great importance to this argument, but in truth it is the weakest of
all the arguments mentioned above. It is founded on the tenth
proposition, the feebleness of which in ignoring the actual properties
of things, we have clearly shown in regard to ordinary beings and must
be much more evident in regard to the Creator. There is no difference
between this argument and their assertion that the fact of the
existence of the Universe having been preferred to its non-existence
proves the existence of an agens that preferred the existence of the
Universe to its non-existence at a time when both were equally
possible. If it were asked why this argument should not be applied to
God—viz., that His mere existence proved the existence of an agens
which determined His existence and rejected His non-existence—they
would undoubtedly answer that this admission would only lead to a
repetition of the same argument until at length a being be found whose
existence is not merely potential but necessary, and which does not
require a causa efficiens. But this same answer can also be applied to
dimensions and to form. It can only be said in reference to all other
forms and magnitudes, the existence of which is possible, that is to
say which came into existence after a state of non-existence, that they
might have been larger or smaller than they actually are, or that they
might have had a form different from that which they actually possess,
and require for this reason some determining agens. But the forms and
dimensions of God (who is above all imperfection and similitude)! did
not come into existence according to the opinion of the Corporealist
after a state of non-existence, and therefore no determining agens was
necessary; His substance with its dimensions and forms has a necessary
existence; no agens was required to decide upon His existence, and to
reject His non-existence, since non-existence is altogether
inadmissible in God. In like manner there was no force required to
determine His magnitude and form, they were absolutely inseparable from
His existence.
If you wish to go in search of truth, to cast aside your passions, your
tradition, and your fondness of things you have been accustomed to
cherish, if you wish to guard yourself against error: then consider the
fate of these speculators and the result of their labours; observe how
they rushed, as it were, from the ashes into the fire. They denied the
nature of the existing things, misrepresented the properties of heaven
and earth, and thought that they were able, by their propositions, to
prove the creation of the world, but in fact they were far from proving
the creatio ex nihilo, and have weakened the arguments for the
existence, the unity, and the incorporeality of God. The proofs of all
these doctrines must be based on the well-known nature of the existing
things, as perceived by the senses and the intellect.
Having thus discussed the arguments of the Mutakallemim, we shall now
proceed to consider the propositions of the philosophers and their
arguments for the existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality,
and we shall for the present assume the Eternity of the Universe
without finally accepting it. Next to this we shall develop our own
method, which is the result of deep study, in demonstrating these three
principles, and we shall then examine the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe as assumed by the philosophers.