PART II
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five of the propositions which are employed in the proof for the
existence of God, or in the arguments demonstrating that God is neither
corporeal nor a force connected with a material being, or that He is
One, have been fully established, and their correctness is beyond
doubt. Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him have proved each
of these propositions. There is, however, one proposition which we do
not accept—namely, the proposition which affirms the Eternity of the
Universe, but we will admit it for the present, because by doing so we
shall be enabled dearly to demonstrate our own theory.
Proposition I.
The existence of an infinite magnitude is impossible.
Proposition II.
The co-existence of an infinite number of finite magnitudes is
impossible.
Proposition III.
The existence of an infinite number of causes and effects is
impossible, even if these were not magnitudes; if, e.g., one
Intelligence were the cause of a second, the second the cause of a
third, the third the cause of a fourth, and so on, the series could not
be continued ad infinitum.
Proposition IV.
Four categories are subject to change:—
(a.) Substance.—Changes which affect the substance of a thing are
called genesis and destruction.
(b.) Quantity.—Changes in reference to quantity are increase and
decrease.
(c.) Quality.—Changes in the qualities of things are transformations.
(d.) Place.—Change of place is called motion.
The term “motion” is properly applied to change of place, but is also
used in a general sense of all kinds of changes.
Proposition V.
Motion implies change and transition from potentiality to actuality.
Proposition VI.
The motion of a thing is either essential or accidental; or it is due
to an external force, or to the participation of the thing in the
motion of another thing. This latter kind of motion is similar to the
accidental one. An instance of essential motion may be found in the
translation of a thing from one place to another. The accident of a
thing, as, e.g., its black colour, is said to move when the thing
itself changes its place. The upward motion of a stone, owing to a
force applied to it in that direction, is an instance of a motion due
to an external force. The motion of a nail in a boat may serve to
illustrate motion due to the participation of a thing in the motion of
another thing; for when the boat moves, the nail is said to move
likewise. The same is the case with everything composed of several
parts: when the thing itself moves, every part of it is likewise said
to move.
Proposition VII.
Things which are changeable are, at the same time, divisible. Hence
everything that moves is divisible, and consequently corporeal; but
that which is indivisible cannot move, and cannot therefore be
corporeal.
Proposition VIII.
A thing that moves accidentally must come to rest, because it does not
move of its own accord; hence accidental motion cannot continue for
ever.
Proposition IX.
A corporeal thing that sets another corporeal thing in motion can only
effect this by setting itself in motion at the time it causes the other
thing to move.
Proposition X.
A thing which is said to be contained in a corporeal object must
satisfy either of the two following conditions: it either exists
through that object, as is the case with accidents, or it is the cause
of the existence of that object; such is, e.g., its essential property.
In both cases it is a force existing in a corporeal object.
Proposition XI.
Among the things which exist through a material object, there are some
which participate in the division of that object, and are therefore
accidentally divisible, as, e.g., its colour, and all other qualities
that spread throughout its parts. On the other hand, among the things
which form the essential elements of an object, there are some which
cannot be divided in any way, as, e.g., the soul and the intellect.
Proposition XII.
A force which occupies all parts of a corporeal object is finite, that
object itself being finite.
Proposition XIII.
None of the several kinds of change can be continuous, except motion
from place to place, provided it be circular.
Proposition XIV.
Locomotion is in the natural order of the several kinds of motion the
first and foremost. For genesis and corruption are preceded by
transformation, which, in its turn, is preceded by the approach of the
transforming agent to the object which is to be transformed. Also,
increase and decrease are impossible without previous genesis and
corruption.
Proposition XV.
Time is an accident that is related and joined to motion in such a
manner that the one is never found without the other. Motion is only
possible in time, and the idea of time cannot be conceived otherwise
than in connexion with motion; things which do not move have no
relation to time.
Proposition XVI.
Incorporeal bodies can only be numbered when they are forces situated
in a body; the several forces must then be counted together with
substances or objects in which they exist. Hence purely spiritual
beings, which are neither corporeal nor forces situated in corporeal
objects, cannot be counted, except when considered as causes and
effects.
Proposition XVII.
When an object moves, there must be some agent that moves it, from
without, as, e.g., in the case of a stone set in motion by the hand; or
from within, e.g., when the body of a living being moves. Living beings
include in themselves, at the same time, the moving agent and the thing
moved; when, therefore, a living being dies, and the moving agent, the
soul, has left the body, i.e., the thing moved, the body remains for
some time in the same condition as before, and yet cannot move in the
manner it has moved previously. The moving agent, when included in the
thing moved, is hidden from, and imperceptible to, the senses. This
circumstance gave rise to the belief that the body of an animal moves
without the aid of a moving agent. When we therefore affirm, concerning
a thing in motion, that it is its own moving agent, or, as is generally
said, that it moves of its own accord, we mean to say that the force
which really sets the body in motion exists in that body itself.
Proposition XVIII.
Everything that passes over from a state of potentiality to that of
actuality, is caused to do so by some external agent; because if that
agent existed in the thing itself, and no obstacle prevented the
transition, the thing would never be in a state of potentiality, but
always in that of actuality. If, on the other hand, while the thing
itself contained that agent, some obstacle existed, and at a certain
time that obstacle was removed, the same cause which removed the
obstacle would undoubtedly be described as the cause of the transition
from potentiality to actuality, [and not the force situated within the
body]. Note this.
Proposition XIX.
A thing which owes its existence to certain causes has in itself merely
the possibility of existence; for only if these causes exist, the thing
likewise exists. It does not exist if the causes do not exist at all,
or if they have ceased to exist, or if there has been a change in the
relation which implies the existence of that thing as a necessary
consequence of those causes.
Proposition XX.
A thing which has in itself the necessity of existence cannot have for
its existence any cause whatever.
Proposition XXI.
A thing composed of two elements has necessarily their composition as
the cause of its present existence. Its existence is therefore not
necessitated by its own essence; it depends on the existence of its two
component parts and their combination.
Proposition XXII.
Material objects are always composed of two elements [at least], and
are without exception subject to accidents. The two component elements
of all bodies are substance and form. The accidents attributed to
material objects are quantity, geometrical form, and position.
Proposition XXIII.
Everything that exists potentially, and whose essence includes a
certain state of possibility, may at some time be without actual
existence.
Proposition XXIV.
That which is potentially a certain thing is necessarily material, for
the state of possibility is always connected with matter.
Proposition XXV.
Each compound substance consists of matter and form, and requires an
agent for its existence, viz., a force which sets the substance in
motion, and thereby enables it to receive a certain form. The force
which thus prepares the substance of a certain individual being, is
called the immediate motor.
Here the necessity arises of investigating into the properties of
motion, the moving agent and the thing moved. But this has already been
explained sufficiently; and the opinion of Aristotle may be expressed
in the following proposition: Matter does not move of its own accord—an
important proposition that led to the investigation of the Prime Motor
(the first moving agent).
Of these foregoing twenty-five propositions some may be verified by
means of a little reflection and the application of a few propositions
capable of proof, or of axioms or theorems of almost the same force,
such as have been explained by me. Others require many arguments and
propositions, all of which, however, have been established by
conclusive proofs partly in the Physics and its commentaries, and
partly in the Metaphysics and its commentary. I have already stated
that in this work it is not my intention to copy the books of the
philosophers or to explain difficult problems, but simply to mention
those propositions which are closely connected with our subject, and
which we want for our purpose.
To the above propositions one must be added which enunciates that the
universe is eternal, and which is held by Aristotle to be true, and
even more acceptable than any other theory. For the present we admit
it, as a hypothesis, only for the purpose of demonstrating our theory.
It is the following proposition:—
Proposition XXVI.
Time and motion are eternal, constant, and in actual existence.
In accordance with this proposition, Aristotle is compelled to assume
that there exists actually a body with constant motion, viz., the fifth
element. He therefore says that the heavens are not subject to genesis
or destruction, because motion cannot be generated nor destroyed. He
also holds that every motion must necessarily be preceded by another
motion, either of the same or of a different kind. The belief that the
locomotion of an animal is not preceded by another motion, is not true;
for the animal is caused to move, after it had been in rest, by the
intention to obtain those very things which bring about that
locomotion. A change in its state of health, or some image, or some new
idea can produce a desire to seek that which is conducive to its
welfare and to avoid that which is contrary. Each of these three causes
sets the living being in motion, and each of them is produced by
various kinds of motion. Aristotle likewise asserts that everything
which is created must, before its actual creation, have existed in
potentiâ. By inferences drawn from this assertion he seeks to establish
his proposition, viz., The thing that moves is finite, and its path
finite; but it repeats the motion in its path an infinite number of
times. This can only take place when the motion is circular, as has
been stated in Proposition XIII. Hence follows also the existence of an
infinite number of things which do not co-exist but follow one after
the other.
Aristotle frequently attempts to establish this proposition; but I
believe that he did not consider his proofs to be conclusive. It
appeared to him to be the most probable and acceptable proposition. His
followers, however, and the commentators of his books, contend that it
contains not only a probable but a demonstrative proof, and that it
has, in fact, been fully established. On the other hand, the
Mutakallemim try to prove that the proposition cannot be true, as,
according to their opinion, it is impossible to conceive how an
infinite number of things could even come into existence successively.
They assume this impossibility as an axiom. I, however, think that this
proposition is admissible, but neither demonstrative, as the
commentators of Aristotle assert, nor, on the other hand, impossible,
as the Mutakallemim say. We have no intention to explain here the
proofs given by Aristotle, or to show our doubts concerning them, or to
set forth our opinions on the creation of the universe. I here simply
desire to mention those propositions which we shall require for the
proof of the three principles stated above. Having thus quoted and
admitted these propositions, I will now proceed to explain what may be
inferred from them.
CHAPTER I
According to Proposition XXV., a moving agent must exist which has
moved the substance of all existing transient things and enabled it to
receive Form. The cause of the motion of that agent is found in the
existence of another motor of the same or of a different class, the
term “motion,” in a general sense, being common to four categories
(Prop. IV.). This series of motions is not infinite (Prop. III.); we
find that it can only be continued till the motion of the fifth element
is arrived at, and then it ends. The motion of the fifth element is the
source of every force that moves and prepares any substance on earth
for its combination with a certain form, and is connected with that
force by a chain of intermediate motions. The celestial sphere [or the
fifth element] performs the act of locomotion which is the first of the
several kinds of motion (Prop. XIV.), and all locomotion is found to be
the indirect effect of the motion of this sphere; e.g., a stone is set
in motion by a stick, the stick by a man’s hand, the hand by the
sinews, the sinews by the muscles, the muscles by the nerves, the
nerves by the natural heat of the body, and the heat of the body by its
form. This is undoubtedly the immediate motive cause, but the action of
this immediate cause is due to a certain design, e.g., to bring a stone
into a hole by striking against it with a stick in order to prevent the
draught from coming through the crevice. The motion of the air that
causes the draught is the effect of the motion of the celestial sphere.
Similarly it may be shown that the ultimate cause of all genesis and
destruction can be traced to the motion of the sphere. But the motion
of the sphere must likewise have been effected by an agent (Prop.
XVII.) residing either without the sphere or within it; a third case
being impossible. In the first case, if the motor is without the
sphere, it must either be corporeal or incorporeal; if incorporeal, it
cannot be said that the agent is without the sphere; it can only be
described as separate from it; because an incorporeal object can only
be said metaphorically to reside without a certain corporeal object. In
the second case, if the agent resides within the sphere, it must be
either a force distributed throughout the whole sphere so that each
part of the sphere includes a part of the force, as is the case with
the heat of fire; or it is an indivisible force, e.g., the soul and the
intellect (Props. X. and XI.). The agent which sets the sphere in
motion must consequently be one of the following four things: a
corporeal object without the sphere; an incorporeal object separate
from it; a force spread throughout the whole of the sphere; or an
indivisible force [within the sphere].
The first case, viz., that the moving agent of the sphere is a
corporeal object without the sphere, is impossible, as will be
explained. Since the moving agent is corporeal, it must itself move
while setting another object in motion (Prop. IX.), and as the sixth
element would likewise move when imparting motion to another body, it
would be set in motion by a seventh element, which must also move. An
infinite number of bodies would thus be required before the sphere
could be set in motion. This is contrary to Proposition II.
The third case, viz., that the moving object be a force distributed
throughout the whole body, is likewise impossible. For the sphere is
corporeal, and must therefore be finite (Prop. I.); also the force it
contains must be finite (Prop. XII.), since each part of the sphere
contains part of the force (Prop. XI.): the latter can consequently not
produce an infinite motion, such as we assumed according to Proposition
XXVI., which we admitted for the present.
The fourth case is likewise impossible, viz., that the sphere is set in
motion by an indivisible force residing in the sphere in the same
manner as the soul resides in the body of man. For this force, though
indivisible, could not be the cause of infinite motion by itself alone;
because if that were the case the prime motor would have an accidental
motion (Prop. VI.). But things that move accidentally must come to rest
(Prop. VIII.), and then the thing comes also to rest which is set in
motion. (The following may serve as a further illustration of the
nature of accidental motion. When man is moved by the soul, i.e., by
his form, to go from the basement of the house to the upper storey, his
body moves directly, while the soul, the really efficient cause of that
motion, participates in it accidentally. For through the translation of
the body from the basement to the upper storey, the soul has likewise
changed its place, and when no fresh impulse for the motion of the body
is given by the soul, the body which has been set in motion by such
impulse comes to rest, and the accidental motion of the soul is
discontinued). Consequently the motion of that supposed first motor
must be due to some cause which does not form part of things composed
of two elements, viz., a moving agent and an object moved; if such a
cause is present the motor in that compound sets the other element in
motion; in the absence of such a cause no motion takes place. Living
beings do therefore not move continually, although each of them
possesses an indivisible motive element; because this element is not
constantly in motion, as it would be if it produced motion of its own
accord. On the contrary, the things to which the action is due are
separate from the motor. The action is caused either by desire for that
which is agreeable, or by aversion from that which is disagreeable, or
by some image, or by some ideal when the moving being has the capacity
of conceiving it. When any of these causes are present then the motor
acts; its motion is accidental, and must therefore come to an end
(Prop. VIII.). If the motor of the sphere were of this kind the sphere
could not move ad infinitum. Our opponent, however, holds that the
spheres move continually ad infinitum; if this were the case, and it is
in fact possible (Prop. XIII.), the efficient cause of the motion of
the sphere must, according to the above division, be of the second
kind, viz., something incorporeal and separate from the sphere.
It may thus be considered as proved that the efficient cause of the
motion of the sphere, if that motion be eternal, is neither itself
corporeal nor does it reside in a corporeal object; it must move
neither of its own accord nor accidentally; it must be indivisible and
unchangeable (Prop. VII. and Prop. V.). This Prime Motor of the sphere
is God, praised be His name!
The hypothesis that there exist two Gods is inadmissible, because
absolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted (Prop. XVI.), except as
cause and effect; the relation of time is not applicable to God (Prop.
XV.), because motion cannot be predicated of Him.
The result of the above argument is consequently this: the sphere
cannot move ad infinitum of its own accord; the Prime Motor is not
corporeal, nor a force residing within a body; it is One, unchangeable,
and in its existence independent of time. Three of our postulates are
thus proved by the principal philosophers.
The philosophers employ besides another argument, based on the
following proposition of Aristotle. If there be a thing composed of two
elements, and the one of them is known to exist also by itself, apart
from that thing, then the other element is likewise found in existence
by itself separate from that compound. For if the nature of the two
elements were such that they could only exist together—as, e.g., matter
and form—then neither of them could in any way exist separate from the
other. The fact that the one component is found also in a separate
existence proves that the two elements are not indissolubly connected,
and that the same must therefore be the case with the other component.
Thus we infer from the existence of honey-vinegar and of honey by
itself, that there exists also vinegar by itself. After having
explained this Proposition Aristotle continues thus: We notice many
objects consisting of a motor and a motum, i.e., objects which set
other things in motion, and whilst doing so are themselves set in
motion by other things; such is clearly the case as regards all the
middle members of a series of things in motion. We also see a thing
that is moved, but does not itself move anything, viz., the last member
of the series; consequently a motor must exist without being at the
same time a motum, and that is the Prime Motor, which, not being
subject to motion, is indivisible, incorporeal, and independent of
time, as has been shown in the preceding argument.
Third Philosophical Argument.—This is taken from the words of
Aristotle, though he gives it in a different form. It runs as follows:
There is no doubt that many things actually exist, as, e.g., things
perceived with the senses. Now there are only three cases conceivable,
viz., either all these things are without beginning and without end, or
all of them have beginning and end, or some are with and some without
beginning and end. The first of these three cases is altogether
inadmissible, since we clearly perceive objects which come into
existence and are subsequently destroyed. The second case is likewise
inadmissible, for if everything had but a temporary existence all
things might be destroyed, and that which is enunciated of a whole
class of things as possible is necessarily actual. All things must
therefore come to an end, and then nothing would ever be in existence,
for there would not exist any being to produce anything. Consequently
nothing whatever would exist [if all things were transient]; but as we
see things existing, and find ourselves in existence we conclude as
follows:—Since there are undoubtedly beings of a temporary existence,
there must also be an eternal being that is not subject to destruction,
and whose existence is real, not merely possible.
It has been further argued that the existence of this being is
necessary, either on account of itself alone or on account of some
external force. In the latter case its existence and non-existence
would be equally possible, because of its own properties, but its
existence would be necessary on account of the external force. That
force would then be the being that possesses absolute existence (Prop.
XIX.). It is therefore certain that there must be a being which has
absolutely independent existence, and is the source of the existence of
all things, whether transient or permanent, if, as Aristotle assumes,
there is in existence such a thing, which is the effect of an eternal
cause, and must therefore itself be eternal. This is a proof the
correctness of which is not doubted, disputed, or rejected, except by
those who have no knowledge of the method of proof. We further say that
the existence of anything that has independent existence is not due to
any cause (Prop. X.), and that such a being does not include any
plurality whatever (Prop. XXI.); consequently it cannot be a body, nor
a force residing in a body (Prop. XXII.). It is now clear that there
must be a being with absolutely independent existence, a being whose
existence cannot be attributed to any external cause, and which does
not include different elements; it cannot therefore be corporeal, or a
force residing in a corporeal object; this being is God.
It can easily be proved that absolutely independent existence cannot be
attributed to two beings. For, if that were the case, absolutely
independent existence would be a property added to the substance of
both; neither of them would be absolutely independent on account of
their essence, but only through a certain property, viz., that of this
independent existence, which is common to both. It can besides be shown
in many ways that independent existence cannot be reconciled with the
principle of dualism by any means. It would make no difference, whether
we imagine two beings of similar or of different properties. The reason
for all this is to be sought in the absolute simplicity and in the
utmost perfection of the essence of this being, which is the only
member of its species, and does not depend on any cause whatever; this
being has therefore nothing in common with other beings.
Fourth Argument.—This is likewise a well-known philosophical argument.
We constantly see things passing from a state of potentiality to that
of actuality, but in every such case there is for that transition of a
thing an agent separate from it (Prop. XVIII.). It is likewise clear
that the agent has also passed from potentiality to actuality. It has
at first been potential, because it could not be actual, owing to some
obstacle contained in itself, or on account of the absence of a certain
relation between itself and the object of its action; it became an
actual agent as soon as that relation was present. Whichever cause be
assumed, an agent is again necessary to remove the obstacle or to
create the relation. The same can be argued respecting this
last-mentioned agent that creates the relation or removes the obstacle.
This series of causes cannot go on ad infinitum; we must at last arrive
at a cause of the transition of an object from the state of
potentiality to that of actuality, which is constant, and admits of no
potentiality whatever. In the essence of this cause nothing exists
potentially, for if its essence included any possibility of existence
it would not exist at all (Prop. XXIII.); it cannot be corporeal, but
it must be spiritual (Prop. XXIV.); and the immaterial being that
includes no possibility whatever, but exists actually by its own
essence, is God. Since He is incorporeal, as has been demonstrated, it
follows that He is One (Prop. XVI.).
Even if we were to admit the Eternity of the Universe, we could by any
of these methods prove the existence of God; that He is One and
incorporeal, and that He does not reside as a force in a corporeal
object.
The following is likewise a correct method to prove the Incorporeality
and the Unity of God: If there were two Gods, they would necessarily
have one element in common by virtue of which they were Gods, and
another element by which they were distinguished from each other and
existed as two Gods; the distinguishing element would either be in both
different from the property common to both—in that case both of them
would consist of different elements, and neither of them would be the
First Cause, or have absolutely independent existence; but their
existence would depend on certain causes (Prop. XIX.)—or the
distinguishing element would only in one of them be different from the
element common to both: then that being could not have absolute
independence.
Another proof of the Unity of God.—It has been demonstrated by proof
that the whole existing world is one organic body, all parts of which
are connected together; also, that the influences of the spheres above
pervade the earthly substance and prepare it for its forms. Hence it is
impossible to assume that one deity be engaged in forming one part, and
another deity in forming another part of that organic body of which all
parts are closely connected together. A duality could only be imagined
in this way, either that at one time the one deity is active, the other
at another time, or that both act simultaneously, nothing being done
except by both together. The first alternative is certainly absurd for
many reasons; if at the time the one deity be active the other could
also be active, there is no reason why the one deity should then act
and the other not; if, on the other hand, it be impossible for the one
deity to act when the other is at work, there must be some other cause
[besides these deities] which [at a certain time] enables the one to
act and disables the other. [Such difference would not be caused by
time], since time is without change, and the object of the action
likewise remains one and the same organic whole. Besides, if two
deities existed in this way, both would be subject to the relations of
time, since their actions would depend on time; they would also in the
moment of acting pass from potentiality to actuality, and require an
agent for such transition; their essence would besides include
possibility [of existence]. It is equally absurd to assume that both
together produce everything in existence, and that neither of them does
anything alone; for when a number of forces must be united for a
certain result, none of these forces acts of its own accord, and none
is by itself the immediate cause of that result, but their union is the
immediate cause. It has, furthermore, been proved that the action of
the absolute cannot be due to an [external] cause. The union is also an
act which presupposes a cause effecting that union, and if that cause
be one, it is undoubtedly God; but if it also consists of a number of
separate forces, a cause is required for the combination of these
forces, as in the first case. Finally, one simple being must be arrived
at, that is the cause of the existence of the Universe, which is one
whole; it would make no difference whether we assumed that the First
Cause had produced the Universe by creatio ex nihilo, or whether the
Universe co-existed with the First Cause. It is thus clear how we can
prove the Unity of God from the fact that this Universe is one whole.
Another argument concerning the Incorporeality of God.—Every corporeal
object is composed of matter and form (Prop. XXII.); every compound of
these two elements requires an agent for effecting their combination.
Besides, it is evident that a body is divisible and has dimensions; a
body is thus undoubtedly subject to accidents. Consequently nothing
corporeal can be a unity, either because everything corporeal is
divisible or because it is a compound; that is to say, it can logically
be analysed into two elements; because a body can only be said to be a
certain body when the distinguishing element is added to the corporeal
substratum, and must therefore include two elements; but it has been
proved that the Absolute admits of no dualism whatever.
Now that we have discussed these proofs, we will expound our own method
in accordance with our promise.
CHAPTER II
The fifth essence, i.e., the heavenly spheres, must either be
transient, and in this case motion would likewise be temporary, or, as
our opponent assumes, it must be eternal. If the spheres are transient,
then God is their Creator; for if anything comes into existence after a
period of non-existence, it is self-evident that an agent exists which
has effected this result. It would be absurd to contend that the thing
itself effected it. If, on the other hand, the heavenly spheres be
eternal, with a regular perpetual motion, the cause of this perpetual
motion, according to the Propositions enumerated in the Introduction,
must be something that is neither a body, nor a force residing in a
body, and that is God, praised be His name! We have thus shown that
whether we believe in the Creatio ex Nihilo, or in the Eternity of the
Universe, we can prove by demonstrative arguments the existence of God,
i.e., an absolute Being, whose existence cannot be attributed to any
cause, or admit in itself any potentiality. The theory that God is One
and Incorporeal has likewise been established by proof without any
reference to the theory of the Creation or the Eternity of the
Universe. This has been explained by us in the third philosophical
argument [in support of the Existence of God], and also in our
subsequent description of the methods of the philosophers in proving
the Incorporeality and the Unity of God.
We deem it now convenient to continue with the theory of the
philosophers, and to give their proofs for the existence of
Intelligences. We will then show that their theory in this regard is in
harmony with the teaching of Scripture concerning the existence of
angels. After the full treatment of this subject we shall return to our
task and discuss the theory of creatio ex nihilo. For the best
arguments in favour of this theory cannot be fully comprehended unless
the theory of the existence of Intelligences be well understood, and
also the method which I adopt in proving their existence. We must,
however, first give the following note, which will introduce you into
the secrets of this whole subject, both of that which we have already
given and of what will yet be given.
Note.—It was not my intention when writing this treatise to expound
natural science or discuss metaphysical systems; it was not my object
to prove truths which have already been demonstrated, or describe the
number and the properties of the spheres: for the books written on
these subjects serve their purpose, and if in some points they are not
satisfactory, I do not think that what I could say would be better than
what has already been explained by others. But my intention was, as has
been stated in the Introduction, to expound Biblical passages which
have been impugned, and to elucidate their hidden and true sense, which
is above the comprehension of the multitude. When you therefore notice
that I prove the existence and number of Intelligences or the number of
the spheres, with the causes of their motion, or discuss the true
relation of matter and form, the meaning of Divine manifestation, or
similar subjects, you must not think that I intend merely to establish
a certain philosophical proposition; for these subjects have been
discussed in many books, and most of them have been demonstrated by
proof. I only desire to mention that which might, when well understood,
serve as a means of removing some of the doubts concerning anything
taught in Scripture; and indeed many difficulties will disappear when
that which I am about to explain is taken into consideration. From the
Introduction to this treatise you may learn that its principal object
is to expound, as far as can be done, the account of the Creation (Gen.
i.-iii.), and of the Divine Chariot (Ezek. i.), and to answer questions
raised in respect to Prophecy and to the knowledge of God. You will
sometimes notice that I am rather explicit on truths already
ascertained; some of them Natural Philosophy has established as facts;
others Metaphysics has either fully demonstrated, or at least shown to
be worthy of belief; others Mathematics have made plain. But you will
invariably find that my exposition includes the key for the
understanding of some allegorical passage of Holy Writ and its esoteric
interpretation, and that I have mentioned, explained, and demonstrated
the subject only because it furthers the knowledge of the “Divine
Chariot,” or “the Creation,” or explains some principle with respect to
Prophecy, or to the belief in any of the truths taught in Scripture.
Now, having made this statement, we return to the subject of which we
began to treat.
CHAPTER III
The theory of Aristotle in respect to the causes of the motion of the
spheres led him to assume the existence of Intelligences. Although this
theory consists of assertions which cannot be proved, yet it is the
least open to doubt, and is more systematic than any other, as has been
stated by Alexander in the book called The Origin of the Universe. It
includes maxims which are identical with those taught in Scripture, and
it is to a still greater extent in harmony with doctrines contained in
well-known genuine Midrashim, as will be explained by me. For this
reason I will cite his views and his proofs, and collect from them what
coincides with the teachings of Scripture, and agrees with the doctrine
held by our Sages.
CHAPTER IV
The enunciation that the heavenly sphere is endowed with a soul will
appear reasonable to all who sufficiently reflect on it; but at first
thought they may find it unintelligible or even objectionable; because
they wrongly assume that when we ascribe a soul to the heavenly spheres
we mean something like the soul of man, or that of an ass, or ox. We
merely intend to say that the locomotion of the sphere undoubtedly
leads us to assume some inherent principle by which it moves; and this
principle is certainly a soul. For it would be absurd to assume that
the principle of the circular motion of the spheres was like that of
the rectilinear motion of a stone downward or of fire upwards, for the
cause of the latter motion is a natural property and not a soul; a
thing set in motion by a natural property moves only as long as it is
away from the proper place of its element, but when it has again
arrived there, it comes to rest; whilst the sphere continues its
circular motion in its own place. It is, however, not because the
sphere has a soul, that it moves in this manner; for animate beings
move either by instinct or by reason. By “instinct” I mean the
intention of an animal to approach something agreeable, or to retreat
from something disagreeable; e.g., to approach the water it seeks
because of thirst, or to retreat from the sun because of its heat. It
makes no difference whether that thing really exists or is merely
imaginary, since the imagination of something agreeable or of something
disagreeable likewise causes the animal to move. The heavenly sphere
does not move for the purpose of withdrawing from what is bad or
approaching what is good. For in the first instance it moves toward the
same point from which it has moved away, and vice versâ it moves away
from the same point towards which it has moved. Secondly, if this were
the object of the motion, we should expect that the sphere would move
towards a certain point, and would then rest; for if it moved for the
purpose of avoiding something, and never obtained that object, the
motion would be in vain. The circular motion of the sphere is
consequently due to the action of some idea which produces this
particular kind of motion; but as ideas are only possible in
intellectual beings, the heavenly sphere is an intellectual being. But
even a being that is endowed with the faculty of forming an idea, and
possesses a soul with the faculty of moving, does not change its place
on each occasion that it forms an idea; for an idea alone does not
produce motion, as has been explained in [Aristotle’s] Metaphysics. We
can easily understand this, when we consider how often we form ideas of
certain things, yet do not move towards them, though we are able to do
so; it is only when a desire arises for the thing imagined, that we
move in order to obtain it. We have thus shown that both the soul, the
principle of motion, and the intellect, the source of the ideas, would
not produce motion without the existence of a desire for the object of
which an idea has been formed. It follows that the heavenly sphere must
have a desire for the ideal which it has comprehended, and that ideal,
for which it has a desire, is God, exalted be His name! When we say
that God moves the spheres, we mean it in the following sense: the
spheres have a desire to become similar to the ideal comprehended by
them. This ideal, however, is simple in the strictest sense of the
word, and not subject to any change or alteration, but constant in
producing everything good, whilst the spheres are corporeal; the latter
can therefore not be like this ideal in any other way, except in the
production of circular motion; for this is the only action of corporeal
beings that can be perpetual; it is the most simple motion of a body;
there is no change in the essence of the sphere, nor in the beneficial
results of its motion.
When Aristotle had arrived at this result, he further investigated the
subject, and found, by proof, that there were many spheres, and that
all moved in circles, but each with its peculiar motion as regards
velocity and direction. He naturally argued that the ideal comprehended
by the one sphere, which completes its circuit in one day, is different
from that of another sphere which completes its circuit in thirty
years; he thus arrived at the conclusion that there were as many ideals
as there were spheres; each sphere has a desire for that ideal which is
the source of its existence, and that desire is the cause of its
individual motion, so that in fact the ideal sets the sphere in motion.
Aristotle does not say, nor does any other authority, that there are
ten or a hundred ideals; he simply states that their number agrees with
that of the spheres. When, therefore, some of his contemporaries held
that the number of spheres was fifty, he said, if that was true, the
number of ideals must likewise be fifty. For the scholars in his time
were few and possessed but imperfect learning; they thought that there
must be a separate sphere for each movement, because they did not know
that what appear to be several distinct movements can be explained as
resulting from the inclination of one sphere as is, e.g., the case with
the change in the longitude of a star, its declination and the places
of its rising and setting noticed in the circle of the horizon. This
point, however, does not concern us at present; let us therefore return
to our subject.
The later philosophers assumed ten Intelligences, because they counted
the spheres containing stars and the all-encompassing sphere, although
some of the spheres included several distinct orbits. There are
altogether nine spheres, viz., the all-encompassing sphere, that of the
fixed stars, and those of the seven planets; nine Intelligences
correspond to the nine spheres; the tenth Intelligence is the Active
Intellect. The existence of the latter is proved by the transition of
our intellect from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, and by
the same transition in the case of the forms of all transient beings.
For whatever passes from potentiality into actuality, requires for that
transition an external agent of the same kind as itself. Thus the
builder does not build the storehouse in his capacity of workman, but
in that of a person that has the form of the storehouse in his mind;
and that form of the building which exists in the mind of the builder
caused the transition of the potential form of the storehouse into
actuality, and impressed it on the material of the building. As that
which gives form to matter must itself be pure form, so the source of
intellect must itself be pure intellect, and this source is the Active
Intellect. The relation of the latter to the elements and their
compounds is the same as that of the Intelligences to their respective
spheres; and our intellect in action, which originates in the Active
Intellect, and enables us to comprehend that intellect, finds a
parallel in the intellect of each of the spheres which originates in
the Intelligence corresponding to that sphere, and enables the sphere
to comprehend that Intelligence, to form an idea of it, and to move in
seeking to become similar to it.
Aristotle further infers, what has already been explained, that God
does not act by means of direct contact. When, e.g., He destroys
anything with fire, the fire is set in motion through the movement of
the spheres, and the spheres by the Intelligences; the latter, which
are identical with “the angels,” and act by direct influence, are
consequently, each in its turn, the cause of the motion of the spheres;
as however, purely spiritual beings do not differ in their essence, and
are by no means discrete quantities, he (Aristotle) came to the
following conclusion: God created the first Intelligence, the motive
agent of the first sphere; the Intelligence which causes the second
sphere to move has its source and origin in the first Intelligence, and
so on; the Intelligence which sets the sphere nearest to the earth in
motion is the source and origin of the Active Intellect, the last in
the series of purely spiritual beings. The series of material bodies
similarly begins with the uppermost sphere, and ends with the elements
and their compounds. The Intelligence which moves the uppermost sphere
cannot be the Absolute Being, for there is an element common to all
Intelligences, namely, the property of being the motive agent of a
sphere, and there is another element by which each of them is
distinguished from the rest; each of the ten Intelligences includes,
therefore, two elements, and consequently another being must be the
First Cause.
This is the theory and opinion of Aristotle on these questions, and his
proofs, where proof is possible, are given in various works of the
Aristotelian school. In short, he believes that the spheres are
animated and intellectual beings, capable of fully comprehending the
principia of their existence; that there exist purely spiritual beings
(Intelligences), which do not reside in corporeal objects, and which
derive existence from God; and that these form the intermediate element
between God and this material world.
In the chapters which follow I will show how far the teaching of
Scripture is in harmony with these views, and how far it differs from
them.
CHAPTER V
Scripture supports the theory that the spheres are animate and
intellectual, i.e., capable of comprehending things; that they are not,
as ignorant persons believe, inanimate masses like fire and earth, but
are, as the philosophers assert, endowed with life, and serve their
Lord, whom they mightily praise and glorify; comp. “The heavens declare
the glory of God,” etc. (Ps. xix. 2). It is a great error to think that
this is a mere figure of speech; for the verbs “to declare” and “to
relate,” when joined together, are, in Hebrew, only used of
intellectual beings. That the Psalmist really means to describe the
heavens’ own doing, in other words, what the spheres actually do, and
not what man thinks of them, may be best inferred from the words,
“There is no speech, nor language, their voice is not heard” (ver. 4).
Here he clearly shows that he describes the heavens themselves as in
reality praising God, and declaring His wonders without words of lip
and tongue. When man praises God in words actually uttered, he only
relates the ideas which he has conceived, but these ideas form the real
praise. The reason why he gives expression to these ideas is to be
found in his desire to communicate them to others, or to make himself
sure that he has truly conceived them. Therefore it is said, “Commune
with your own heart upon your bed, and be still” (Ps. iv. 5). Only
ignorant or obstinate persons would refuse to admit this proof taken
from Scripture.
As to the opinion of our Sages, I do not see any necessity for
expounding or demonstrating it. Consider only the form they gave to the
blessing recited on seeing the new moon, the ideas repeatedly occurring
in the prayers and the remarks in the Midrash on the following and
similar passages:—“And the host of heaven worshippeth thee” (Neh. ix.
6); “When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God
shouted for joy” (Job xxxviii. 7). In Bereshit Rabba, on the
passage—“And the earth was empty and formless” (Gen. i. 2), our Sages
remark as follows: “The words tohu and bohu mean mourning and crying;
the earth mourned and cried on account of her evil lot, saying, ‘I and
the heavens were created together, and yet the beings above live for
ever, and we are mortal.’” Our Sages, by this remark, indicate their
belief that the spheres are animated beings, and not inanimate matter
like the elements.
The opinion of Aristotle, that the spheres are capable of comprehension
and conception, is in accordance with the words of our prophets and our
theologians or Sages. The philosophers further agree that this world
below is governed by influences emanating from the spheres, and that
the latter comprehend and have knowledge of the things which they
influence. This theory is also met with in Scripture; comp. [the stars
and all the host of heaven] “which the Lord thy God hath divided unto
all nations” (Deut. iv. 19), that is to say, the stars, which God
appointed to be the means of governing His creatures, and not the
objects of man’s worship. It has therefore been stated clearly: “And to
rule over the day and over the night” (Gen. i. 18). The term “ruling”
here refers to the power which the spheres possess of governing the
earth, in addition to the property of giving light and darkness. The
latter property is the direct cause of genesis and destruction; it is
described in the words, “And to divide the light from the darkness”
(ibid.). It is impossible to assume that those who rule a thing are
ignorant of that very thing which they rule, if we take “to rule” in
its proper sense. We will add another chapter on this subject.
CHAPTER VI
As for the existence of angels, there is no necessity to cite any proof
from Scripture, where the fact is frequently mentioned. The term elohim
signifies “judges”; comp. “The cause of both parties shall come before
the ‘judges’” (ha-elohim; Exod. xxii. 8). It has been figuratively
applied to angels, and to the Creator as being Judge over the angels.
When God says, “I am the Lord your God,” the pronoun “your” refers to
all mankind; but in the phrase elohe ha-elohim, He is described as the
God of the angels, and in adone ha-adonim, as the Lord of the spheres
and the stars, which are the masters of the rest of the corporeal
creation. The nouns elohim and adonim in these phrases do not refer to
human judges or masters, because these are in rank inferior to the
heavenly bodies; much less do they refer to mankind in general,
including masters and servants, or to objects of stone and wood
worshipped by some as gods; for it is no honour or greatness to God to
be superior to stone, wood, or a piece of metal. The phrases therefore
admit of no other meaning than this: God is the Judge over the judges;
i.e., over the angels, and the Lord over the spheres.
We have already stated above that the angels are incorporeal. This
agrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference in
the names employed—he uses the term “Intelligences,” and we say instead
“angels.” His theory is that the Intelligences are intermediate beings
between the Prime Cause and existing things, and that they effect the
motion of the spheres, on which motion the existence of all things
depends. This is also the view we meet with in all parts of Scripture;
every act of God is described as being performed by angels. But “angel”
means “messenger”; hence every one that is intrusted with a certain
mission is an angel. Even the movements of the brute creation are
sometimes due to the action of an angel, when such movements serve the
purpose of the Creator, who endowed it with the power of performing
that movement; e.g., “God hath sent His angel, and hath shut the lions’
mouths that they have not hurt me” (Dan. vi. 22). Another instance may
be seen in the movements of Balaam’s ass, described as caused by an
angel. The elements are also called angels. Comp. “Who maketh winds His
angels, flaming fire His ministers” (Ps. civ. 4). There is no doubt
that the word “angel” is used of a messenger sent by man; e.g., “And
Jacob sent angels” (Gen. xxxii. 4); of a prophet, e.g., “And an angel
of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim” (Judges ii. 1); “And He sent
an angel, and hath brought us forth out of Egypt” (Num. xx. 16). It is
also used of ideals, perceived by prophets in prophetic visions, and of
man’s animal powers, as will be explained in another place.
When we assert that Scripture teaches that God rules this world through
angels, we mean such angels as are identical with the Intelligences. In
some passages the plural is used of God, e.g., “Let us make man in our
image” (Gen. i. 26); “Go to, let us go down, and there confound their
language” (ibid. xi. 7). Our Sages explain this in the following
manner: God, as it were, does nothing without contemplating the host
above. I wonder at the expression “contemplating,” which is the very
expression used by Plato: God, as it were, “contemplates the world of
ideals, and thus produces the existing beings.” In other passages our
Sages expressed it more decidedly: “God does nothing without consulting
the host above” (the word familia, used in the original, is a Greek
noun, and signifies “host”). On the words, “what they have already
made” (Eccles. ii. 12), the following remark is made in Bereshit Rabba
and in Midrash Koheleth: “It is not said ‘what He has made,’ but ‘what
they have made’; hence we infer that He, as it were, with His court,
have agreed upon the form of each of the limbs of man before placing it
in its position, as it is said, ‘He hath made thee and established
thee’” (Deut. xxxii. 6). In Bereshit Rabba (chap. li.) it is also
stated, that wherever the term “and the Lord” occurred in Scripture,
the Lord with His court is to be understood. These passages do not
convey the idea that God spoke, thought, reflected, or that He
consulted and employed the opinion of other beings, as ignorant persons
have believed. How could the Creator be assisted by those whom He
created! They only show that all parts of the Universe, even the limbs
of animals in their actual form, are produced through angels; for
natural forces and angels are identical. How bad and injurious is the
blindness of ignorance! Say to a person who is believed to belong to
the wise men of Israel that the Almighty sends His angel to enter the
womb of a woman and to form there the fœtus, he will be satisfied with
the account; he will believe it, and even find in it a description of
the greatness of God’s might and wisdom; although he believes that the
angel consists of burning fire, and is as big as a third part of the
Universe, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tell
him that God gave the seed a formative power which produces and shapes
the limbs, and that this power is called “angel,” or that all forms are
the result of the influence of the Active Intellect, and that the
latter is the angel, the Prince of the world, frequently mentioned by
our Sages, and he will turn away; because he cannot comprehend the true
greatness and power of creating forces that act in a body without being
perceived by our senses. Our Sages have already stated—for him who has
understanding—that all forces that reside in a body are angels, much
more the forces that are active in the Universe. The theory that each
force acts only in one particular way, is expressed in Bereshit Rabba
(chap. l.) as follows: “One angel does not perform two things, and two
angels do not perform one thing”; this is exactly the property of all
forces. We may find a confirmation of the opinion that the natural and
psychical forces of an individual are called angels in a statement of
our Sages which is frequently quoted, and occurs originally in Bereshit
Rabba (chap. lxxviii.): “Every day God creates a legion of angels; they
sing before Him, and disappear.” When, in opposition to this statement,
other statements were quoted to the effect that angels are eternal—and,
in fact, it has repeatedly been shown that they live permanently—the
reply has been given that some angels live permanently, others perish;
and this is really the case; for individual forces are transient,
whilst the genera are permanent and imperishable. Again, we read (in
Bereshit Rabba, chap. lxxxv.), in reference to the relation between
Judah and Tamar: “R. Jochanan said that Judah was about to pass by
[without noticing Tamar], but God caused the angel of lust, i.e., the
libidinous disposition, to present himself to him.” Man’s disposition
is here called an angel. Likewise we frequently meet with the phrase
“the angel set over a certain thing.” In Midrash-Koheleth (on Eccles.
x. 7) the following passage occurs: “When man sleeps, his soul speaks
to the angel, the angel to the cherub.” The intelligent reader will
find here a clear statement that man’s imaginative faculty is also
called “angel,” and that “cherub” is used for man’s intellectual
faculty. How beautiful must this appear to him who understands it; how
absurd to the ignorant!
We have already stated that the forms in which angels appear form part
of the prophetic vision. Some prophets see angels in the form of man,
e.g., “And behold three men stood by him” (Gen. xviii. 2); others
perceive an angel as a fearful and terrible being, e.g., “And his
countenance was as the countenance of an angel of God, very terrible”
(Judges xiii. 6); others see them as fire, e.g., “And the angel of the
Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire” (Exod. iii. 2). In Bereshit
Rabba (chap. 1.) the following remark occurs: “To Abraham, whose
prophetic power was great, the angels appeared in the form of men; to
Lot, whose power was weak, they appeared as angels.” This is an
important principle as regards Prophecy; it will be fully discussed
when we treat of that subject (chap. xxxii. sqq.). Another passage in
Bereshit Rabba (ibid.) runs thus: “Before the angels have accomplished
their task they are called men, when they have accomplished it they are
angels.” Consider how clearly they say that the term “angel” signifies
nothing but a certain action, and that every appearance of an angel is
part of a prophetic vision, depending on the capacity of the person
that perceives it.
There is nothing in the opinion of Aristotle on this subject contrary
to the teaching of Scripture. The whole difference between him and
ourselves is this: he believes all these beings to be eternal,
co-existing with the First Cause as its necessary effect; but we
believe that they have had a beginning, that God created the
Intelligences, and gave the spheres the capacity of seeking to become
like them; that in creating the Intelligences and the spheres, He
endowed them with their governing powers. In this point we differ from
him.
In the course of this treatise we shall give his theory as well as the
theory of Creatio ex nihilo taught in Scripture.
CHAPTER VII
We have already explained that the term “angel” is a homonym, and is
used of the intellectual beings, the spheres, and the elements; for all
these are engaged in performing a divine command. But do not imagine
that the Intelligences and the spheres are like other forces which
reside in bodies and act by the laws of nature without being conscious
of what they do. The spheres and the Intelligences are conscious of
their actions, and select by their own free will the objects of their
influence, although not in the same manner as we exercise free will and
rule over other things, which only concern temporary beings. I have
been led to adopt this theory by certain passages in Scripture; e.g.,
an angel says to Lot: “For I cannot do anything,” etc. (Gen. xix. 21);
and telling him to deliver himself, the angel says: “Behold I have
accepted thee concerning this thing” (ver. 21). Again: “Take heed
before him, and listen to his voice,” etc. (Exod. xxiii. 21). These
passages show that angels are conscious of what they do, and have free
will in the sphere of action intrusted to them, just as we have free
will within our province, and in accordance with the power given to us
with our very existence. The difference is that what we do is the
lowest stage of excellence, and that our influence and actions are
preceded by non-action; whilst the Intelligences and the spheres always
perform that which is good, they contain nothing except what is good
and perfect, as will be shown further on, and they have continually
been active from the beginning.
CHAPTER VIII
It is one of the ancient beliefs, both among the philosophers and other
people, that the motions of the spheres produced mighty and fearful
sounds. They observed how little objects produced by rapid motion a
loud, shrilling, and terrifying noise, and concluded that this must to
a far higher degree be the case with the bodies of the sun, the moon
and the stars, considering their greatness and their velocity. The
Pythagoreans believed that the sounds were pleasant, and, though loud,
had the same proportions to each other as the musical notes. They also
explained why these mighty and tremendous sounds are not heard by us.
This belief is also widespread in our nation. Thus our Sages describe
the greatness of the sound produced by the sun in the daily circuit in
its orbit. The same description could be given of all heavenly bodies.
Aristotle, however, rejects this, and holds that they produce no
sounds. You will find his opinion in the book The Heavens and the World
(De Cœlo). You must not find it strange that Aristotle differs here
from the opinion of our Sages. The theory of the music of the spheres
is connected with the theory of the motion of the stars in a fixed
sphere, and our Sages have, in this astronomical question, abandoned
their own theory in favour of the theory of others. Thus, it is
distinctly stated, “The wise men of other nations have defeated the
wise men of Israel.” It is quite right that our Sages have abandoned
their own theory; for speculative matters every one treats according to
the results of his own study, and every one accepts that which appears
to him established by proof.
CHAPTER IX
We have stated above that in the age of Aristotle the number of spheres
was not accurately known; and that those who at present count nine
spheres consider a sphere containing several rotating circles as one, a
fact well known to all who have a knowledge of astronomy. We need,
therefore, not reject the opinion of those who assume two spheres in
accordance with the words of Scripture: “Behold the heaven and the
heaven of heavens are the Lord’s” (Deut. x. 14). They reckon all the
spheres with stars, i.e., with all the circles in which the stars move,
as one; the all-encompassing sphere in which there are no stars, is
regarded by them as the second; hence they maintain that there are two
spheres.
I will here introduce an explanation which is necessary for the
understanding of our view on the present subject. There is a difference
among ancient astronomers whether the spheres of Mercury and Venus are
above or below the sun, because no proof can be given for the position
of these two spheres. At first it was generally assumed that they were
above the sun—note this well; later on Ptolemy maintained that they
were below the sun; because he believed that in this manner the whole
arrangement of the spheres would be most reasonable; the sun would be
in the middle, having three stars below and three above itself. More
recently some Andalusian scholars concluded, from certain principles
laid down by Ptolemy, that Venus and Mercury were above the sun. Ibn
Aflaḥ of Seville, with whose son I was acquainted, has written a famous
book on the subject; also the excellent philosopher Abu-Bekr
ibn-Alẓaig, one of whose pupils was my fellow-student, has treated of
this subject and offered certain proofs—which we have copied—of the
improbability of Venus and Mercury being above the sun. The proofs
given by Abu-Bekr show only the improbability, not the impossibility.
In short, whether it be so or not, the ancients placed Venus and
Mercury above the sun, and had, therefore, the following five spheres:
that of the moon, which is undoubtedly the nearest to us; that of the
sun, which is, of course, above the former; then that of the five
planets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and the outermost sphere, which
does not contain any star. Consequently there are four spheres
containing figures, i.e., stars, which were called figures by the
ancients in their well-known works—viz., the spheres of the fixed
stars, of the five planets, of the sun, and of the moon; above these
there is one sphere which is empty, without any star. This number is
for me of great importance in respect to an idea which none of the
philosophers clearly stated, though I was led to it by various
utterances of the philosophers and of our Sages. I will now state the
idea and expound it.
CHAPTER X
It is a well-known fact that the philosophers, when they discuss in
their works the order of the Universe, assume that the existing order
of things in this sublunary world of transient beings depends on forces
which emanate from the spheres. We have mentioned this several times.
In like manner our Sages say, “There is no single herb below without
its corresponding star above, that beats upon it and commands it to
grow.” Comp. “Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven? Canst thou set the
dominion thereof in the earth?” (Job xxxviii. 33). The term mazzal,
literally meaning a constellation in the Zodiac, is also used of every
star, as may be inferred from the following passage in the beginning of
Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.): “While one star (mazzal) completes its
circuit in thirty days, another completes it in thirty years.” They
have thus clearly expressed it, that even each individual being in this
world has its corresponding star. Although the influences of the
spheres extend over all beings, there is besides the influence of a
particular star directed to each particular species; a fact noticed
also in reference to the several forces in one organic body; for the
whole Universe is like one organic body, as we have stated above. Thus
the philosophers speak of the peculiar influence of the moon on the
particular element water. That this is the case is proved by the
increase and decrease of the water in the seas and rivers according to
the increase and decrease of the moon; also by the rising and the
falling of the seas according to the advance or return of the moon,
i.e., her ascending and her descending in the several quarters of her
course. This is dear to every one who has directed his attention to
these phenomena. The influence of the sun’s rays upon fire may easily
be noticed in the increase of heat or cold on earth, according as the
sun approaches the earth or recedes or is concealed from it. All this
is so clear that I need not explain it further. Now it occurred to my
mind that the four spheres which contain stars exercise influence upon
all beings on earth that come into existence, and, in fact, are the
cause of their existence; but each of the four spheres is the exclusive
source of the properties of one only of the four elements, and becomes
by its own motion the cause of the motion and changes of that element.
Thus water is set in motion by the moon-sphere, fire by the sun-sphere,
air by the other planets, which move in many and different courses with
retrogressions, progressions, and stations, and therefore produce the
various forms of the air with its frequent changes, contractions, and
expansions; the sphere of the other stars, namely, the fixed stars,
sets earth in motion; and it may be that on this account, viz., on
account of the slow motion of the fixed stars, earth is but slowly set
in motion to change and to combine with other elements. The particular
influence which the fixed stars exercise upon earth is implied in the
saying of our Sages, that the number of the species of plants is the
same as that of the individuals included in the general term “stars.”
The arrangement of the Universe may therefore be assumed to be as
follows: there are four spheres, four elements set in motion by them,
and also four principal properties which earthly beings derive from
them, as has been stated above. Furthermore, there are four causes of
the motion of every sphere, namely, the following four essential
elements in the sphere; its spherical shape, its soul, its intellect,
by which the sphere is capable of forming ideas, and the Intelligence,
which the sphere desires to imitate. Note this well. The explanation of
what I said is this: the sphere could not have been continuously in
motion, had it not this peculiar form; continuity of motion is only
possible when the motion is circular. Rectilinear motion, even if
frequently repeated in the same moment, cannot be continuous; for when
a body moves successively in two opposite directions, it must pass
through a moment of rest, as has been demonstrated in its proper place.
The necessity of a continuous motion constantly repeated in the same
path implies the necessity of a circular form. The spheres must have a
soul; for only animate beings can move freely. There must be some cause
for the motion, and as it does not consist in the fear of that which is
injurious, or the desire of that which is profitable, it must be found
in the notion which the spheres form of a certain being, and in the
desire to approach that being. This formation of a notion demands, in
the first place, that the spheres possess intellect; it demands further
that something exists which corresponds to that notion, and which the
spheres desire to approach. These are the four causes of the motion of
the spheres. The following are the four principal forces directly
derived from the spheres: the nature of minerals, the properties
peculiar to plants, the animal faculties, and the intellect. An
examination of these forces shows that they have two functions, namely,
to produce things and to perpetuate them; that is to say, to preserve
the species perpetually, and the individuals in each species for a
certain time. These are also the functions ascribed to Nature, which is
said to be wise, to govern the Universe, to provide, as it were, by
plan for the production of living beings, and to provide also for their
preservation and perpetuation. Nature creates formative faculties,
which are the cause of the production of living beings, and nutritive
faculties as the source of their temporal existence and preservation.
It may be that by Nature the Divine Will is meant, which is the origin
of these two kinds of faculties through the medium of the spheres.
As to the number four, it is strange, and demands our attention. In
Midrash Tanḥuma the following passage occurs: “How many steps were in
Jacob’s ladder?—Four.” The question refers to the verse, “And behold a
ladder set upon the earth,” etc. (Gen. xxviii. 12). In all the
Midrashim it is stated that there were four hosts of angels; this
statement is frequently repeated. Some read in the above passage: “How
many steps were in the ladder?—Seven.” But all readings and all
Midrashim unanimously express that the angels whom Jacob saw ascending
the ladder, and descending, were only four; two of whom were going up
and two coming down. These four angels, the two that went up and the
two that came down, occupied one step of the ladder, standing in one
line. Hence it has been inferred that the breadth of the ladder in this
vision was four-thirds of the world. For the breadth of an angel in a
prophetic vision is equal to one-third of the world; comp. “And his
body was like tarshish (two-sixths)” (Dan. x. 6); the four angels
therefore occupied four-thirds of the world.—Zechariah, in describing
the allegorical vision of “the four chariots that came out from between
two mountains, which mountains were mountains of brass” (Zech. vi. 1),
adds the explanation, “These are the four spirits of the heavens which
go forth from standing before the Lord of all the earth” (ibid. ver.
5). By these four spirits the causes are meant which produce all
changes in the Universe. The term “brass” (neḥoshet), employed here,
and the phrase “burnished brass” (neḥoshet kalal), used by Ezekiel (i.
7), are to some extent homonymous, and will be discussed further on.
The saying of our Sages, that the angel is as broad as the third part
of the Universe, or, in the words of Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.), that
the angel is the third part of the world, is quite clear; we have
already explained it in our large work on the Holy Law. The whole
creation consists of three parts, (1) the pure intelligences, or
angels; (2) the bodies of the spheres; and (3) the materia prima, or
the bodies which are below the spheres, and are subject to constant
change.
In this manner may those understand the dark sayings of the prophets
who desire to understand them, who awake from the sleep of
forgetfulness, deliver themselves from the sea of ignorance, and raise
themselves upward nearer the higher beings. But those who prefer to
swim in the waters of their ignorance, and to “go down very low,” need
not exert the body or heart; they need only cease to move, and they
will go down by the law of nature. Note and consider well all we have
said.
CHAPTER XI
When a simple mathematician reads and studies these astronomical
discussions, he believes that the form and the number of the spheres
are facts established by proof. But this is not the case; for the
science of astronomy does not aim at demonstrating them, although it
includes subjects that can be proved; e.g., it has been proved that the
path of the sun is inclined against the equator; this cannot be
doubted. But it has not yet been decided whether the sphere of the sun
is excentric or contains a revolving epicycle, and the astronomer does
not take notice of this uncertainty, for his object is simply to find
an hypothesis that would lead to a uniform and circular motion of the
stars without acceleration, retardation, or change, and which is in its
effects in accordance with observation. He will, besides, endeavour to
find such an hypothesis which would require the least complicated
motion and the least number of spheres; he will therefore prefer an
hypothesis which would explain all the phenomena of the stars by means
of three spheres to an hypothesis which would require four spheres.
From this reason we adopt, in reference to the circuit of the sun, the
theory of excentricity, and reject the epicyclic revolution assumed by
Ptolemy. When we therefore perceive that all fixed stars move in the
same way uniformly, without the least difference, we conclude that they
are all in one sphere. It is, however, not impossible that the stars
should have each its own sphere, with a separate centre, and yet move
in the same way. If this theory be accepted, a number of Intelligences
must be assumed, equal to that of the stars, and therefore Scripture
says in reference to them, “Is there any number of his armies?” (Job
xxv. 3); for the Intelligences, the heavenly bodies, and the natural
forces, are called the armies of God. Nevertheless the species of the
stars can be numbered, and therefore we would still be justified in
counting the spheres of the fixed stars collectively as one, just as
the five spheres of the planets, together with the numerous spheres
they contain, are regarded by us as one. Our object in adopting this
number is, as you have noticed, to divide the influences which we can
trace in the Universe according to their general character, without
desiring to fix the number of the Intelligences and the spheres. All we
wish to point out is this: in the first place, that the whole Creation
is divided into three parts, viz. (1) the pure Intelligences; (2) the
bodies of the spheres endowed with permanent forms—(the forms of these
bodies do not pass from one substratum to another, nor do their
substrata undergo any change whatever); and (3) the transient earthly
beings, all of which consist of the same substance. Furthermore, we
desire to show that the ruling power emanates from the Creator, and is
received by the Intelligences according to their order; from the
Intelligences part of the good and the light bestowed upon them is
communicated to the spheres, and the latter, being in possession of the
abundance obtained of the Intelligences, transmit forces and properties
unto the beings of this transient world. We must, however, add that the
part which benefits the part below it in the order described does not
exist for the sole purpose of producing that benefit. For if this were
the case it would lead to the paradox that the higher, better, and
nobler beings existed for the sake of beings lower in rank, whilst in
reality the object should be of greater importance than the means
applied for attaining it. No intelligent person will admit that this is
possible. The nature of the influence which one part of the Creation
exercises upon another must be explained as follows: A thing perfect in
a certain way is either perfect only in itself, without being able to
communicate that perfection to another being, or it is so perfect that
it is capable of imparting perfection to another being. A person may
possess wealth sufficient for his own wants without being able to spare
anything for another, or he may have wealth enough to benefit also
other people, or even to enrich them to such an extent as would enable
them to give part of their property to others. In the same manner the
creative act of the Almighty in giving existence to pure Intelligences
endows the first of them with the power of giving existence to another,
and so on, down to the Active Intellect, the lowest of the purely
spiritual beings. Besides producing other Intelligences, each
Intelligence gives existence to one of the spheres, from the highest
down to the lowest, which is the sphere of the moon. After the latter
follows this transient world, i.e., the materia prima, and all that has
been formed of it. In this manner the elements receive certain
properties from each sphere, and a succession of genesis and
destruction is produced.
We have already mentioned that these theories are not opposed to
anything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages. Our nation is wise and
perfect, as has been declared by the Most High, through Moses, who made
us perfect: “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding
people” (Deut. iv. 6). But when wicked barbarians have deprived us of
our possessions, put an end to our science and literature, and killed
our wise men, we have become ignorant; this has been foretold by the
prophets, when they pronounced the punishment for our sins: “The wisdom
of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent
men shall be hid” (Isa. xxix. 14). We are mixed up with other nations;
we have learnt their opinions, and followed their ways and acts. The
Psalmist, deploring this imitation of the actions of other nations,
says, “They were mingled among the nations, and learned their works”
(Ps. cvi. 35). Isaiah likewise complains that the Israelites adopted
the opinions of their neighbours, and says, “And they please themselves
in the children of strangers” (Isa. ii. 6); or, according to the
Aramaic version of Jonathan, son of Uzziel, “And they walk in the ways
of the nations.” Having been brought up among persons untrained in
philosophy, we are inclined to consider these philosophical opinions as
foreign to our religion, just as uneducated persons find them foreign
to their own notions. But, in fact, it is not so.
Since we have repeatedly spoken of the influence emanating from God and
the Intelligences, we will now proceed to explain what is the true
meaning of this influence, and after that I will discuss the theory of
the Creation.
CHAPTER XII
It is clear that whenever a thing is produced, an efficient cause must
exist for the production of the thing that has not existed previously.
This immediate efficient cause is either corporeal or incorporeal; if
corporeal, it is not the efficient cause on account of its
corporeality, but on account of its being an individual corporeal
object, and therefore by means of its form. I will speak of this
subject later on. The immediate efficient cause of a thing may again be
the effect of some cause, and so on, but not ad infinitum. The series
of causes for a certain product must necessarily conclude with a First
Cause, which is the true cause of that product, and whose existence is
not due to another cause. The question remains, Why has this thing been
produced now and not long before, since the cause has always been in
existence? The answer is, that a certain relation between cause and
product has been absent, if the cause be corporeal; or, that the
substance has not been sufficiently prepared, if the cause be
incorporeal. All this is in accordance with the teachings of natural
science. We ignore for the present the question whether to assume the
Eternity of the Universe, or the Creatio ex nihilo. We do not intend to
discuss the question here.
In Physics it has been shown that a body in acting upon another body
must either directly be in contact with it, or indirectly through the
medium of other bodies. E.g., a body that has been heated has been in
contact with fire, or the air that surrounds the body has been heated
by the fire, and has communicated the heat to the body; the immediate
cause of the heat in this body is the corporeal substance of the heated
air. The magnet attracts iron from a distance through a certain force
communicated to the air round the iron. The magnet does therefore not
act at all distances, just as fire does not act at every distance, but
only as long as the air between the fire and the object is affected by
the fire. When the air is no longer affected by the fire which is under
a piece of wax, the latter does not melt. The same is the case with
magnetism. When an object that has previously not been warm has now
become warm, the cause of its heat must now have been created; either
some fire has been produced, or the distance of the fire from the
object has been changed, and the altered relation between the fire and
the object is the cause now created. In a similar manner we find the
causes of all changes in the Universe to be changes in the combination
of the elements that act upon each other when one body approaches
another or separates from it. There are, however, changes which are not
connected with the combination of the elements, but concern only the
forms of the things; they require likewise an efficient cause; there
must exist a force that produces the various forms. This cause is
incorporeal, for that which produces form must itself be abstract form,
as has been shown in its proper place. I have also indicated the proof
of this theorem in previous chapters. The following may, in addition,
serve to illustrate it: All combinations of the elements are subject to
increase and decrease, and this change takes place gradually. It is
different with forms; they do not change gradually, and are therefore
without motion; they appear and disappear instantaneously, and are
consequently not the result of the combination of corporeal elements.
This combination merely prepares matter for receiving a certain form.
The efficient cause which produces the form is indivisible, because it
is of the same kind as the thing produced. Hence it may be concluded
that the agent that has produced a certain form, or given it to a
certain substance, must itself be an abstract form. The action of this
incorporeal agent cannot depend on a certain relation to the corporeal
product; being incorporeal, it cannot approach a body, or recede from
it; nor can a body approach the incorporeal agent, or recede from it,
because there is no relation of distance between corporeal and
incorporeal beings. The reason why the action has not taken place
before must be sought in the circumstance that the substance has not
been prepared for the action of the abstract form.
It is now clear that the action of bodies upon each other, according to
their forms, prepares the substance for receiving the action of an
incorporeal being, or Form. The existence of actions of purely
incorporeal beings, in every case of change that does not originate in
the mere combination of elements, is now firmly established. These
actions do not depend on impact, or on a certain distance. They are
termed “influence” (or “emanation”), on account of their similarity to
a water-spring. The latter sends forth water in all directions, has no
peculiar side for receiving or spending its contents; it springs forth
on all sides, and continually waters both neighbouring and distant
places. In a similar manner incorporeal beings, in receiving power and
imparting it to others, are not limited to a particular side, distance,
or time. They act continually; and whenever an object is sufficiently
prepared, it receives the effect of that continuous action, called
“influence” (or “emanation”). God being incorporeal, and everything
being the work of Him as the efficient cause, we say that the Universe
has been created by the Divine influence, and that all changes in the
Universe emanate from Him. In the same sense we say that He caused
wisdom to emanate from Him and to come upon the prophets. In all such
cases we merely wish to express that an incorporeal Being, whose action
we call “influence,” has produced a certain effect. The term
“influence” has been considered applicable to the Creator on account of
the similarity between His actions and those of a spring. There is no
better way of describing the action of an incorporeal being than by
this analogy; and no term can be found that would accurately describe
it. For it is as difficult to form an idea of that action as to form an
idea of the incorporeal being itself. As we imagine only bodies or
forces residing in bodies, so we only imagine actions possible when the
agent is near, at a certain distance, and on a particular side. There
are therefore persons who, on learning that God is incorporeal, or that
He does not approach the object of His action, believe that He gives
commands to angels, and that the latter carry them out by approach or
direct contact, as is the case when we produce something. These persons
thus imagine also the angels as bodies. Some of them, further, believe
that God commands an action in words consisting, like ours, of letters
and sound, and that thereby the action is done. All this is the work of
the imagination, which is, in fact, identical with “evil inclination.”
For all our defects in speech or in character are either the direct or
the indirect work of imagination. This is not the subject of the
present chapter, in which we only intended to explain the term
“influence” in so far as it is applied to incorporeal beings, namely,
to God and to the Intelligences or angels. But the term is also applied
to the forces of the spheres in their effects upon the earth; and we
speak of the “influence” of the spheres, although the spheres are
corporeal, and the stars, being corporeal, only act at certain
distances, i.e., at a smaller or a greater distance from the centre, or
at a definite distance from each other, a circumstance which led to
Astrology.
As to our assertion that Scripture applies the notion of “influence” to
God, compare “They have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters”
(Jer. ii. 13), i.e., the Divine influence that gives life or existence,
for the two are undoubtedly identical. Further, “For with Thee is the
fountain of life” (Ps. xxxvi. 10), i.e., the Divine influence that
gives existence. The concluding words of this verse, “in Thy light we
see light,” express exactly what we said, namely, that by the influence
of the intellect which emanates from God we become wise, by it we are
guided and enabled to comprehend the Active Intellect. Note this.
CHAPTER XIII
Among those who believe in the existence of God, there are found three
different theories as regards the question whether the Universe is
eternal or not.
First Theory.—Those who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, hold that
the whole Universe, i.e., everything except God, has been brought by
Him into existence out of non-existence. In the beginning God alone
existed, and nothing else; neither angels, nor spheres, nor the things
that are contained within the spheres existed. He then produced from
nothing all existing things such as they are, by His will and desire.
Even time itself is among the things created; for time depends on
motion, i.e., on an accident in things which move, and the things upon
whose motion time depends are themselves created beings, which have
passed from non-existence into existence. We say that God existed
before the creation of the Universe, although the verb existed appears
to imply the notion of time; we also believe that He existed an
infinite space of time before the Universe was created; but in these
cases we do not mean time in its true sense. We only use the term to
signify something analogous or similar to time. For time is undoubtedly
an accident, and, according to our opinion, one of the created
accidents, like blackness and whiteness; it is not a quality, but an
accident connected with motion. This must be clear to all who
understand what Aristotle has said on time and its real existence.
The following remark does not form an essential part of our present
research; it will nevertheless be found useful in the course of this
discussion. Many scholars do not know what time really is, and men like
Galen were so perplexed about it that they asked whether time has a
real existence or not; the reason for this uncertainty is to be found
in the circumstance that time is an accident of an accident. Accidents
which are directly connected with material bodies, e.g., colour and
taste, are easily understood, and correct notions are formed of them.
There are, however, accidents which are connected with other accidents,
e.g., the splendour of colour, or the inclination and the curvature of
a line; of these it is very difficult to form a correct notion,
especially when the accident which forms the substratum for the other
accident is not constant but variable. Both difficulties are present in
the notion of time: it is an accident of motion, which is itself an
accident of a moving object; besides, it is not a fixed property; on
the contrary, its true and essential condition is, not to remain in the
same state for two consecutive moments. This is the source of ignorance
about the nature of time.
We consider time a thing created; it comes into existence in the same
manner as other accidents, and the substances which form the substratum
for the accidents. For this reason, viz., because time belongs to the
things created, it cannot be said that God produced the Universe in the
beginning. Consider this well; for he who does not understand it is
unable to refute forcible objections raised against the theory of
Creatio ex nihilo. If you admit the existence of time before the
Creation, you will be compelled to accept the theory of the Eternity of
the Universe. For time is an accident and requires a substratum. You
will therefore have to assume that something [beside God] existed
before this Universe was created, an assumption which it is our duty to
oppose.
This is the first theory, and it is undoubtedly a fundamental principle
of the Law of our teacher Moses; it is next in importance to the
principle of God’s unity. Do not follow any other theory. Abraham, our
father, was the first that taught it, after he had established it by
philosophical research. He proclaimed, therefore, “the name of the Lord
the God of the Universe” (Gen. xxi. 33); and he had previously
expressed this theory in the words, “The Possessor of heaven and earth”
(ibid. xiv. 22).
Second Theory.—The theory of all philosophers whose opinions and works
are known to us is this: It is impossible to assume that God produced
anything from nothing, or that He reduces anything to nothing; that is
to say, it is impossible that an object consisting of matter and form
should be produced when that matter is absolutely absent, or that it
should be destroyed in such a manner that that matter be absolutely no
longer in existence. To say of God that He can produce a thing from
nothing or reduce a thing to nothing is, according to the opinion of
these philosophers, the same as if we were to say that He could cause
one substance to have at the same time two opposite properties, or
produce another being like Himself, or change Himself into a body, or
produce a square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar
impossibilities. The philosophers thus believe that it is no defect in
the Supreme Being that He does not produce impossibilities, for the
nature of that which is impossible is constant—it does not depend on
the action of an agent, and for this reason it cannot be changed.
Similarly there is, according to them, no defect in the greatness of
God, when He is unable to produce a thing from nothing, because they
consider this as one of the impossibilities. They therefore assume that
a certain substance has co-existed with God from eternity in such a
manner that neither God existed without that substance nor the latter
without God. But they do not hold that the existence of that substance
equals in rank that of God; for God is the cause of that existence, and
the substance is in the same relation to God as the clay is to the
potter, or the iron to the smith; God can do with it what He pleases;
at one time He forms of it heaven and earth, at another time He forms
some other thing. Those who hold this view also assume that the heavens
are transient, that they came into existence, though not from nothing,
and may cease to exist, although they cannot be reduced to nothing.
They are transient in the same manner as the individuals among living
beings which are produced from some existing substance, and are again
reduced to some substance that remains in existence. The process of
genesis and destruction is, in the case of the heavens, the same as in
that of earthly beings.
The followers of this theory are divided into different schools, whose
opinions and principles it is useless to discuss here; but what I have
mentioned is common to all of them. Plato holds the same opinion.
Aristotle says in his Physics, that according to Plato the heavens are
transient. This view is also stated in Plato’s Timæus. His opinion,
however, does not agree with our belief; only superficial and careless
persons wrongly assume that Plato has the same belief as we have. For
whilst we hold that the heavens have been created from absolutely
nothing, Plato believes that they have been formed out of
something.—This is the second theory.
Third Theory.—viz., that of Aristotle, his followers, and commentators.
Aristotle maintains, like the adherents of the second theory, that a
corporeal object cannot be produced without a corporeal substance. He
goes, however, farther, and contends that the heavens are
indestructible. For he holds that the Universe in its totality has
never been different, nor will it ever change: the heavens, which form
the permanent element in the Universe, and are not subject to genesis
and destruction, have always been so; time and motion are eternal,
permanent, and have neither beginning nor end; the sublunary world,
which includes the transient elements, has always been the same,
because the materia prima is itself eternal, and merely combines
successively with different forms; when one form is removed, another is
assumed. This whole arrangement, therefore, both above and here below,
is never disturbed or interrupted, and nothing is produced contrary to
the laws or the ordinary course of Nature. He further says—though not
in the same terms—that he considers it impossible for God to change His
will or conceive a new desire; that God produced this Universe in its
totality by His will, but not from nothing. Aristotle finds it as
impossible to assume that God changes His will or conceives a new
desire, as to believe that He is non-existing, or that His essence is
changeable. Hence it follows that this Universe has always been the
same in the past, and will be the same eternally.
This is a full account of the opinions of those who consider that the
existence of God, the First Cause of the Universe, has been established
by proof. But it would be quite useless to mention the opinions of
those who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the
existing state of things is the result of accidental combination and
separation of the elements, and that the Universe has no Ruler or
Governor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and his school, and similar
philosophers, as stated by Alexander [Aphrodisiensis]; it would be
superfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of God has been
demonstrated whilst their theory is built upon a basis proved to be
untenable. It is likewise useless to prove the correctness of the
followers of the second theory in asserting that the heavens are
transient, because they at the same time believe in the Eternity of the
Universe, and so long as this theory is adopted, it makes no difference
to us whether it is believed that the heavens are transient, and that
only their substance is eternal, or the heavens are held to be
indestructible, in accordance with the view of Aristotle. All who
follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, and Abraham, our Father, and all
who adopt similar theories, assume that nothing is eternal except God,
and that the theory of Creatio ex nihilo includes nothing that is
impossible, whilst some thinkers even regard it as an established
truth.
After having described the different theories, I will now proceed to
show how Aristotle proved his theory, and what induced him to adopt it.
CHAPTER XIV
It is not necessary to repeat in every chapter that I write this
treatise with the full knowledge of what you have studied; that I
therefore need not quote the exact words of the philosophers; it will
suffice to give an abstract of their views. I will, however, point out
the methods which they employ, in the same manner as I have done when I
discussed the theories of the Mutakallemim. No notice will be taken of
the opinion of any philosopher but that of Aristotle; his opinions
alone deserve to be criticized, and if our objections or doubts with
regard to any of these be well founded, this must be the case in a far
higher degree in respect to all other opponents of our fundamental
principles.
I now proceed to describe the methods of the philosophers.
First Method.—According to Aristotle, motion, that is to say, motion
par excellence, is eternal. For if the motion had a beginning, there
must already have been some motion when it came into existence, for
transition from potentiality into actuality, and from non-existence
into existence, always implies motion; then that previous motion, the
cause of the motion which follows, must be eternal, or else the series
would have to be carried back ad infinitum. On the same principle he
maintains that time is eternal, for time is related to and connected
with motion: there is no motion except in time, and time can only be
perceived by motion, as has been demonstrated by proof. By this
argument Aristotle proves the eternity of the Universe.
Second Method.—The First Substance common to the four elements is
eternal. For if it had a beginning it would have come into existence
from another substance; it would further be endowed with a form, as
coming into existence is nothing but receiving Form. But we mean by
“First Substance” a formless substance; it can therefore not have come
into existence from another substance, and must be without beginning
and without end; hence it is concluded that the Universe is eternal.
Third Method.—The substance of the spheres contains no opposite
elements; for circular motion includes no such opposite directions as
are found in rectilinear motion. Whatever is destroyed, owes its
destruction to the opposite elements it contains. The spheres contain
no opposite elements; they are therefore indestructible, and because
they are indestructible they are also without beginning. Aristotle thus
assumes the axiom that everything that has had a beginning is
destructible, and that everything destructible has had a beginning;
that things without beginning are indestructible, and indestructible
things are without beginning. Hence follows the Eternity of the
Universe.
Fourth Method.—The actual production of a thing is preceded in time by
its possibility. The actual change of a thing is likewise preceded in
time by its possibility. From this proposition Aristotle derives the
eternity of the circular motion of the spheres. The Aristotelians in
more recent time employ this proposition in demonstrating the Eternity
of the Universe. They argue thus: When the Universe did not yet exist,
its existence was either possible or necessary, or impossible. If it
was necessary, the Universe could never have been non-existing; if
impossible, the Universe could never have been in existence; if
possible, the question arises, What was the substratum of that
possibility? for there must be in existence something of which that
possibility can be predicated. This is a forcible argument in favour of
the Eternity of the Universe. Some of the later schools of the
Mutakallemim imagined that they could confute this argument by
objecting that the possibility rests with the agent, and not with the
production. But this objection is of no force whatever; for there are
two distinct possibilities, viz., the thing produced has had the
possibility of being produced before this actually took place; and the
agent has had the possibility of producing it before he actually did
so. There are, therefore, undoubtedly two possibilities—that of the
substance to receive a certain form, and that of the agent to perform a
certain act.
These are the principal methods, based on the properties of the
Universe, by which Aristotle proves the Eternity of the Universe. There
are, however, other methods of proving the Eternity of the Universe.
They are based on the notions formed of God, and philosophers after
Aristotle derived them from his philosophy. Some of them employed the
following argument:—
Fifth Method.—If God produced the Universe from nothing, He must have
been a potential agent before He was an actual one, and must have
passed from a state of potentiality into that of actuality—a process
that is merely possible, and requires an agent for effecting it. This
argument is likewise a source of great doubts, and every intelligent
person must examine it in order to refute it and to expose its
character.
Sixth Method.—An agent is active at one time and inactive at another,
according as favourable or unfavourable circumstances arise. The
unfavourable circumstances cause the abandonment of an intended action.
The favourable ones, on the other hand, even produce a desire for an
action for which there has not been a desire previously. As, however,
God is not subject to accidents which could bring about a change in His
will, and is not affected by obstacles and hindrances that might appear
or disappear, it is impossible, they argue, to imagine that God is
active at one time and inactive at another. He is, on the contrary,
always active in the same manner as He is always in actual existence.
Seventh Method.—The actions of God are perfect; they are in no way
defective, nor do they contain anything useless or superfluous. In
similar terms Aristotle frequently praises Him, when he says that
Nature is wise and does nothing in vain, but makes everything as
perfect as possible. The philosophers therefore contend that this
existing Universe is so perfect that it cannot be improved, and must be
permanent; for it is the result of God’s wisdom, which is not only
always present in His essence, but is identical with it.
All arguments in favour of the Eternity of the Universe are based on
the above methods, and can be traced to one or other of them. The
following objection is also raised against Creatio ex nihilo: How could
God ever have been inactive without producing or creating anything in
the infinite past? How could He have passed the long infinite period
which preceded the Creation without producing anything, so as to
commence, as it were, only yesterday, the Creation of the Universe? For
even if you said, e.g., that God created previously as many successive
worlds as the outermost sphere could contain grains of mustard, and
that each of these worlds existed as many years: considering the
infinite existence of God, it would be the same as if He had only
yesterday commenced the Creation. For when we once admit the beginning
of the existence of things after their non-existence, it makes no
difference whether thousands of centuries have passed since the
beginning, or only a short time. Those who defend the Eternity of the
Universe find both assumptions equally improbable.
Eighth Method.—The following method is based on the circumstance that
the theory implies a belief which is so common to all peoples and ages,
and so universal, that it appears to express a real fact and not merely
an hypothesis. Aristotle says that all people have evidently believed
in the permanency and stability of the heavens; and thinking that these
were eternal, they declared them to be the habitation of God and of the
spiritual beings or angels. By thus attributing the heavens to God,
they expressed their belief that the heavens are indestructible.
Several other arguments of the same kind are employed by Aristotle in
treating of this subject in order to support the results of his
philosophical speculation by common sense.
CHAPTER XV
In this chapter I intend to show that Aristotle was well aware that he
had not proved the Eternity of the Universe. He was not mistaken in
this respect. He knew that he could not prove his theory, and that his
arguments and proofs were only apparent and plausible. They are the
least objectionable, according to Alexander; but, according to the same
authority, Aristotle could not have considered them conclusive, after
having himself taught us the rules of logic, and the means by which
arguments can be refuted or confirmed.
The reason why I have introduced this subject is this: Later
philosophers, disciples of Aristotle, assume that he has proved the
Eternity of the Universe, and most of those who believe that they are
philosophers blindly follow him in this point, and accept all his
arguments as conclusive and absolute proofs. They consider it wrong to
differ from Aristotle, or to think that he was ignorant or mistaken in
anything. For this reason, taking their standpoint, I show that
Aristotle himself did not claim to have proved the Eternity of the
Universe. He says in his book Physics (viii., chap. i.) as follows:
“All the Physicists before us believed that motion is eternal, except
Plato, who holds that motion is transient; according to his opinion the
heavens are likewise transient.” Now if Aristotle had conclusive proofs
for his theory, he would not have considered it necessary to support it
by citing the opinions of preceding Physicists, nor would he have found
it necessary to point out the folly and absurdity of his opponents. For
a truth, once established by proof, does neither gain force nor
certainty by the consent of all scholars, nor lose by the general
dissent. We further find that Aristotle, in the book The Heavens and
the World, introduces his theory of the Eternity of the Universe in the
following manner: “Let us inquire into the nature of the heavens, and
see whether they are the product of something or not, destructible or
not.” After this statement of the problem, he proceeds to cite the
views of those who hold that the heavens have had a beginning, and
continues thus: “By doing this, our theory will be most plausible and
acceptable in the opinion of profound thinkers; and it will be the more
so, when, as we propose, the arguments of our opponents are first
heard. For if we were to state our opinion and our arguments without
mentioning those of our opponents, our words would be received less
favourably. He who desires to be just must not show himself hostile to
his opponent; he must have sympathy with him, and readily acknowledge
any truth contained in his words; he must admit the correctness of such
of his opponent’s arguments as he would admit if they were in his own
favour.” This is the contents of the words of Aristotle. Now, I ask
you, men of intelligence, can we have any complaint against him after
this frank statement? Or can any one now imagine that a real proof has
been given for the Eternity of the Universe? Or can Aristotle, or any
one else, believe that a theorem, though fully proved, would not be
acceptable unless the arguments of the opponents were fully refuted? We
must also take into consideration that Aristotle describes this theory
as his opinion, and his proofs as arguments. Is Aristotle ignorant of
the difference between argument and proof? between opinions, which may
be received more or less favourably, and truths capable of
demonstration? or would rhetorical appeal to the impartiality of
opponents have been required for the support of his theory if a real
proof had been given? Certainly not. Aristotle only desires to show
that his theory is better than those of his opponents, who hold that
philosophical speculation leads to the conviction that the heavens are
transient, but have never been entirely without existence; or that the
heavens have had a beginning, but are indestructible; or to defend any
of the other views mentioned by him. In this he is undoubtedly right;
for his opinion is nearer the truth than theirs, so far as a proof can
be taken from the nature of existing things; we differ from him, as
will be explained. Passion, that exercises great influence in most of
the different sects, must have influenced even the philosophers who
wished to affirm that Aristotle demonstrated his theory by proof.
Perhaps they really believe it, and assume that Aristotle himself was
not aware of it, as it was only discovered after his death! My
conviction is, that what Aristotle says on the Eternity of the
Universe, the cause of the variety in the motion of the spheres and the
order of the Intelligences, cannot be proved, and that Aristotle never
intended to prove these things. I agree with him that the ways of
proving this theory have their gates closed before us, there being no
foundation on which to build up the proof. His words on this subject
are well known. He says, “There are things concerning which we are
unable to reason, or which we find too high for us; to say why these
things have a certain property is as difficult as to decide whether the
Universe is eternal or not.” So far Aristotle. The interpretation which
Abu-nasr offers of this parallel is well known. He denies that
Aristotle had any doubt about the Eternity of the Universe, and is very
severe upon Galen, who maintains that this theory is still doubtful,
and that no proof has been offered. According to Abu-nasr, it is clear
and demonstrable by proof that the heavens are eternal, but all that is
enclosed within the heavens is transient. We hold, that by none of the
methods mentioned in this chapter can a theory be established, refuted,
or shaken.
We have mentioned these things only because we know that the majority
of those who consider themselves wise, although they know nothing of
science, accept the theory of the Eternity of the Universe on the
authority of famous scholars. They reject the words of the prophets,
because the latter do not employ any scientific method by which only a
few persons would be instructed who are intellectually well prepared,
but simply communicate the truth as received by Divine inspiration.
In the chapters which follow we will expound the theory of the Creation
in accordance with the teaching of Scripture.
CHAPTER XVI
In this chapter I will first expound my view on this question, and then
support it by argument—not by such arguments as those of the
Mutakallemim, who believe that they have proved the Creatio ex nihilo.
I will not deceive myself, and consider dialectical methods as proofs;
and the fact that a certain proposition has been proved by a
dialectical argument will never induce me to accept that proposition,
but, on the contrary, will weaken my faith in it, and cause me to doubt
it. For when we understand the fallacy of a proof, our faith in the
proposition itself is shaken. It is therefore better that a proposition
which cannot be demonstrated be received as an axiom, or that one of
the two opposite solutions of the problem be accepted on authority. The
methods by which the Mutakallemim proved the Creatio ex nihilo have
already been described by me, and I have exposed their weak points. As
to the proofs of Aristotle and his followers for the Eternity of the
Universe, they are, according to my opinion, not conclusive; they are
open to strong objections, as will be explained. I intend to show that
the theory of the Creation, as taught in Scripture, contains nothing
that is impossible; and that all those philosophical arguments which
seem to disprove our view contain weak points which make them
inconclusive, and render the attacks on our view untenable. Since I am
convinced of the correctness of my method, and consider either of the
two theories—viz., the Eternity of the Universe, and the Creation—as
admissible, I accept the latter on the authority of Prophecy, which can
teach things beyond the reach of philosophical speculation. For the
belief in prophecy is, as will be shown in the course of this treatise,
consistent even with the belief in the Eternity of the Universe. When I
have established the admissibility of our theory, I will, by
philosophical reasoning, show that our theory of the Creation is more
acceptable than that of the Eternity of the Universe; and although our
theory includes points open to criticism, I will show that there are
much stronger reasons for the rejection of the theory of our opponents.
I will now proceed to expound the method by which the proofs given for
the Eternity of the Universe can be refuted.
CHAPTER XVII
Everything produced comes into existence from non-existence; even when
the substance of a thing has been in existence, and has only changed
its form, the thing itself, which has gone through the process of
genesis and development, and has arrived at its final state, has now
different properties from those which it possessed at the commencement
of the transition from potentiality to reality, or before that time.
Take, e.g., the human ovum as contained in the female’s blood when
still included in its vessels; its nature is different from what it was
in the moment of conception, when it is met by the semen of the male
and begins to develop; the properties of the semen in that moment are
different from the properties of the living being after its birth when
fully developed. It is therefore quite impossible to infer from the
nature which a thing possesses after having passed through all stages
of its development, what the condition of the thing has been in the
moment when this process commenced; nor does the condition of a thing
in this moment show what its previous condition has been. If you make
this mistake, and attempt to prove the nature of a thing in potential
existence by its properties when actually existing, you will fall into
great confusion; you will reject evident truths and admit false
opinions. Let us assume, in our above instance, that a man born without
defect had after his birth been nursed by his mother only a few months;
the mother then died, and the father alone brought him up in a lonely
island, till he grew up, became wise, and acquired knowledge. Suppose
this man has never seen a woman or any female being; he asks some
person how man has come into existence, and how he has developed, and
receives the following answer: “Man begins his existence in the womb of
an individual of his own class, namely, in the womb of a female, which
has a certain form. While in the womb he is very small; yet he has
life, moves, receives nourishment, and gradually grows, till he arrives
at a certain stage of development. He then leaves the womb and
continues to grow till he is in the condition in which you see him.”
The orphan will naturally ask: “Did this person, when he lived, moved,
and grew in the womb, eat and drink, and breathe with his mouth and his
nostrils? Did he excrete any substance?” The answer will be, “No.”
Undoubtedly he will then attempt to refute the statements of that
person, and to prove their impossibility, by referring to the
properties of a fully developed person, in the following manner: “When
any one of us is deprived of breath for a short time he dies, and
cannot move any longer: how then can we imagine that any one of us has
been inclosed in a bag in the midst of a body for several months and
remained alive, able to move? If any one of us would swallow a living
bird, the bird would die immediately when it reached the stomach, much
more so when it came to the lower part of the belly; if we should not
take food or drink with our mouth, in a few days we should undoubtedly
be dead: how then can man remain alive for months without taking food?
If any person would take food and would not be able to excrete it,
great pains and death would follow in a short time, and yet I am to
believe that man has lived for months without that function! Suppose by
accident a hole were formed in the belly of a person, it would prove
fatal, and yet we are to believe that the navel of the fœtus has been
open! Why should the fœtus not open the eyes, spread forth the hands
and stretch out the legs, if, as you think, the limbs are all whole and
perfect.” This mode of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that man
cannot come into existence and develop in the manner described.
If philosophers would consider this example well and reflect on it,
they would find that it represents exactly the dispute between
Aristotle and ourselves. We, the followers of Moses, our Teacher, and
of Abraham, our Father, believe that the Universe has been produced and
has developed in a certain manner, and that it has been created in a
certain order. The Aristotelians oppose us, and found their objections
on the properties which the things in the Universe possess when in
actual existence and fully developed. We admit the existence of these
properties, but hold that they are by no means the same as those which
the things possessed in the moment of their production; and we hold
that these properties themselves have come into existence from absolute
non-existence. Their arguments are therefore no objection whatever to
our theory; they have demonstrative force only against those who hold
that the nature of things as at present in existence proves the
Creation. But this is not my opinion.
I will now return to our theme, viz., to the description of the
principal proofs of Aristotle, and show that they prove nothing
whatever against us, since we hold that God brought the entire Universe
into existence from absolute non-existence, and that He caused it to
develop into the present state. Aristotle says that the materia prima
is eternal, and by referring to the properties of transient beings he
attempts to prove this statement, and to show that the materia prima
could not possibly have been produced. He is right; we do not maintain
that the materia prima has been produced in the same manner as man is
produced from the ovum, and that it can be destroyed in the same manner
as man is reduced to dust. But we believe that God created it from
nothing, and that since its creation it has its own properties, viz.,
that all things are produced of it and again reduced to it, when they
cease to exist; that it does not exist without Form; and that it is the
source of all genesis and destruction. Its genesis is not like that of
the things produced from it, nor its destruction like theirs; for it
has been created from nothing, and if it should please the Creator, He
might reduce it to absolutely nothing. The same applies to motion.
Aristotle founds some of his proofs on the fact that motion is not
subject to genesis or destruction. This is correct; if we consider
motion as it exists at present, we cannot imagine that in its totality
it should be subject, like individual motions, to genesis and
destruction. In like manner Aristotle is correct in saying that
circular motion is without beginning, in so far as seeing the rotating
spherical body in actual existence, we cannot conceive the idea that
that rotation has ever been absent. The same argument we employ as
regards the law that a state of potentiality precedes all actual
genesis. This law applies to the Universe as it exists at present, when
everything produced originates in another thing; but nothing perceived
with our senses or comprehended in our mind can prove that a thing
created from nothing must have been previously in a state of
potentiality. Again, as regards the theory that the heavens contain no
opposites [and are therefore indestructible], we admit its correctness;
but we do not maintain that the production of the heavens has taken
place in the same way as that of a horse or ass, and we do not say that
they are like plants and animals, which are destructible on account of
the opposite elements they contain. In short, the properties of things
when fully developed contain no clue as to what have been the
properties of the things before their perfection. We therefore do not
reject as impossible the opinion of those who say that the heavens were
produced before the earth, or the reverse, or that the heavens have
existed without stars, or that certain species of animals have been in
existence, and others not. For the state of the whole Universe when it
came into existence may be compared with that of animals when their
existence begins; the heart evidently precedes the testicles, the veins
are in existence before the bones; although, when the animal is fully
developed, none of the parts is missing which is essential to its
existence. This remark is not superfluous, if the Scriptural account of
the Creation be taken literally; in reality, it cannot be taken
literally, as will be shown when we shall treat of this subject.
The principle laid down in the foregoing must be well understood; it is
a high rampart erected round the Law, and able to resist all missiles
directed against it. Aristotle, or rather his followers, may perhaps
ask us how we know that the Universe has been created; and that other
forces than those it has at present were acting in its Creation, since
we hold that the properties of the Universe, as it exists at present,
prove nothing as regards its creation? We reply, there is no necessity
for this according to our plan; for we do not desire to prove the
Creation, but only its possibility; and this possibility is not refuted
by arguments based on the nature of the present Universe, which we do
not dispute. When we have established the admissibility of our theory,
we shall then show its superiority. In attempting to prove the
inadmissibility of Creatio ex nihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore
not derive any support from the nature of the Universe; they must
resort to the notion our mind has formed of God. Their proofs include
the three methods which I have mentioned above, and which are based on
the notion conceived of God. In the next chapter I will expose the weak
points of these arguments, and show that they really prove nothing.
CHAPTER XVIII
The first method employed by the philosophers is this: they assume that
a transition from potentiality to actuality would take place in the
Deity itself, if He produced a thing only at a certain fixed time. The
refutation of this argument is very easy. The argument applies only to
bodies composed of substance—the element that possesses the possibility
[of change]—and form; for when such a body does not act for some time,
and then acts by virtue of its form, it must undoubtedly have possessed
something in potentia that hath now become actual, and the transition
can only have been effected by some external agent. As far as corporeal
bodies are concerned, this has been fully proved. But that which is
incorporeal and without substance does not include anything merely
possible; everything it contains is always in existence. The above
argument does not apply to it, and it is not impossible that such a
being acts at one time and does not act at another. This does not imply
a change in the incorporeal being itself nor a transition from
potentiality to actuality. The Active Intellect may be taken as an
illustration. According to Aristotle and his school, the Active
Intellect, an incorporeal being, acts at one time and does not act at
another, as has been shown by Abu-nasr in his treatise on the
Intellect. He says there quite correctly as follows: “It is an evident
fact that the Active Intellect does not act continually, but only at
times.” And yet he does not say that the Active Intellect is
changeable, or passes from a state of potentiality to that of
actuality, although it produces at one time something which it has not
produced before. For there is no relation or comparison whatever
between corporeal and incorporeal beings, neither in the moment of
action nor in that of inaction. It is only by homonymity that the term
“action” is used in reference to the forms residing in bodies, and also
in reference to absolutely spiritual beings. The circumstance that a
purely spiritual being does not effect at one time that which it
effects at another, does not necessitate a transition from potentiality
to actuality; such a transition is necessary in the case of forces
connected with bodies. It might, perhaps, be objected that our argument
is, to some extent, a fallacy; since it is not due to anything
contained in the Active Intellect itself, but to the absence of
substances sufficiently prepared for its action, that at times it does
not act; it does act always when substances sufficiently prepared are
present, and, when the action does not continue, it is owing to the
absence of substance sufficiently prepared, and not to any change in
the Intellect. I answer that it is not our intention to state the
reason why God created at one time and not at another; and, in
referring to the Active Intellect as a parallel, we do not mean to
assert that God acts at one time and not at another, in the same manner
as the Active Intellect, an absolutely spiritual being, acts
intermittently. We do not make this assertion, and, if we did, the
conclusion would be fallacious. What we infer, and what we are
justified in inferring, is this: the Active Intellect is neither a
corporeal object nor a force residing in a body; it acts
intermittently, and yet whatever the cause may be why it does not
always act, we do not say that the Active Intellect has passed from a
state of potentiality to that of actuality; or that it implies the
possibility [of change], or that an agent must exist that causes the
transition from potentiality to actuality. We have thus refuted the
strong objection raised by those who believe in the Eternity of the
Universe; since we believe that God is neither a corporeal body nor a
force residing in a body, we need not assume that the Creation, after a
period of inaction, is due to a change in the Creator Himself.
The second method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is
based on the theory that all wants, changes, and obstacles are absent
from the Essence of God. Our refutation of this proof, which is both
difficult and profound, is this. Every being that is endowed with free
will and performs certain acts in reference to another being,
necessarily interrupts those acts at one time or another, in
consequence of some obstacles or changes. E.g., a person desires to
have a house, but he does not build one, because he meets with some
obstacles: he has not the material, or he has the material, but it is
not prepared for the purpose on account of the absence of proper
instruments; or he has material and instruments, and yet does not build
a house, because he does not desire to build it; since he feels no want
for a refuge. When changed circumstances, as heat or cold, impel him to
seek a refuge, then he desires to build a house. Thus changed
circumstances change his will, and the will, when it meets with
obstacles, is not carried into effect. This, however, is only the case
when the causes of the actions are external; but when the action has no
other purpose whatever than to fulfil the will, then the will does not
depend on the existence of favourable circumstances. The being endowed
with this will need not act continually even in the absence of all
obstacles, because there does not exist anything for the sake of which
it acts, and which, in the absence of all obstacles, would necessitate
the action: the act simply follows the will. But, some might ask, even
if we admit the correctness of all this, is not change imputed in the
fact that the will of the being exists at one time and not at another?
I reply thus: The true essence of the will of a being is simply the
faculty of conceiving a desire at one time and not conceiving it at
another. In the case of corporeal beings, the will which aims at a
certain external object changes according to obstacles and
circumstances. But the will of an absolutely spiritual being which does
not depend on external causes is unchangeable, and the fact that the
being desires one thing one day and another thing another day, does not
imply a change in the essence of that being, or necessitate the
existence of an external cause [for this change in the desire].
Similarly it has been shown by us that if a being acted at one time and
did not act at another, this would not involve a change in the being
itself. It is now clear that the term “will” is homonymously used of
man’s will and of the will of God, there being no comparison whatever
between God’s will and that of man. The objection is refuted, and our
theory is not shaken by it. This is all we desire to establish.
The third method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is
this: whatever the wisdom of God finds necessary to produce is produced
eo ipso; but this wisdom, being His Essence, is eternal, and that which
results from His wisdom must be eternal. This is a very weak argument.
As we do not understand why the wisdom of God produced nine spheres,
neither more nor less, or why He fixed the number and size of the stars
exactly as they are; so we cannot understand why His wisdom at a
certain time caused the Universe to exist, whilst a short time before
it had not been in existence. All things owe their existence to His
eternal and constant wisdom, but we are utterly ignorant of the ways
and methods of that wisdom, since, according to our opinion [that God
has no attributes], His will is identical with His wisdom, and all His
attributes are one and the same thing, namely, His Essence or Wisdom.
More will be said on this question in the section on Providence. Thus
this objection to our theory falls likewise to the ground.
There is no evidence for the theory of the Eternity of the Universe,
neither in the fact cited by Aristotle of the general consent of the
ancient peoples when they describe the heavens as the habitation of the
angels and of God, nor in the apparent concurrence of Scriptural texts
with this belief. These facts merely prove that the heavens lead us to
believe in the existence of the Intelligences, i.e., ideals and angels,
and that these lead us to believe in the existence of God; for He sets
them in motion, and rules them. We will explain and show that there is
no better evidence for the existence of a Creator, as we believe, than
that furnished by the heavens; but also according to the opinion of the
philosophers, as has been mentioned by us, they give evidence that a
being exists that sets them in motion, and that this being is neither a
corporeal body nor a force residing in a body.
Having proved that our theory is admissible, and not impossible, as
those who defend the Eternity of the Universe assert, I will, in the
chapters which follow, show that our theory is preferable from a
philosophical point of view, and expose the absurdities implied in the
theory of Aristotle.
CHAPTER XIX
It has been shown that according to Aristotle, and according to all
that defend his theory, the Universe is inseparable from God; He is the
cause, and the Universe the effect; and this effect is a necessary one;
and as it cannot be explained why or how God exists in this particular
manner, namely, being One and incorporeal, so it cannot be asked
concerning the whole Universe why or how it exists in this particular
way. For it is necessary that the whole, the cause as well as the
effect, exist in this particular manner, it is impossible for them not
to exist, or to be different from what they actually are. This leads to
the conclusion that the nature of everything remains constant, that
nothing changes its nature in any way, and that such a change is
impossible in any existing thing. It would also follow that the
Universe is not the result of design, choice, and desire; for if this
were the case, they would have been non-existing before the design had
been conceived.
We, however, hold that all things in the Universe are the result of
design, and not merely of necessity; He who designed them may change
them when He changes His design. But not every design is subject to
change; for there are things which are impossible, and their nature
cannot be altered, as will be explained. Here, in this chapter, I
merely wish to show by arguments almost as forcible as real proofs,
that the Universe gives evidence of design; but I will not fall into
the error in which the Mutakallemim have so much distinguished
themselves, namely, of ignoring the existing nature of things or
assuming the existence of atoms, or the successive creation of
accidents, or any of their propositions which I have tried to explain,
and which are intended to establish the principle of Divine selection.
You must not, however, think that they understood the principle in the
same sense as we do, although they undoubtedly aimed at the same thing,
and mentioned the same things which we also will mention, when they
treated of Divine Selection. For they do not distinguish between
selection in the case of a plant to make it red and not white, or sweet
and not bitter, and determination in the case of the heavens which gave
them their peculiar geometrical form and did not give them a triangular
or quadrilateral shape. The Mutakallemim established the principle of
determination by means of their propositions, which have been
enumerated above (Part I., chap. lxxiii.). I will establish this
principle only as far as necessary, and only by philosophical
propositions based on the nature of things. But before I begin my
argument, I will state the following facts: Matter is common to things
different from each other; there must be either one external cause
which endows this matter partly with one property, partly with another,
or there must be as many different causes as there are different forms
of the matter common to all things. This is admitted by those who
assume the Eternity of the Universe. After having premised this
proposition, I will proceed with the discussion of our theme from an
Aristotelian point of view, in form of a dialogue.
We.—You have proved that all things in the sublunary world have one
common substance; why then do the species of things vary? why are the
individuals in each species different from each other?
Aristotelian.—Because the composition of the things formed of that
substance varies. For the common substance at first received four
different forms, and each form was endowed with two qualities, and
through these four qualities the substance was turned into the elements
of which all things are formed. The composition of the elements takes
place in the following manner:—First they are mixed in consequence of
the motion of the spheres, and then they combine together; a cause for
variation arises then in the variation of the degree of heat, cold,
moisture, and dryness of the elements which form the constituent parts
of the things. By these different combinations things are variously
predisposed to receive different forms; and these in their turn are
again prepared to receive other forms, and so on. Each generic form
finds a wide sphere in its substance both as regards quality and
quantity; and the individuals of the classes vary accordingly. This is
fully explained in Natural Science. It is quite correct and clear to
every one that readily acknowledges the truth, and does not wish to
deceive himself.
We.—Since the combination of the elements prepares substances and
enables them to receive different forms, what has prepared the first
substance and caused one part of it to receive the form of fire,
another part the form of earth, and the parts between these two the
forms of water and of air, since one substance is common to all?
Through what has the substance of earth become more fit for the form of
earth, and the substance of fire more fit for that of fire?
Ar.—The difference of the elements was caused by their different
position; for the different places prepared the same substance
differently, in the following way: the portion nearest the surrounding
sphere became more rarified and swifter in motion, and thus approaching
the nature of that sphere, it received by this preparation the form of
fire. The farther the substance is away from the surrounding sphere
towards the centre, the denser, the more solid, and the less luminous
it is; it becomes earth; the same is the cause of the formation of
water and air. This is necessarily so; for it would be absurd to deny
that each part of the substance is in a certain place; or to assume
that the surface is identical with the centre, or the centre with the
surface. This difference in place determined the different forms, i.e.,
predisposed the substance to receive different forms.
We.—Is the substance of the surrounding sphere, i.e., the heavens, the
same as that of the elements?
Ar.—No; the substance is different, and the forms are different. The
term “body” is homonymously used of these bodies below and of the
heavens, as has been shown by modern philosophers. All this has been
demonstrated by proof.
But let now the reader of this treatise hear what I have to say.
Aristotle has proved that the difference of forms becomes evident by
the difference of actions. Since, therefore, the motion of the elements
is rectilinear, and that of the spheres circular, we infer that the
substances are different. This inference is supported by Natural
Science. When we further notice that substances with rectilinear motion
differ in their directions, that some move upward, some downward, and
that substances which move in the same direction have different
velocities, we infer that their forms must be different. Thus we learn
that there are four elements. In the same way we come to the conclusion
that the substance of all the spheres is the same, since they all have
circular motion. Their forms, however, are different, since one sphere
moves from east to west, and another from west to east; and their
motions have also different velocities. We can now put the following
question to Aristotle: There is one substance common to all spheres;
each one has its own peculiar form. Who thus determined and predisposed
these spheres to receive different forms? Is there above the spheres
any being capable of determining this except God? I will show the
profundity and the extraordinary acumen which Aristotle displayed when
this question troubled him. He strove very hard to meet this objection
with arguments, which, however, were not borne out by facts. Although
he does not mention this objection, it is clear from his words that he
endeavours to show the nature of the spheres, as he has shown that of
the things in the sublunary world. Everything is, according to him, the
result of a law of Nature, and not the result of the design of a being
that designs as it likes, or the determination of a being that
determines as it pleases. He has not carried out the idea consistently,
and it will never be done. He tries indeed to find the cause why the
sphere moves from east and not from west; why some spheres move with
greater velocity, others with less velocity, and he finds the cause of
these differences in their different positions in reference to the
uppermost sphere. He further attempts to show why there are several
spheres for each of the seven planets, while there is only one sphere
for the large number of fixed stars. For all this he endeavours to
state the reason, so as to show that the whole order is the necessary
result of the laws of Nature. He has not attained his object. For as
regards the things in the sublunary world, his explanations are in
accordance with facts, and the relation between cause and effect is
clearly shown. It can therefore be assumed that everything is the
necessary result of the motions and influences of the spheres. But when
he treats of the properties of the spheres, he does not clearly show
the causal relation, nor does he explain the phenomena in that
systematic way which the hypothesis of natural laws would demand. For
let us consider the spheres: in one case a sphere with greater velocity
is above a sphere with less velocity, in another case we notice the
reverse; in a third case there are two spheres with equal velocities,
one above the other. There are, besides, other phenomena which speak
strongly against the hypothesis that all is regulated by the laws of
Nature, and I will devote a special chapter to the discussion of these
phenomena. In short, there is no doubt that Aristotle knew the weakness
of his arguments in tracing and describing the cause of all these
things, and therefore he prefaces his researches on these things as
follows:—“We will now thoroughly investigate two problems, which it is
our proper duty to investigate and to discuss according to our
capacity, wisdom, and opinion. This our attempt must not be attributed
to presumption and pride, but to our extraordinary zeal in the study of
philosophy; when we attempt the highest and grandest problems, and
endeavour to offer some proper solution, every one that hears it should
rejoice and be pleased.” So far Aristotle. This shows that he
undoubtedly knew the weakness of his theory. How much weaker must it
appear when we bear in mind that the science of Astronomy was not yet
fully developed, and that in the days of Aristotle the motions of the
spheres were not known so well as they are at present. I think that it
was the object of Aristotle in attributing in his Metaphysics one
Intelligence to every sphere, to assume the existence of something
capable of determining the peculiar course of each sphere. Later on I
will show that he has not gained anything thereby; but now I will
explain the words, “according to our capacity, wisdom, and opinion,”
occurring in the passage which we quoted. I have not noticed that any
of the commentators explain them. The term “our opinion” refers to the
principle that everything is the result of natural laws, or to the
theory of the Eternity of the Universe. By “our wisdom” he meant the
knowledge of that which is clear and generally accepted, viz., that the
existence of every one of these things is due to a certain cause, and
not to chance. By “our capacity” he meant the insufficiency of our
intellect to find the causes of all these things. He only intended to
trace the causes for a few of them; and so he did. For he gives an
excellent reason why the sphere of the fixed stars moves slowly, while
the other spheres move with greater velocity, namely, because its
motion is in a different direction [from the uppermost sphere]. He
further says that the more distant a sphere is from the eighth sphere
the greater is its velocity. But this rule does not hold good in all
cases, as I have already explained (p. 174). More forcible still is the
following objection: There are spheres below the eighth that move from
east to west. Of these each upper one, according to this rule, would
have a greater velocity than the lower one; and the velocity of these
spheres would almost equal that of the ninth sphere. But Astronomy had,
in the days of Aristotle, not yet developed to the height it has
reached at present.
According to our theory of the Creation, all this can easily be
explained; for we say that there is a being that determines the
direction and the velocity of the motion of each sphere; but we do not
know the reason why the wisdom of that being gave to each sphere its
peculiar property. If Aristotle had been able to state the cause of the
difference in the motion of the spheres, and show that it corresponded
as he thought to their relative positions, this would have been
excellent, and the variety in their motions would be explained in the
same way as the variety of the elements, by their relative position
between the centre and the surface; but this is not the case, as I said
before.
There is a phenomenon in the spheres which more clearly shows the
existence of voluntary determination; it cannot be explained otherwise
than by assuming that some being designed it: this phenomenon is the
existence of the stars. The fact that the sphere is constantly in
motion, while the stars remain stationary, indicates that the substance
of the stars is different from that of the spheres. Abu-nasr has
already mentioned the fact in his additions to the Physics of
Aristotle. He says: “There is a difference between the stars and the
spheres; for the spheres are transparent, the stars are opaque; and the
cause of this is that there is a difference, however small it may be,
between their substances and forms.” So far Abu-nasr. But I do not say
that there is a small difference, but a very great difference; because
I do not infer it from the transparency of the spheres, but from their
motions. I am convinced that there are three different kinds of
substance, with three different forms, namely:—(1) Bodies which never
move of their own accord; such are the bodies of the stars; (2) bodies
which always move, such are the bodies of the spheres; (3) bodies which
both move and rest, such are the elements. Now, I ask, what has united
these two bodies, which, according to my opinion, differ very much from
each other, though, according to Abu-nasr, only a little? Who has
prepared the bodies for this union? In short, it would be strange that,
without the existence of design, one of two different bodies should be
joined to the other in such a manner that it is fixed to it in a
certain place but does not combine with it. It is still more difficult
to explain the existence of the numerous stars in the eighth sphere;
they are all spherical; some of them are large, some small; here we
notice two stars apparently distant from each other one cubit; there a
group of ten close together; whilst in another place there is a large
space without any star. What determined that the one small part should
have ten stars, and the other portion should be without any star? and
the whole body of the sphere being uniform throughout, why should a
particular star occupy the one place and not another? The answer to
these and similar questions is very difficult, and almost impossible,
if we assume that all emanates from God as the necessary result of
certain permanent laws, as Aristotle holds. But if we assume that all
this is the result of design, there is nothing strange or improbable;
and the only question to be asked is this: What is the cause of this
design? The answer to this question is that all this has been made for
a certain purpose, though we do not know it; there is nothing that is
done in vain, or by chance. It is well known that the veins and nerves
of an individual dog or ass are not the result of chance; their
magnitude is not determined by chance; nor is it by chance, but for a
certain purpose, that one vein is thick, another thin; that one nerve
has many branches, another has none; that one goes down straight,
whilst another is bent; it is well known that all this must be just as
it is. How, then, can any reasonable person imagine that the position,
magnitude, and number of the stars, or the various courses of their
spheres, are purposeless, or the result of chance? There is no doubt
that every one of these things is necessary and in accordance with a
certain design; and it is extremely improbable that these things should
be the necessary result of natural laws, and not that of design.
The best proof for design in the Universe I find in the different
motions of the spheres, and in the fixed position of the stars in the
spheres. For this reason you find all the prophets point to the spheres
and stars when they want to prove that there must exist a Divine Being.
Thus Abraham reflected on the stars, as is well known; Isaiah (xl. 26)
exhorts to learn from them the existence of God, and says, “Lift up
your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things?” Jeremiah
[calls God] “The Maker of the heavens”; Abraham calls Him “The God of
the heavens” (Gen. xxiv. 7); [Moses], the chief of the Prophets, uses
the phrase explained by us (Part I., chap, lxx.), “He who rideth on the
heavens” (Deut. xxxiii. 26). The proof taken from the heavens is
convincing; for the variety of things in the sublunary world, though
their substance is one and the same, can be explained as the work of
the influences of the spheres, or the result of the variety in the
position of the substance in relation to the spheres, as has been shown
by Aristotle. But who has determined the variety in the spheres and the
stars, if not the Will of God? To say that the Intelligences have
determined it is of no use whatever; for the Intelligences are not
corporeal, and have no local relation to the spheres. Why then should
the one sphere in its desire to approach the Intelligence, move
eastward, and another westward? Is the one Intelligence in the east,
the other in the west? or why does one move with great velocity,
another slowly? This difference is not in accordance with their
distances from each other, as is well known. We must then say that the
nature and essence of each sphere necessitated its motion in a certain
direction, and in a certain manner, as the consequence of its desire to
approach its Intelligence. Aristotle clearly expresses this opinion. We
thus have returned to the part from which we started; and we ask, Since
the substance of all things is the same, what made the nature of one
portion different from another? Why has this sphere a desire which
produces a motion different from that which the desire of another
sphere produces? This must have been done by an agent capable of
determining. We have thus been brought to examine two questions:—(1) Is
it necessary to assume that the variety of the things in the Universe
is the result of Design, and not of fixed laws of Nature, or is it not
necessary? (2) Assuming that all this is the result of Design, does it
follow that it has been created after not having existed, or does
Creatio ex nihilo not follow, and has the Being which has determined
all this done always so? Some of those who believe in the Eternity of
the Universe hold the last opinion. I will now begin the examination of
these two questions, and explain them as much as necessary in the
following chapters.
CHAPTER XX
According to Aristotle, none of the products of Nature are due to
chance. His proof is this: That which is due to chance does not
reappear constantly nor frequently, but all products of Nature reappear
either constantly or at least frequently. The heavens, with all that
they contain, are constant; they never change, as has been explained,
neither as regards their essence nor as regards their place. But in the
sublunary world we find both things which are constant and things which
reappear frequently [though not constantly]. Thus, e.g., the heat of
fire and the downward tendency of a stone are constant properties,
whilst the form and life of the individuals in each species are the
same in most cases. All this is clear. If the parts of the Universe are
not accidental, how can the whole Universe be considered as the result
of chance? Therefore the existence of the Universe is not due to
chance. The following is, in short, the objection which Aristotle
raises against one of the earlier philosophers who assumed that the
Universe is the result of chance, and that it came into existence by
itself, without any cause. Some assume that the heavens and the whole
Universe came into existence spontaneously, as well as the rotation and
motion [of the spheres], which has produced the variety of things and
established their present order. This opinion implies a great
absurdity. They admit that animals and plants do not owe their
existence or production to chance, but to a certain cause, be that
cause Nature, or reason, or the like; e.g., they do not assume that
everything might be formed by chance of a certain seed or semen, but
that of a certain seed only an olive-tree is produced, and of a certain
semen only a human being is developed. And yet they think that the
heavens, and those bodies which appear divine among the rest of bodies,
came into existence spontaneously, without the action of any such cause
as produces plants and animals. Having thus examined this theory,
Aristotle then proceeds to refute it at greater length. It is therefore
clear that Aristotle believes and proves that things in real existence
are not accidental; they cannot be accidental, because they are
essential, i.e., there is a cause which necessitates that they should
be in their actual condition, and on account of that cause they are
just as they in reality are. This has been proved, and it is the
opinion of Aristotle. But I do not think that, according to Aristotle,
the rejection of the spontaneous origin of things implies the admission
of Design and Will. For as it is impossible to reconcile two opposites,
so it is impossible to reconcile the two theories, that of necessary
existence by causality, and that of Creation by the desire and will of
a Creator. For the necessary existence assumed by Aristotle must be
understood in this sense, that for everything that is not the product
of work there must be a certain cause that produces it with its
properties; for this cause there is another cause, and for the second a
third, and so on. The series of causes ends with the Prime Cause, from
which everything derives existence, since it is impossible that the
series should continue ad infinitum. He nevertheless does not mean to
say that the existence of the Universe is the necessary product of the
Creator, i.e., the Prime Cause, in the same manner as the shadow is
caused by a body, or heat by fire, or light by the sun. Only those who
do not comprehend his words attribute such ideas to him. He uses here
the term necessary in the same sense as we use the term when we say
that the existence of the intellectus necessarily implies that of the
intellectum, for the former is the efficient cause of the latter in so
far as intellectum. Even Aristotle holds that the Prime Cause is the
highest and most perfect Intellect; he therefore says that the First
Cause is pleased, satisfied, and delighted with that which necessarily
derives existence from Him, and it is impossible that He should wish it
to be different. But we do not call this “design,” and it has nothing
in common with design. E.g., man is pleased, satisfied, and delighted
that he is endowed with eyes and hands, and it is impossible that he
should desire it to be otherwise, and yet the eyes and hands which a
man has are not the result of his design, and it is not by his own
determination that he has certain properties and is able to perform
certain actions. The notion of design and determination applies only to
things not yet in existence, when there is still the possibility of
their being in accordance with the design or not. I do not know whether
the modern Aristotelians understood his words to imply that the
existence of the Universe presupposes some cause in the sense of design
and determination, or whether, in opposition to him, they assumed
design and determination, in the belief that this does not conflict
with the theory of the Eternity of the Universe.
Having explained this, I will now proceed to examine the opinions of
the modern philosophers.
CHAPTER XXI
Some of the recent philosophers who adhere to the theory of the
Eternity of the Universe hold that God produces the Universe, that He
by His will designs and determines its existence and form; they reject,
however, the theory that this act took place at one certain time, and
assume that this always has been the case, and will always be so. The
circumstance that we cannot imagine an agent otherwise than preceding
the result of its action, they explain by the fact that this is
invariably the case in all that we produce; because for agents of the
same kind as we are, there are some moments in which they are not
active, and are only agents in potentia; they become agents when they
act. But as regards God there are no moments of non-action, or of
potentiality in any respect; He is not before His work, He is always an
actual agent. And as there is a great difference between His essence
and ours, so is also a great difference between the relation of His
work to Him and the relation of our work to us. They apply the same
argument to will and determination; for there is no difference in this
respect whether we say He acts, wills, designs, or determines. They
further assume that change in His action or will is inadmissible. It is
therefore clear that these philosophers abandoned the term “necessary
result,” but retained the theory of it; they perhaps sought to use a
better expression, or to remove an objectionable term. For it is the
same thing, whether we say in accordance with the view of Aristotle
that the Universe is the result of the Prime Cause, and must be eternal
as that Cause is eternal, or in accordance with these philosophers that
the Universe is the result of the act, design, will, selection, and
determination of God, but it has always been so, and will always be so;
in the same manner as the rising of the sun undoubtedly produces the
day, and yet it does not precede it. But when we speak of design we do
not mean it in this sense; we mean to express by it that the Universe
is not the “necessary result” of God’s existence, as the effect is the
necessary result of the efficient cause; in the latter case the effect
cannot be separated from the cause; it cannot change unless the cause
changes entirely, or at least in some respect. If we accept this
explanation we easily see how absurd it is to say that the Universe is
in the same relation to God as the effect is to the efficient cause,
and to assume at the same time that the Universe is the result of the
action and determination of God.
Having fully explained this subject, we come to the question whether
the cause, which must be assumed for the variety of properties noticed
in the heavenly beings, is merely an efficient cause, that must
necessarily produce that variety as its effect, or whether that variety
is due to a determining agent, such as we believe, in accordance with
the theory of Moses our Teacher. Before I discuss this question I will
first explain fully what Aristotle means by “necessary result”; after
that I will show by such philosophical arguments as are free from every
fallacy why I prefer the theory of Creatio ex nihilo. It is clear that
when he says that the first Intelligence is the necessary result of the
existence of God, the second Intelligence the result of the existence
of the first, the third of the second [and so on], and that the spheres
are the necessary result of the existence of the Intelligences, and so
forth, in the well-known order which you learnt from passages dealing
with it, and of which we have given a résumé in this part (ch. iv.)—he
does not mean that the one thing was first in existence, and then the
second came as the necessary result of the first; he denies that any
one of these beings has had a beginning. By “necessary result” he
merely refers to the causal relation; he means to say that the first
Intelligence is the cause of the existence of the second; the second of
the third, and so on to the last of the Intelligences; and the same is
also the case as regards the spheres and the materia prima; none of
these preceded another, or has been in existence without the existence
of that other. We say, e.g., that the necessary result of the primary
qualities are roughness [and] smoothness, hardness [and] softness,
porosity and solidity; and no person doubts that heat, cold, moisture,
and dryness are the causes of smoothness and roughness, of hardness and
softness, porosity and solidity, and similar qualities, and that the
latter are the necessary result of those four primary qualities. And
yet it is impossible that a body should exist with the primary
qualities without the secondary ones; for the relation between the two
sets of qualities is that of causality, not that of agent and its
product. Just in the same way the term “necessary result” is used by
Aristotle in reference to the whole Universe, when he says that one
portion is the result of the other, and continues the series up to the
First Cause as he calls it, or first Intellect, if you prefer this
term. For we all mean the same, only with this difference, that
according to Aristotle everything besides that Being is the necessary
result of the latter, as I have already mentioned; whilst, according to
our opinion, that Being created the whole Universe with design and
will, so that the Universe which had not been in existence before, has
by His will come into existence. I will now begin in the following
chapters my proofs for the superiority of our theory, that of Creatio
ex nihilo.
CHAPTER XXII
Aristotle and all philosophers assume as an axiom that a simple element
can only produce one simple thing, whilst a compound can produce as
many things as it contains simple elements; e.g., fire combines in
itself two properties, heat and dryness; it gives heat by the one
property, and produces dryness by the other: an object composed of
matter and form produces certain things on account of its matter, and
others on account of its form, if [both matter and form] consist of
several elements. In accordance with this axiom, Aristotle holds that
the direct emanation from God must be one simple Intelligence, and
nothing else.
A second axiom assumed by him is this: Things are not produced by other
things at random; there must be some relation between cause and effect.
Thus accidents are not produced by accidents promiscuously; quality
cannot be the origin of quantity, nor quantity that of quality; a form
cannot emanate from matter, nor matter from form.
A third axiom is this: A single agent that acts with design and will,
and not merely by the force of the laws of Nature, can produce
different objects.
A fourth axiom is as follows: An object, whose several elements are
only connected by juxtaposition, is more properly a compound than an
object whose different elements have entirely combined; e.g., bone,
flesh, veins, or nerves, are more simple than the hand or the foot,
that are a combination of bone, flesh, veins, and nerves. This is very
clear, and requires no further explanation.
Having premised these axioms, I ask the following question: Aristotle
holds that the first Intelligence is the cause of the second, the
second of the third, and so on, till the thousandth, if we assume a
series of that number. Now the first Intellect is undoubtedly simple.
How then can the compound form of existing things come from such an
Intellect by fixed laws of Nature, as Aristotle assumes? We admit all
he said concerning the Intelligences, that the further they are away
from the first, the greater is the variety of their compounds, in
consequence of the larger number of the objects comprehensible by the
Intelligences; but even after admitting this, the question remains, By
what law of Nature did the spheres emanate from the Intelligences? What
relation is there between material and immaterial beings? Suppose we
admit that each sphere emanates from an Intelligence of the form
mentioned; that the Intelligence, including, as it were, two elements,
in so far as it comprehends itself and another thing, produces the next
Intelligence by the one element, and a sphere by the other; but the
question would then be, how the one simple element could produce the
sphere, that contains two substances and two forms, namely, the
substance and the form of the sphere, and also the substance and the
form of the star fixed in that sphere. For, according to the laws of
Nature, the compound can only emanate from a compound. There must
therefore be one element, from which the body of the sphere emanates,
and another element, from which the body of the star emanates. This
would be necessary even if the substance of all stars were the same;
but it is possible that the luminous stars have not the same substance
as the non-luminous stars; it is besides well known that each body has
its own matter and its own form. It must now be clear that this
emanation could not have taken place by the force of the laws of
Nature, as Aristotle contends. Nor does the difference of the motions
of the spheres follow the order of their positions; and therefore it
cannot be said that this difference is the result of certain laws of
Nature. We have already mentioned this (ch. xix.).
There is in the properties of the spheres another circumstance that is
opposed to the assumed laws of Nature; namely, if the substance of all
spheres is the same, why does it not occur that the form of one sphere
combines with the substance of another sphere, as is the case with
things on earth, simply because their substance is fit [for such
changes]? If the substance of all spheres is the same, if it is not
assumed that each of them has a peculiar substance, and if, contrary to
all principles, the peculiar motion of each sphere is no evidence for
the special character of its substance, why then should a certain form
constantly remain united with a certain substance? Again, if the stars
have all one substance, by what are they distinguished from each other?
is it by forms? or by accidents? Whichever be the case, the forms or
the accidents would interchange, so that they would successively unite
with every one of the stars, so long as their substance [being the
same] admits the combinations [with every one of the forms or the
accidents]. This shows that the term substance, when used of the
spheres or the stars, does not mean the same as it signifies when used
of the substance of earthly things, but is applied to the two
synonymously. It further shows that every one of the bodies of the
spheres has its own peculiar form of existence different from that of
all other beings. Why then is circular motion common to all spheres,
and why is the fixed position of the stars in their respective spheres
common to all stars? If we, however, assume design and determination of
a Creator, in accordance with His incomprehensible wisdom, all these
difficulties disappear. They must arise when we consider the whole
Universe, not as the result of free will, but as the result of fixed
laws of Nature: a theory which, on the one hand, is not in harmony with
the existing order of things, and does not offer for it a sufficient
reason or argument; and, on the other hand, implies many and great
improbabilities. For, according to this theory, God, whose perfection
in every respect is recognised by all thinking persons, is in such a
relation to the Universe that He cannot change anything; if He wished
to make the wing of a fly longer, or to reduce the number of the legs
of a worm by one, He could not accomplish it. According to Aristotle,
He does not try such a thing, and it is wholly impossible for Him to
desire any change in the existing order of things; if He could, it
would not increase His perfection; it might, on the contrary, from some
point of view, diminish it.
Although I know that many partial critics will ascribe my opinion
concerning the theory of Aristotle to insufficient understanding, or to
intentional opposition, I will not refrain from stating in short the
results of my researches, however poor my capacities may be. I hold
that the theory of Aristotle is undoubtedly correct as far as the
things are concerned which exist between the sphere of the moon and the
centre of the earth. Only an ignorant person rejects it, or a person
with preconceived opinions of his own, which he desires to maintain and
to defend, and which lead him to ignore clear facts. But what Aristotle
says concerning things above the sphere of the moon is, with few
exceptions, mere imagination and opinion; to a still greater extent
this applies to his system of Intelligences, and to some of his
metaphysical views; they include great improbabilities, [promote] ideas
which all nations consider as evidently corrupt, and cause views to
spread which cannot be proved.
It may perhaps be asked why I have enumerated the doubts which can be
raised against the theory of Aristotle; whether by mere doubts a theory
can be overthrown, or its opposite established? This is certainly not
the case. But we treat this philosopher exactly as his followers tell
us to do. For Alexander stated that when a theory cannot be established
by proof, the two most opposite views should be compared as to the
doubts entertained concerning each of them, and that view which admits
of fewer doubts should be accepted. Alexander further says that this
rule applies to all those opinions of Aristotle in Metaphysics for
which he offered no proof. For those that followed Aristotle believed
that his opinions are far less subject to doubt than any other opinion.
We follow the same rule. Being convinced that the question whether the
heavens are eternal or not cannot be decided by proof, neither in the
affirmative nor in the negative, we have enumerated the objections
raised to either view, and shown how the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe is subject to stronger objections, and is more apt to corrupt
the notions concerning God [than the other]. Another argument can be
drawn from the fact that the theory of the Creation was held by our
Father Abraham, and by our Teacher Moses.
Having mentioned the method of testing the two theories by the
objections raised against them, I find it necessary to give some
further explanation of the subject.
CHAPTER XXIII
In comparing the objections raised against one theory with those raised
against the opposite theory, in order to decide in favour of the least
objectionable, we must not consider the number of the objections, but
the degree of improbability and of deviation from real facts [pointed
out by the objections]; for one objection may sometimes have more
weight than a thousand others. But the comparison cannot be trustworthy
unless the two theories be considered with the same interest, and if
you are predisposed in favour of one of them, be it on account of your
training or because of some advantage, you are too blind to see the
truth. For that which can be demonstrated you cannot reject, however
much you may be inclined against it; but in questions like those under
consideration you are apt to dispute [in consequence of your
inclination]. You will, however, be able to decide the question, as far
as necessary, if you free yourself from passions, ignore customs, and
follow only your reason. But many are the conditions which must be
fulfilled. First you must know your mental capacities and your natural
talents; you will find this out when you study all mathematical
sciences, and are well acquainted with Logic. Secondly, you must have a
thorough knowledge of Natural Science, that you may be able to
understand the nature of the objections. Thirdly, you must be morally
good. For if a person is voluptuous or passionate, and, loosening the
reins, allows his anger to pass the just limits, it makes no difference
whether he is so from nature or from habit, he will blunder and stumble
in his way, he will seek the theory which is in accordance with his
inclinations. I mention this lest you be deceived; for a person might
some day, by some objection which he raises, shake your belief in the
theory of the Creation, and then easily mislead you; you would then
adopt the theory [of the Eternity of the Universe] which is contrary to
the fundamental principles of our religion, and leads to “speaking
words that turn away from God.” You must rather have suspicion against
your own reason, and accept the theory taught by two prophets who have
bid the foundation for the existing order in the religious and social
relations of mankind. Only demonstrative proof should be able to make
you abandon the theory of the Creation; but such a proof does not exist
in Nature.
You will not find it strange that I introduce into this discussion
historical matter in support of the theory of the Creation, seeing that
Aristotle, the greatest philosopher, in his principal works, introduces
histories in support of the theory of the Eternity of the Universe. In
this regard we may justly quote the saying: “Should not our perfect Law
be as good as their gossip?” (B. T. Baba batra, 115 b). When he
supports his view by quoting Sabean stories, why should we not support
our view by that which Moses and Abraham said, and that which follows
from their words?
I have before promised to describe in a separate chapter the strong
objections which must occur to him who thinks that human wisdom
comprehends fully the nature of the spheres and their motions; that
these are subject to fixed laws, and capable of being comprehended as
regards order and relation. I will now explain this.
CHAPTER XXIV
You know of Astronomy as much as you have studied with me, and learnt
from the book Almagest; we had not sufficient time to go beyond this.
The theory that [the spheres] move regularly, and that the assumed
courses of the stars are in harmony with observation, depends, as you
are aware, on two hypotheses: we must assume either epicycles, or
excentric spheres, or a combination of both. Now I will show that each
of these two hypotheses is irregular, and totally contrary to the
results of Natural Science. Let us first consider an epicycle, such as
has been assumed in the spheres of the moon and the five planets,
rotating on a sphere, but not round the centre of the sphere that
carries it. This arrangement would necessarily produce a revolving
motion; the epicycle would then revolve, and entirely change its place;
but that anything in the spheres should change its place is exactly
what Aristotle considers impossible. For that reason Abu-bekr
ibn-Alzaig, in an astronomical treatise which he wrote, rejects the
existence of epicycles. Besides this impossibility, he mentions others,
showing that the theory of epicycles implies other absurd notions. I
will here explain them:—(1) It is absurd to assume that the revolution
of a cycle has not the centre of the Universe for its centre; for it is
a fundamental principle in the order of the Universe that there are
only three kinds of motion—from the centre, towards the centre, and
round the centre; but an epicycle does not move away from the centre,
nor towards it, nor round it. (2) Again, according to what Aristotle
explains in Natural Science, there must be something fixed round which
the motion takes place; this is the reason why the earth remains
stationary. But the epicycle would move round a centre which is not
stationary. I have heard that Abu-bekr discovered a system in which no
epicycles occur; but excentric spheres are not excluded by him. I have
not heard it from his pupils; and even if it be correct that he
discovered such a system, he has not gained much by it; for
excentricity is likewise as contrary as possible to the principles laid
down by Aristotle. For it seems to me that an excentric sphere does not
move round the centre of the Universe, but round an imaginary point
distant from the centre, and therefore round a point which is not
fixed. A person ignorant of astronomy might think that the motion of
the excentric spheres may still be considered as taking place round
something fixed, since their centre is apparently within the sphere of
the moon. I would admit this if the centre were situated in the region
of fire or air, although the spheres would not move round a stable
point. But I will show that the amount of excentricity has, in a
certain way, been described in the Almagest; and later scholars have
calculated the exact amount of excentricity in terms of radii of the
earth, and have proved the result. The same measure has been used in
astronomy in describing all distances and magnitudes. It has thus been
shown that the point round which the sun moves lies undoubtedly beyond
the sphere of the moon, and below the superficies of the sphere of
Mercury. The centre for the circuit of Mars, that is, the centre of the
excentric sphere of Mars, is beyond the sphere of Mercury, and below
the sphere of Venus. The centre of Jupiter has the same distance; it
lies between the sphere of Venus and that of Mercury, whilst the centre
of Saturn lies between the spheres of Mars and Jupiter. Now, consider
how improbable all this appears according to the laws of Natural
Science. You will find it out when you consider the known distances and
magnitudes of each sphere and each star, all expressed in terms of the
radii of the earth. There is a uniform measure for all, and the
excentricity of each sphere is not determined by units proportionate to
its own magnitude.
It is still more improbable and more objectionable to assume that there
are two spheres, the one within the other; that these are closely
joined from all sides, and have, nevertheless, different centres. For
in this case the smaller sphere might move whilst the larger be at
rest; but the smaller cannot be at rest when the larger moves, and must
move with the larger when the latter rotates round any other axis than
that which passes through the two centres. Now we have this proposition
which can be proved; and, further, the established theory that there is
no vacuum, and also the assumed excentricity of the spheres; from all
this it follows that in every two spheres the motion of the upper one
should cause the lower sphere to move in the same way, and round the
same centre. But this is not the case; the outer and the inner spheres
do not move in the same way, and not round the same centre or the same
axis; each of them has its peculiar motion. For this reason it has been
assumed that between every two spheres there are substances different
from those of the spheres. It may be very much doubted whether this is
the case; for where should the centres of these intermediate substances
be placed? have these substances likewise their own peculiar motion?
Thabith has explained the above-mentioned theory in one of his
treatises, and proved that we must assume a substance of a spherical
form intermediate between one sphere and the other. All this is part of
that which I have not explained to you when you studied with me, for I
was afraid you might become confused and would not understand even
those things which I wished to show you. But as to the inclination and
the deviation assumed in respect to the latitude of the paths of Venus
and Mercury, I have already clearly shown you vivâ voce that it is
impossible to imagine material beings under such conditions. You have
seen that Ptolemy has already pointed out this difficulty. He says as
follows: “Let no one think that these and similar principles are
improbable. If any one considers what we have here expounded in the
same light as he considers things produced by skill and subtle work, he
will find it improbable; but it is not right to compare human things to
divine things.” This is, as you know, what Ptolemy says, and I have
already pointed out to you the passages by which you can verify all I
said, except what I stated about the position of the centres of the
excentric spheres; for I have not heard that any one has paid attention
to this question. But you will understand it when you know the length
of the diameter of each sphere, and the extent of its excentricity in
terms of radii of the earth, according to the facts which Kabici has
established in his treatise on the distances. When you notice these
distances you will confirm my words.
Consider, therefore, how many difficulties arise if we accept the
theory which Aristotle expounds in Physics. For, according to that
theory, there are no epicycles, and no excentric spheres, but all
spheres rotate round the centre of the earth! How then can the
different courses of the stars be explained? how is it possible to
assume a uniform perfect rotation with the phenomena which we perceive,
except by admitting one of the two hypotheses or both of them? The
difficulty is still more apparent when we find that admitting what
Ptolemy said as regards the epicycle of the moon, and its inclination
towards a point different both from the centre of the Universe and from
its own centre, the calculations according to these hypotheses are
perfectly correct, within one minute; that their correctness is
confirmed by the most accurate calculation of the time, duration, and
extent of the eclipses, which is always based on these hypotheses.
Furthermore, how can we reconcile, without assuming the existence of
epicycles, the apparent retrogression of a star with its other motions?
How can rotation or motion take place round a point which is not fixed?
These are real difficulties.
I have explained to you already vivâ voce, that these difficulties do
not concern the astronomer; for he does not profess to tell us the
existing properties of the spheres, but to suggest, whether correctly
or not, a theory in which the motion of the stars is circular and
uniform, and yet in agreement with our observation. You know that
Abu-bekr al-Zaig, in his treatise on Physics, expresses a doubt whether
Aristotle knew the excentricity of the sun but ignored it, and only
discussed the effect of the inclination, because he saw that the effect
of the excentricity was identical with that of the inclination; or
whether he did not perceive it. The truth is that he did not notice it
or hear of it; the science was not perfect in his age. If he had heard
of it, he would have strongly opposed it; if he had been convinced of
its correctness, he would have been greatly embarrassed as regards all
that he said on the question. What I said before (ch. xxii.) I will
repeat now, namely, that the theory of Aristotle, in explaining the
phenomena in the sublunary world, is in accordance with logical
inference; here we know the causal relation between one phenomenon and
another; we see how far science can investigate them, and the
management of nature is clear and intelligible. But of the things in
the heavens man knows nothing except a few mathematical calculations,
and you see how far these go. I say in the words of the poet, “The
heavens are the Lord’s, but the earth He hath given to the sons of man”
(Ps. cxv. 16); that is to say, God alone has a perfect and true
knowledge of the heavens, their nature, their essence, their form,
their motions, and their causes; but He gave man power to know the
things which are under the heavens; here is man’s world, here is his
home, into which he has been placed, and of which he is himself a
portion. This is in reality the truth. For the facts which we require
in proving the existence of heavenly beings are withheld from us; the
heavens are too far from us, and too exalted in place and rank. Man’s
faculties are too deficient to comprehend even the general proof the
heavens contain for the existence of Him who sets them in motion. It is
in fact ignorance or a kind of madness to weary our minds with finding
out things which are beyond our reach, without having the means of
approaching them. We must content ourselves with that which is within
our reach, and that which cannot be approached by logical inference let
us leave to him who has been endowed with that great and divine
influence, expressed in the words: “Mouth to mouth do I speak with Him”
(Num. xii. 8).
This is all I can say on this question; another person may perhaps be
able to establish by proof what appears doubtful to me. It is on
account of my great love of truth that I have shown my embarrassment in
these matters, and I have not heard, nor do I know that any of these
theories have been established by proof.
CHAPTER XXV
We do not reject the Eternity of the Universe, because certain passages
in Scripture confirm the Creation; for such passages are not more
numerous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal being;
nor is it impossible or difficult to find for them a suitable
interpretation. We might have explained them in the same manner as we
did in respect to the Incorporeality of God. We should perhaps have had
an easier task in showing that the Scriptural passages referred to are
in harmony with the theory of the Eternity of the Universe if we
accepted the latter, than we had in explaining the anthropomorphisms in
the Bible when we rejected the idea that God is corporeal. For two
reasons, however, we have not done so, and have not accepted the
Eternity of the Universe. First, the Incorporeality of God has been
demonstrated by proof; those passages in the Bible, which in their
literal sense contain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and
can be interpreted otherwise. But the Eternity of the Universe has not
been proved; a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not
sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text,
and explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be
supported by an equally good argument.
Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary to
any of the fundamental principles of our religion; it is not contrary
to the words of any prophet. Only ignorant people believe that it is
contrary to the teaching of Scripture; but we have shown that this is
not the case; on the contrary, Scripture teaches the Incorporeality of
God. If we were to accept the Eternity of the Universe as taught by
Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws,
that Nature does not change, and that there is nothing supernatural, we
should necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion,
we should disbelieve all miracles and signs, and certainly reject all
hopes and fears derived from Scripture, unless the miracles are also
explained figuratively. The Allegorists amongst the Mohammedans have
done this, and have thereby arrived at absurd conclusions. If, however,
we accepted the Eternity of the Universe in accordance with the second
of the theories which we have expounded above (ch. xxiii.), and
assumed, with Plato, that the heavens are likewise transient, we should
not be in opposition to the fundamental principles of our religion;
this theory would not imply the rejection of miracles, but, on the
contrary, would admit them as possible. The Scriptural text might have
been explained accordingly, and many expressions might have been found
in the Bible and in other writings that would confirm and support this
theory. But there is no necessity for this expedient, so long as the
theory has not been proved. As there is no proof sufficient to convince
us, this theory need not be taken into consideration, nor the other
one; we take the text of the Bible literally, and say that it teaches
us a truth which we cannot prove; and the miracles are evidence for the
correctness of our view.
Accepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, that
Revelation is possible, and that every difficulty in this question is
removed. We might be asked, Why has God inspired a certain person and
not another? why has He revealed the Law to one particular nation, and
at one particular time? why has He commanded this, and forbidden that?
why has He shown through a prophet certain particular miracles? what is
the object of these laws? and why has He not made the commandments and
the prohibitions part of our nature, if it was His object that we
should live in accordance with them? We answer to all these questions:
He willed it so; or, His wisdom decided so. Just as He created the
world according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form, and
as we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decided upon that
peculiar form, and upon that peculiar time, so we do not know why His
will or wisdom determined any of the things mentioned in the preceding
questions. But if we assume that the Universe has the present form as
the result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions;
and these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying
denial and rejection of the Biblical texts, the correctness of which no
intelligent person doubts. Owing to the absence of all proof, we reject
the theory of the Eternity of the Universe; and it is for this very
reason that the noblest minds spent and will spend their days in
research. For if the Creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if
only according to the Platonic hypothesis, all arguments of the
philosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand,
Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the whole teaching of Scripture
would be rejected, and we should be forced to other opinions. I have
thus shown that all depends on this question. Note it.
CHAPTER XXVI
In the famous chapters known as the Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, I find
R. Eliezer the Great saying something more extraordinary than I have
ever seen in the utterances of any believer in the Law of Moses. I mean
the following passage: “Whence were the heavens created? He took part
of the light of His garment, stretched it like a cloth, and thus the
heavens were extending continually, as it is said: He covereth Himself
with light as with a garment, He stretcheth the heavens like a curtain”
(Ps. civ. 2). “Whence was the earth created? He took of the snow under
the throne of glory, and threw it; according to the words: He saith to
the snow, Be thou earth” (Job xxxvii. 6). These are the words given
there; and I, in my surprise, ask, What was the belief of this sage?
did he think that nothing can be produced from nothing, and that a
substance must have existed of which the things were formed? and did he
for this reason ask whence were the heavens and the earth created? What
has he gained by the answer? We might ask him, Whence was the light of
His garment created? or the snow under the throne of His glory? or the
throne of glory itself? If the terms “the light of His garment” and
“the throne of glory” mean something eternal, they must be rejected;
the words would imply an admission of the Eternity of the Universe,
though only in the form taught by Plato. The creation of the throne of
glory is mentioned by our Sages, though in a strange way; for they say
that it has been created before the creation of the Universe.
Scripture, however, does not mention the creation of the throne, except
in the words of David, “The Lord hath established his throne in the
heavens” (Ps. ciii. 19), which words admit of figurative
interpretation; but the eternity of the throne is distinctly described,
“Thou, O Lord, dwellest for ever, thy throne for ever and ever” (Lam.
v. 19). Now, if R. Eliezer had believed that the throne was eternal, so
that the word “throne” expressed an attribute of God, and not something
created, how could anything be produced of a mere attribute? Stranger
still is his expression “of the light of His garment.”
In short, it is a passage that greatly confuses the notions of all
intelligent and religious persons. I am unable to explain it
sufficiently. I quoted it in order that you may not be misled by it.
One important thing R. Eliezer taught us here, that the substance of
the heavens is different from that of the earth; that there are two
different substances: the one is described as belonging to God, being
the light of His garment, on account of its superiority; and the other,
the earthly substance, which is distant from His splendour and light,
as being the snow under the throne of His glory. This led me to explain
the words, “And under his feet as the work of the whiteness of the
sapphire” (Exod. xxiv. 10), as expressing that the nobles of the
children of Israel comprehended in a prophetical vision the nature of
the earthly materia prima. For, according to Onkelos, the pronoun in
the phrase, “His feet” refers to “throne,” as I have shown; this
indicates that the whiteness under the throne signifies the earthly
substance. R. Eliezer has thus repeated the same idea, and told us that
there are two substances—a higher one, and a lower one; and that there
is not one substance common to all things. This is an important
subject, and we must not think light of the opinion which the wisest
men in Israel have held on this point. It concerns an important point
in explaining the existence of the Universe, and one of the mysteries
of the Law. In Bereshit Rabba (chap. xii.) the following passage
occurs: “R. Eliezer says, The things in the heavens have been created
of the heavens, the things on earth of the earth.” Consider how
ingeniously this sage stated that all things on earth have one common
substance; the heavens and the things in them have one substance,
different from the first. He also explains in the Chapters [of R.
Eliezer], in addition to the preceding things, the superiority of the
heavenly substance, and its proximity to God; and, on the other hand,
the inferiority of the earthly substance and its position. Note it.
CHAPTER XXVII
We have already stated that the belief in the Creation is a fundamental
principle of our religion; but we do not consider it a principle of our
faith that the Universe will again be reduced to nothing. It is not
contrary to the tenets of our religion to assume that the Universe will
continue to exist for ever. It might be objected that everything
produced is subject to destruction, as has been shown; consequently the
Universe, having had a beginning, must come to an end. This axiom
cannot be applied according to our views. We do not hold that the
Universe came into existence, like all things in Nature, as the result
of the laws of Nature. For whatever owes its existence to the action of
physical laws is, according to the same laws, subject to destruction:
the same law which caused the existence of a thing after a period of
non-existence, is also the cause that the thing is not permanent; since
the previous non-existence proves that the nature of that thing does
not necessitate its permanent existence. According to our theory,
taught in Scripture, the existence or non-existence of things depends
solely on the will of God and not on fixed laws, and, therefore, it
does not follow that God must destroy the Universe after having created
it from nothing. It depends on His will. He may, according to His
desire, or according to the decree of His wisdom, either destroy it, or
allow it to exist, and it is therefore possible that He will preserve
the Universe for ever, and let it exist permanently as He Himself
exists. It is well known that our Sages never said that the throne of
glory will perish, although they assumed that it has been created. No
prophet or sage ever maintained that the throne of glory will be
destroyed or annihilated; but, on the contrary, the Scriptural passages
speak of its permanent existence. We are of opinion that the souls of
the pious have been created, and at the same time we believe that they
are immortal. Some hold, in accordance with the literal meaning of the
Midrashim, that the bodies of the pious will also enjoy everlasting
happiness. Their notion is like the well-known belief of certain
people, that there are bodily enjoyments in Paradise. In short,
reasoning leads to the conclusion that the destruction of the Universe
is not a certain fact. There remains only the question as to what the
prophets and our Sages say on this point; whether they affirm that the
world will certainly come to an end, or not. Most people amongst us
believe that such statements have been made, and that the world will at
one time be destroyed. I will show you that this is not the case; and
that, on the contrary, many passages in the Bible speak of the
permanent existence of the Universe. Those passages which, in the
literal sense, would indicate the destruction of the Universe, are
undoubtedly to be understood in a figurative sense, as will be shown.
If, however, those who follow the literal sense of the Scriptural texts
reject our view, and assume that the ultimate certain destruction of
the Universe is part of their faith, they are at liberty to do so. But
we must tell them that the belief in the destruction is not necessarily
implied in the belief in the Creation; they believe it because they
trust the writer, who used a figurative expression, which they take
literally. Their faith, however, does not suffer by it.
CHAPTER XXVIII
Many of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believed in the
Eternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can we suppose that
any one that adheres to the Law of Moses, our Teacher, should accept
that theory? if we were to assume that Solomon has on this point, God
forbid, deviated from the Law of Moses, the question would be asked,
Why did most of the Prophets and of the Sages accept it of him? Why
have they not opposed him, or blamed him for holding that opinion, as
he has been blamed for having married strange women, and for other
things? The reason why this has been imputed to him is to be found in
the following passage: “They desired to suppress the book Koheleth,
because its words incline towards scepticism.” It is undoubtedly true
that certain passages in this book include, when taken literally,
opinions different from those taught in the Law, and they must
therefore be explained figuratively. But the theory of the Eternity of
the Universe is not among those opinions, the book does not even
contain any passage that implies this theory; much less a passage in
which it is clearly set forth. There are, however, in the book, some
passages which imply the indestructibility of the Universe, a doctrine
that is true; and from the fact that the indestructibility of the
Universe is taught in this book, some persons wrongly inferred that the
author believed in the Eternity of the Universe. The following are the
words that refer to the indestructibility of the Universe: “And the
earth remaineth for ever.” And those who do not agree with me as
regards the above distinction [between the indestructibility and the
Eternity of the Universe], are compelled to explain the term le-ʻolam
(lit., “for ever”), to mean “the time fixed for the existence of the
earth.” Similarly they explain the words of God, “Yet all the days of
the earth” (Gen. viii. 22) to signify the days fixed for its existence.
But I wonder how they would explain the words of David: “He laid the
foundations of the earth, that it should not be moved for ever” (Ps.
civ. 5). If they maintain here also that the term le-ʻolam va-ʻed (lit.
“for ever”) does not imply perpetuity, they must come to the conclusion
that God exists only for a fixed period, since the same term is
employed in describing the perpetuity of God, “The Lord will reign
(le-ʻolam) for ever” (Exod. xv. 18, or Ps. x. 16). We must, however,
bear in mind that ʻolam only signifies perpetuity when it is combined
with ʻad; it makes no difference whether ʻad follows, as in ʻolam
va-ʻed, or whether it precedes, as in ʻad ʻolam. The words of Solomon
which only contain the word le-ʻolam, have therefore less force than
the words of David, who uses the term ʻolam va-ʻed. David has also in
other passages clearly spoken of the incorruptibility of the heavens,
the perpetuity and immutability of their laws, and of all the heavenly
beings. He says, “Praise ye the Lord from the heavens, etc. For He
commanded, and they were created. He hath also stablished them for ever
and ever; he hath made a decree which shall not pass” (Ps. cxlviii.
1–6); that is to say, there will never be a change in the decrees which
God made, or in the sources of the properties of the heavens and the
earth, which the Psalmist has mentioned before. But he distinctly
states that they have been created. For he says, “He hath commanded,
and they were created.” Jeremiah (xxxi. 35) likewise says, “He giveth
the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the
stars for a light by night,” etc. “If these ordinances depart from
before me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall cease
from being a nation before me for ever.” He thus declares, that these
decrees will never be removed, although they had a beginning. We
therefore find this idea, when we search for it, expressed not only by
Solomon but also by others. Solomon himself has stated that these works
of God, the Universe, and all that is contained in it, remain with
their properties for ever, although they have been created. For he
says, “Whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put
to it, nor anything taken away from it” (Eccles. iii. 14). He declares
in these words that the world has been created by God and remains for
ever. He adds the reason for it by saying, “Nothing can be put to it,
nor anything taken from it;” for this is the reason for the perpetuity,
as if he meant to say that things are changed in order to supply that
which is wanting, or in order to take away what is superfluous. The
works of God being most perfect, admitting no addition or deduction,
must remain the same for ever. It is impossible that anything should
exist that could cause a change in them. In the conclusion of the
verse, Solomon, as it were describes the purpose of exceptions from the
laws of Nature, or an excuse for changes in them, when he says, “And
God doeth it (viz., He performs miracles) that men should fear before
him.” The words which follow, “That which hath been is now; and that
which is to be hath already been, and God seeketh that which is
pursued,” contain the idea that God desires the perpetuity and
continuity of the Universe. The fact that the works of God are perfect,
admitting of no addition or diminution, has already been mentioned by
Moses, the wisest of all men, in the words: “The rock, His work is
perfect” (Deut. xxxii. 14). All His works or creations are most
perfect, containing no defect whatever, nothing superfluous, nor
anything unnecessary. Also whatever God decrees for those created
things, and whatever He effects through them, is perfectly just, and is
the result of His wisdom, as will be explained in some chapters of this
treatise.
CHAPTER XXIX
If we hear a person speaking whose language we do not understand, we
undoubtedly know that he speaks, but do not know what his words mean;
it may even happen that we hear some words which mean one thing in the
tongue of the speaker, and exactly the reverse in our language, and
taking the words in the sense which they have in our language, we
imagine that the speaker employed them in that sense. Suppose, e.g., an
Arab hears of a Hebrew the word abah, he thinks that the Hebrew relates
how a man despised and refused a certain thing, whilst the Hebrew in
reality says that the man was pleased and satisfied with it. The very
same thing happens to the ordinary reader of the Prophets; some of
their words he does not understand at all, like those to whom the
prophet says (Isa. xxix. 11), “the vision of all is become unto you as
the words of a book that is sealed”; in other passages he finds the
opposite or the reverse of what the prophet meant; to this case
reference is made in the words, “Ye have perverted the words of the
living God” (Jer. xxiii. 36). Besides, it must be borne in mind that
every prophet has his own peculiar diction, which is, as it were, his
language, and it is in that language that the prophecy addressed to him
is communicated to those who understand it. After this preliminary
remark you will understand the metaphor frequently employed by Isaiah,
and less frequently by other prophets, when they describe the ruin of a
kingdom or the destruction of a great nation in phrases like the
following:—“The stars have fallen,” “The heavens are overthrown,” “The
sun is darkened,” “The earth is waste, and trembles,” and similar
metaphors. The Arabs likewise say of a person who has met with a
serious accident, “His heavens, together with his earth, have been
covered”; and when they speak of the approach of a nation’s prosperity,
they say, “The light of the sun and moon has increased,” “A new heaven
and a new earth has been created,” or they use similar phrases. So also
the prophets, in referring to the ruin of a person, of a nation, or of
a country, describe it as the result of God’s great anger and wrath,
whilst the prosperity of a nation is the result of God’s pleasure and
satisfaction. In the former case the prophets employ such phrases as
“He came forth,” “came down,” “roared,” “thundered,” or “caused his
voice to be heard”; also “He commanded,” “said,” “did,” “made,” and the
like, as will be shown. Sometimes the prophets use the term “mankind”
instead of “the people of a certain place,” whose destruction they
predict; e.g., Isaiah speaking of the destruction of Israel says, “And
the Lord will remove man far away” (Isa. vi. 12). So also Zephaniah (i.
3, 4), “And I will cut off man from off the earth. I will also stretch
out mine hand upon Judah.” Note this likewise.
Having spoken of the language of the prophets in general, I will now
verify and prove my statement. When Isaiah received the divine mission
to prophesy the destruction of the Babylonian empire, the death of
Sennacherib and that of Nebuchadnezzar, who rose after the overthrow of
Sennacherib, he commences in the following manner to describe their
fall and the end of their dominion, their defeat, and such evils as are
endured by all who are vanquished and compelled to flee before the
victorious sword [of the enemy]: “For the stars of heaven, and the
constellations thereof, shall not give their light: the sun is darkened
in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine”
(xiii. 10); again, “Therefore I will shake the heavens, and the earth
shall remove out of her place, in the wrath of the Lord of hosts, and
in the day of his fierce anger” (xiii. 13). I do not think that any
person is so foolish and blind, and so much in favour of the literal
sense of figurative and oratorical phrases, as to assume that at the
fall of the Babylonian kingdom a change took place in the nature of the
stars of heaven, or in the light of the sun and moon, or that the earth
moved away from its centre. For all this is merely the description of a
country that has been defeated; the inhabitants undoubtedly find all
light dark, and all sweet things bitter: the whole earth appears too
narrow for them, and the heavens are changed in their eyes. He speaks
in a similar manner when he describes the poverty and humiliation of
the people of Israel, their captivity and their defeat, the continuous
misfortunes caused by the wicked Sennacherib when he ruled over all the
fortified places of Judah, or the loss of the entire land of Israel
when it came into the possession of Sennacherib. He says (xxiv. 17):
“Fear, and the pit, and the snare, are upon thee, O inhabitant of the
earth. And it shall come to pass, that he who fleeth from the noise of
the fear shall fall into the pit; and he that cometh out of the midst
of the pit shall be taken in the snare: for the windows from on high
are open, and the foundations of the earth do shake. The earth is
utterly broken down, the earth is clean dissolved, the earth is moved
exceedingly. The earth shall reel to and fro like a drunkard.” At the
end of the same prophecy, when Isaiah describes how God will punish
Sennacherib, destroy his mighty empire, and reduce him to disgrace, he
uses the following figure (xxiv. 23): “Then the moon shall be
confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign,”
etc. This verse is beautifully explained by Jonathan, the son of
Uzziel; he says that when Sennacherib will meet with his fate because
of Jerusalem, the idolaters will understand that this is the work of
God; they will faint and be confounded. He therefore translates the
verse thus: “Those who worship the moon will be ashamed, and those who
bow down to the sun will be humbled, when the kingdom of God shall
reveal itself,” etc. The prophet then pictures the peace of the
children of Israel after the death of Sennacherib, the fertility and
the cultivation of their land, and the increasing power of their
kingdom through Hezekiah. He employs here the figure of the increase of
the light of the sun and moon. When speaking of the defeated, he says
that for them the light of the sun and moon will be diminished and
darkened; in the same sense their light is said to increase for the
victorious. We can frequently notice the correctness of this figure of
speech. When great troubles befall us, our eyes become dim, and we
cannot see clearly because the spiritus visus is made turbid by the
prevailing vapours, and is weakened and diminished by great anxiety and
straits of the soul; whilst in a state of gladness and comfort of the
soul the spiritus visus becomes clear, and man feels as if the light
had increased. Thus the good tidings that the people shall dwell in
Zion, and in Jerusalem, and shall weep no more, etc., conclude in the
following manner: “Moreover, the light of the moon shall be as the
light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the
light of seven days, in the day that the Lord bindeth up the breaches
of his people, and healeth the stroke of their wound” (Isa. xxx. 19,
26); that is to say, when God will raise them up again after they had
fallen through the wicked Sennacherib. The phrase “as the light of
seven days” signifies, according to the commentators, “very great
light”: for in this same sense the number “seven” is frequently used in
Hebrew. I think that reference is made by this phrase to the seven days
of the dedication of the temple in the reign of Solomon; for there was
never a nation so great, prosperous, and happy in every respect, as
Israel was at that time, and therefore the prophet says, that Israel’s
greatness and happiness will be the same as it was in those seven days.
Speaking of wicked Edom, Israel’s oppressor, Isaiah says: “Their slain
also shall be cast out, and their stink shall come up out of their
carcases, and the mountains shall be melted with their blood. And all
the host of heaven shall be dissolved, and the heavens shall be rolled
together as a scroll: and all their host shall fall down, as a leaf
falleth off from the vine, and as a fig falleth from the fig-tree. For
my sword shall be bathed in heaven; behold, I shall come down upon
Idumea, and upon the people of my curse, to judgment,” etc. (Isa.
xxxiv. 3–5). Will any person who has eyes to see find in these verses
any expression that is obscure, or that might lead him to think that
they contain an account of what will befall the heavens? or anything
but a figurative description of the ruin of the Edomites, the
withdrawal of God’s protection from them, their decline, and the sudden
and rapid fall of their nobles? The prophet means to say that the
individuals, who were like stars as regards their permanent, high, and
undisturbed position, will quickly come down, as a leaf falleth from
the vine, and as a fig falling from the fig-tree. This is self-evident;
and there would be no need to mention it, much less to speak on it at
length, had it not become necessary, owing to the fact that the common
people, and even persons who are considered as distinguished scholars,
quote this passage without regarding its context or its purpose, [in
support of their view of the future destruction of the heavens]. They
believe that Scripture describes here what will, in future, happen to
the heavens, in the same manner as it informs us how the heavens have
come into existence. Again, when Isaiah told the Israelites—what
afterwards became a well-known fact—that Sennacherib, with his allied
nations and kings, would perish, and that the Israelites would be
helped by God alone, he employed figurative language, and said: “See
how the heavens decay and the earth withers away, and all beings on the
earth die, and you are saved”; that is to say, those who have filled
the earth, and have been considered, to use an hyperbole, as permanent
and stable as the heavens, will quickly perish and disappear like
smoke; and their famous power, that has been as stable as the earth,
will be destroyed like a garment. The passage to which I refer begins:
“For the Lord hath comforted Zion; He hath comforted all her waste
places,” etc. “Hearken unto me, my people,” etc. “My righteousness is
near: my salvation is gone forth,” etc. It continues thus: “Lift up
your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath; for the
heavens shall vanish like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a
garment, and they that dwell therein shall die in like manner; for my
salvation shall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be
abolished” (Isa. li. 3–6). The restoration of the kingdom of Israel,
its stability and permanence, is described as a creation of heaven and
earth. For Isaiah frequently speaks of the land of a king as if it were
the whole Universe, as if heaven and earth belonged to him. He
therefore comforts Israel and says: “I, even I, am he that comforteth
you,” etc. “And I have put my words in thy mouth, and I have covered
thee in the shadow of mine hand, that I may plant the heavens, and lay
the foundations of the earth, and say unto Zion, Thou art my people”
(li. 12–16). In the following verses, Isaiah declares that the dominion
of Israel will continue, whilst that of the renowned and mighty people
will cease: “For the mountains shall depart,” etc. (liv. 10). In order
to express that the kingdom of the Messiah will be permanent, and that
the kingdom of Israel will not be destroyed any more, he says, “Thy sun
shall no more go down,” etc. (lx. 20). In metaphors like these, which
are intelligible to those who understand the context, Isaiah continues
to describe the details of the exile, the restoration, and the removal
of all sorrow, and says figuratively as follows: “I will create new
heavens and a new earth; for the first shall be forgotten, and their
memory shall be blotted out.” He explains this in the course of the
speech, by pointing out that by the phrase, “I will create,” he means
that God will give them perpetual gladness and joy in place of the
previous grief and mourning, which shall no longer be remembered. I
will now describe the sequence of the ideas, and the order of the
verses in which these ideas are contained. The prophet begins as
follows: “I will mention the loving-kindnesses of the Lord,” etc.
(lxiii. 7). He then gives (1) an account of God’s past kindness to us,
concluding with the words, “And he bare them and carried them all the
days of old” (ver. 9). (2) Next follows our rebellion: “But they
rebelled, and vexed his holy spirit,” etc. (ver. 10); (3) the dominion
of our enemies over us: “Our adversaries have trodden down thy
sanctuary; we are like those over whom thou hast never ruled,” etc.
(vers. 18, 19); (4) and the prophet’s prayer on our account: “Be not
wroth very sore,” etc. (lxiv. 9). (5) The prophet then describes how we
deserved these punishments, and how we were called to the truth but did
not respond: “I offered myself to be sought of them that asked not for
me,” etc. (lxv. 1); (6) promises mercy and pardon: “Thus saith the
Lord, As the new wine is found in the cluster,” etc. (ver. 8); (7)
predicts evil for our oppressors: “Behold, my servant shall eat, but ye
shall be hungry,” etc. (ver. 13); (8) and moral improvement of our
nation to such a degree that we shall be a blessing on the earth, and
the previous troubles will be forgotten: “And he shall call his
servants by another name: that he who blesseth himself in the earth,
shall bless himself in the God of truth; and he that sweareth in the
earth, shall swear by the God of truth; because the former troubles are
forgotten, and because they are hid from mine eyes. For, behold, I
create new heavens, and a new earth: and the former shall not be
remembered, nor come into mind. But be ye glad and rejoice for ever in
that which I create: for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and
her people a joy. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my
people,” etc. (lxv. 15–19). The whole subject must now be clear and
evident; for the words, “I create new heavens, and a new earth,” etc.,
are followed by the explanation, “I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and
her people a joy,” etc. The prophet then adds that the seed and name of
Israel will be as permanent as their faith and as the rejoicing in it,
which God promised to create and to spread over the whole earth: for
faith in God and rejoicing in it are two possessions which, once
obtained, are never lost or changed. This is expressed in the words:
“For as the new heavens and the new earth, which I will make, remain
before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain”
(lxvi. 22). But of other nations, in some instances, the seed remains,
whilst the name has perished; so, e.g., many people are of the seed of
the Persians or Greeks, without being known by that special name; they
bear the names of other nations, of which they form part. According to
my opinion, we have here a prophecy that our religion, which gives us
our special name, will remain permanently.
As these figures are frequent in Isaiah, I explained all of them. But
we meet with them also in the words of other prophets. Jeremiah, in
describing the destruction of Jerusalem in consequence of our sins,
says (iv. 23): “I beheld the earth, and, lo, it was without form, and
void,” etc. Ezekiel (xxxii. 7, 8) foretells the destruction of the
kingdom of Egypt, and the death of Pharaoh, through Nebuchadnezzar, in
the following words: “And when I shall put thee out, I will cover the
heaven, and make the stars thereof dark; I will cover the sun with a
cloud, and the moon shall not give her light. All the bright lights of
heaven will I make dark over thee, and set darkness upon thy land,
saith the Lord.” Joel, the son of Pethuel (ii. 10), describes the
multitude of locusts that came in his days as follows: “The earth shall
quake before them: the heavens shall tremble: the sun and the moon
shall be dark, and the stars shall withdraw their shining.” Amos (viii.
9, 10), speaking of the destruction of Samaria, says: “I will cause the
sun to go down at noon, and I will darken the earth in the clear day;
and I will turn your feasts,” etc. Micah (i. 3, 4), in relating the
fall of Samaria, uses the following well-known rhetorical figures:
“For, behold, the Lord cometh forth out of his place, and will come
down, and tread upon the high places of the earth. And the mountains
shall be molten,” etc. Similarly Haggai (ii. 6, 7), in describing the
destruction of the kingdom of the Medes and Persians: “I will shake the
heavens and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land; and I will shake
all nations,” etc. When [David] (Ps. lx. 4) describes how, during the
expedition of Joab against the Edomites, the nation was low and weak,
and how he prayed to God for His assistance, he says: “Thou hast made
the earth to tremble; thou hast broken it: heal the breaches thereof;
for it shaketh.” In another instance he expresses the idea that we need
not fear when we see other nations die and perish, because we rely on
God’s support, and not on our sword and strength, in accordance with
the words: “A people saved by the Lord, the shield of thy help” (Deut.
xxxiii. 29); he says (Ps. xlvi. 2): “Therefore will we not fear, though
the earth be removed, and though the mountains be shaken in the midst
of the sea.”
The following figurative language is employed in Scripture in referring
to the death of the Egyptians in the Red Sea: “The waters saw thee;
they were afraid: the depths also were troubled, etc. The voice of thy
thunder was in the heaven: the lightnings lightened the world; the
earth trembled and shook” (Ps. lxxvii. 17–19). “Was the Lord displeased
against the rivers?” etc. (Hab. iii. 8). “There went up a smoke out of
his nostrils,” etc. (Ps. xviii. 9). “The earth trembled,” etc. (Judges
v. 4, in the Song of Deborah). There are many other instances; but
those which I have not quoted can be explained in accordance with those
which I have cited.
Let us now consider the words of Joel (iii. 3–5): “And I will show
wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood and fire, and pillars of
smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood,
before the great and terrible day of the Lord come. And it shall come
to pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be
delivered, for in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be deliverance,”
etc. I refer them to the defeat of Sennacherib near Jerusalem; but they
may be taken as an account of the defeat of Gog and Magog near
Jerusalem in the days of the Messiah, if this appears preferable,
although nothing is mentioned in this passage but great slaughter,
destruction, fire, and the diminution of the light of the two
luminaries. You may perhaps object: How can the day of the fall of
Sennacherib, according to our explanation, be called “the great and the
terrible day of the Lord?” But you must know that a day of great
salvation or of great distress is called “the great and terrible day of
the Lord.” Thus Joel (ii. 11) says of the day on which the locusts came
over the land, “For the day of the Lord is great and terrible, and who
can abide it?”
Our opinion, in support of which we have quoted these passages, is
clearly established, namely, that no prophet or sage has ever announced
the destruction of the Universe, or a change of its present condition,
or a permanent change of any of its properties. When our Sages say,
“The world remains six thousand years, and one thousand years it will
be waste,” they do not mean a complete cessation of existing things;
the phrase “one thousand years it will be waste” distinctly shows that
time will continue; besides, this is the individual opinion of one
Rabbi, and in accordance with one particular theory. But on the other
hand the words, “There is nothing new under the sun” (Eccles. i. 9), in
the sense that no new creation takes place in any way and under any
circumstances, express the general opinion of our Sages, and include a
principle which every one of the doctors of the Mishnah and the Talmud
recognises and makes use of in his arguments. Even those who understand
the words “new heavens and a new earth” in their literal sense hold
that the heavens, which will in future be formed, have already been
created and are in existence, and that for this reason the present
tense “remain” is used, and not the future “will remain.” They support
their view by citing the text, “There is nothing new under the sun.” Do
not imagine that this is opposed to our opinion. They mean, perhaps, to
say that the natural laws, by which the promised future condition of
Israel will be effected, have been in existence since the days of the
Creation, and in that they are perfectly correct. When I, however, said
that no prophet ever announced “a permanent change of any of its
properties,” I intended to except miracles. For although the rod was
turned into a serpent, the water into blood, the pure and noble hand
into a leprous one, without the existence of any natural cause that
could effect these or similar phenomena, these changes were not
permanent, they have not become a physical property. On the contrary,
the Universe since continues its regular course. This is my opinion;
this should be our belief. Our Sages, however, said very strange things
as regards miracles; they are found in Bereshit Rabba, and in Midrash
Koheleth, namely, that the miracles are to some extent also natural;
for they say, when God created the Universe with its present physical
properties, He made it part of these properties, that they should
produce certain miracles at certain times, and the sign of a prophet
consisted in the fact that God told him to declare when a certain thing
will take place, but the thing itself was effected according to the
fixed laws of Nature. If this is really the meaning of the passage
referred to, it testifies to the greatness of the author, and shows
that he held it to be impossible that there should be a change in the
laws of Nature, or a change in the will of God [as regards the physical
properties of things] after they have once been established. He
therefore assumes, e.g., that God gave the waters the property of
joining together, and of flowing in a downward direction, and of
separating only at the time when the Egyptians were drowned, and only
in a particular place. I have already pointed out to you the source of
this passage, and it only tends to oppose the hypothesis of a new
creation. It is said there: R. Jonathan said, God made an agreement
with the sea that it should divide before the Israelites; thus it is
said, “And the sea returned to its strength when the morning appeared”
(Exod. xiv. 27). R. Jeremiah, son of Elazar, said: Not only with the
sea, but with all that has been created in the six days of the
beginning [was the agreement made]; this is referred to in the words,
“I, even my hands have stretched out the heavens, and all their host
have I commanded” (Isa. xlv. 12); i.e., I have commanded the sea to
divide, the fire not to hurt Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, the lions
not to harm Daniel, and the fish to spit out Jonah. The same is the
case with the rest of the miracles.
We have thus clearly stated and explained our opinion, that we agree
with Aristotle in one half of his theory. For we believe that this
Universe remains perpetually with the same properties with which the
Creator has endowed it, and that none of these will ever be changed
except by way of miracle in some individual instances, although the
Creator has the power to change the whole Universe, to annihilate it,
or to remove any of its properties. The Universe, had, however, a
beginning and commencement, for when nothing was as yet in existence
except God, His wisdom decreed that the Universe be brought into
existence at a certain time, that it should not be annihilated or
changed as regards any of its properties, except in some instances;
some of these are known to us, whilst others belong to the future, and
are therefore unknown to us. This is our opinion and the basis of our
religion. The opinion of Aristotle is that the Universe, being
permanent and indestructible, is also eternal and without beginning. We
have already shown that this theory is based on the hypothesis that the
Universe is the necessary result of causal relation, and that this
hypothesis includes a certain amount of blasphemy. Having come thus far
we will make in the next chapter a few remarks on passages in the first
chapters of Genesis. For the primary object in this treatise has been
to expound as much as possible of the Scriptural account of the
Creation (maʻaseh bereshit), and the description of the heavenly
chariot (maʻaseh mercabah). But let us premise two general
observations.
First, the account given in Scripture of the Creation is not, as is
generally believed, intended to be in all its parts literal. For if
this were the case, wise men would not have kept its explanation
secret, and our Sages would not have employed figurative speech [in
treating of the Creation] in order to hide its true meaning, nor would
they have objected to discuss it in the presence of the common people.
The literal meaning of the words might lead us to conceive corrupt
ideas and to form false opinions about God, or even entirely to abandon
and reject the principles of our Faith. It is therefore right to
abstain and refrain from examining this subject superficially and
unscientifically. We must blame the practice of some ignorant preachers
and expounders of the Bible, who think that wisdom consists in knowing
the explanation of words, and that greater perfection is attained by
employing more words and longer speech. It is, however, right that we
should examine the Scriptural texts by the intellect, after having
acquired a knowledge of demonstrative science, and of the true hidden
meaning of prophecies. But if one has obtained some knowledge in this
matter he must not preach on it, as I stated in my Commentary on the
Mishnah (Ḥagigah, ii. 7), and our Sages said distinctly: From the
beginning of the book to this place—after the account of the sixth day
of the Creation—it is “the glory of God to conceal a thing” (Prov. xxv.
2).
We have thus clearly stated our opinion. It is, however, part of the
Divine plan that every one who has obtained some perfection transmit it
to some other persons, as will be shown in the chapter on Prophecy. It
is, therefore, impossible for a scholar to possess knowledge of these
problems, whether it be through his own researches or through his
master’s teaching, without communicating part of that knowledge to
others; it cannot be done in clear words; it must be done sparingly by
way of hints. We find in the words of some of our Sages numerous hints
and notes of this kind, but mixed up with the words of others and with
other subjects. In treating of these mysteries, as a rule, I quote as
much as contains the principal idea, and leave the rest for those who
are worthy of it.
Secondly, the prophets employ homonymous terms and use words which are
not meant to be understood in their ordinary signification, but are
only used because of some other meaning which they admit, e.g., “a rod
of an almond-tree (shaked),” because of the words which follow, “for I
will hasten (shaked)” (Jer. i. 11, 12), as will be shown in the chapter
on Prophecy. According to the same principle Ezekiel in the account of
the Divine Chariot employs, as we have stated the term ḥashmal (Ezek.
i. 4); also regel egel (v. 7), neḥoshet kalal (v. 7), and similar
terms; Zechariah (vi. 1) likewise adopts this method, and says: “And
the mountains were mountains of neḥoshet (brass),” and the like.
After these two remarks I will proceed to the chapter which I have
promised.
CHAPTER XXX
There is a difference between first and beginning (or principle). The
latter exists in the thing of which it is the beginning, or co-exists
with it; it need not precede it; e.g., the heart is the beginning of
the living being; the element is the beginning of that of which it is
the basis. The term “first” is likewise applied to things of this kind;
but is also employed in cases where precedence in time alone is to be
expressed, and the thing which precedes is not the beginning (or the
cause) of the thing that follows. E.g., we say A. was the first
inhabitant of this house, after him came B; this does not imply that A
is the cause of B inhabiting the house. In Hebrew, teḥillah is used in
the sense of “first”; e.g., when God first (teḥillat) spake to Hosea
(Hos. i. 1), and the “beginning” is expressed by reshith, derived from
rosh, “head,” the principal part of the living being as regards
position. The Universe has not been created out of an element that
preceded it in time, since time itself formed part of the Creation. For
this reason Scripture employs the term “bereshit” (in a principle), in
which the beth is a preposition denoting “in.” The true explanation of
the first verse of Genesis is as follows: “In [creating] a principle
God created the beings above and the things below.” This explanation is
in accordance with the theory of the Creation. We find that some of our
Sages are reported to have held the opinion that time existed before
the Creation. But this report is very doubtful, because the theory that
time cannot be imagined with a beginning, has been taught by Aristotle,
as I showed you, and is objectionable. Those who have made this
assertion have been led to it by a saying of one of our Sages in
reference to the terms “one day,” “a second day.” Taking these terms
literally, the author of that saying asked, What determined “the first
day,” since there was no rotating sphere, and no sun? and continues as
follows: Scripture uses the term “one day”; R. Jehudah, son of R.
Simon, said: “Hence we learn that the divisions of time have existed
previously.” R. Abahu said, “Hence we learn that God built worlds and
again destroyed them.” This latter exposition is still worse than the
former. Consider the difficulty which these two Rabbis found in the
statement that time existed before the creation of the sun. We shall
undoubtedly soon remove this difficulty, unless these two Rabbis
intended to infer from the Scriptural text that the divisions of time
must have existed before the Creation, and thus adopted the theory of
the Eternity of the Universe. But every religious man rejects this. The
above saying is, in my opinion, certainly of the same character as that
of R. Eliezer, “Whence were the heavens created,” etc., (chap. xxvi.).
In short, in these questions, do not take notice of the utterances of
any person. I told you that the foundation of our faith is the belief
that God created the Universe from nothing; that time did not exist
previously, but was created; for it depends on the motion of the
sphere, and the sphere has been created.
You must know that the particle et in the phrase et ha-shamayim ve-et
ha-areẓ (“the heavens and the earth”) signifies “together with”; our
Sages have explained the word in the same sense in many instances.
Accordingly they assume that God created with the heavens everything
that the heavens contain, and with the earth everything the earth
includes. They further say that the simultaneous Creation of the
heavens and the earth is implied in the words, “I call unto them, they
stand up together” (Ps. xlviii.). Consequently, all things were created
together, but were separated from each other successively. Our Sages
illustrated this by the following simile: We sow various seeds at the
same time; some spring forth after one day, some after two, and some
after three days, although all have been sown at the same time.
According to this interpretation, which is undoubtedly correct, the
difficulty is removed, which led R. Jehudah, son of R. Simon, to utter
the above saying, and consisted in the doubt as to the thing by which
the first day, the second, and the third were determined. In Bereshit
Rabba, our Sages, speaking of the light created on the first day
according to the Scriptural account, say as follows: these lights [of
the luminaries mentioned in the Creation of the fourth day] are the
same that were created on the first day, but were only fixed in their
places on the fourth day. The meaning [of the first verse] has thus
been clearly stated.
We must further consider that the term ereẓ is a homonym, and is used
in a general and a particular sense. It has a more general
signification when used of everything within the sphere of the moon,
i.e., of all the four elements; and is used in particular of one of
them, of the lowest, viz., earth. This is evident from the passage:
“And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was on the
surface of the deep. And the wind of God moved upon the face of the
waters.” The term “earth” [mentioned here, and in the first verse]
includes all the four elements, whilst further on it is said, “And God
called the dry land Earth” (Gen. i. 10).
It is also important to notice that the words, “And God called a
certain thing a certain name,” are invariably intended to distinguish
one thing from others which are called by the same common noun. I
explain, therefore, the first verse in Genesis thus: In creating the
principle God created the things above and those below. Ereẓ in this
verse denotes “the things below,” or “the four elements,” and in the
verse, “And God called the dry land Earth” (ereẓ), it signifies the
element earth. This subject is now made clear.
The four elements indicated, according to our explanation, in the term
ereẓ “earth,” in the first verse, are mentioned first after the
heavens; for there are named ereẓ (earth), ruaḥ (air), mayim (water),
and ḥoshek (fire). By ḥoshek the element fire is meant, nothing else;
comp. “And thou heardest his words out of the midst of the fire” (Deut.
iv. 36); and, “When ye heard the voice out of the midst of the ḥoshek”
(darkness) (ibid. v. 2); again, “All ḥoshek (darkness) shall be hid in
his secret places: a fire not blown shall consume him” (Job xx. 26).
The element fire is called ḥoshek because it is not luminous, it is
only transparent; for if it were luminous we should see at night the
whole atmosphere in flames. The order of the four elements, according
to the natural position is here described; namely, first earth, above
it water, air close to water, and fire above air; for by placing air
over water, ḥoshek (fire), which is “upon the face of the deep,” is
undoubtedly above air. It was here necessary to use the term ruaḥ
elohim, because air is described here as in motion (meraḥefet), and the
motion of the air is, as a rule, ascribed to God; comp. “And there went
forth a wind from the Lord” (Num. xi. 31); “Thou didst blow with thy
wind” (Exod. xv. 10); “And the Lord turned a mighty strong west wind”
(ibid. x. 19), and the like. As the first ḥoshek, which denotes the
element fire, is different from the ḥoshek mentioned further on in the
sense of “darkness,” the latter is explained and distinguished from the
former, according to our explanation, in the words, “And darkness he
called Night.” This is now clear.
The phrase, “And he divided between the waters,” etc., does not
describe a division in space, as if the one part were merely above the
other, whilst the nature of both remained the same, but a distinction
as regards their nature or form. One portion of that which was first
called water was made one thing by certain properties it received, and
another portion received a different form, and this latter portion is
that which is commonly called water and of this it is said, “And the
gathering of the waters he called Seas.” Scripture even indicates that
the first mayim (“water”) in the phrase, “On the face of the waters,”
does not refer to the waters which form the seas; and that part of the
element “water,” having received a particular form, and being above the
air, is distinguished from the other part which has received the form
of ordinary water. For the words, “And he divided between the waters
which are beneath the firmament and the waters which are above the
firmament,” are similar in meaning to the phrase, “And God divided
between the light and the darkness,” and refer to a distinction by a
separate form. The firmament itself was formed of water; and in the
words of our Sages (Bereshit Rabba; cap. iv.), “The middle drop
congealed and formed the heavens.”
Here likewise Scripture says, in accordance with what I said above,
“And God called the firmament Heaven” (Gen. i. 8), in order to explain
the homonymity of the term shamayim (heaven), and to show that shamayim
in the first verse is not the firmament which is also called shamayim
(heaven). The difference is more clearly expressed in the words, “In
the open firmament of heaven” (ibid. i. 20); here it is shown that
“firmament” (rakiʻa), and “heaven” (shamayim), are two different
things. In consequence of this homonymity of the term shamayim the term
rakiʻa (firmament) is also used of the true heaven, just as the real
firmament is sometimes called shamayim (heaven); comp. “And God set
them in the rakiʻa (firmament) of the heaven” (ibid. i. 17).
This verse shows clearly that the stars, the sun, and the moon are not,
as people believe, on the surface of the spheres, but they are fixed in
the spheres, and this has been proved satisfactorily, there being no
vacuum in the Universe; for it is said, “in the firmament of the
heaven,” and not “upon the firmament of the heaven.”
It is therefore clear that there has been one common element called
water, which has been afterwards distinguished by three different
forms; one part forms the seas, another the firmament, and a third part
is over the firmament, and all this is separate from the earth. The
Scriptural text follows here a peculiar method in order to indicate
some extraordinary mysteries. It has also been declared by our Sages
that the portion above the firmament is only water by name, not in
reality, for they say (Babyl. Talmud, Ḥagigah 14b) “Four entered the
paradise,” etc. R. Akiba said to them, “When you come to the stores of
pure marble, do not say, Water, water, for it is written, ‘He that
telleth lies shall not tarry in my sight’” (Ps. ci. 7). Consider, if
you belong to the class of thinking men, how clearly and distinctly
this passage explains the subject for those who reflect on it!
Understand that which has been proved by Aristotle in his book On
Meteorology, and note whatever men of science have said on
meteorological matters.
It is necessary to inquire into the reason why the declaration “that it
was good” is not found in the account of the second day of the
Creation. The various Midrashic sayings of our Sages on this point are
well known; the best of them is the explanation that the creation of
the water was not completed on that day. According to my opinion the
reason is likewise clear, and is as follows: When the creation of any
part of the Universe is described that is permanent, regular, and in a
settled order, the phrase “that it is good” is used. But the account of
the firmament, with that which is above it and is called water, is, as
you see, of a very mysterious character. For if taken literally the
firmament would appear at first thought to be merely an imaginary
thing, as there is no other substance but the elements between us and
the lowest of the heavenly spheres, and there is no water above the
air; and if the firmament, with that which is over it, be supposed to
be above the heavens, it would a fortiori seem to be unreal and
uncomprehensible. But if the account be understood in a figurative
sense and according to its true meaning, it is still more mysterious,
since it was considered necessary to make this one of the most hidden
secrets, in order to prevent the multitude from knowing it. This being
the case, how could it be said [of the creation of the second day]
“that it was good”? This phrase would tell us that it is perfectly
clear what share the thing to which it refers takes in the permanent
existence of the Universe. But what good can people find in a thing
whose real nature is hidden, and whose apparent nature is not real?
Why, therefore, should it be said in reference to it, “that it was
good”? I must, however, give the following additional explanation.
Although the result of the second day’s creation forms an important
element among the existing things, the firmament was not its primary
object in the organization of the Universe, and therefore it could not
be said “that it was good”; it was only the means for the uncovering of
the earth. Note this. Our Sages have already explained that the herbs
and trees, which God caused to spring forth from the ground, were
caused by God to grow, after He had sent down rain upon them; and the
passage beginning, “And there went up a mist from the earth” (ii. 6),
refers to that which took place before the creative act, related in the
words, “Let the earth bring forth grass,” etc. (i. ii.). Therefore
Onkelos translates it: “And there had gone up a mist from the earth.”
It is also evident from the text itself, where it is distinctly said,
“And every plant in the field before it was in the earth,” etc. (ii.
5). This question is now explained.
It is well known to every philosopher that the principal causes of
production and destruction, after the influence of the spheres, are
light and darkness, in so far as these are accompanied by heat and
cold. For by the motion of the spheres the elements intermix, and by
light and darkness their constitution changes. The first change
consists in the formation of two kinds of mist; these are the first
causes of meteorological phenomena, such as rain; they also caused the
formation of minerals, of plants, of animals, and at last of man. It is
likewise known that darkness is the natural property of all things on
earth; in them light is accidental, coming from an external cause, and
therefore everything remains in a state of rest in the absence of
light. The Scriptural account of the Creation follows in every respect
exactly the same order, without any deviation.
Note also the saying of our Sages: “When the Universe was created, all
things were created with size, intellect, and beauty fully developed,
i.e., everything was created perfect in magnitude and form, and endowed
with the most suitable properties; the word ẓibyonam (their beauty)
used here has the same meaning as ẓebi, ‘glory’” (Ezek. xx. 6). Note
this likewise, for it includes a principle fully established.
The following point now claims our attention. The account of the six
days of creation contains, in reference to the creation of man, the
statement: “Male and female created he them” (i. 27), and concludes
with the words: “Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all
the host of them” (ii. 1), and yet the portion which follows describes
the creation of Eve from Adam, the tree of life, and the tree of
knowledge, the history of the serpent and the events connected
therewith, and all this as having taken place after Adam had been
placed in the Garden of Eden. All our Sages agree that this took place
on the sixth day, and that nothing new was created after the close of
the six days. None of the things mentioned above is therefore
impossible, because the laws of Nature were then not yet permanently
fixed. There are, however, some utterances of our Sages on this subject
[which apparently imply a different view]. I will gather them from
their different sources and place them before you, and I will refer
also to certain things by mere hints, just as has been done by the
Sages. You must know that their words, which I am about to quote, are
most perfect, most accurate, and clear to those for whom they were
said. I will therefore not add long explanations, lest I make their
statements plain, and I might thus become “a revealer of secrets,” but
I will give them in a certain order, accompanied with a few remarks,
which will suffice for readers like you.
One of these utterances is this: “Adam and Eve were at first created as
one being, having their backs united; they were then separated, and one
half was removed and brought before Adam as Eve.” The term mi-ẓalʻotav
(lit. “of his ribs”) signifies “of his sides.” The meaning of the word
is proved by referring to ẓelʻa, “the side” of the tabernacle (Exod.
xxvi. 20), which Onkelos renders setar (“side”), and so also
mi-ẓalʻotav is rendered by him “mi-sitrohi” (of his sides). Note also
how clearly it has been stated that Adam and Eve were two in some
respects, and yet they remained one, according to the words, “Bone of
my bones, and flesh of my flesh” (Gen. ii. 23). The unity of the two is
proved by the fact that both have the same name, for she is called
ishshah (woman), because she was taken out of ish (man), also by the
words, “And shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh”
(ii. 24). How great is the ignorance of those who do not see that all
this necessarily includes some [other] idea [besides the literal
meaning of the words]. This is now clear.
Another noteworthy Midrashic remark of our Sages is the following: “The
serpent had a rider, the rider was as big as a camel, and it was the
rider that enticed Eve; this rider was Samaël.” Samaël is the name
generally applied by our Sages to Satan. Thus they say in several
places that Satan desired to entice Abraham to sin, and to abstain from
binding Isaac, and he desired also to persuade Isaac not to obey his
father. At the same time they also say, in reference to the same
subject, viz., the Akedah (“the binding of Isaac”), that Samaël came to
Abraham and said to him, “What! hast thou, being an old man, lost thy
senses?” etc. This shows that Samaël and Satan are identical. There is
a meaning in this name [Samaël], as there is also in the name naḥash
(“serpent”). In describing how the serpent came to entice Eve, our
Sages say: “Samaël was riding on it, and God was laughing at both the
camel and its rider.” It is especially of importance to notice that the
serpent did not approach or address Adam, but all his attempts were
directed against Eve, and it was through her that the serpent caused
injury and death to Adam. The greatest hatred exists between the
serpent and Eve, and between his seed and her seed; her seed being
undoubtedly also the seed of man. More remarkable still is the way in
which the serpent is joined to Eve, or rather his seed to her seed; the
head of the one touches the heel of the other. Eve defeats the serpent
by crushing its head, whilst the serpent defeats her by wounding her
heel. This is likewise clear.
The following is also a remarkable passage, most absurd in its literal
sense; but as an allegory it contains wonderful wisdom, and fully
agrees with real facts, as will be found by those who understand all
the chapters of this treatise. When the serpent came to Eve he infected
her with poison; the Israelites, who stood at Mount Sinai, removed that
poison; idolaters, who did not stand at Mount Sinai, have not got rid
of it. Note this likewise. Again they said: “The tree of life extends
over an area of five hundred years’ journey, and it is from beneath it
that all the waters of the creation sprang forth”; and they added the
explanation that this measure referred to the thickness of its body,
and not to the extent of its branches, for they continue thus: “Not the
extent of the branches thereof, but the stem thereof [korato, lit.,
‘its beam,’ signifying here ‘its stem’] has a thickness of five hundred
years’ journey.” This is now sufficiently clear. Again: “God has never
shown the tree of knowledge [of good and evil] to man, nor will He ever
show it.” This is correct, for it must be so according to the nature of
the Universe. Another noteworthy saying is this: “And the Lord God took
the man, i.e., raised him, and placed him in the Garden of Eden,” i.e.,
He gave him rest. The words “He took him,” “He gave him,” have no
reference to position in space, but they indicate his position in rank
among transient beings, and the prominent character of his existence.
Remarkable and noteworthy is the great wisdom contained in the names of
Adam, Cain, and Abel, and in the fact that it was Cain who slew Abel in
the field, that both of them perished, although the murderer had some
respite, and that the existence of mankind is due to Seth alone. Comp.
“For God has appointed me another seed” (iv. 25). This has proved true.
It is also necessary to understand and consider the words, “And Adam
gave names” (ii. 20); here it is indicated that languages are
conventional, and that they are not natural, as has been assumed by
some. We must also consider the four different terms employed in
expressing the relations of the heavens to God, bore (Creator), ʻoseh
(Maker), koneh (Possessor), and el (God). Comp. “God created the heaven
and the earth” (i. 1); “In the day that God made the earth and the
heavens” (ii. 4); “Possessor of heaven and earth” (xiv. 19); “God of
the Universe” (xxi. 31); “The God of heaven and the God of the earth”
(xxiv. 3). As to the verbs, konen, “he established,” tafaḥ, “he
spanned,” and natah, “he stretched out,” occurring in the following
passages, “Which thou hast established” (Ps. viii. 4), “My right hand
hath spanned the heavens” (Isa. xviii. 13), “Who stretchest out the
heavens” (Ps. civ. 2), they are included in the term ʻasah (“he made”);
the verb yaẓar, “he formed,” does not occur in reference to the
heavens. According to my opinion the verb yaẓar denotes to make a form,
a shape, or any other accident (for form and shape are likewise
accidents). It is therefore said, yoẓer or, “Who formeth the light”
(Isa. xiv. 7), light being an accident; yoẓer harim, “That formeth the
mountains” (Amos iv. 13), i.e., that gave them their shape. In the same
sense the verb is used in the passage, “And the Lord God formed
(va-yiẓer) all the beasts,” etc. (Gen. ii. 7). But in reference to the
Universe, viz., the heavens and the earth, which comprises the totality
of the Creation, Scripture employs the verb bara, which we explain as
denoting he produced something from nothing; also ʻasah (“he made”), on
account of the general forms or natural properties of the things which
were given to them; kanah, “he possessed,” because God rules over them
like a master over his servants. For this reason He is also called,
“The Lord of the whole earth” (Jos. iii. 11–13); ha-adon, “the Lord”
(Exod. xx., iii. 17). But although none can be a master unless there
exists something that is in his possession, this attribute cannot be
considered to imply the belief in the eternal existence of a materia
prima, since the verbs bara, “he created,” and ʻasah, “he made,” are
also employed in reference to the heavens. The Creator is called the
God of the heavens and the God of the Universe, on account of the
relations between Him and the heavens; He governs, and they are
governed; the word elohim does not signify “master” in the sense of
“owner”; it expresses the relation between His position in the totality
of existing beings, and the position of the heavens or the Universe; He
is God, not they, i.e., not the heavens. Note this.
This, together with those explanations which we have given, and which
we intend to give, in reference to this subject, may suffice,
considering the object of this treatise and the capacity of the reader.
CHAPTER XXXI
It is perhaps clear why the laws concerning Sabbath are so severe, that
their transgression is visited with death by stoning, and that the
greatest of the prophets put a person to death for breaking the
Sabbath. The commandment of the Sabbath is the third from the
commandment concerning the existence and the unity of God. For the
commandment not to worship any other being is merely an explanation of
the first. You know already from what I have said, that no opinions
retain their vitality except those which are confirmed, published, and
by certain actions constantly revived among the people. Therefore we
are told in the Law to honour this day; in order to confirm thereby the
principle of Creation which will spread in the world, when all peoples
keep Sabbath on the same day. For when the question is asked, why this
is done, the answer is given: “For in six days the Lord hath made,”
etc. (Exod. xx. 11). Two different reasons are given for this
commandment, because of two different objects. In the Decalogue in
Exodus, the following reason is given for distinguishing the Sabbath:
“For in six days,” etc. But in Deuteronomy (chap. v. 15) the reason is
given: “And thou shalt remember that thou hast been a slave in the land
of Egypt, etc., therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee,” etc. This
difference can easily be explained. In the former, the cause of the
honour and distinction of the day is given; comp. “Therefore the Lord
hath blessed the day of the Sabbath and sanctified it” (Exod. xx. 10),
and the cause for this is, “For in six days,” etc. But the fact that
God has given us the law of the Sabbath and commanded us to keep it, is
the consequence of our having been slaves; for then our work did not
depend on our will, nor could we choose the time for it; and we could
not rest. Thus God commanded us to abstain from work on the Sabbath,
and to rest, for two purposes; namely, (1) That we might confirm the
true theory, that of the Creation, which at once and clearly leads to
the theory of the existence of God. (2) That we might remember how kind
God has been in freeing us from the burden of the Egyptians.—The
Sabbath is therefore a double blessing: it gives us correct notions,
and also promotes the well-being of our bodies.
CHAPTER XXXII
There are as many different opinions concerning Prophecy as concerning
the Eternity or Non-Eternity of the Universe. For we have shown that
those who assume the existence of God as proved may be divided into
three classes, according to the view they take of the question, whether
the Universe is eternal or not. Similarly there are three different
opinions on Prophecy. I will not notice the view of the Atheist; he
does not believe in the Existence of God, much less in Prophecy; but I
will content myself with discussing the various opinions [on Prophecy]
held by those who believe in God.
Among those who believe in Prophecy, and even among our
coreligionists, there are some ignorant people who think as follows:
God selects any person He pleases, inspires him with the spirit of
Prophecy, and entrusts him with a mission. It makes no difference
whether that person be wise or stupid, old or young; provided he be, to
some extent, morally good. For these people have not yet gone so far as
to maintain that God might also inspire a wicked person with His
spirit. They admit that this is impossible, unless God has previously
caused him to improve his ways.The philosophers hold that prophecy is a certain faculty of man in a
state of perfection, which can only be obtained by study. Although the
faculty is common to the whole race, yet it is not fully developed in
each individual, either on account of the individual’s defective
constitution, or on account of some other external cause. This is the
case with every faculty common to a class. It is only brought to a
state of perfection in some individuals, and not in all; but it is
impossible that it should not be perfect in some individual of the
class; and if the perfection is of such a nature that it can only be
produced by an agent, such an agent must exist. Accordingly, it is
impossible that an ignorant person should be a prophet; or that a
person being no prophet in the evening, should, unexpectedly on the
following morning, find himself a prophet, as if prophecy were a thing
that could be found unintentionally. But if a person, perfect in his
intellectual and moral faculties, and also perfect, as far as possible,
in his imaginative faculty, prepares himself in the manner which will
be described, he must become a prophet; for prophecy is a natural
faculty of man. It is impossible that a man who has the capacity for
prophecy should prepare himself for it without attaining it, just as it
is impossible that a person with a healthy constitution should be fed
well, and yet not properly assimilate his food; and the like.The third view is that which is taught in Scripture, and which forms
one of the principles of our religion. It coincides with the opinion of
the philosophers in all points except one. For we believe that, even if
one has the capacity for prophecy, and has duly prepared himself, it
may yet happen that he does not actually prophesy. It is in that case
the will of God [that withholds from him the use of the faculty].
According to my opinion, this fact is as exceptional as any other
miracle, and acts in the same way. For the laws of Nature demand that
every one should be a prophet, who has a proper physical constitution,
and has been duly prepared as regards education and training. If such a
person is not a prophet, he is in the same position as a person who,
like Jeroboam (1 Kings xiii. 4), is deprived of the use of his hand, or
of his eyes, as was the case with the army of Syria, in the history of
Elisha (2 Kings vi. 18). As for the principle which I laid down, that
preparation and perfection of moral and rational faculties are the sine
quâ non, our Sages say exactly the same: “The spirit of prophecy only
rests upon persons who are wise, strong, and rich.” We have explained
these words in our Commentary on the Mishnah, and in our large work. We
stated there that the Sons of the Prophets were constantly engaged in
preparation. That those who have prepared themselves may still be
prevented from being prophets, may be inferred from the history of
Baruch, the son of Nerijah; for he followed Jeremiah, who prepared and
instructed him; and yet he hoped in vain for prophecy; comp., “I am
weary with my sighing, and rest have I not found.” He was then told
through Jeremiah, “Thus saith the Lord, Thus shalt thou say to him,
Thou seekest for thee great things, do not seek” (Jer. xlv. 5). It may
perhaps be assumed that prophecy is here described as a thing “too
great” for Baruch. So also the fact that “her prophets did not find
visions from the Lord” (Lam. ii. 4), may be considered as the result of
the exile of her prophets, as will be explained (chap. xxxvi.). There
are, however, numerous passages in Scripture as well as in the writings
of our Sages, which support the principle that it depends chiefly on
the will of God who is to prophesy, and at what time; and that He only
selects the best and the wisest. We hold that fools and ignorant people
are unfit for this distinction. It is as impossible for any one of
these to prophesy as it is for an ass or a frog; for prophecy is
impossible without study and training; when these have created the
possibility, then it depends on the will of God whether the possibility
is to be turned into reality. We must not be misled by the words of
Jeremiah (i. 5), “Before I formed thee in the womb I knew thee, and
before thou camest forth from the womb I have sanctified thee”; for
this is the case with all prophets; there must be a physical
preparation from the beginning of their existence, as will be
explained. As to the words, “For I am young” (ibid. ver. 6), it is well
known that the pious Joseph, when he was thirty years old, is called by
the Hebrew “young” (naʻar); also Joshua, when he was nearly sixty years
old. For the statement, “and his minister Joshua, the son of Nun, was
young,” occurs in the account of the Golden Calf (Exod. xxxiii. 11).
Moses was then eighty-one years old, he lived one hundred and twenty
years; Joshua, who survived him fourteen years, lived one hundred and
ten years and must consequently have been at least fifty-seven years
old at the time when the Golden Calf was made, and yet he is called
naʻar, “young.” Nor must we be misled by prophecies like the following:
“I will pour out my spirit over all flesh, and your sons and your
daughters shall prophesy”; since it is distinctly stated what is meant
by “prophesy” in this place, viz., “Your old men will dream dreams,
your young men shall see visions.” For we call also prophets all those
who reveal something unknown by surmises, or conjectures, or correct
inferences. Thus “prophets of Baal” and “of Asherah” are mentioned in
Scripture. And God says, “If there arise among you a prophet or a
dreamer of dreams,” etc. (Deut. xiii. 1). As to the revelation on Mount
Sinai, all saw the great fire, and heard the fearful thunderings, that
caused such an extraordinary terror; but only those of them who were
duly qualified were prophetically inspired, each one according to his
capacities. Therefore it is said, “Come up unto the Lord, thou and
Aaron, Nadab and Abihu.” Moses rose to the highest degree of prophecy,
according to the words, “And Moses alone shall come near the Lord.”
Aaron was below him, Nadab and Abihu below Aaron, and the seventy
elders below Nadab and Abihu, and the rest below the latter, each one
according to his degree of perfection. Similarly our Sages wrote: Moses
had his own place and Aaron his own. Since we have touched upon the
revelation on Mount Sinai, we will point out in a separate chapter what
may be inferred as regards the nature of that event, both from the
Scriptural text, in accordance with reasonable interpretation, and from
the words of our Sages.
CHAPTER XXXIII
It is clear to me that what Moses experienced at the revelation on
Mount Sinai was different from that which was experienced by all the
other Israelites, for Moses alone was addressed by God, and for this
reason the second person singular is used in the Ten Commandments;
Moses then went down to the foot of the mount and told his fellow-men
what he had heard. Comp., “I stood between the Lord and you at that
time to tell you the word of the Lord” (Deut. v. 5). Again, “Moses
spake, and God answered him with a loud voice” (Exod. xix. 19). In the
Mechilta our Sages say distinctly that he brought to them every word as
he had heard it. Furthermore, the words, “In order that the people hear
when I speak with thee” (Exod. xix. 9), show that God spoke to Moses,
and the people only heard the mighty sound, not distinct words. It is
to the perception of this mighty sound that Scripture refers in the
passage, “When ye hear the sound” (Deut. v. 20); again it is stated,
“You heard a sound of words” (ibid. iv. 12), and it is not said “You
heard words”; and even where the hearing of the words is mentioned,
only the perception of the sound is meant. It was only Moses that heard
the words, and he reported them to the people. This is apparent from
Scripture, and from the utterances of our Sages in general. There is,
however, an opinion of our Sages frequently expressed in the Midrashim,
and found also in the Talmud, to this effect: The Israelites heard the
first and the second commandments from God, i.e., they learnt the truth
of the principles contained in these two commandments in the same
manner as Moses, and not through Moses. For these two principles, the
existence of God and His Unity, can be arrived at by means of
reasoning, and whatever can be established by proof is known by the
prophet in the same way as by any other person; he has no advantage in
this respect. These two principles were not known through prophecy
alone. Comp., “Thou hast been shown to know that,” etc. (Deut. iv. 34).
But the rest of the commandments are of an ethical and authoritative
character, and do not contain [truths] perceived by the intellect.
Notwithstanding all that has been said by our Sages on this subject, we
infer from Scripture as well as from the words of our Sages, that the
Israelites heard on that occasion a certain sound which Moses
understood to proclaim the first two commandments, and through Moses
all other Israelites learnt them when he in intelligible sounds
repeated them to the people. Our Sages mention this view, and support
it by the verse, “God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this” (Ps.
lxii. 11). They state distinctly, in the beginning of Midrash Ḥazita,
that the Israelites did not hear any other command directly from God;
comp. “A loud voice, and it was not heard again” (Deut. v. 19). It was
after this first sound was heard that the people were seized with the
fear and terror described in Scripture, and that they said, “Behold the
Lord our God has shown us, etc., and now why shall we die, etc. Come
thou near,” etc. Then Moses, the most distinguished of all mankind,
came the second time, received successively the other commandments, and
came down to the foot of the mountain to proclaim them to the people,
whilst the mighty phenomena continued; they saw the fire, they heard
the sounds, which were those of thunder and lightning during a storm,
and the loud sound of the shofar; and all that is said of the many
sounds heard at that time, e.g., in the verse, “and all the people
perceived the sounds,” etc., refers to the sound of the shofar,
thunder, and similar sounds. But the voice of the Lord, that is, the
voice created for that purpose, which was understood to include the
diverse commandments, was only heard once, as is declared in the Law,
and has been clearly stated by our Sages in the places which I have
indicated to you. When the people heard this voice their soul left
them; and in this voice they perceived the first two commandments. It
must, however, be noticed that the people did not understand the voice
in the same degree as Moses did. I will point out to you this important
fact, and show you that it was a matter of tradition with the nation,
and well known by our Sages. For, as a rule, Onkelos renders the word
va-yedabber by u-mallel (“and God spake”); this is also the case with
this word in the beginning of the twentieth chapter of Exodus, but the
words ve-al yedabber immanu elohim, “let not God speak to us” (Exod.
xx. 19), addressed by the people to Moses, is rendered vela yitmallel
immanu min kodam adonai (“Let not aught be spoken to us by the Lord”).
Onkelos makes thus the same distinction which we made. You know that
according to the Talmud Onkelos received all these excellent
interpretations directly from R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, the wisest men
in Israel. Note it, and remember it, for it is impossible for any
person to expound the revelation on Mount Sinai more fully than our
Sages have done, since it is one of the secrets of the Law. It is very
difficult to have a true conception of the events, for there has never
been before, nor will there ever be again, anything like it. Note it.
CHAPTER XXXIV
The meaning of the Scriptural passage, “Behold I will send an angel
before thee,” etc. (Exod. xxiii. 20), is identical with the parallel
passage in Deuteronomy which God is represented to have addressed to
Moses at the revelation on Mount Sinai, namely, “I will raise them up a
prophet from among their brethren,” etc. (Deut. xviii. 18). The words,
“Beware of him, and obey his voice,” etc., said in reference to the
angel, prove [that this passage speaks of a prophet]. For there is no
doubt that the commandment is given to the ordinary people, to whom
angels do not appear with commandments and exhortations, and it is
therefore unnecessary to tell them not to disobey him. The meaning of
the passage quoted above is this: God informs the Israelites that He
will raise up for them a prophet, to whom an angel will appear in order
to speak to him, to command him, and to exhort him; he therefore
cautions them not to rebel against this angel, whose word the prophet
will communicate to them. Therefore it is expressly said in
Deuteronomy, “Unto him ye shall hearken” (Deut. xviii. 15); “And it
shall come to pass that whosoever shall not hearken unto my words which
he shall speak in my name,” etc. (ibid. 19). This is the explanation of
the words, “for my name is in him” (Exod. xxiv. 21). The object of all
this is to say to the Israelites, This great sight witnessed by you,
the revelation on Mount Sinai, will not continue for ever, nor will it
ever be repeated. Fire and cloud will not continually rest over the
tabernacle, as they are resting now on it; but the towns will be
conquered for you, peace will be secured for you in the land, and you
will be informed of what you have to do, by an angel whom I will send
to your prophets; he will thus teach you what to do, and what not to
do. Here a principle is laid down which I have constantly expounded,
viz., that all prophets except Moses receive the prophecy through an
angel. Note it.
CHAPTER XXXV
I have already described the four points in which the prophecy of Moses
our Teacher was distinguished from that of other prophets, in books
accessible to every one, in the Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin x.
- and in Mishneh-torah (S. Maddʻa I. vii. 6); I have also adduced
evidence for my explanation, and shown the correctness thereof. I need
not repeat the subject here, nor is it included in the theme of this
work. For I must tell you that whatever I say here of prophecy refers
exclusively to the form of the prophecy of all prophets before and
after Moses. But as to the prophecy of Moses I will not discuss it in
this work with one single word, whether directly or indirectly,
because, in my opinion, the term prophet is applied to Moses and other
men homonymously. A similar distinction, I think, must be made between
the miracles wrought by Moses and those wrought by other prophets, for
his signs are not of the same class as the miracles of other prophets.
That his prophecy was distinguished from that of all his predecessors
is proved by the passage, “And I appeared to Abraham, etc., but by my
name, the Lord, I was not known unto them” (Exod. vi. 3). We thus learn
that his prophetic perception was different from that of the
Patriarchs, and excelled it; a fortiori it must have excelled that of
other prophets before Moses. As to the distinction of Moses’ prophecy
from that of succeeding prophets, it is stated as a fact, “And there
arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew
face to face” (Deut. xxxiv. 10). It is thus clear that his prophetic
perception was above that of later prophets in Israel, who are “a
kingdom of priests and a holy nation,” and “in whose midst is the
Lord”; much more is it above that of prophets among other nations.
The general distinction between the wonders of Moses and those of other
prophets is this: The wonders wrought by prophets, or for them, are
witnessed by a few individuals, e.g., the wonders wrought by Elijah and
Elisha; the king of Israel is therefore surprised, and asked Gehazi to
describe to him the miracles wrought by Elisha: “Tell me, I pray thee,
all the great things that Elisha hath done. And it came to pass as he
was telling, etc. And Gehazi said: ‘My lord, O king, this is the woman,
and this is her son, whom Elisha restored to life’” (2 Kings viii. 4,
5). The same is the case with the signs of every other prophet, except
Moses our Teacher. Scripture, therefore declares that no prophet will
ever, like Moses, do signs publicly in the presence of friend and
enemy, of his followers and his opponents; this is the meaning of the
words: “And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses,
etc., in all the signs and the wonders, etc., in the sight of all
Israel.” Two things are here mentioned together; namely, that there
will not arise a prophet that will perceive as Moses perceived, or a
prophet that will do as he did; then it is pointed out that the signs
were made in the presence of Pharaoh, all his servants and all his
land, the opponents of Moses, and also in the presence of all the
Israelites, his followers. Comp. “In the sight of all Israel.” This is
a distinction not possessed by any prophet before Moses; nor, as is
correctly foretold, will it ever be possessed by another prophet. We
must not be misled by the account that the light of the sun stood still
certain hours for Joshua, when “he said in the sight of Israel,” etc.
(Josh. x. 12); for it is not said there “in the sight of all Israel,”
as is said in reference to Moses. So also the miracle of Elijah, at
Mount Carmel, was witnessed only by a few people. When I said above
that the sun stood still certain hours, I explain the words “ka-jom
tamim” to mean “the longest possible day,” because tamim means
“perfect,” and indicates that that day appeared to the people at Gibeon
as their longest day in the summer. Your mind must comprehend the
distinction of the prophecy and the wonders of Moses, and understand
that his greatness in prophetic perception was the same as his power of
producing miracles. If you further assume that we are unable fully to
comprehend the nature of this greatness, you will understand that when
I speak, in the chapters which follow this, on prophecy and the
different classes of prophets, I only refer to the prophets which have
not attained the high degree that Moses attained. This is what I
desired to explain in this chapter.
CHAPTER XXXVI
Prophecy is, in truth and reality, an emanation sent forth by the
Divine Being through the medium of the Active Intellect, in the first
instance to man’s rational faculty, and then to his imaginative
faculty; it is the highest degree and greatest perfection man can
attain; it consists in the most perfect development of the imaginative
faculty. Prophecy is a faculty that cannot in any way be found in a
person, or acquired by man, through a culture of his mental and moral
faculties; for even if these latter were as good and perfect as
possible, they would be of no avail, unless they were combined with the
highest natural excellence of the imaginative faculty. You know that
the full development of any faculty of the body, such as the
imagination, depends on the condition of the organ, by means of which
the faculty acts. This must be the best possible as regards its
temperament and its size, and also as regards the purity of its
substance. Any defect in this respect cannot in any way be supplied or
remedied by training. For when any organ is defective in its
temperament, proper training can in the best case restore a healthy
condition to some extent, but cannot make such an organ perfect. But if
the organ is defective as regards size, position, or as regards the
substance and the matter of which the organ is formed, there is no
remedy. You know all this, and I need not explain it to you at length.
Part of the functions of the imaginative faculty is, as you well know,
to retain impressions by the senses, to combine them, and chiefly to
form images. The principal and highest function is performed when the
senses are at rest and pause in their action, for then it receives, to
some extent, divine inspiration in the measure as it is predisposed for
this influence. This is the nature of those dreams which prove true,
and also of prophecy, the difference being one of quantity, not of
quality. Thus our Sages say, that dream is the sixtieth part of
prophecy; and no such comparison could be made between two things of
different kinds, for we cannot say the perfection of man is so many
times the perfection of a horse. In Bereshit Rabba (sect. xvii.) the
following saying of our Sages occurs, “Dream is the nobelet (the unripe
fruit) of prophecy.” This is an excellent comparison, for the unripe
fruit (nobelet) is really the fruit to some extent, only it has fallen
from the tree before it was fully developed and ripe. In a similar
manner the action of the imaginative faculty during sleep is the same
as at the time when it receives a prophecy, only in the first case it
is not fully developed, and has not yet reached its highest degree. But
why need I quote the words of our Sages, when I can refer to the
following passage of Scripture: “If there be among you a prophet, I,
the Lord, will make myself known unto him in a vision, in a dream will
I speak to him” (Num. xii. 6). Here the Lord tells us what the real
essence of prophecy is, that it is a perfection acquired in a dream or
in a vision (the original mareh is a noun derived from the verb raah);
the imaginative faculty acquires such an efficiency in its action that
it sees the thing as if it came from without, and perceives it as if
through the medium of bodily senses. These two modes of prophecy,
vision and dream, include all its different degrees. It is a well-known
fact that the thing which engages greatly and earnestly man’s attention
whilst he is awake and in the full possession of his senses forms
during his sleep the object of the action of his imaginative faculty.
Imagination is then only influenced by the intellect in so far as it is
predisposed for such influence. It would be quite useless to illustrate
this by a simile, or to explain it fully, as it is clear, and every one
knows it. It is like the action of the senses, the existence of which
no person with common sense would ever deny. After these introductory
remarks you will understand that a person must satisfy the following
conditions before he can become a prophet: The substance of the brain
must from the very beginning be in the most perfect condition as
regards purity of matter, composition of its different parts, size and
position; no part of his body must suffer from ill-health; he must in
addition have studied and acquired wisdom, so that his rational faculty
passes from a state of potentiality to that of actuality; his intellect
must be as developed and perfect as human intellect can be; his
passions pure and equally balanced; all his desires must aim at
obtaining a knowledge of the hidden laws and causes that are in force
in the Universe; his thoughts must be engaged in lofty matters; his
attention directed to the knowledge of God, the consideration of His
works, and of that which he must believe in this respect. There must be
an absence of the lower desires and appetites, of the seeking after
pleasure in eating, drinking, and cohabitation; and, in short, every
pleasure connected with the sense of touch. (Aristotle correctly says
that this sense is a disgrace to us, since we possess it only in virtue
of our being animals; and it does not include any specifically human
element, whilst enjoyments connected with other senses, as smell,
hearing, and sight, though likewise of a material nature, may sometimes
include [intellectual] pleasure, appealing to man as man, according to
Aristotle. This remark, although forming no part of our subject, is not
superfluous, for the thoughts of the most renowned wise men are to a
great extent affected by the pleasures of this sense, and filled with a
desire for them. And yet people are surprised that these scholars do
not prophesy, if prophesying be nothing but a certain degree in the
natural development of man.) It is further necessary to suppress every
thought or desire for unreal power and dominion; that is to say, for
victory, increase of followers, acquisition of honour, and service from
the people without any ulterior object. On the contrary, the multitude
must be considered according to their true worth; some of them are
undoubtedly like domesticated cattle, and others like wild beasts, and
these only engage the mind of the perfect and distinguished man in so
far as he desires to guard himself from injury, in case of contact with
them, and to derive some benefit from them when necessary. A man who
satisfies these conditions, whilst his fully developed imagination is
in action, influenced by the Active Intellect according to his mental
training,—such a person will undoubtedly perceive nothing but things
very extraordinary and divine, and see nothing but God and His angels.
His knowledge will only include that which is real knowledge, and his
thought will only be directed to such general principles as would tend
to improve the social relations between man and man.
We have thus described three kinds of perfection: mental perfection
acquired by training, perfection of the natural constitution of the
imaginative faculty, and moral perfection produced by the suppression
of every thought of bodily pleasures, and of every kind of foolish or
evil ambition. These qualities are, as is well known, possessed by the
wise men in different degrees, and the degrees of prophetic faculty
vary in accordance with this difference. Faculties of the body are, as
you know, at one time weak, wearied, and corrupted, at others in a
healthy state. Imagination is certainly one of the faculties of the
body. You find, therefore, that prophets are deprived of the faculty of
prophesying when they mourn, are angry, or are similarly affected. Our
Sages say, Inspiration does not come upon a prophet when he is sad or
languid. This is the reason why Jacob did not receive any revelation
during the period of his mourning, when his imagination was engaged
with the loss of Joseph. The same was the case with Moses, when he was
in a state of depression through the multitude of his troubles, which
lasted from the murmurings of the Israelites in consequence of the evil
report of the spies, till the death of the warriors of that generation.
He received no message of God, as he used to do, even though he did not
receive prophetic inspiration through the medium of the imaginative
faculty, but directly through the intellect. We have mentioned it
several times that Moses did not, like other prophets, speak in
similes. This will be further explained (chap. xlv.), but it is not the
subject of the present chapter. There were also persons who prophesied
for a certain time and then left off altogether, something occurring
that caused them to discontinue prophesying. The same circumstance,
prevalence of sadness and dulness, was undoubtedly the direct cause of
the interruption of prophecy during the exile; for can there be any
greater misfortune for man than this: to be a slave bought for money in
the service of ignorant and voluptuous masters, and powerless against
them as they unite in themselves the absence of true knowledge and the
force of all animal desires? Such an evil state has been prophesied to
us in the words, “They shall run to and fro to seek the word of God,
but shall not find it” (Amos viii. 12); “Her king and her princes are
among the nations, the law is no more, her prophets also find no vision
from the Lord” (Lam. ii. 9). This is a real fact, and the cause is
evident; the pre-requisites [of prophecy] have been lost. In the
Messianic period—may it soon commence—prophecy will therefore again be
in our midst, as has been promised by God.
CHAPTER XXXVII
It is necessary to consider the nature of the divine influence, which
enables us to think, and gives us the various degrees of intelligence.
For this influence may reach a person only in a small measure, and in
exactly the same proportion would then be his intellectual condition,
whilst it may reach another person in such a measure that, in addition
to his own perfection, he can be the means of perfection for others.
The same relation may be observed throughout the whole Universe. There
are some beings so perfect that they can govern other beings, but there
are also beings that are only perfect in so far as they can govern
themselves and cannot influence other beings. In some cases the
influence of the [Active] Intellect reaches only the logical and not
the imaginative faculty; either on account of the insufficiency of that
influence, or on account of a defect in the constitution of the
imaginative faculty, and the consequent inability of the latter to
receive that influence: this is the condition of wise men or
philosophers. If, however, the imaginative faculty is naturally in the
most perfect condition, this influence may, as has been explained by us
and by other philosophers, reach both his logical and his imaginative
faculties: this is the case with prophets. But it happens sometimes
that the influence only reaches the imaginative faculty on account of
the insufficiency of the logical faculty, arising either from a natural
defect, or from a neglect in training. This is the case with statesmen,
lawgivers, diviners, charmers, and men that have true dreams, or do
wonderful things by strange means and secret arts, though they are not
wise men; all these belong to the third class. It is further necessary
to understand that some persons belonging to the third class perceive
scenes, dreams, and confused images, when awake, in the form of a
prophetic vision. They then believe that they are prophets; they wonder
that they perceive visions, and think that they have acquired wisdom
without training. They fall into grave errors as regards important
philosophical principles, and see a strange mixture of true and
imaginary things. All this is the consequence of the strength of their
imaginative faculty, and the weakness of their logical faculty, which
has not developed, and has not passed from potentiality to actuality.
It is well known that the members of each class differ greatly from
each other. Each of the first two classes is again subdivided, and
contains two sections, namely, those who receive the influence only as
far as is necessary for their own perfection, and those who receive it
in so great a measure that it suffices for their own perfection and
that of others. A member of the first class, the wise men, may have his
mind influenced either only so far, that he is enabled to search, to
understand, to know, and to discern, without attempting to be a teacher
or an author, having neither the desire nor the capacity; but he may
also be influenced to such a degree that he becomes a teacher and an
author. The same is the case with the second class. A person may
receive a prophecy enabling him to perfect himself but not others; but
he may also receive such a prophecy as would compel him to address his
fellow-men, teach them, and benefit them through his perfection. It is
clear that, without this second degree of perfection, no books would
have been written, nor would any prophets have persuaded others to know
the truth. For a scholar does not write a book with the object to teach
himself what he already knows. But the characteristic of the intellect
is this: what the intellect of one receives is transmitted to another,
and so on, till a person is reached that can only himself be perfected
by such an influence, but is unable to communicate it to others, as has
been explained in some chapters of this treatise (chap. xi.). It is
further the nature of this element in man that he who possesses an
additional degree of that influence is compelled to address his
fellow-men, under all circumstances, whether he is listened to or not,
even if he injures himself thereby. Thus we find prophets that did not
leave off speaking to the people until they were slain; it is this
divine influence that moves them, that does not allow them to rest in
any way, though they might bring upon themselves great evils by their
action. E.g., when Jeremiah was despised, like other teachers and
scholars of his age, he could not, though he desired it, withhold his
prophecy, or cease from reminding the people of the truths which they
rejected. Comp. “For the Word of the Lord was unto me a reproach and a
mocking all day, and I said, I will not mention it, nor will I again
speak in His name; but it was in mine heart as a burning fire, enclosed
in my bones, and I was wearied to keep it, and did not prevail” (Jer.
xx. 8, 9). This is also the meaning of the words of another prophet,
“The Lord God hath spoken, who shall not prophesy?” (Amos iii. 8) Note
it.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
Every man possesses a certain amount of courage, otherwise he would not
stir to remove anything that might injure him. This psychical force
seems to me analogous to the physical force of repulsion. Energy varies
like all other forces, being great in one case and small in another.
There are, therefore, people who attack a lion, whilst others run away
at the sight of a mouse. One attacks a whole army and fights, another
is frightened and terrified by the threat of a woman. This courage
requires that there be in a man’s constitution a certain disposition
for it. If man, in accordance with a certain view, employs it more
frequently, it develops and increases, but, on the other hand, if it is
employed, in accordance with the opposite view, more rarely, it will
diminish. From our own youth we remember that there are different
degrees of energy among boys.
The same is the case with the intuitive faculty; all possess it, but in
different degrees. Man’s intuitive power is especially strong in things
which he has well comprehended, and in which his mind is much engaged.
Thus you may yourself guess correctly that a certain person said or did
a certain thing in a certain matter. Some persons are so strong and
sound in their imagination and intuitive faculty that, when they assume
a thing to be in existence, the reality either entirely or partly
confirms their assumption. Although the causes of this assumption are
numerous, and include many preceding, succeeding, and present
circumstances, by means of the intuitive faculty the intellect can pass
over all these causes, and draw inferences from them very quickly,
almost instantaneously. This same faculty enables some persons to
foretell important coming events. The prophets must have had these two
forces, courage and intuition, highly developed, and these were still
more strengthened when they were under the influence of the Active
Intellect. Their courage was so great that, e.g., Moses, with only a
staff in his hand, dared to address a great king in his desire to
deliver a nation from his service. He was not frightened or terrified,
because he had been told, “I will be with thee” (Exod. iii. 12). The
prophets have not all the same degree of courage, but none of them have
been entirely without it. Thus Jeremiah is told: “Be not afraid of
them,” etc. (Jer. i. 8), and Ezekiel is exhorted, “Do not fear them or
their word” (Ezek. ii. 6). In the same manner, you find that all
prophets possessed great courage. Again, through the excellence of
their intuitive faculty, they could quickly foretell the future, but
this excellence, as is well known, likewise admits of different
degrees.
The true prophets undoubtedly conceive ideas that result from premisses
which human reason could not comprehend by itself; thus they tell
things which men could not tell by reason and ordinary imagination
alone; for [the action of the prophets’ mental capacities is influenced
by] the same agent that causes the perfection of the imaginative
faculty, and that enables the prophet thereby to foretell a future
event with such clearness as if it was a thing already perceived with
the senses, and only through them conveyed to his imagination. This
agent perfects the prophet’s mind, and influences it in such a manner
that he conceives ideas which are confirmed by reality, and are so
clear to him as if he deduced them by means of syllogisms.
This should be the belief of all who choose to accept the truth. For
[all things are in a certain relation to each other, and] what is
noticed in one thing may be used as evidence for the existence of
certain properties in another, and the knowledge of one thing leads us
to the knowledge of other things. But [what we said of the
extraordinary powers of our imaginative faculty] applies with special
force to our intellect, which is directly influenced by the Active
Intellect, and caused by it to pass from potentiality to actuality. It
is through the intellect that the influence reaches the imaginative
faculty. How then could the latter be so perfect as to be able to
represent things not previously perceived by the senses, if the same
degree of perfection were withheld from the intellect, and the latter
could not comprehend things otherwise than in the usual manner, namely,
by means of premiss, conclusion, and inference? This is the true
characteristic of prophecy, and of the disciplines to which the
preparation for prophecy must exclusively be devoted. I spoke here of
true prophets in order to exclude the third class, namely, those
persons whose logical faculties are not fully developed, and who do not
possess any wisdom, but are only endowed with imaginative and inventive
powers. It may be that things perceived by these persons are nothing
but ideas which they had before, and of which impressions were left in
their imaginations together with those of other things; but whilst the
impressions of other images are effaced and have disappeared, certain
images alone remain, are seen and considered as new and objective,
coming from without. The process is analogous to the following case: A
person has with him in the house a thousand living individuals; all
except one of them leave the house: when the person finds himself alone
with that individual, he imagines that the latter has entered the house
now, contrary to the fact that he has only not left the house. This is
one of the many phenomena open to gross misinterpretations and
dangerous errors, and many of those who believed that they were wise
perished thereby.
There were, therefore, men who supported their opinion by a dream which
they had, thinking that the vision during sleep was independent of what
they had previously believed or heard when awake. Persons whose mental
capacities are not fully developed, and who have not attained
intellectual perfection, must not take any notice of these [dreams].
Those who reach that perfection may, through the influence of the
divine intellect, obtain knowledge independent of that possessed by
them when awake. They are true prophets, as is distinctly stated in
Scripture, ve-nabi lebab ḥokmah (Ps. xc. 12), “And the true prophet
possesseth a heart of wisdom.” This must likewise be noticed.
CHAPTER XXXIX
We have given the definition of prophecy, stated its true
characteristics, and shown that the prophecy of Moses our Teacher was
distinguished from that of other prophets; we will now explain that
this distinction alone qualified him for the office of proclaiming the
Law, a mission without a parallel in the history from Adam to Moses, or
among the prophets who came after him; it is a principle in our faith
that there will never be revealed another Law. Consequently we hold
that there has never been, nor will there ever be, any other divine Law
but that of Moses our Teacher. According to what is written in
Scripture and handed down by tradition, the fact may be explained in
the following way: There were prophets before Moses, as the patriarchs
Shem, Eber, Noah, Methushelah, and Enoch, but of these none said to any
portion of mankind that God sent him to them and commanded him to
convey to them a certain message or to prohibit or to command a certain
thing. Such a thing is not related in Scripture, or in authentic
tradition. Divine prophecy reached them as we have explained. Men like
Abraham, who received a large measure of prophetic inspiration, called
their fellow-men together and led them by training and instruction to
the truth which they had perceived. Thus Abraham taught, and showed by
philosophical arguments that there is one God, that He has created
everything that exists beside Him, and that neither the constellations
nor anything in the air ought to be worshipped; he trained his
fellow-men in this belief, and won their attention by pleasant words as
well as by acts of kindness. Abraham did not tell the people that God
had sent him to them with the command concerning certain things which
should or should not be done. Even when it was commanded that he, his
sons, and his servants should be circumcised, he fulfilled that
commandment, but he did not address his fellow-men prophetically on
this subject. That Abraham induced his fellow-men to do what is right,
telling them only his own will [and not that of God], may be learnt
from the following passage of Scripture: “For I know him, because he
commands his sons and his house after him, to practise righteousness
and judgment” (Gen. xix. 19). Also Isaac, Jacob, Levi, Kohath, and
Amram influenced their fellow-men in the same way. Our Sages, when
speaking of prophets before Moses, used expressions like the following:
The bet-din (court of justice) of Eber, the bet-din of Methushelah, and
in the college of Methushelah; although all these were prophets, yet
they taught their fellow-men in the manner of preachers, teachers, and
pedagogues, but did not use such phrases as the following: “And God
said to me, Speak to certain people so and so.” This was the state of
prophecy before Moses. But as regards Moses, you know what [God] said
to him, what he said [to the people], and the words addressed to him by
the whole nation: “This day we have seen that God doth talk with man,
and that he liveth” (Deut. v. 21). The history of all our prophets that
lived after Moses is well known to you; they performed, as it were, the
function of warning the people and exhorting them to keep the Law of
Moses, threatening evil to those who would neglect it, and announcing
blessings to those who would submit to its guidance. This we believe
will always be the case. Comp. “It is not in the heavens that one might
say,” etc. (ibid. xxx. 12); “For us and for our children for ever”
(ibid. xxix. 28). It is but natural that it should be so. For if one
individual of a class has reached the highest perfection possible in
that class, every other individual must necessarily be less perfect,
and deviate from the perfect measure either by surplus or deficiency.
Take, e.g., the normal constitution of a being, it is the most proper
composition possible in that class; any constitution that deviates from
that norm contains something too much or too little. The same is the
case with the Law. It is clear that the Law is normal in this sense;
for it contains “Just statutes and judgments” (Deut. iv. 8); but “just”
is here identical with “equibalanced.” The statutes of the Law do not
impose burdens or excesses as are implied in the service of a hermit or
pilgrim, and the like; but, on the other hand, they are not so
deficient as to lead to gluttony or lewdness, or to prevent, as the
religious laws of the heathen nations do, the development of man’s
moral and intellectual faculties. We intend to discuss in this treatise
the reasons of the commandments, and we shall then show, as far as
necessary, the justice and wisdom of the Law, on account of which it is
said: “The Law of God is perfect, refreshing the heart” (Ps. xix. 8).
There are persons who believe that the Law commands much exertion and
great pain, but due consideration will show them their error. Later on
I will show how easy it is for the perfect to obey the Law. Comp. “What
does the Lord thy God ask of thee?” etc. (Deut. x. 12); “Have I been a
wilderness to Israel?” (Jer. ii. 31). But this applies only to the
noble ones; whilst wicked, violent, and pugnacious persons find it most
injurious and hard that there should be any divine authority tending to
subdue their passion. To low-minded, wanton, and passionate persons it
appears most cruel that there should be an obstacle in their way to
satisfy their carnal appetite, or that a punishment should be inflicted
for their doings. Similarly every godless person imagines that it is
too hard to abstain from the evil he has chosen in accordance with his
inclination. We must not consider the Law easy or hard according as it
appears to any wicked, low-minded, and immoral person, but as it
appears to the judgment of the most perfect, who, according to the Law,
are fit to be the example for all mankind. This Law alone is called
divine; other laws, such as the political legislations among the
Greeks, or the follies of the Sabeans, are the works of human leaders,
but not of prophets, as I have explained several times.
CHAPTER XL
It has already been fully explained that man is naturally a social
being, that by virtue of his nature he seeks to form communities; man
is therefore different from other living beings that are not compelled
to combine into communities. He is, as you know, the highest form in
the creation, and he therefore includes the largest number of
constituent elements; this is the reason why the human race contains
such a great variety of individuals, that we cannot discover two
persons exactly alike in any moral quality, or in external appearance.
The cause of this is the variety in man’s temperament, and in accidents
dependent on his form; for with every physical form there are connected
certain special accidents different from those which are connected with
the substance. Such a variety among the individuals of a class does not
exist in any other class of living beings; for the variety in any other
species is limited; only man forms an exception; two persons may be so
different from each other in every respect that they appear to belong
to two different classes. Whilst one person is so cruel that he kills
his youngest child in his anger, another is too delicate and
faint-hearted to kill even a fly or worm. The same is the case with
most of the accidents. This great variety and the necessity of social
life are essential elements in man’s nature. But the well-being of
society demands that there should be a leader able to regulate the
actions of man; he must complete every shortcoming, remove every
excess, and prescribe for the conduct of all, so that the natural
variety should be counterbalanced by the uniformity of legislation, and
the order of society be well established. I therefore maintain that the
Law, though not a product of Nature, is nevertheless not entirely
foreign to Nature. It being the will of God that our race should exist
and be permanently established, He in His wisdom gave it such
properties that men can acquire the capacity of ruling others. Some
persons are therefore inspired with theories of legislation, such as
prophets and lawgivers; others possess the power of enforcing the
dictates of the former, and of compelling people to obey them, and to
act accordingly. Such are kings, who accept the code of lawgivers, and
[rulers] who pretend to be prophets, and accept, either entirely or
partly, the teaching of the prophets. They accept one part while
rejecting another part, either because this course appears to them more
convenient, or out of ambition, because it might lead people to believe
that the rulers themselves had been prophetically inspired with these
laws, and did not copy them from others. For when we like a certain
perfection, find pleasure in it, and wish to possess it, we sometimes
desire to make others believe that we possess that virtue, although we
are fully aware that we do not possess it. Thus people, e.g., adorn
themselves with the poems of others, and publish them as their own
productions. It also occurs in the works of wise men on the various
branches of Science, that an ambitious, lazy person sees an opinion
expressed by another person, appropriates it, and boasts that he
himself originated it. The same [ambition] occurs also with regard to
the faculty of prophecy. There were men who, like Zedekiah, the son of
Chenaanah (1 Kings xxii. 11, 24) boasted that they received a prophecy,
and declared things which have never been prophesied. Others, like
Hananiah, son of Azzur (Jer. xxviii. 1–5), claim the capacity of
prophecy, and proclaim things which, no doubt, have been said by God,
that is to say, that have been the subject of a divine inspiration, but
not to them. They nevertheless say that they are prophets, and adorn
themselves with the prophecies of others. All this can easily be
ascertained and recognized. I will, however, fully explain this to you,
so that no doubt be left to you on this question, and that you may have
a test by which you may distinguish between the guidance of human
legislation, of the divine law, and of teachings stolen from prophets.
As regards those who declare that the laws proclaimed by them are their
own ideas, no further test is required; the confession of the defendant
makes the evidence of the witness superfluous. I only wish to instruct
you about laws which are proclaimed as prophetic. Some of these are
truly prophetic, originating in divine inspiration, some are of
non-prophetic character, and some, though prophetic originally, are the
result of plagiarism. You will find that the sole object of certain
laws, in accordance with the intention of their author, who well
considered their effect, is to establish the good order of the state
and its affairs, to free it from all mischief and wrong; these laws do
not deal with philosophic problems, contain no teaching for the
perfecting of our logical faculties, and are not concerned about the
existence of sound or unsound opinions. Their sole object is to
arrange, under all circumstances, the relations of men to each other,
and to secure their well-being, in accordance with the view of the
author of these laws. These laws are political, and their author
belongs, as has been stated above, to the third class, viz., to those
who only distinguish themselves by the perfection of their imaginative
faculties. You will also find laws which, in all their rules, aim, as
the law just mentioned, at the improvement of the material interests of
the people; but, besides, tend to improve the state of the faith of
man, to create first correct notions of God, and of angels, and to lead
then the people, by instruction and education, to an accurate knowledge
of the Universe: this education comes from God; these laws are divine.
The question which now remains to be settled is this: Is the person who
proclaimed these laws the same perfect man that received them by
prophetic inspiration, or a plagiarist, who has stolen these ideas from
a true prophet? In order to be enabled to answer this question, we must
examine the merits of the person, obtain an accurate account of his
actions, and consider his character. The best test is the rejection,
abstention, and contempt of bodily pleasures; for this is the first
condition of men, and a fortiori of prophets; they must especially
disregard pleasures of the sense of touch, which, according to
Aristotle, is a disgrace to us; and, above all, restrain from the
pollution of sensual intercourse. Thus God exposes thereby false
prophets to public shame, in order that those who really seek the truth
may find it, and not err or go astray; e.g., Zedekiah, son of Maasiah,
and Ahab, son of Kolaiah, boasted that they had received a prophecy.
They persuaded the people to follow them, by proclaiming utterances of
other prophets; but all the time they continued to seek the low
pleasures of sensual intercourse, committing even adultery with the
wives of their companions and followers. God exposed their falsehood as
He has exposed that of other false prophets. The king of Babylon burnt
them, as Jeremiah distinctly states: “And of them shall be taken up a
curse by all the captivity of Judah, which are in Babylon, saying, The
Lord make thee like Zedekiah, and like Ahab, whom the king of Babylon
roasted in the fire. Because they have committed villainy in Israel,
and have committed adultery with their neighbours’ wives, and have
spoken lying words in my name, which I have not commanded them” (Jer.
xxix. 22, 23). Note what is meant by these words.
CHAPTER XLI
I need not explain what a dream is, but I will explain the meaning of
the term mareh, “vision,” which occurs in the passage: “In a vision
(be-mareh) do I make myself known unto him” (Num. xii. 6). The term
signifies that which is also called mareh ha-nebuah, “prophetic
vision,” yad ha-shem, “the hand of God,” and maḥazeh, “a vision.” It is
something terrible and fearful which the prophet feels while awake, as
is distinctly stated by Daniel: “And I saw this great vision, and there
remained no strength in me, for my comeliness was turned in me into
corruption, and I retained no strength” (Dan. x. 8). He afterwards
continues, “Thus was I in deep sleep on my face, and my face toward the
ground” (ibid. ver. 9). But it was in a prophetic vision that the angel
spoke to him and “set him upon his knees.” Under such circumstances the
senses cease to act, and the [Active Intellect] influences the rational
faculties, and through them the imaginative faculties, which become
perfect and active. Sometimes the prophecy begins with a prophetic
vision, the prophet greatly trembles, and is much affected in
consequence of the perfect action of the imaginative faculty, and after
that the prophecy follows. This was the case with Abraham. The
commencement of the prophecy is, “The word of the Lord came to Abraham
in a vision” (Gen. xv. 1); after this, “a deep sleep fell upon
Abraham”; and at last, “he said unto Abraham,” etc. When prophets speak
of the fact that they received a prophecy, they say that they received
it from an angel, or from God; but even in the latter case it was
likewise received through an angel. Our Sages, therefore, explain the
words, “And the Lord said unto her” that He spake through an angel. You
must know that whenever Scripture relates that the Lord or an angel
spoke to a person, this took place in a dream or in a prophetic vision.
There are four different ways in which Scripture relates the fact that
a divine communication was made to the prophet. (1) The prophet relates
that he heard the words of an angel in a dream or vision; (2) He
reports the words of the angel without mentioning that they were
perceived in a dream or vision, assuming that it is well known that
prophecy can only originate in one of the two ways, “In a vision I will
make myself known unto him, in a dream I will speak unto him” (Num.
xii. 6). (3) The prophet does not mention the angel at all; he says
that God spoke to him, but he states that he received the message in a
dream or a vision. (4) He introduces his prophecy by stating that God
spoke to him, or told him to do a certain thing, or speak certain
words, but he does not explain that he received the message in a dream
or vision, because he assumes that it is well known, and has been
established as a principle that no prophecy or revelation originates
otherwise than in a dream or vision, and through an angel. Instances of
the first form are the following:—“And the angel of the Lord said unto
me in a dream, Jacob” (Gen. xxxi. 11); “And an angel said unto Israel
in a vision of night” (ibid. xlvi. 2); “And an angel came to Balaam by
night”; “And an angel said unto Balaam” (Num. xxii. 20–22). Instances
of the second form are these: “And Elohim (an angel), said unto Jacob,
Rise, go up to Bethel” (Gen. xxxv. 1); “And Elohim said unto him, Thy
name is Jacob,” etc. (ibid. xxxv. 10); “And an angel of the Lord called
unto Abraham out of heaven the second time” (ibid. xxii. 15); “And
Elohim said unto Noah” (ibid. vi. 13). The following is an instance of
the third form: “The word of the Lord came unto Abraham in a vision”
(ibid. xv. 1). Instances of the fourth form are: “And the Lord said
unto Abraham” (ibid. xviii. 13); “And the Lord said unto Jacob,
Return,” etc. (ibid. xxxi. 3); “And the Lord said unto Joshua” (Josh.
v. 9); “And the Lord said unto Gideon” (Judges vii. 2). Most of the
prophets speak in a similar manner: “And the Lord said unto me” (Deut.
ii. 2); “And the word of the Lord came unto me” (Ezek. xxx. 1); “And
the word of the Lord came” (2 Sam. xxiv. 11); “And behold, the word of
the Lord came unto him” (1 Kings xix. 9); “And the word of the Lord
came expressly” (Ezek. i. 3); “The beginning of the word of the Lord by
Hosea” (Hos. i. 2); “The hand of the Lord was upon me” (Ezek. xxxvii.
1). There are a great many instances of this class. Every passage in
Scripture introduced by any of these four forms is a prophecy
proclaimed by a prophet; but the phrase, “And Elohim (an angel) came to
a certain person in the dream of night,” does not indicate a prophecy,
and the person mentioned in that phrase is not a prophet; the phrase
only informs us that the attention of the person was called by God to a
certain thing, and at the same time that this happened at night. For
just as God may cause a person to move in order to save or kill another
person, so He may cause, according to His will, certain things to rise
in man’s mind in a dream by night. We have no doubt that the Syrian
Laban was a perfectly wicked man, and an idolater; likewise Abimelech,
though a good man among his people, is told by Abraham concerning his
land [Gerar] and his kingdom, “Surely there is no fear of God in this
place” (Gen. xx. 11). And yet concerning both of them, viz., Laban and
Abimelech, it is said [that an angel appeared to them in a dream].
Comp. “And Elohim (an angel) came to Abimelech in a dream by night”
(ibid. ver. 3); and also, “And Elohim came to the Syrian Laban in the
dream of the night” (ibid. xxxi. 24). Note and consider the distinction
between the phrases, “And Elohim came,” and “Elohim said,” between “in
a dream by night,” and “in a vision by night.” In reference to Jacob it
is said, “And an angel said to Israel in the visions by night” (Gen.
xlvi. 2), but in reference to Laban and Abimelech, “And Elohim came,”
etc. Onkelos makes the distinction clear; he translates, in the last
two instances, ata memar min kodam adonai, “a word came from the Lord,”
and not ve-itgeli, “and the Lord appeared.” The phrase, “And the Lord
said to a certain person,” is employed even when this person was not
really addressed by the Lord, and did not receive any prophecy, but was
informed of a certain thing through a prophet. E.g., “And she went to
inquire of the Lord” (Gen. xxv. 22); that is, according to the
explanation of our Sages, she went to the college of Eber, and the
latter gave her the answer; and this is expressed by the words, “And
the Lord said unto her” (ibid. ver. 23). These words have also been
explained thus, God spoke to her through an angel; and by “angel” Eber
is meant here, for a prophet is sometimes called “angel,” as will be
explained; or the angel that appeared to Eber in this vision is
referred to, or the object of the Midrash explanation is merely to
express that wherever God is introduced as directly speaking to a
person, i.e., to any of the ordinary prophets, He speaks through an
angel, as has been set forth by us (chap. xxxiv.).
CHAPTER XLII
We have already shown that the appearance or speech of an angel
mentioned in Scripture took place in a vision or dream; it makes no
difference whether this is expressly stated or not, as we have
explained above. This is a point of considerable importance. In some
cases the account begins by stating that the prophet saw an angel; in
others, the account apparently introduces a human being, who ultimately
is shown to be an angel; but it makes no difference, for if the fact
that an angel has been heard is only mentioned at the end, you may rest
satisfied that the whole account from the beginning describes a
prophetic vision. In such visions, a prophet either sees God who speaks
to him, as will be explained by us, or he sees an angel who speaks to
him, or he hears some one speaking to him without seeing the speaker,
or he sees a man who speaks to him, and learns afterwards that the
speaker was an angel. In this latter kind of prophecies, the prophet
relates that he saw a man who was doing or saying something, and that
he learnt afterwards that it was an angel.
This important principle was adopted by one of our Sages, one of the
most distinguished among them, R. Ḥiya the Great (Bereshit Rabba,
xlviii.), in the exposition of the Scriptural passage commencing, “And
the Lord appeared unto him in the plain of Mamre” (Gen. xviii.). The
general statement that the Lord appeared to Abraham is followed by the
description in what manner that appearance of the Lord took place;
namely, Abraham saw first three men; he ran and spoke to them. R. Ḥiya,
the author of the explanation, holds that the words of Abraham, “My
Lord, if now I have found grace in thy sight, do not, I pray thee, pass
from thy servant,” were spoken by him in a prophetic vision to one of
the men; for he says that Abraham addressed these words to the chief of
these men. Note this well, for it is one of the great mysteries [of the
Law]. The same, I hold, is the case when it is said in reference to
Jacob, “And a man wrestled with him” (Gen. xxxii. 25); this took place
in a prophetic vision, since it is expressly stated in the end (ver.
31) that it was an angel. The circumstances are here exactly the same
as those in the vision of Abraham, where the general statement, “And
the Lord appeared to him,” etc., is followed by a detailed description.
Similarly the account of the vision of Jacob begins, “And the angels of
God met him” (Gen. xxxii. 2); then follows a detailed description how
it came to pass that they met him; namely, Jacob sent messengers, and
after having prepared and done certain things, “he was left alone,”
etc., “and a man wrestled with him” (ibid. ver. 24). By this term “man”
[one of] the angels of God is meant, mentioned in the phrase, “And
angels of God met him”; the wrestling and speaking was entirely a
prophetic vision. That which happened to Balaam on the way, and the
speaking of the ass, took place in a prophetic vision, since further
on, in the same account, an angel of God is introduced as speaking to
Balaam. I also think that what Joshua perceived, when “he lifted up his
eyes and saw, and behold a man stood before him” (Josh. v. 13) was a
prophetic vision, since it is stated afterwards (ver. 14) that it was
“the prince of the host of the Lord.” But in the passages, “And an
angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal” (Judges ii. 1); “And it came to
pass that the angel of the Lord spake these words to all Israel” (ibid.
ver. 2); the “angel” is, according to the explanation of our Sages,
Phineas. They say, The angel is Phineas, for, when the Divine Glory
rested upon him, he was “like an angel.” We have already shown (chap.
vi.) that the term “angel” is homonymous, and denotes also “prophet,”
as is the case in the following passages:—“And He sent an angel, and He
hath brought us up out of Egypt” (Num. xx. 16); “Then spake Haggai, the
angel of the Lord, in the Lord’s message” (Hagg. i. 13); “But they
mocked the angels of God” (2 Chron. xxxvi. 16).—Comp. also the words of
Daniel, “And the man Gabriel, whom I had seen in the vision at the
beginning, being caused to fly swiftly, touched me about the time of
the evening oblation” (Dan. ix. 11). All this passed in a prophetic
vision. Do not imagine that an angel is seen or his word heard
otherwise than in a prophetic vision or prophetic dream, according to
the principle laid down:—“I make myself known unto him in a vision, and
speak unto him in a dream” (Num. xii. 6). The instances quoted may
serve as an illustration of those passages which I do not mention. From
the rule laid down by us that prophecy requires preparation, and from
our interpretation of the homonym “angel,” you will infer that Hagar,
the Egyptian woman, was not a prophetess; also Manoah and his wife were
no prophets; for the speech they heard, or imagined they heard, was
like the bat-kol (prophetic echo), which is so frequently mentioned by
our Sages, and is something that may be experienced by men not prepared
for prophecy. The homonymity of the word “angel” misleads in this
matter. This is the principal method by which most of the difficult
passages in the Bible can be explained. Consider the words, “And an
angel of the Lord found her by the well of water” (Gen. xvi. 7), which
are similar to the words referring to Joseph—“And a man found him, and
behold, he was erring in the field” (ibid. xxxvii. 15). All the
Midrashim assume that by man in this passage an angel is meant.
CHAPTER XLIII
We have already shown in our work that the prophets sometimes prophesy
in allegories; they use a term allegorically, and in the same prophecy
the meaning of the allegory is given. In our dreams, we sometimes
believe that we are awake, and relate a dream to another person, who
explains the meaning, and all this goes on while we dream. Our Sages
call this “a dream interpreted in a dream.” In other cases we learn the
meaning of the dream after waking from sleep. The same is the case with
prophetic allegories. Some are interpreted in the prophetic vision.
Thus it is related in Zechariah, after the description of the
allegorical vision—“And the angel that talked with me came again and
waked me as a man that is awakened from his sleep. And he said unto me,
‘What dost thou see?’” etc. (Zech. iv. 1–2), and then the allegory is
explained (ver. 6, sqq.).
Another instance we find in Daniel. It is first stated there: “Daniel
had a dream and visions of his head upon his bed” (Dan. vii. 1). The
whole allegory is then given, and Daniel is described as sighing that
he did not know its interpretation. He asks the angel for an
explanation, and he received it in a prophetic vision. He relates as
follows: “I came near unto one of those that stood by, and asked him
the truth of all this. So he told me, and made me know the
interpretation of the things” (ibid. ver. 16). The whole scene is
called ḥazon (vision), although it was stated that Daniel had a dream,
because an angel explained the dream to him in the same manner as is
mentioned in reference to a prophetic dream. I refer to the verse: “A
vision appeared to me Daniel, after that which appeared to me at the
first” (ibid. viii. 1). This is clear, for ḥazon (vision) is derived
from ḥaza, “to see,” and mareh, “vision,” from raah, “to see”; and ḥaza
and raah are synonymous. There is therefore no difference whether we
use mareh, or maḥazeh, or ḥazon, there is no other mode of revelation
but the two mentioned in Scripture: “In a vision I make myself known to
him, in a dream I will speak unto him” (Num. xii. 6). There are,
however, different degrees [of prophetic proficiency], as will be shown
(chap. xlv.).
There are other prophetic allegories whose meaning is not given in a
prophetic vision. The prophet learns it when he awakes from his sleep.
Take, e.g., the staves which Zechariah took in a prophetic vision.
You must further know that the prophets see things shown to them
allegorically, such as the candlesticks, horses, and mountains of
Zechariah (Zech. iv. 2; vi. 1–7), the scroll of Ezekiel (Ezek. ii. 9),
the wall made by a plumb-line (Amos vii. 7), which Amos saw, the
animals of Daniel (Dan. vii. and viii.), the seething pot of Jeremiah
(Jer. i. 13), and similar allegorical objects shown to represent
certain ideas. The prophets, however, are also shown things which do
not illustrate the object of the vision, but indicate it by their name
through its etymology or homonymity. Thus the imaginative faculty forms
the image of a thing, the name of which has two meanings, one of which
denotes something different [from the image]. This is likewise a kind
of allegory. Comp. Makkal shaked, “almond staff,” of Jeremiah (i.
11–12). It was intended to indicate by the second meaning of shaked the
prophecy, “For I will watch” (shoked), etc., which has no relation
whatever to the staff or to almonds. The same is the case with the
kelub ḳayiẓ, “a basket of summer fruit,” seen by Amos, by which the
completion of a certain period was indicated, “the end (ha-ḳeẓ) having
come” (Amos viii. 2). Still more strange is the following manner of
calling the prophet’s attention to a certain object. He is shown a
different object, the name of which has neither etymologically nor
homonymously any relation to the first object, but the names of both
contain the same letters, though in a different order. Take, e.g., the
allegories of Zechariah (chap. xi. 7, sqq.). He takes in a prophetic
vision staves to lead the flock; he calls the one Noʻam (pleasure), the
other ḥobelim. He indicates thereby that the nation was at first in
favour with God, who was their leader and guide. They rejoiced in the
service of God, and found happiness in it, while God was pleased with
them, and loved them, as it is said, “Thou hast avouched the Lord thy
God,” etc., and “the Lord hath avouched thee,” etc. (Deut. xxvi. 17,
18). They were guided and directed by Moses and the prophets that
followed him. But later a change took place. They rejected the love of
God, and God rejected them, appointing destroyers like Jeroboam and
Manasse as their rulers. Accordingly, the word ḥobelim has the same
meaning [viz., destroying] as the root ḥabal has in Meḥabbelim keramim,
“destroying vineyards” (Song of Sol. ii. 15). But the prophet found
also in this name Ḥobelim the indication that the people despised God,
and that God despised them. This is, however, not expressed by the word
ḥabal, but by a transposition of the letters Ḥet, Bet, and Lamed, the
meaning of despising and rejecting is obtained. Comp. “My soul loathed
them, and their soul also abhorred me” [baḥalah] (Zech. xi. 8). The
prophet had therefore to change the order of the letters in ḥabal into
that of Baḥal. In this way we find very strange things and also
mysteries (Sodot) in the words neḥoshet, Kalal, regel, ʻegel, and
ḥashmal of the Mercabah, and in other terms in other passages. After
the above explanation you will see the mysteries in the meaning of
these expressions if you examine them thoroughly.
CHAPTER XLIV
Prophecy is given either in a vision or in a dream, as we have said so
many times, and we will not constantly repeat it. We say now that when
a prophet is inspired with a prophecy he may see an allegory, as we
have shown frequently, or he may in a prophetic vision perceive that
God speaks to him, as is said in Isaiah (vi. 8), “And I heard the voice
of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?” or he
hears an angel addressing him, and sees him also. This is very
frequent, e.g., “And the angel of God spake unto me,” etc. (Gen. xxxi.
11); “And the angel that talked with me answered and said unto me, Dost
thou not know what these are” (Zech. iv. 5); “And I heard one holy
speaking” (Dan. viii. 13). Instances of this are innumerable. The
prophet sometimes sees a man that speaks to him. Comp., “And behold
there was a man, whose appearance was like the appearance of brass, and
the man said to me,” etc. (Ezek. xl. 3, 4), although the passage
begins, “The hand of the Lord was upon me” (ibid. ver. 1). In some
cases the prophet sees no figure at all, only hears in the prophetic
vision the words addressed to him; e.g., “And I heard the voice of a
man between the banks of Ulai” (Dan. viii. 16); “There was silence, and
I heard a voice” (in the speech of Eliphaz, Job iv. 16); “And I heard a
voice of one that spake to me” (Ezek. i. 28). The being which Ezekiel
perceived in the prophetic vision was not the same that addressed him;
for at the conclusion of the strange and extraordinary scene which
Ezekiel describes expressly as having been perceived by him, the object
and form of the prophecy is introduced by the words, “And I heard a
voice of a man that spake to me.” After this remark on the different
kinds of prophecy, as suggested by Scripture, I say that the prophet
may perceive that which he hears with the greatest possible intensity,
just as a person may hear thunder in his dream, or perceive a storm or
an earthquake; such dreams are frequent. The prophet may also hear the
prophecy in ordinary common speech, without anything unusual. Take,
e.g., the account of the prophet Samuel. When he was called in a
prophetic vision, he believed that the priest Eli called him; and this
happened three times consecutively. The text then explains the cause of
it, saying that Samuel naturally believed that Eli had called him,
because at that time he did not yet know that God addressed the prophet
in this form, nor had that secret as yet been revealed to him. Comp.,
“And Samuel did not yet know the Lord, and the word of the Lord was not
yet revealed to him,” i.e., he did not yet know, and it had not yet
been revealed to him, that the word of God is communicated in this way.
The words, “He did not yet know the Lord,” may perhaps mean that Samuel
had not yet received any prophecy; for in reference to a prophet’s
receiving divine communication it is said, “I make myself known to him
in a vision, I speak to him in a dream” (Num. xii. 6). The meaning of
the verse accordingly is this, Samuel had not yet received any
prophecy, and therefore did not know that this was the form of
prophecy. Note it.
CHAPTER XLV
After having explained prophecy in accordance with reason and
Scripture, I must now describe the different degrees of prophecy from
these two points of view. Not all the degrees of prophecy which I will
enumerate qualify a person for the office of a prophet. The first and
the second degrees are only steps leading to prophecy, and a person
possessing either of these two degrees does not belong to the class of
prophets whose merits we have been discussing. When such a person is
occasionally called prophet, the term is used in a wider sense, and is
applied to him because he is almost a prophet. You must not be misled
by the fact that according to the books of the Prophets, a certain
prophet, after having been inspired with one kind of prophecy, is
reported to have received prophecy in another form. For it is possible
for a prophet to prophesy at one time in the form of one of the degrees
which I am about to enumerate, and at another time in another form. In
the same manner, as the prophet does not prophesy continuously, but is
inspired at one time and not at another, so he may at one time prophesy
in the form of a higher degree, and at another time in that of a lower
degree; it may happen that the highest degree is reached by a prophet
only once in his lifetime, and afterwards remains inaccessible to him,
or that a prophet remains below the highest degree until he entirely
loses the faculty; for ordinary prophets must cease to prophesy a
shorter or longer period before their death. Comp. “And the word of the
Lord ceased from Jeremiah” (Ezra i. 1); “And these are the last words
of David” (2 Sam. xxiii. 1). From these instances it can be inferred
that the same is the case with all prophets. After this introduction
and explanation, I will begin to enumerate the degrees of prophecy to
which I have referred above.
(1) The first degree of prophecy consists in the divine assistance
which is given to a person, and induces and encourages him to do
something good and grand, e.g., to deliver a congregation of good men
from the hands of evildoers; to save one noble person, or to bring
happiness to a large number of people; he finds in himself the cause
that moves and urges him to this deed. This degree of divine influence
is called “the spirit of the Lord”; and of the person who is under that
influence we say that the spirit of the Lord came upon him, clothed
him, or rested upon him, or the Lord was with him, and the like. All
the judges of Israel possessed this degree, for the following general
statement is made concerning them:—“The Lord raised up judges for them;
and the Lord was with the judge, and he saved them” (Judges ii. 18).
Also all the noble chiefs of Israel belonged to this class. The same is
distinctly stated concerning some of the judges and the kings:—“The
spirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah” (ibid. xi. 29); of Samson it is
said, “The spirit of the Lord came upon him” (ibid. xiv. 19); “And the
spirit of the Lord came upon Saul when he heard those words” (1 Sam.
xi. 6). When Amasa was moved by the holy spirit to assist David, “A
spirit clothed Amasa, who was chief of the captains, and he said, Thine
are we, David,” etc. (1 Chron. xii. 18). This faculty was always
possessed by Moses from the time he had attained the age of manhood; it
moved him to slay the Egyptian, and to prevent evil from the two men
that quarrelled; it was so strong that, after he had fled from Egypt
out of fear, and arrived in Midian, a trembling stranger, he could not
restrain himself from interfering when he saw wrong being done; he
could not bear it. Comp. “And Moses rose and saved them” (Exod. ii.
17). David likewise was filled with this spirit, when he was anointed
with the oil of anointing. Comp. “And the spirit of God came upon David
from that day and upward” (1 Sam. xvi. 13). He thus conquered the lion
and the bear and the Philistine, and accomplished similar tasks, by
this very spirit. This faculty did not cause any of the above-named
persons to speak on a certain subject, for it only aims at encouraging
the person who possesses it to action; it does not encourage him to do
everything, but only to help either a distinguished man or a whole
congregation when oppressed, or to do something that leads to that end.
Just as not all who have a true dream are prophets, so it cannot be
said of every one who is assisted in a certain undertaking, as in the
acquisition of property, or of some other personal advantage, that the
spirit of the Lord came upon him, or that the Lord was with him, or
that he performed his actions by the holy spirit. We only apply such
phrases to those who have accomplished something very good and grand,
or something that leads to that end; e.g., the success of Joseph in the
house of the Egyptian, which was the first cause leading evidently to
great events that occurred subsequently.
(2) The second degree is this: A person feels as if something came upon
him, and as if he had received a new power that encourages him to
speak. He treats of science, or composes hymns, exhorts his fellow-men,
discusses political and theological problems; all this he does while
awake, and in the full possession of his senses. Such a person is said
to speak by the holy spirit. David composed the Psalms, and Solomon the
Book of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon by this spirit;
also Daniel, Job, Chronicles, and the rest of the Hagiographa were
written in this holy spirit; therefore they are called ketubim
(Writings, or Written), i.e., written by men inspired by the holy
spirit. Our Sages mention this expressly concerning the Book of Esther.
In reference to such holy spirit, David says: “The spirit of the Lord
spoke in me, and his word is on my tongue” (2 Sam. xxiii. 2); i.e., the
spirit of the Lord caused him to utter these words. This class includes
the seventy elders of whom it is said, “And it came to pass when the
spirit rested upon them, that they prophesied, and did not cease” (Num.
xi. 25); also Eldad and Medad (ibid. ver. 26); furthermore, every high
priest that inquired [of God] by the Urim and Tummim; on whom, as our
Sages say, the divine glory rested, and who spoke by the holy spirit;
Yahaziel, son of Zechariah, belongs likewise to this class. Comp. “The
spirit of the Lord came upon him in the midst of the assembly, and he
said, Listen, all Judah and inhabitants of Jerusalem, thus saith the
Lord unto you,” etc. (2 Chron. xx. 14, 15); also Zechariah, son of
Jehoiada the priest. Comp. “And he stood above the people and said unto
them, Thus saith God” (ibid. xxiv. 20); furthermore, Azariah, son of
Oded; comp. “And Azariah, son of Oded, when the spirit of the Lord came
upon him, went forth before Asa,” etc. (ibid. xv. 1, 2); and all who
acted under similar circumstances. You must know that Balaam likewise
belonged to this class, when he was good; this is indicated by the
words, “And God put a word in the mouth of Balaam” (Num. xxiii. 5),
i.e., Balaam spoke by divine inspiration; he therefore says of himself,
“Who heareth the words of God,” etc. (ibid. xxiv. 4). We must
especially point out that David, Solomon, and Daniel belonged to this
class, and not to the class of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Nathan the prophet,
Ahijah the Shilonite, and those like them. For David, Solomon, and
Daniel spoke and wrote inspired by the holy spirit, and when David
says, “The God of Israel spoke and said unto me, the rock of Israel” (2
Sam. xxiii. 3), he meant to say that God promised him happiness through
a prophet, through Nathan or another prophet. The phrase must here be
interpreted in the same manner as in the following passages, “And God
said to her” (Gen. xxv. 26); “And God said unto Solomon, Because this
hath been in thy heart, and thou hast not kept my covenant,” etc. (1
Kings xi. 11). The latter passage undoubtedly contains a prophecy of
Ahijah the Shilonite, or another prophet, who foretold Solomon that
evil would befall him. The passage, “God appeared to Solomon at Gibeon
in a dream by night, and God said” (ibid. iii. 5), does not contain a
real prophecy, such as is introduced by the words: “The word of the
Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying” (Gen. xv. 1); or, “And God said
to Israel in the visions of the night” (ibid. xlvi. 2), or such as the
prophecies of Isaiah and Jeremiah contain; in all these cases the
prophets, though receiving the prophecy in a prophetic dream, are told
that it is a prophecy, and that they have received prophetic
inspiration. But in the case of Solomon, the account concludes, “And
Solomon awoke, and behold it was a dream” (1 Kings iii. 15); and in the
account of the second divine appearance, it is said, “And God appeared
to Solomon a second time, as he appeared to him at Gibeon” (ibid. ix.
2); it was evidently a dream. This kind of prophecy is a degree below
that of which Scripture says, “In a dream I will speak to him” (Num.
xii. 6). When prophets are inspired in a dream, they by no means call
this a dream, although the prophecy reached them in a dream, but
declare it decidedly to be a prophecy. Thus Jacob, our father, when
awaking from a prophetic dream, did not say it was a dream, but
declared, “Surely there is the Lord in this place,” etc. (Gen. xxviii.
16); “God the Almighty appeared to me in Luz, in the land of Canaan”
(ibid. xlviii. 3), expressing thereby that it was a prophecy. But in
reference to Solomon we read:—“And Solomon awoke, and behold it was a
dream” (1 Kings iii. 15). Similarly Daniel declares that he had a
dream; although he sees an angel and hears his word, he speaks of the
event as of a dream; even when he had received the information
[concerning the dreams of Nebukadnezzar], he speaks of it in the
following manner—“Then was the secret revealed to Daniel in a night
vision” (Dan. ii. 19). On other occasions it is said, “He wrote down
the dream”; “I saw in the visions by night,” etc.; “And the visions of
my head confused me” (Dan. vii. 1, 2, 15); “I was surprised at the
vision, and none noticed it” (ibid. viii. 27). There is no doubt that
this is one degree below that form of prophecy to which the words, “In
a dream I will speak to him,” are applied. For this reason the nation
desired to place the book of Daniel among the Hagiographa, and not
among the Prophets. I have, therefore, pointed out to you, that the
prophecy revealed to Daniel and Solomon, although they saw an angel in
the dream, was not considered by them as a perfect prophecy, but as a
dream containing correct information. They belonged to the class of men
that spoke, inspired by the ruaḥ ha-kodesh, “the holy spirit.” Also in
the order of the holy writings, no distinction is made between the
books of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Daniel, Psalms, Ruth, and Esther; they
are all written by divine inspiration. The authors of all these books
are called prophets in the more general sense of the term.
(3) The third class is the lowest [class of actual prophets, i.e.] of
those who introduce their speech by the phrase, “And the word of the
Lord came unto me,” or a similar phrase. The prophet sees an allegory
in a dream—under those conditions which we have mentioned when speaking
of real prophecy—and in the prophetic dream itself the allegory is
interpreted. Such are most of the allegories of Zechariah.
(4) The prophet hears in a prophetic dream something clearly and
distinctly, but does not see the speaker. This was the case with Samuel
in the beginning of his prophetic mission, as has been explained (chap.
xliv.).
(5) A person addresses the prophet in a dream, as was the case in some
of the prophecies of Ezekiel. Comp. “And the man spake unto me, Son of
man,” etc. (Ezek. xl. 4).
(6) An angel speaks to him in a dream; this applies to most of the
prophets; e.g., “And an angel of God said to me in a dream of night”
(Gen. xxxi. 11).
(7) In a prophetic dream it appears to the prophet as if God spoke to
him. Thus Isaiah says, “And I saw the Lord, and I heard the voice of
the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?” (Isa. vi.
1, 8). Micaiah, son of Imla, said likewise, “I saw the Lord” (1 Kings
xxii. 19).
(8) Something presents itself to the prophet in a prophetic vision; he
sees allegorical figures, such as were seen by Abraham in the vision
“between the pieces” (Gen. xv. 9, 10); for it was in a vision by
daytime, as is distinctly stated.
(9) The prophet hears words in a prophetic vision; as, e.g., is said in
reference to Abraham, “And behold, the word came to him, saying, This
shall not be thine heir” (ibid. xv. 4).
(10) The prophet sees a man that speaks to him in a prophetic vision;
e.g., Abraham in the plain of Mamre (ibid. xviii. 1), and Joshua in
Jericho (Josh. v. 13).
(11) He sees an angel that speaks to him in the vision, as was the case
when Abraham was addressed by an angel at the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen.
xxii. 15). This I hold to be—if we except Moses—the highest degree a
prophet can attain according to Scripture, provided he has, as reason
demands, his rational faculties fully developed. But it appears to me
improbable that a prophet should be able to perceive in a prophetic
vision God speaking to him; the action of the imaginative faculty does
not go so far, and therefore we do not notice this in the case of the
ordinary prophets; Scripture says expressly, “In a vision I will make
myself known, in a dream I will speak to him”; the speaking is here
connected with dream, the influence and the action of the intellect is
connected with vision; comp. “In a vision I will make myself known to
him” (etvaddaʻ, hitpael of yadaʻ, “to know”), but it is not said here
that in a vision anything is heard from God. When I, therefore, met
with statements in Scripture that a prophet heard words spoken to him,
and that this took place in a vision, it occurred to me that the case
in which God appears to address the prophet seems to be the only
difference between a vision and a dream, according to the literal sense
of the Scriptural text. But it is possible to explain the passages in
which a prophet is reported to have heard in the course of a vision
words spoken to him, in the following manner: at first he has had a
vision, but subsequently he fell into a deep sleep, and the vision was
changed into a dream. Thus we explained the words, “And a deep sleep
fell upon Abram” (Gen. xv. 12); and our Sages remark thereon, “This was
a deep sleep of prophecy.” According to this explanation, it is only in
a dream that the prophet can hear words addressed to him; it makes no
difference in what manner words are spoken. Scripture supports this
theory, “In a dream I will speak to him.” But in a prophetic vision
only allegories are perceived, or rational truths are obtained, that
lead to some knowledge in science, such as can be arrived at by
reasoning. This is the meaning of the words, “In a vision I will make
myself known unto him.” According to this second explanation, the
degrees of prophecy are reduced to eight, the highest of them being the
prophetic vision, including all kinds of vision, even the case in which
a man appears to address the prophet, as has been mentioned. You will
perhaps ask this question: among the different degrees of prophecy
there is one in which prophets, e.g., Isaiah, Micaiah, appear to hear
God addressing them; how can this be reconciled with the principle that
all prophets are prophetically addressed through an angel, except Moses
our Teacher, in reference to whom Scripture says, “Mouth to mouth I
speak to him” (Num. xii. 8)? I answer, this is really the case, the
medium here being the imaginative faculty that hears in a prophetic
dream God speaking; but Moses heard the voice addressing him “from
above the covering of the ark from between the two cherubim” (Exod.
xxv. 22) without the medium of the imaginative faculty. In Mishne-torah
we have given the characteristics of this kind of prophecy, and
explained the meaning of the phrases, “Mouth to mouth I speak to him”;
“As man speaketh to his neighbour” (Exod. xxxiii. 11), and the like.
Study it there, and I need not repeat what has already been said.
CHAPTER XLVI
One individual may be taken as an illustration of the individuals of
the whole species. From its properties we learn those of each
individual of the species. I mean to say that the form of one account
of a prophecy illustrates all accounts of the same class. After this
remark you will understand that a person may sometimes dream that he
has gone to a certain country, married there, stayed there for some
time, and had a son, whom he gave a certain name, and who was in a
certain condition [though nothing of all this has really taken place];
so also in prophetic allegories certain objects are seen, acts
performed—if the style of the allegory demands it—things are done by
the prophet, the intervals between one act and another determined, and
journeys undertaken from one place to another; but all these things are
only processes of a prophetic vision, and not real things that could be
perceived by the senses of the body. Some of the accounts simply relate
these incidents [without premising that they are part of a vision],
because it is a well-known fact that all these accounts refer to
prophetic visions, and it was not necessary to repeat in each case a
statement to this effect.
Thus the prophet relates: “And the Lord said unto me,” and need not add
the explanation that it was in a dream. The ordinary reader believes
that the acts, journeys, questions, and answers of the prophets really
took place, and were perceived by the senses, and did not merely form
part of a prophetic vision. I will mention here an instance concerning
which no person will entertain the least doubt. I will add a few more
of the same kind, and these will show you how those passages must be
understood which I do not cite. The following passage in Ezekiel (viii.
1, 3) is clear, and admits of no doubt: “I sat in mine house, and the
elders of Judah sat before me, etc., and a spirit lifted me up between
the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the visions of God to
Jerusalem,” etc.; also the passage, “Thus I arose and went into the
plain” (iii. 2, 3), refers to a prophetic vision; just as the words,
“And he brought him forth abroad, and said, Look now toward heaven and
tell the stars, if thou be able to number them” (Gen. xv. 5) describe a
vision. The same is the case with the words of Ezekiel (xxxvii. 1),
“And set me down in the midst of the valley.” In the description of the
vision in which Ezekiel is brought to Jerusalem, we read as follows:
“And when I looked, behold a hole in the wall. Then said he unto me,
Son of man, dig now in the wall; and when I had digged in the wall,
behold a door” (ibid. viii. 7–8), etc. It was thus in a vision that he
was commanded to dig in the wall, to enter and to see what people were
doing there, and it was in the same vision that he digged, entered
through the hole, and saw certain things, as is related. Just as all
this forms part of a vision, the same may be said of the following
passages: “And thou take unto thee a tile,” etc., “and lie thou also on
thy left side,” etc.; “Take thou also wheat and barley,” etc., “and
cause it to pass over thine head and upon thy beard” (chaps, iv. and
v.) It was in a prophetic vision that he saw that he did all these
actions which he was commanded to do. God forbid to assume that God
would make his prophets appear an object of ridicule and sport in the
eyes of the ignorant, and order them to perform foolish acts. We must
also bear in mind that the command given to Ezekiel implied
disobedience to the Law, for he, being a priest, would, in causing the
razor to pass over every corner of the beard and of the head, have been
guilty of transgressing two prohibitions in each case. But it was only
done in a prophetic vision. Again, when it is said, “As my servant
Isaiah went naked and barefoot” (Isa. xx. 3), the prophet did so in a
prophetic vision. Weak-minded persons believe that the prophet relates
here what he was commanded to do, and what he actually did, and that he
describes how he was commanded to dig in a wall on the Temple mount
although he was in Babylon, and relates how he obeyed the command, for
he says, “And I digged in the wall.” But it is distinctly stated that
all this took place in a vision.
It is analogous to the description of the vision of Abraham which
begins, “The word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying” (Gen.
xv. 1); and contains at the same time the passage, “He brought him
forth abroad, and said, Look now to the heaven and count the stars”
(ibid. ver. 6). It is evident that it was in a vision that Abraham saw
himself brought forth from his place looking towards the heavens and
being told to count the stars. This is related [without repeating the
statement that it was in a vision]. The same I say in reference to the
command given to Jeremiah, to conceal the girdle in the Euphrates, and
the statement that he concealed it, examined it after a long time, and
found it rotten and spoiled (Jer. xiii. 4–7). All this was
allegorically shown in a vision; Jeremiah did not go from Palestine to
Babylon, and did not see the Euphrates. The same applies to the account
of the commandment given to Hosea (i.-iii.): “Take unto thee a wife of
whoredom, and children of whoredom,” to the birth of the children and
to the giving of names to them. All this passed in a prophetic vision.
When once stated that these are allegories, there is left no doubt that
the events related had no real existence, except in the minds of those
of whom the prophet says: “And the vision of every one was unto them
like the words of a sealed book” (Isa. xxix. 11). I believe that the
trial of Gideon (Judges vi. 21, 27) with the fleece and other things
was a vision. I do not call it a prophetic vision, as Gideon had not
reached the degree of prophets, much less that height which would
enable him to do wonders. He only rose to the height of the Judges of
Israel, and he has even been counted by our Sages among persons of
little importance, as has been pointed out by us.
The same can be said of the passage in Zechariah (xi. 7), “And I fed
the flock of slaughter,” and all the incidents that are subsequently
described; the graceful asking for wages, the acceptance of the wages,
the wanting of the money, and the casting of the same into the house of
the treasure; all these incidents form part of the vision. He received
the commandment and carried it out in a prophetic vision or dream.
The correctness of this theory cannot be doubted, and only those do not
comprehend it who do not know to distinguish between that which is
possible, and that which is impossible. The instances quoted may serve
as an illustration of other similar Scriptural passages not quoted by
me. They are all of the same kind, and in the same style. Whatever is
said in the account of a vision, that the prophet heard, went forth,
came out, said, was told, stood, sat, went up, went down, journeyed,
asked, or was asked, all is part of the prophetic vision; even when
there is a lengthened account, the details of which are well connected
as regards the time, the persons referred to, and the place. After it
has once been stated that the event described is to be understood
figuratively, it must be assumed for certain that the whole is a
prophetic vision.
CHAPTER XLVII
It is undoubtedly clear and evident that most prophecies are given in
images, for this is the characteristic of the imaginative faculty, the
organ of prophecy. We find it also necessary to say a few words on the
figures, hyperboles, and exaggerations that occur in Scripture. They
would create strange ideas if we were to take them literally without
noticing the exaggeration which they contain, or if we were to
understand them in accordance with the original meaning of the terms,
ignoring the fact that these are used figuratively. Our Sages say
distinctly Scripture uses hyperbolic or exaggerated language; and quote
as an instance, “cities walled and fortified, rising up to heaven”
(Deut. i. 28). As a hyperbole our Sages quote, “For the bird of heaven
carries the voice” (Eccles. x. 20); in the same sense it is said,
“Whose height is like that of cedar trees” (Amos ii. 9). Instances of
this kind are frequent in the language of all prophets; what they say
is frequently hyperbolic or exaggerated, and not precise or exact. What
Scripture says about Og, “Behold, his bedstead was an iron bedstead,
nine cubits its length,” etc. (Deut.), does not belong to this class of
figures, for the bedstead (eres, comp. arsenu, Song of Sol. i. 16) is
never exactly of the same dimensions as the person using it; it is not
like a dress that fits round the body; it is always greater than the
person that sleeps therein; as a rule, it is by a third longer. If,
therefore, the bed of Og was nine cubits in length, he must, according
to this proportion, have been six cubits high, or a little more. The
words, “by the cubit of a man,” mean, by the measure of an ordinary
man, and not by the measure of Og; for men have the limbs in a certain
proportion. Scripture thus tells us that Og was double as long as an
ordinary person, or a little less. This is undoubtedly an exceptional
height among men, but not quite impossible. As regards the Scriptural
statement about the length of man’s life in those days, I say that only
the persons named lived so long, whilst other people enjoyed the
ordinary length of life. The men named were exceptions, either in
consequence of different causes, as e.g., their food or mode of living,
or by way of miracle, which admits of no analogy.
We must further discuss the figurative language employed in Scripture.
In some cases this is clear and evident, and doubted by no person;
e.g., “The mountains and hills shall break forth in song before you,
and all the trees of the wood clap their hands” (Isa. lv. 12); this is
evidently figurative language; also the following passage—“The
fir-trees rejoice at thee,” etc. (ibid. xiv. 8), which is rendered by
Jonathan, son of Uzziel, “The rulers rejoice at thee, who are rich in
possessions.” This figure is similar to that used in the phrase,
“Butter of kine and milk of sheep,” etc. (Deut. xxxii. 14).
And these figures are very frequent in the books of the prophets. Some
are easily recognised by the ordinary reader as figures, others with
some difficulty. Thus nobody doubts that the blessing, “May the Lord
open to thee his good treasure, the heavens,” must be taken
figuratively; for God has no treasure in which He keeps the rain. The
same is the case with the following passage—“He opened the doors of
heaven, he rained upon them manna to eat” (Ps. lxxviii. 23, 24). No
person assumes that there is a door or gate in heaven, but every one
understands that this is a simile and a figurative expression. In the
same way must be understood the following passages—“The heavens were
opened” (Ezek. i. 1); “If not, blot me out from thy book which thou
hast written” (Exod. xxxii. 32); “I will blot him out from the book of
life” (ibid. ver. 33). All these phrases are figurative; and we must
not assume that God has a book in which He writes, or from which He
blots out, as those generally believe that do not find figurative
speech in these passages. They are all of the same kind. You must
explain passages not quoted by me by those which I have quoted in this
chapter. Employ your reason, and you will be able to discern what is
said allegorically, figuratively, or hyperbolically, and what is meant
literally, exactly according to the original meaning of the words. You
will then understand all prophecies, learn and retain rational
principles of faith, pleasing in the eyes of God who is most pleased
with truth, and most displeased with falsehood; your mind and heart
will not be so perplexed as to believe or accept as law what is untrue
or improbable, whilst the Law is perfectly true when properly
understood. Thus Scripture says, “Thy testimonies are righteousness for
ever” (Ps. cxix. 144); and “I the Lord speak righteousness” (Isa. xlv.
19). If you adopt this method, you will not imagine the existence of
things which God has not created, or accept principles which might
partly lead to atheism, or to a corruption of your notions of God so as
to ascribe to Him corporeality, attributes, or emotions, as has been
shown by us, nor will you believe that the words of the prophets are
false; for the cause of this disease is ignorance of what we have
explained. These things belong likewise to the mysteries of the Law;
and although we have treated them in a general manner, they can easily
be understood in all their details in accordance with the above
remarks.
CHAPTER XLVIII
It is clear that everything produced must have an immediate cause which
produced it; that cause again a cause, and so on, till the First Cause,
viz., the will and decree of God is reached. The prophets therefore
omit sometimes the intermediate causes, and ascribe the production of
an individual thing directly to God, saying that God has made it. This
method is well known, and we, as well as others of those who seek the
truth, have explained it; it is the belief of our co-religionists.
After having heard this remark, listen to what I will explain in this
chapter; direct your special attention to it more than you have done to
the other chapters of this part. It is this: As regards the immediate
causes of things produced, it makes no difference whether these causes
consist in substances, physical properties, freewill, or chance—by
freewill I mean that of man—or even in the will of another living
being. The prophets [omit them and] ascribe the production directly to
God and use such phrases as, God has done it, commanded it, or said it;
in all such cases the verbs “to say,” “to speak,” “to command,” “to
call,” and “to send” are employed. What I desired to state in this
chapter is this: According to the hypothesis and theory accepted, it is
God that gave will to dumb animals, freewill to the human being, and
natural properties to everything; and as accidents originate in the
redundancy of some natural force, as has been explained [by Aristotle],
and are mostly the result of the combined action of nature, desire, and
freewill: it can consequently be said of everything which is produced
by any of these causes, that God commanded that it should be made, or
said that it should be so. I will give you instances, and they will
guide you in the interpretation of passages which I do not mention. As
regards phenomena produced regularly by natural causes, such as the
melting of the snow when the atmosphere becomes warm, the roaring of
the sea when a storm rages [I quote the following passages], “He
sendeth his word and melteth them” (Ps. cxlvii. 18); “And he saith, and
a storm-wind riseth, and lifteth up its waves” (ibid. cvii. 25). In
reference to the rain we read: “I will command the clouds that they
shall not rain,” etc. (Isa. v. 6). Events caused by man’s freewill,
such as war, the dominion of one nation over another, the attempt of
one person to hurt another, or to insult him, [are ascribed to God, as]
e.g., in reference to the dominion of Nebuchadnezzar and his host, “I
have commended my holy ones, also I have called my heroes for my anger”
(Isa. xiii. 3); and “I will send him against a hypocrite nation” (ibid.
x. 6); in reference to Shimei, son of Gera, “For God said to him, Curse
David” (2 Sam. xvi. 10); in reference to the deliverance of Joseph, the
righteous, from prison, “He sent an angel and loosed him” (Ps. cv. 20);
in reference to the victory of the Persians over the Chaldees, “I will
send to Babylon scatterers, and they shall scatter it” (Jer. li. 2); in
reference to the providing of food to Eliah, “I have commanded there a
woman, a widow, to maintain thee” (1 Kings xvii. 9); and Joseph, the
righteous, says: “Not ye have sent me hither,” etc. (Gen. xlv. 8). The
case that the will of an animal or its desire for some of its natural
wants is the cause of some event, may be illustrated by the following
instance: “And God spake unto the fish, and it vomited out Jonah” (ii.
11). The act is ascribed to God, because He gave the fish the will, and
not because He made it a prophet or endowed it with a prophetical
spirit. Similarly it is said of the locusts that appeared in the days
of Joel, son of Pethuel, “Mighty is he that accomplishes his word”
(Joel ii. 11); or of the beasts that took possession of the land of
Edom when destroyed in the days of Sennacherib, “He cast lot for them,
and his hand divided it unto them by a line” (Isa. xxxiv. 17). Although
here the verbs “to say,” “to command,” “to send,” are not used, the
meaning is evidently the same, and you must explain all passages that
are analogous to it in a similar manner. Events evidently due to chance
are ascribed to God; e.g., in reference to Rebecca, “Let her be a wife
to the son of thy master, as the Lord spake” (Gen. xxiv. 51); in
reference to David and Jonathan, “Go, for the Lord has sent thee.” (1
Sam. xx. 22); in reference to Joseph, “God sent me before you” (Gen.
xlv. 7). You see clearly that the providing of a cause, in whatever
manner this may take place, by substance, accident, freewill, or will,
is always expressed by one of the five terms, commanding, saying,
speaking, sending, or calling. Note this, and apply it everywhere
according to the context. Many difficulties will thereby be removed,
and passages apparently containing things far from truth will prove to
be true. This is the conclusion of the treatise on Prophecy, its
allegories and language. It is all I intend to say on this subject in
this treatise. We will now commence to treat of other subjects, with
the help of the Most High.